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Section 1: Outline and methods !
1.1 Summary of Thesis 
Despite the global trend of trade union decline, the Global Union Federations (GUFs) have 
shown remarkable durability. They have, since their creation, struggled with the enormous 
barriers to organising international solidarity action including the inherent difficulties of 
building solidaristic ties between diverse groups of workers and the costs of international 
campaigning against Multinational Companies (MNCs). Despite increasingly severe 
resource limitations, the GUFs have secured large international memberships, particularly 
from developing countries, principally because of the unique opportunities they provide for 
international solidaristic and industrial activity. 
The traditional ‘counter-power’ argument for international trade union organisation is 
that it provides an organised challenge to the internationalisation of capital. As early as the 
1920s, Edo Fimmen, the then General Secretary of the International Transport Workers’ 
Federation (ITF), in his seminal book Labour’s Alternative: the United States of Europe or 
Europe Limited (1924), argued that global unions are a necessary response by labour to 
the internationalisation of capital and growth of European companies and monopolies. 
Fimmen’s work looks at the economic causes of World War II, principally the fight for 
control over raw materials after a period of rapid industrialization, and the subsequent 
challenges facing the working and capitalist classes. Fimmen predicts the development of 
‘concerns’ (business which fuses diversified branches of production and controls under 
one management) and then vertical (same production process) and horizontal (same 
industry) ‘combines’ or cartels that consolidate capital in order to reduce risk and eliminate 
competition. This ‘mingling’ of capital, he argues, has led to a mingling of interests 
between entrepreneurs from different countries bringing with it a potential for a ‘world-wide 
monopoly’ (Fimmen, 1924: 58).  
Fimmen’s argument is simple; that the growing international division of labour means 
that local industrial action is weakened because work can be significantly redistributed 
internationally. Trade union organisation therefore requires international organisation to 
coordinate worker unity and strategy, sufficient to act as a counter power for ‘successful 
combat’. 
This vision of global unions was developed further in the 1980s and 1990s by the 
leadership of the GUFs. Chip Levinson, ICEF General Secretary in the 1980s, and Vic 
Thorpe, the ICEM General Secretary in the 1990s to 2000s, both produced important 
!10
books on this theme, Vodka-Cola (1978) and Power and Counterpower: The union 
response to Global Capital (1996). These books are surprisingly contemporary, outlining 
the international concentration of capital and predicting a global decline in wages and the 
increased exploitation of working people. They both predicted the results of economic 
globalisation as splitting the working world into two economies, formal and informal, with a 
decline in union organisation. As a result, both writers argued for a re-orientation of trade 
unions towards an organising and collective bargaining agenda organised at international 
level. 
These three GUF leaders offer a critical and political analysis of the growth of MNCs, 
concentration of capital, increased insecurity of investment and decline in state regulation, 
themes now mainstream within the popular inequalities literature (Stiglitz, 2013). But these 
are also trade unionists who understood profoundly the potential of galvanising still strong 
Western European and North American affiliates to establish international bargaining with 
employers, laying the foundation for three decades of global networking across MNCs and 
sectors, a model that still dominates the work of the GUFs. 
These economic conditions have created a demand for the work of the GUFs, 
particularly from affiliates in countries where national regulatory power is weak. 
Additionally, the GUFs provide affiliates in Western Europe and North America with 
increased access and scope to work internationally, including international regulatory 
mechanisms such as International Framework Agreements (IFAs) and long term union 
building programmes in developing and transition economies. This provides affiliates with 
important industrial relations gains, including leverage with MNCs, information and 
networking with unions in the same sectors and companies. The multilateral structure of 
the GUFs provides national unions with an important source of legitimacy, as the 
geographical and sectoral scope of GUF membership provides affiliates with 
unprecedented access to international partners, significantly beyond their capacity as 
individual unions.  
Currently this resource is valuable enough to key affiliates in Western Europe, North 
America and Japan to warrant their continued financial contribution to the GUFs, 
something which represents the greatest part of GUF income. However, as will be argued 
in this context statement, GUF legitimacy in some key regions and sectors is likely to 
reduce, threatening the long term capacity of the GUFs to coordinate international 
solidarity. Future trends in international capital, geopolitical developments, changes in the 
employment relationship, and decline in national trade union movements will lead to a 
decline in GUF leverage in relation to both employers and future workers. This then raises 
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questions about the organisational changes required to build GUF capacity in a context of 
declining financial resources. The priority is inevitably therefore to develop strategies that 
are adaptive to these future trends while at the same time building on the GUFs’ capacities 
and unique solidaristic value to existing and future trade union memberships.  
This context statement takes a broad perspective on the basis of GUF legitimacy and 
capacity. Firstly it is proposed that GUF legitimacy does not rest entirely on either 
membership size and geographic scope or international agreements with MNCs; instead it 
will be argued that increasingly the GUFs’ political proposals and activities will be 
necessary to secure their continued legitimacy. Secondly, it will be argued that GUF 
legitimacy is based on their capacities to build the social and political capital required to 
sustain international solidarity across increasingly diverse groups and networks of working 
people. In Section 4 it will be argued that the resources available to the GUFs to build this 
social and political capital are their educational activities, using an emancipatory model 
based on the work of Paulo Freire (1970), activities which are still considered marginal by 
the GUFs. 
The strategic advantage of using an emancipatory education model is that it allows a 
deeper and broader exchange between trade union organisations and individual activists. 
This is important not just in developing social capital in changing societal and workplace 
settings, it also provides unions, who are often working in isolation, with ‘field enlarging’ 
strategies. Where unions have successfully developed responses to workplace issues, 
such as in the Colombian case study outlined in Section 2.4, these experiences when 
pooled and exchanged through GUF networks and activities create valuable collective 
knowledge and capacity for union building. It is additionally argued in Section 4 that 
through the use of emancipatory education methods the efficiency of those exchanges 
between individuals and groups will increase, leading to higher levels of social and political 
capital being generated.  
This model of trade unionism emphasises the capacity for mobilisation, defined as a 
way of turning association (numbers of people forming a collectivity) into organisation 
(capacity for collective action in opposition to capital and the state) (Sullivan, 2010b). It is a 
relational model of organising where trade unions create spaces where working people 
can understand societal and industrial changes taking place, build dialogue and strong 
solidaristic relationships in situations of industrial conflict that can mobilise members in a 
context of diminishing resources.  
The psychosocial (Sedgwick, 1982) basis of Freire’s model regards union building as 
essentially a project of emancipation. Emancipation is understood as a dual task of 
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addressing the external reality of oppression, as well as internal psychic oppression, 
where individual psychological empowerment, or building ego strength, is central to the 
political project of organising.  
The proposal of this thesis is to prioritise the union building work of the GUFs across all 
areas of activity as a response to the political deficit that the GUFs currently face. An 
emancipatory educational model provides a union building process that encourages both 
the development of strong solidaristic ties between workers as well as providing a space 
for dialogue that allows for the development of common ideas and strategies. That is, 
emancipatory education methods can build both the social and political capital needed for 
the GUFs to bring about real social change and developmental processes. 
Fimmen steadily reminds us that the work of global unions involves two objectives 
which, at times, are in tension: to operate within the existing economic system in order to 
negotiate the best conditions for working people but at the same time to develop 
alternatives to it. This is essentially the tension that the GUFs need now to navigate, and 
the proposal is to emphasise the development of the social and political capital that can 
shape this alternative rather than a continued strategy of adaptation to the current 
economic order. In Fimmen’s postscript he argues that ‘the most mischievous of 
illusions’ (1924: 127) is that these multinational companies offer organising potential for 
global unions because of the resistance that this organising initiative will encounter. 
Additionally he argues against a narrow view of trade unionism focused on narrow 
industrial concerns and advocates instead a model of strategic solidarity in response to the 
growth of international capital. 
In a context of declining leverage and therefore affiliation fee income, the argument of 
this context statement is that GUF activity will need to be re-calibrated towards a wider 
political project of social justice in a context of aggressive neo-liberal economic policies 
and the rise of nationalism and religious fundamentalism. In this context, the political work 
of the GUFs has to be built - not as an ideological project but rather as a developmental 
one. The central argument of this thesis, and the publications included in it, is that the 
primary value of the GUFs is that they are able to create spaces for dialogue between 
diverse interests and provide a safe environment out of which new political ideas and 
movements can start to grow. 
Further, it is argued that a refocusing on this broader political purpose should then 
dictate the techniques and strategies that they should use. That in order to create the 
democratic conditions and spaces where workers can build a political agenda, 
emancipatory education methods should be adopted and resourced as a matter of priority. 
!13
Although this approach does not offer a magic solution to the global threats to freedom of 
association, it uses the strategic advantages of the GUFs’ work to their fullest effect and 
the basis for a developmental rather than a survival strategy.  
!
1.2 Aims 
The aim of this thesis, and the individual publications within it, is principally to provide a 
realistic picture of the GUFs and to critically explore their power relative to the international 
industrial relations and political environments within which they operate. 
!
Additionally, the thesis aims to: 
• critically analyse the GUFs from different perspectives: organisational, international 
relations, global governance and developmental; 
• explore the factors impacting the future work of the GUFs with particular emphasis on 
the decline in union membership and geopolitical developments; and 
• argue for a reorientation in the work of the GUFs in response to these factors with 
particular emphasis on building social and political capital through educational work 
!
This context statement also aims to draw together the main themes and arguments 
within the publications and explore more deeply the strategic importance of the 
educational work of the GUFs in building the social and political capital required to adapt 
to this changing environment.  
!
1.3 Methods 
The publications included in this thesis are primarily based on data collected through 
participant observation by the author (Myers, 1999). The research is based on the author’s 
experience as Head of Education for the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, 
Mine and General Workers’ Unions (ICEM) during the period 1999-2007 and work with the 
International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied 
Workers’ Associations (IUF), the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) and 
ICEM as a project coordinator for educational programmes in Transition Economies during 
1995-1999. During this period the author developed and oversaw educational programmes 
in thirty-five countries in every geographical region with the exception of the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA). Programmes focused on themes such as education methods, 
collective bargaining and HIV/AIDS. She was also responsible for raising annual funding 
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and liaising with unions and donors, principally from Germany, Netherlands and 
Scandinavian countries. This work involved coordination with the other GUFs and the 
ITUC through established project coordination meetings and collaborative projects in 
Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.  
In relation to the specific case studies covered by the publications the author was 
responsible for developing these initiatives including the content of the projects, 
developing partnerships with key employers and government bodies, carrying out the 
planning and evaluation of the projects and overseeing their management.  
This experience provides an insider’s viewpoint of the GUFs, their work and the political 
dynamics at play as well as an insight into contemporary events and the attitudes of the 
actors and organisations involved (Iacono et al., 2009).  
Attempts have been made to minimise the subjectivity inherent in this model of data 
collection and analysis by the author (Darke, Shanks & Broadbent, 1998). The participant 
observations are supplemented by public and official documents and archival records, 
many of which were produced after 2007. Documents include GUF and ITUC congress 
documents, project and activity reports, online publications, presentations at seminars and 
conferences and ILO conference reports, included in the references sections of the 
individual publications. Additionally, the published works have been peer reviewed, with 
extensive reviews and responses to the Global Unions Global Business book from within 
the academic and trade union communities. All of these publications have been presented 
extensively at various forums and academic conferences.  
During the final writing process interviews and correspondence were carried out with 
existing and previous GUF staff in Industriall and IUF and  the international staff of their 
affiliates in Sweden, Nepal, Colombia, South Africa, USA, UK and Thailand. Data was 
reviewed from GUF and ITUC congress documents, project evaluations and activity 
reports from Industriall.  Additionally research was carried out using all of the GUFs’ online 
news services and research, particularly in relation to solidarity actions and work focusing 
on precarious employment. 
One of the difficulties in researching about the GUFs as organisations is their 
characteristic of exhibiting defensiveness and lack of engagement on organisational 
issues with non-affiliated unions and individuals. Although this information is easily 
available within the formal structures it is difficult for researchers to engage GUF 
leadership in critical thinking about their current work and organisations.  
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Much of the important organisational and strategic information that exists within the 
GUFs is held at local level, often through projects and project coordinators. The GUFs 
differ in how strategically they use this information with some collecting it methodically (this 
was the culture within the ITGLWF, now merged into Industriall). One of the consequences 
of undervaluing and under-resourcing the education work of the GUFs is that the valuable 
knowledge and information which surfaces during educational activity is either not 
captured or not made use of strategically. A great deal of important information is therefore 
held in project documents which the author was responsible for writing and monitoring and 
has been used throughout this thesis and the publications within it.  
Additionally at national and international level critical academic writing about trade 
unions is often not encouraged, with ‘labour friendly’ academics cautious about raising 
contentious issues for fear of losing access to insiders and valuable data. There is limited 
history of either existing staff or external researchers producing critical and analytic 
research contacts within the GUFs, with most research being purely descriptive such as 
Aidan White’s book (2008), Hans Schwass’s directory funded by the FES (2004) and most 
recently Ed Mustill’s guide to global unions produced by LabourStart (2013). There are 
some important exceptions to this in the writings of Dan Gallin, previous General Secretary 
of the IUF (Gallin, 2014) and Vic Thorpe, previous General Secretary of the ICEM (Thorpe, 
1996) who follow in the footsteps of Fimmen and Chip Levinson, the previous General 
Secretary of the ICEF, the organisation that merged with the miners to form ICEM 
(Levinson, 1978). Current critical writings about the GUFs come from a limited number of 
‘insiders’ such as Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick (previously IUF) (Cotton & Gumbrell-
McCormick, 2012; Gumbrell-McCormick, 2000a; 2000b; 2001; 2002; 2004) Peter 
Rossman, Mohammad Greenfield and Kirill Buketov from the IUF (Garver et al., 2007; 
Rossman & Greenfield, 2006), Doug Miller, previously the ITGLWF (Miller, 2004; 2005; 
Miller et al., 2000), and the author (Cotton, 2014; 2013; 2010; Cotton & Gumbrell-
McCormick, 2012; Cotton & Royle, 2014; Croucher & Cotton, 2013; 2012). 
The publications included in this thesis represent the transition from practitioner to writer 
and the development in my own ideas and my confidence in them. It was only once I 
stopped working within the GUFs that I became aware of the difficulties of critically 
examining them from within. The culture, certainly within the ICEM at that time, was a 
combative one where critical thinking was not encouraged. At times the GUFs, like many 
trade union organisations, can react defensively to threat, either internal or external, by 
shutting down open debate about the strategies and structures of the GUFs. This is 
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particularly the case in relation to financial information that is rarely analysed or debated 
openly within their structures.  
As is often the case in most trade unions, they run on a high degree of loyalty and the 
vocational motivations of staff that at times can block critical thinking and reform. This 
reality was compounded by my position within the ICEM as Head of Education, a place 
where dialogue and debate has to take place and where, often, problematic issues are 
raised. This put me in the difficult position of raising contentious issues within ICEM 
structures and meetings, while maintaining a growing volume of project work and securing 
funding annually from affiliates.  
As a woman in her twenties and thirties I was in a distinct minority within the GUFs and 
in many of the national union contexts where I was working, such that I experienced 
additional difficulties in making and holding a position in discussions. Despite being 
appointed and supported by the then General Secretary and, in the main, managing to 
establish highly collaborative relationships with colleagues, the organisational dynamics at 
play were often painful and difficult to manage.  
This relates not least to the extraordinary workloads placed on educational staff within 
the GUFs. This was already a serious problem by the time I started to work at the ICEM, 
following the early death of the previous Education Officer, Anne Browne, from cancer. 
Despite the effectiveness of education work in delivering the objectives of the GUFs, it 
continues to be greatly undervalued and issues about the unsustainable workloads of staff 
remain hidden. In interviews with Industriall staff it was suggested that ‘education’ was no 
longer a priority with a ‘new’ strategy of organising and union building following the merger 
between ICEM, ITGLWF and IMF. Although the methods, funding and local project co-
ordinators remain exactly the same as before 2007 and long term developmental projects 
carried out by each organisation continue, there has been an attempt to ‘reinvent’ 
education as organising. This underlines the lack of understanding and value attached to 
education within the GUFs and the often nonsensical debates held by the GUFs and 
affiliates about ‘new’ models of organising. Despite the evidence that union building 
methods have not radically changed in the last two decades this repackaging of education 
has been used to promote some radical political shift post-merger which has arguably not 
taken place.  
On my first day of work at the ICEM, I was gently reminded of the dilemma faced by 
activists within union organisations where tensions and impossible demands are routine by 
an experienced Swedish trade unionist. His advice was deceptively simple; it was to ‘be 
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honest’. At the time I thought this was a cultural bias but throughout my time working in the 
GUFs it proved to be a valuable strategy to attempt although, at times, an unpopular one. 
It is no coincidence that having left the ICEM in 2007 I started the process of training in 
psychotherapy and developed a deep interest in the psychology of work and mental 
health.  
As part of my process of development, I chose to co-author the first three publications. 
Although comfortable with writing, it took several years to learn the craft of writing 
academically. My first publication was written with Richard Croucher, who I had worked 
with since the mid-1990s on education projects in the former Soviet Union for the IUF and 
the ICEM, under the coordination of Labour and Society International based in the ITF 
building in London. We jointly carried out these pioneering projects taking participatory 
education methods to trade unions for the first time in the region, and went on to develop 
similar programmes in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. Richard encouraged me to 
come to work at Middlesex University and over the first six months of being back in the UK 
we wrote the Global Unions Global Business book. This was an important developmental 
process for me, learning to craft a piece of work this size and to reflect on my experience 
for the first time. 
The second publication was co-authored with Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick whose 
background includes working as Communications Director of the IUF. She wrote an 
important PhD (2001) on the ITUC (then ICFTU), which was one of the first pieces of 
writing about the global unions that I recognised as based on reality. We became friends 
and she was highly supportive in helping me establish myself and my ideas within an 
academic context. The final co-authored piece I wrote with Tony Royle whose case study 
on organising in McDonalds in Russia I had read some years before when I was working 
with the IUF in Eastern Europe. This is a brilliant case study and I wanted to create 
something this powerful based on my experience in the Colombian Mining sector.  
This was also a period where I learned to value my own experience as an ‘industry 
practitioner’ (Iacono et al., 2009) and the contribution of the experience that I bring. This 
was particularly the case with the case studies, of Anglo American and Colombian mining, 
which represent in both cases long-term fieldwork and new initiatives which form important 
developments in international trade union work. 
Although debate is an obvious part of academic development, coming from a trade 
union environment I was nervous about entering into a dialogue about my work. However, 
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my experience has been positive and I continue to be grateful for the generosity of other 
academics in responding to and building these ideas, in particular Miguel Martinez Lucio 
(Manchester Business School), Paul Gooderham (NHH) and Richard Hyman who have 
consistently taken me seriously enough to engage with my ideas and provide detailed 
comments and discussions about all of the publications in this thesis.  
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Section 2: The GUFs from different perspectives !
This Section summarises the publications that form the basis of the thesis and highlights 
their main contributions and omissions. Each of the publications represents a different 
perspective on the GUFs; organisational, international relations, global governance and 
union building.  
!
2.1 Organisational Perspective 
!
Croucher, R. & Cotton, E. (2012) Global Unions Global Business: Global Union 
Federations and International Business. Second Edition. London: Libri Publishing. 
!
This co-authored book was my first publication after leaving my position at the ICEM and 
returning to the UK to take up a part-time position at Middlesex University. The book was 
co-authored with a colleague who I had worked with for over ten years, in Central and 
Eastern Europe, both with the IUF and the ICEM. The book came out of discussions about 
the deficit of accurate literature about the GUFs, and the difficulties in getting data about 
them, particularly organisational and financial information. We also wanted to develop 
some case studies that could show the range and depth of GUF work but without 
idealising them, particularly focusing on their relationships with multinational companies. 
The book aims to be a useful guide for both trade unionists and people working in 
international employment relations with some critical thinking about their future role in the 
context of the changing employment relationship.  
The first Section of the book offers an introduction to the GUFs and the political 
challenge they face, a general overview of the economic environment in which they work, 
and a chapter on the history of the international trade union movement. Section two gives 
a detailed description of the GUFs as organisations, looking at both their financial and 
political foundations. It is followed by a chapter looking critically at their role in international 
collective bargaining and the strategic role of International Framework Agreements (IFAs) 
in building regulatory responses and relationships with multinational companies (MNCs). 
This is followed by a chapter examining company and regional networks and, in the 
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second edition, a short chapter on campaigning using the case study of the IUF’s long-
term campaign for the rights of contract workers in Unilever.  
The book is critical of the value of global networks given their high financial cost and low 
results in terms of social capital and mobilising international solidarity action over the long 
term. Despite the strategic interest of unions based in MNC headquarter countries to 
establish these networks, it is the case that once their initial funding, usually secured by 
headquarter unions and the companies themselves has been exhausted, unions from 
other countries are unwilling to cover their costs of participation in the long term. This is 
part of a general reluctance of developing country unions to pay for their participation in 
the GUFs but also represents a perceived lack of concrete benefits generated by those 
networks. In most cases it could be argued that these networks were developed from the 
top down, representing the interests of funding unions in Western Europe and North 
America.  
Section Two includes a case study of the relationship between the ICEM (now 
Industriall) and the mining company, Anglo American. This chapter was reproduced in 
Gooderham, Grogaard & Nordhaug (2013) International Management: Theory and 
Practice, providing a detailed summary of the complex network of relationships between 
international employers and the GUFs. The case study was also a useful reminder of the 
wide gap between international negotiations between GUFs and CEOs at head offices and 
the reality of implementing even small changes on the ground, in this case in Colombia 
and Ghana. The case study also highlights the often ‘technical’ and educational nature of 
initial contact between GUFs and affiliates in developing countries and also the concrete 
results that can be secured in even hostile environments with weak protections for workers 
and unions. 
Chapter seven looks in some detail at the GUFs’ education work and sets up the overall 
argument of the book, that education is a highly effective way of delivering the strategic 
objectives of the GUFs. The book provides four main arguments for concentrating GUF 
resources in their educational work, namely that resources used in this way: provide 
socialisation and confidence building for trade union activists and leaders; promote 
discursive practices and collective problem solving methods which are ideally suited for 
building union capacity internationally; use constructively the diversity and international 
experience of GUF affiliates; and stimulate democratic involvement at national and 
international levels.  
Section three is the conclusion where it is argued that in order to adapt to developments 
in the global political economy the GUFs will need to develop this educational approach, 
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operating on a ‘minilateral’ basis within the GUFs’ wider multilateral framework. 
Additionally it is argued that the GUFs should pursue funding for this work by gradually 
devolving fundraising to the regions. The book ends with a political choice for paying 
affiliates to try to overcome the conflict between the Logic of Legitimacy and the Logic of 
Resources. Without increased dues income from key affiliates in Western Europe, North 
America and to lesser extent BRIC countries, the GUFs will continue to fail in terms of the 
imbalance between the supply and demand for international solidarity. This might explain 
the dominant strategy of the GUFs, a response that is likely to be an inadequate one of 
consolidation and decline.  
The book was received well by academics and trade unionists, described as the 
‘essential guide’ to international trade unionism. The book was read by GUF staff, 
particularly in the regional structures and led to some internal debate. The organisational 
and financial data reproduced in the book made its publication the first time that there had 
been a clear outline of the difficulties that the GUFs faced. It was a difficult decision to 
publish this information, in part because of the repercussions of exposing their financial 
vulnerability. It was also unwelcome to some that we highlighted the failure of key affiliates, 
including key unions in developing regions, to address the problem of declining resources 
despite unions in some countries having increasing access to development funding and 
leverage with employers.  
There were a number of omissions in the book. These include an absence of an 
analysis of the lack of solidarity work carried out through the GUFs by unions from 
Australia, North America and Japan or of the motivations behind this failure. Although 
affiliates from these countries pay high affiliation fees, they choose to carry out the main 
bulk of their international work bilaterally, and as a result choose not to fund or strengthen 
the GUF’s union building work. Despite their continued high affiliation fees, the lack of 
union building work represents the loss of an important financial and political resource for 
the GUFs. 
A further omission of the book is a lack of analysis of the GUFs’ relationship with 
organising. The original thinking for the book was that because the GUFs are not actively 
involved in recruiting individual members, their role in organising is limited or indirect. This 
omission also reflects the difficulties in linking existing literature on national attempts to 
build organising models and debates about union renewal to the realities of the working at 
international level. For example, much of the UK literature on union renewal does not 
obviously reflect the debates at international level where there is an undisputed need for 
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unions to use all strategies available to them and a long history of ‘union building’ activities 
that draw from different educational, social and political traditions. On reflection the book 
could have make the link between education and organising more explicit, particularly in 
defending the position of emancipatory education methods as a primary tool for organising 
workers and the importance of this long standing tradition. 
The final omission of the book relates to the different models of trade unionism that are 
reflected within the GUFs and more generally within national labour movements. GUF 
affiliates represent multifaceted forms of unionism (Fairbrother & Hammer, 2005), including 
the contested affiliation of ‘self-employed’ unions such as SEWA. More importantly, the 
role of social movements and new forms of labour organisation needs to be mapped and 
understood, and explicit links to national official trade unions and the GUFs needs to be 
explored further, an issue we return to at the end of this Section. 
As a continuation of the argument contained in the book, this thesis therefore takes a 
pragmatic turn and looks at what would be the most effective use of GUF resources in the 
immediate future. 
!
2.2 International Relations Perspective 
!
Cotton, E. & Gumbrell-McCormick, R. (2012) Global Unions as imperfect multilateral 
organisations: An international relations perspective. Economic and Industrial 
Democracy 33 (4): 707-728. 
!
This article applies an international relations framework and the notion of multilateral 
organisations as a way of understanding the nature of the GUFs and how they operate. 
One of the paradoxes of the GUFs is that they are both powerful and fragile structures, 
with leverage with MNCs and recognition within international bodies such as the United 
Nations, most importantly within the ILO and global governance machinery. At the same 
time they are underfunded structures with small numbers of staff in headquarters and 
regional offices, with often weak ties to affiliates in many parts of the world. Despite this 
reality the GUFs have proved to be resilient organisations and this piece tries to 
understand why this might be the case by using an international relations framework, 
drawing on the work of John Ruggie on multilaterlism (1993) and Keohene on 
minilateralism (1986), themes raised in the book but not fully exploited. This article adds to 
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this frame by introducing Marleau’s concept of subsidiarity (2006), which is used to 
understand the relationship between the GUFs and individual affiliates.  
The central argument of the article is that GUF structures are a form of ‘imperfect 
multilateralism’ which involves both having multilateral structures but also ‘minilateral’ 
methods of working in order to build close solidaristic relationships between trade unionists 
and their organisations. Minilateral methods, principally through the use of educational 
methods and programmes, serve to strengthen affiliates’ engagement and investment in 
the GUFs and their relationships with other affiliates globally. It is this combination of 
providing a multilateral frame, recognised by employers and states, and minilateral ways of 
working. This is what is described as ‘imperfect multilateralism’, which can withstand major 
organisational problems such as a weak financial base. 
 In order to see this imperfect multilateralism more clearly the article uses Marleau’s 
concept of subsidiarity (2006). Subsidiarity is where the multilateral structure - in this case 
the GUF secretariat and executive structures - are setup so that they provide an 
‘articulating device’ between individual unions and regions. As such, the main drivers of 
the GUFs are their regional affiliates with the secretariats carrying out important 
interlocution with other international and multilateral structures.  
This model of multilateral organisation is also important for GUF internal democracy, 
providing a fair mechanism for decision-making and the redistribution of resources 
between affiliates. Because the financial contribution of a small number of unions is so 
great, it is important that the resources - including political ones - are distributed via formal 
decision-making structures. It is the regional members that, in the main, determine the 
priorities for GUF action and where, therefore, funds are directed. The article suggests 
that, given the resource deficits faced by the GUFs, there may well be conflict over 
‘orientation of action’ between affiliates such that this capacity to make democratic 
decisions about where resources are concentrated is an important factor in GUF durability.  
Additionally, the multilateral nature of GUF structures helps to counteract the tendency 
within regions to look inwards and focus on local rather than international priorities. 
Engagement with unions through the GUFs encourages genuine international exchange 
and debate, and a system of global governance for trade unions to carry out solidaristic 
work on broad issues such as precarious work. 
The willingness of affiliates to participate in the structures and work of the GUFs is 
developed through minilateral methods, principally through the use of educational 
programmes. The article argues that the GUFs, therefore, represent an imperfect 
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multilateralism where small-group relationships are an important factor in the capacity of 
the GUFs to carry out international solidarity action within large group and multilateral 
structures.  
One area that we might have explored further in the article is the link between the 
Global and the European federations. The GUFs had a diverse and sometimes difficult 
relationship between the European and international federations with some, notably the 
ITF and IUF, having to manage conflictual territory issues with totally independent 
European bodies, triggered by the formation of a separate European Trade Union 
Congress (ETUC) in the 1970s (Gallin, 2014). The relationships between the GUFs and 
European Federations are not highly developed, with often ‘separatist’ European 
federations, leaving one retired GUF General Secretary to describe their political 
orientation as akin to “a grubby little club of European nationalists” (Gallin, 2014: 23). A 
key reason why the formal European structures matter is money with the European 
affiliates providing the financial stability within the internationals and project funding for 
developing country affiliates.  
However, the contribution of the paper is that it places the much under-researched area 
of the GUFs within an international relations framework and provides a relatively 
sophisticated analysis of how they function. There continues to be a deficit of theorising 
about the GUFs that compounds the often Eurocentric focus of much of the academic 
writing about them. 
!
2.3 Global Governance Perspective 
!
Cotton, E. (2014) Transnational regulation of temporary agency work: Compromised 
partnership between Private Employment Agencies and Global Union Federations. 
Work, Employment and Society. DOI: 10.1177/0950017014545265 
!
This article uses global governance theory to critically explore the potential for the GUFs to 
contribute to the regulation of temporary agency work (TAW). Using the concept of 
transnational private labour regulation (TPLR), the central proposition is that there are 
immediate entry points for the GUFs to establish dialogue with private employment 
agencies (PrEAs), the largest ten companies representing 30 per cent of the TAW market.  
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The first part of the article tries to understand why, despite several years of contact, there 
has been a failure to reach agreement between the GUFs and PrEAs. The article then 
makes three pragmatic regulatory proposals on the basis of existing GUF TPLR 
mechanisms. The first approach is to establish an industry standard based on the shipping 
industry’s Flags of Convenience initiative. The second approach centres on negotiating an 
International Framework Agreement (IFA), and monitoring mechanism. The third approach 
is to establish multi-sectoral dialogue with the GUFs facilitated by the Council of Global 
Unions, making use of the newly created Global Union Principles on Temporary Work 
Agencies. These three approaches are not mutually exclusive but their relative strengths 
are analysed. 
The paper asks the practical question of whether GUFs could use the existing 
framework to make inroads into regulating precarious work as a field enlarging strategy for 
the GUFs. The size of both the GUFs and the ten top PrEAs is a major strategic 
opportunity. The argument is not that any of the TPLR mechanisms are a substitute for 
organising or that they offer a magic solution to the increase of precarious work. However, 
it does argue that there are important distributive and political gains to both sides to extend 
existing TPLR mechanisms to cover temporary agency work. Despite the massive political 
compromise this would represent for the GUFs, it does not contradict their regulatory 
approach to MNCs and establishes trade unions as a legitimate interlocutor for agency 
workers, something they are currently unable to do on the basis of membership. 
The criticism of this approach taken on its own is that it does not lead to change at the 
level of the worker, rather ‘bargaining without bargaining power is a theatre of make 
believe, not a strategy of struggle’ (Gallin, 2014:143). This relates to the well-researched 
problem of implementation of global agreements secured through international bodies, 
compounded by the general lack of union organisation for temporary agency workers. 
Although a legitimate criticism of using TPLR, it is also the case that one of the 
advantages of securing TPLR mechanisms through the GUFs is that it can give some 
national unions entry points into dialogue with employers that they would not otherwise 
have. Although TPLR is an elite based model of regulation in that it is negotiated 
principally at international level without GUF affiliates’ involvement, it potentially provides 
an important human rights framework through which local dialogue and collective 
bargaining can be initiated, often for the first time.  
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The current deadlock raises important questions about how sustainable the GUFs’ 
TPLR activities are, given the apparent lack of strategic value to PrEAs, in addressing their 
CSR interests. There has been little headway in building up the content of IFAs to regulate 
global supply chains, and the only substantial international agreement for TAW is the 2012 
Volkswagen Group/Industriall Temporary Work Charter, which is unlikely to be replicated 
outside a similar, and politically dubious, set of circumstances (see Section 3.1). 
Part of the traditional argument about why IFAs exist is that they satisfy the particular 
interests arising in the institutional background of the mainly Western European 
companies that have signed them. For MNCs from these countries there is still a weak 
acceptance of social partnership with functioning trade unions, and established systems of 
dialogue and negotiations based on a framework of human rights and, often, egalitarian 
principles. The same institutional perspective can also be used to explain the attitudes of 
those MNCs that do not see any strategic advantage of dialogue with the GUFs, such as 
Coca-Cola (Gallin, 2014; Levinson, 1978) and McDonalds (Levinson, 1978; Royle, 2005). 
The predictive power of the Varieties of Capital model is much debated in the academic 
literature as to whether it adequately explains how and why minimum standards are 
established in MNCs. The model obscures the importance of the attitudes of the 
individuals involved, particularly senior leadership within MNCs and the GUFs, an 
omission reflected in this article is an important contributor to the current regulatory 
deadlock.  
The reality is that there are a small number of individuals both in the GUFs and PrEAs 
who are highly active in attempting to regulate agency work and specific reasons why they 
have failed to do so. This includes the frustration experienced by the GUFs at the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) secured through negotiations between Phil 
Jennings, General Secretary of UNI, Denis Pennel, General Secretary of CIETT and 
Annemarie Muntz, Director of Group Public Affairs of Randstad and President of 
EuroCIETT and Fred van Haasteren, CIETT President and Executive Vice President of 
Social and General Affairs of Randstad. This agreement is clearly inadequate from a GUF 
perspective and signed to meet the specific interests of the individuals involved to secure 
gains for their organisations. In the case of UNI, this directly undermines the GUFs’ own 
Principles on Temporary Agency work and with it a basis for joint GUF action.  
This paper came out of a long period of work on the issue of precarious work at the 
ICEM and a consultancy for Randstad’s Public Relations Board in 2012 about how they 
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could engage with the GUFs and establish minimum standards for TAW. This consultancy 
was organised by Annemarie Muntz and involved the General Secretary of CIETT, Denis 
Pennel. The proposals forming the basis of this paper were presented and debated with 
the board, including a critique of the CIETT/UNI MoU. Throughout this period of work, what 
has been striking for me is the lack of real understanding of why global governance 
initiatives had stalled despite the clear potential for agreement on minimum standards 
between the two groups. Although there is no reason to believe that these ideas have 
been taken up by Randstad or CIETT, it was to their credit that the problems surrounding 
the credibility of the existing CIETT/UNI MoU were openly discussed during this process. 
This paper is now somewhat out of date in relation to the recommendation for dialogue 
through the Council of Global Unions (CGU) as in 2015 is likely to be disbanded due to 
lack of coordination and lack of political will within the GUFs to maintain it.  
!
2.4 Union Building Perspective 
!
Cotton, E. & Royle, T. (2014) Transnational Organising: A Case Study of Contract 
Workers in the Colombian Mining Industry. British Journal of Industrial Relations 52 
(4): 705-724. 
!
This article is a case study examining the process of union building carried out by 
Sintracarbon, the Colombian mining union representing workers in the Carbones del 
Cerrejón coal mine, establishing dialogue with multinational employers and organisational 
renewal in this extremely hostile union environment. The use of a case study powerfully 
brings to life the realities of the educational work of the GUFs, and provides a sobering 
reminder of the long-term nature of union building.  
One of the themes of the article is subsidiarity and the ways in which inter-union 
relationships are articulated within the framework of the GUFs. What the case study 
highlights is how the authority of unions principally comes from their experience and 
capacity to act locally, in combination with their affiliation to a multilateral structure that 
offers coordination and articulation between them. Where this exchange takes place, 
within and between regions, it can be a powerful motivator for unions who are isolated and 
in decline. It is argued that unions are much more likely to adopt alternative union building 
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strategies when they are based on the experience of other unions, particularly those in the 
same sector. Further it is argued that this exchange principally takes place through GUF 
education programmes, both local and international, allowing for unprecedented dialogue 
and opportunities for strategy formulation.  
Using Weyland’s concept of a ‘viable solution’ (2008) the case study emphasises the 
important role of regional exchange and the experience of the Peruvian miners’ union in 
exploiting governmental inspection systems to increase leverage with employers and the 
contract workers. This diffusion of ideas between affiliates, facilitated through long 
standing ICEM education projects, provided an important route through the political and 
organisational deadlock that Sintracarbon was in. It enabled Sintracarbon to be highly 
strategic in that it did not attempt to organise contract workers until it had established a 
system of tripartite inspections of contractors within the mine and had managed to re-start 
negotiations with Cerrejón management, including issues of wages and conditions for 
contract workers ultimately secured into their collective bargaining agreement. It was only 
in the very last stage of activity that Sintracarbon leadership started to organise within 
certain contractors, due to concerns about not exposing contract workers to victimization.  
The article also underlines the significance of linking union organising to the local 
community and broader social justice issues. The argument uses Wever’s (1998) concept 
of ‘field enlarging strategies’ of unions in response to the growth of externalised labour in 
the USA and the need to organise precarious workers. Strategies include organising 
around social problems such as housing, health and education, and focusing on social 
justice issues in campaigns. The approach taken by Sintracarbon was essentially 
community based in that the argument for organising contract workers used to persuade 
their own members of the need to organise and subsequently with management was that 
their treatment was unfair. This represented an organising strategy within a broader social 
campaign about inequality and unfair treatment of workers and their families within the 
mining community. 
This article goes into detail about the long-standing educational work of the ICEM in 
Colombia that allows us to understand the unexpected successes of Sintracarbon in 
organising contract workers in this hostile environment. An important aspect of the 
educational work in Colombia worth noting is the apparently ‘technical’ and apolitical 
content of the projects. The ICEM’s work started with a technical health and safety project 
in the mining sector which, although an important issue for miners, was regarded by union 
leadership as a potentially pointless exercise given the level of threat and political 
pressure the unions were under from paramilitary and guerrilla groups. The second phase 
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of the project work then focused on training local representatives on education methods 
where again the question was raised about whether this was a priority in a situation of 
crisis, however, ultimately gaining local support because it provided resources and spaces 
where trade unions could safely meet. Following many years of education methods and 
basic union education, the ICEM’s project turned to the issue of modernisation and 
recruiting members. Something that had been consistently missed in the drama of working 
with unions under threat and an issue not openly discussed within the unions was that 
they had totally ceased to recruit new members. Although painful for the participants and 
ICEM staff involved, this part of the education work allowed the Colombian unions to 
articulate questions and debate the future of their organisations. The issue of priorities 
arose again when the ICEM started to carry out research on contract labour, which was at 
that time not considered a priority or a union organising issue. The final phase of the 
project focusing on social dialogue was seen, by some, as a decision of extreme political 
naivety given that collective bargaining had totally ceased and relations with employers 
were virtually non-existent.  
The use of technical training is twofold. Firstly it builds union ‘expertise’, an important 
motivator for union membership and organising. In the case of HSE this is strategically 
very important to Sintracarbon members and Cerrejón workers. HSE is a genuine issue in 
mining and there is a clear link between HSE and the use of contractors, as well as a link 
between HSE and social justice within the wider community. As a result of the ICEM’s 
Global Health and Safety Project, Sintracarbon was able to develop genuine expertise and 
therefore leverage with management. Additionally, as Cerrejón management has direct 
legal responsibility for HSE for all workers, including contractors, working in the mine it 
provides leverage to Sintracarbon’s argument about their responsibilities to contact 
workers. This expertise is also based on the information that is uncovered through 
research, either formal or informal, during educational activities. There are different ways 
of using research - what Culpepper (2002) calls the ‘logic of information’ and the ‘logic of 
exchange’ where there is a difference in the level of active use of experience and 
information or ‘dialogic capacity’ (Culpepper, 2002: 778), both of which are adopted in this 
case study. Information, often not accessed by employers and academics, is a powerful 
resource in building union strategies.  
Secondly, ‘technical’ education allows the introduction of emancipatory methods into 
settings that do not encourage dialogue and where political differences are difficult to work 
with. What is often not made explicit within trade union education is that the methods 
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themselves have an important political aim, which is to establish dialogue between 
participants and, as in the case of the Colombian Social Dialogue project, with employers. 
The methods are based on a dialogic model that allows for a high level of consciousness 
raising and collective problem solving, which are conceived of as intrinsically democratic 
and therefore political. In discussions with the leadership of Sintracarbon, many of whom 
have participated in all of the ICEM’s projects over a ten year period, the unions were in 
the 1990s heavily ideologically led causing them to be suspicious of the ICEM (previously 
the Miners International Federation) and its politics. It is the case that Colombian unions 
would never have taken part in a project with a GUF, who at early stages were regarded as 
agents of neo-liberalism, which explicitly aimed to politically educate Colombian activists. 
By focusing on technical content such as HSE and education methods, dialogue was 
established quickly without major political buy-in or ideological conflict between 
participants. 
In part because of the long-term nature of this educational approach, it enabled 
Sintracarbon to build high levels of social capital internally as well as with the broader 
mining community. Dense networks already exist within the Cerrejón mine, characteristic 
within mining communities in part because of the inherently dangerous nature of the work 
making miners reliant on good working relationships among themselves and with 
management. The inevitable environmental impact on the wider community of mining 
operations can work to instil norms of solidarity and generalised norms of reciprocity within 
communities. However, it is important not to romanticise the quality of relationships, 
particularly between trade unionists that routinely face threats and violence. Often they are 
working in isolation and have little opportunity for establishing dialogue with other trade 
unionists or community activists and civic actors.  
This is an aspect of the educational work that needed to be underlined, that it provides 
spaces outside of official trade union structures for difficult discussions to safely take 
place. This capacity to establish and maintain ‘transitional’ spaces such as these should 
not be underestimated, particularly in hostile union environments where trade unions have 
a tendency to fall into defensive modalities. This often leads to the stifling of debate and 
avoidance of important strategic issues such as union decline. In the Colombian context, 
there is the additional problem of the security of trade unionists such that internal flights 
are the only safe mode of transport, a cost beyond the Colombian trade unions. As a result 
the budgets of GUF education projects allow trade unionists to meet safely in a literal 
sense. 
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Education work not only deepened relationships, but also widened them to include 
previously unorganised contract workers representing 50 per cent of the working 
population. This combination of widening and deepening interpersonal relations increases 
the strategic capacity of Sintracarbon as well as its legitimacy with the managers of the 
mine. This is reflected in the resilience of the membership organised in contractors and 
Sintracarbon’s continued commitment to organising contract workers in the mine. Although 
the union Sotrans has been unable to successfully gain union recognition two new unions 
in Blasquigmar and Sepecol have been created in 2014 with 120 and 130 new members 
respectively.  
Section 3: GUF Capacity !
Although the GUFs continue to be the largest membership organisations in the world 
outside of religious groups, their significance at international level is not well recognised. 
Much of the academic literature that does exist tends to provide unrealistic analyses of 
their capacity (Hyman, 1997), usually focusing on just one aspect of their work, that of 
securing IFAs and negotiating with MNCs. Although this is an important part of their work, 
it does not reflect their union building activities that, it will be argued in this Section, 
represent a future basis for GUF legitimacy.  
Although the working class has grown on a world scale (Martinez Lucio, 2010), the 
GUFs have always had to aggregate and prioritise a huge diversity of interests. This raises 
an important question of GUF legitimacy, usefully framed by Hyman (1997), which looks at 
whose interests the GUFs represent. Hyman identifies four categories of interests: the 
‘bread and butter’ issues of wages and conditions; workplace rights/security/career 
opportunities; issues of political economy such as welfare and social wages; and finally 
community and environmental issues looking more broadly at society and social justice.  
Changes in existing and potential union membership should over time be reflected in 
changes in union priorities. However, it is important not to underestimate that what are 
often presented as general interests have traditionally been shaped by the particular 
interests of ‘relatively advantaged sections’ (Hyman, 1997: 517) of membership. This is 
particularly the case with the industrial sector GUFs where the interests of key paying 
affiliates in Western Europe and North America have been reflected in the priority given to 
international negotiations and IFAs with MNCs headquartered in these countries. This set 
of interests can be contrasted to the interests of developing country membership - more 
attuned to broader social justice and political economy issues such as informal work and 
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living wages. Also the changing priorities of mainly non-unionised workers in OECD 
counties, concerned with precarious work and welfare reform. 
In addition to the question of whose interests take priority within the GUFs, there is a 
question about the GUF’s capacity to promote these interests. Another way of framing this 
is to ask where GUF capacity lies in the future with rapidly changing geopolitical, 
employment relations and economic developments. Using Gumbrell-McCormick and 
Hyman’s framework for analysing union power (Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman, 2013) this 
next Section analyses GUF leverage using four criteria; institutional, structural, 
associational, and organisational. I have used the terminology of ‘union building’ to replace 
‘organisational’ to allow for some consistency throughout this thesis but the meaning 
remains true to the original framework.  
!
3.1 Institutional Power 
!
Counter-power to Capital 
The GUFs’ capacity to establish international regulation and participate in international 
dialogue with employers and states has traditionally been framed within the broader 
argument for the creation of international trade unions in order to build ‘counter-power’ to 
the growing internationalisation of capital. 
The ‘counter-power’ argument for international sectoral trade union organisation was 
presented by Edo Fimmen in 1924 and remains an important focus for the GUFs in the 
1980s and 1990s. The central argument, re-presented in the writings of Charles Levinson 
(1978) and Vic Thorpe (1996), is that the GUFs and their attempts at international 
collective bargaining are a necessary response to the growth of MNCs and the 
internationalisation of capital.  
As early as 1924, Fimmen predicts the development of ‘concerns’ (business which 
fuses diversified branches of production and controls under one management) and then 
vertical (same production process) and horizontal (same industry) ‘combines’ or cartels 
who are able to operate internationally as precursors to MNCs. This ‘emigration’ (Fimmen, 
1924: 57) of capital was starting to create a redistribution of industrial wealth and power 
within Europe, with companies consolidating in order to reduce risk and eliminate 
competition. 
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The power of MNCs continued to rise quickly during the 1980s shaped by the current 
neoliberal economic globalisation, trends which have intensified since the 2008 economic 
crisis (Peters, 2011). Multinational companies continue to expand their financial interests, 
in particular the growth of State Owned Transnational Corporations (SO-TNCs), shown in 
Table 1. 
!
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Table 1: Top 15 State-Owned TNCs, 2012 
!
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2014). 
!
!
SO-TNC Headquarter 
Country
Sector Foreign  
Employees
Total Global 
Employees
Volkswagen 
Group
Germany Auto 296,000 533,469
Deutsche  
Telecom AG
Germany Telecoms 113,502 232,342
GDF Suez France Utilities 110,308 219,330
General Motors 
Company
USA Auto 108,000 213,000
Orange SA France Telecoms 65,492 170,531
Eni SpA Italy Utilities 30,412 154,730
Airbus Group France Aircraft 88,258 140,405
CITIC Group China Diversified 30,806 140,028
COSCO  China Transport & 
Storage
7,355 130,000
Vale SA Brazil Metal Mining 15,680 85,305
Eni SpA Italy Oil & Gas 51,034 77,838
Petronas Malaysia Oil & Gas 8,653 43,266
Vattentall AB Sweden Utilities 23,864 32,794
Statoil ASA Norway Oil & Gas 2,842 23,028
!35
!!!
As with all MNCs, the significance of SO-TNCs relates to their financial size rather than 
their role as employers. As Table 1 highlights, companies of this size outsource many 
labour functions, which is reflected in the relatively small number of direct employees, both 
in headquarter countries and internationally.  
Further, MNCs have been concentrated through strategic mergers and acquisitions 
since the late 1980s to the present day. 
!
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Table 2: Largest Cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions (value of transactions), 2014 
!
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2014). 
!
Acquirer Name Headquarter 
Country
Target  
Company
Headquarter 
Country
Value of 
transaction 
($ millions)
Pfizer USA AstraZenica UK 106,863
Holcim Switzerland Lafarge France 25,909
Actavis Ireland Forest 
Laboratories
US 25,110
General Electric USA Alstorm-Energy 
SA
France 17,124
Novartis AG Switzerland GSK-Oncology UK 16,000
Kotobuti Reality Co Japan Beam USA 13,933
Vodaphone Group UK Grupo  
Corporativo
Spain 10,025
Porsche Automobil 
(Volkswagen AG)
Germany Scania Sweden 9,162
GlaxoSmithKline UK Novartis-
Vaccines
Switzerland 7,102
LetterOne Holdings 
(L1 Energy)
Luxemburg RWE Dea AG Germany 7,099
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Mergers and Acquisitions have a significant and direct impact on jobs, with 7 per cent of 
all global job losses 2002-2007 attributed to mergers and acquisitions (Peters, 2011) in 
addition to the loss of ‘good-paying’ jobs in favour of more precarious employment 
(Brewster et al., 2008) through outsourcing and contracting out (shown in Table 2). 
Although only a small percentage of people work directly for MNCs they influence the 
employment relationship indirectly through their control of global supply chains, as 
principal users of private employment agencies and their financial and political influence 
on national institutions and labour regulation. As a result MNCs continue to be a major 
focus of interest to trade unions and the GUFs, which is reflected in the structures of the 
GUFs and in the priority given by them to their international regulatory work.  
Despite political diversity among the GUFs, all seek dialogue with employers and use 
campaigning and global agreements to build their leverage with them. The political 
difference between, for example, the IUF which takes a more combative approach to 
relations with MNCs and Industriall, may well be explained by the industrial strategies of 
the MNCs in their sectors. Although there are companies in all sectors that do not 
recognise trade unions or GUFs, clearly the particularly anti-union bias of companies such 
as Unilever, Coca-Cola (Garver et al., 2007), Nestlé (Garver et al., 2007; Greenfield, 2006) 
and McDonalds (Royle, 2005) will impact the IUF’s attitudes and strategies towards them. 
However all of the GUFs seek dialogue with MNCs and, where possible, attempt to secure 
trade union and basic rights for their affiliates. 
Currently, the GUFs carry out their regulatory work in a number of ways, including their 
participation in international dialogue, significantly through the ILO and the OECD, and 
negotiating international agreements with employers that enshrine these international 
standards such as International Framework Agreements (IFAs). 
!
Multilateral structures 
An important reason why GUFs are able to act as interlocutors with MNCs is that they are 
multilateral structures, ones which coordinate relations between three or more states on 
the basis of generalised principles of conduct (Ruggie, 1993). This involves the capacity to 
coordinate dialogue and develop consensus that is then articulated internationally through 
mobilization of affiliates. Because of the rapid increase in developing country affiliations for 
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all of the GUFs, they can be described as genuinely international bodies, with the potential 
to coordinate across an unparalleled section of economic activity. 
Having genuine multilateral structures allows trade unions to engage meaningfully on 
human rights and international standards. The GUFs are the vehicle through which trade 
unions are recognised as legitimate social partners by the United Nations and international 
bodies such as the ILO, OECD and the Global Compact. Having multilateral structures 
also allows trade unions to gain recognition from MNCs through their Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) and governance agendas. This function has high currency with some 
developing country trade unions where leverage with multinational employers at national 
level is weak.  
This multilateral structure in part explains the high strategic capacity of the GUFs 
because it provides an important ‘dialectic’ (Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman, 2013) 
between unions. The GUFs are structures that are uniquely able to facilitate dialogue and 
exchange between trade unions, a powerful resource for trade unions to develop new 
strategies and share information about international employers that can be used to 
increase their leverage at national level.  
This multilateral structure also accounts for the durability of the GUFs in that they are 
highly ‘elastic’ structures, based on fundamental principles that allow for both diverse 
memberships and adaptability in the face of changing economic and political 
environments.  
!
Subsidiarity 
GUFs also operate according to an organisational principle of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is a 
weak form of confederation where the GUF structures take a central coordination role but 
where political power is retained at national and, more loosely, at regional levels. Under 
this model the GUFs operate as an ‘articulating device’ between unions internationally 
where the political and mobilising capacity is retained at the level of the affiliates. For the 
GUFs to function, subsidiarity requires that the international structures provide additional 
leverage with employers but also that affiliates have the capacity to exploit these additional 
gains.  
The GUF’s are organised according to the principle of subsidiarity such that they pool 
the strengths of affiliates, both in terms of collective size at international level as well as 
leverage with employers. The GUFs also emphasise national capacity building 
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programmes in order to assist weaker affiliates to exploit this international and collective 
leverage.  
!
Minilateral structures 
The GUFs are minilateral in two senses. Firstly they have smaller powerful groups at their 
core who carry out and finance a large percentage of their work. The Scandinavian, 
German and UK unions take an organisational lead as the primary funders of the GUFs, 
as well as driving much of the industrial agenda within the GUFs. The regional structures 
of the GUFs have key and dominant affiliates, principally the BRIC countries but also 
unions from countries with established trade union movements such as Ghana and unions 
from strategic sectors such as energy or ports. Additionally, some GUF affiliates are 
important because of their moral and political authority, such as unions from Iraq and 
Colombia. In the case of Western Europe affiliates from Germany and the Dutch Nordic 
countries have high authority because of the level of resources that they contribute 
through affiliation fees but also through project funding. The Scandinavian unions are the 
principal funders of the GUFs’ union building programmes and as a result have a high 
degree of authority at executive and at regional levels in developing countries. 
The GUFs are minilateral in a second sense, in relation to the methods they use to 
facilitate international solidarity an issue explored more fully in Section 4 on trade union 
education below. The methods used promote dialogue and through this the building of 
local social and political capital. This capital has a dual function of promoting local union 
building as well as contributing to the GUFs’ capacity to mobilise international solidarity 
action.  
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Transnational Private Labour Regulation (TPLR) 
Much of the regulatory work of the GUFs involves transnational private labour regulation 
(TPLR), which is regulation involving employers and employees, with the absence of the 
state. TPLR is a ‘soft’ form of regulation, which includes international agreements between 
GUFs and MNCs on the basis of fundamental principles and minimum standards. With an 
established TPLR mechanism such as International Framework Agreements (IFAs), TPLR 
has the relative advantage of being quick to secure. This is partly because such 
mechanisms are highly elastic in that they do not require either side to agree politically or 
substantively in order to reach agreement as well as the established nature of IFAs with 
over eighty signed agreements in existence.  
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The weaknesses of the GUFs’ regulatory work exist at both workplace and international 
levels. At the level of the workplace, there are widespread difficulties of implementation 
with limited trade union and management knowledge and capacity to address human 
rights issues. In very few cases MNCs have committed the resources to build local 
capacity to implement IFAs, instead carrying out the basic requirement of distributing 
agreements internationally in appropriate languages and, sometimes, funding 
communication and review activities. The capacity of the GUFs at international level to 
monitor and implement the agreements is also limited in the main because of financial 
restrictions. This results in a reactive approach with GUFs focusing resources on strategic 
points of conflict and as the number of IFAs grows, so does this problem of 
implementation. 
Further, the lack of capacity of the GUFs to secure labour regulation across supply 
chains remains a major barrier to international regulation. As outlined in Section 2.3, the 
GUFs have so far failed to use existing TPLR and international mechanisms to secure 
rights for contract and temporary agency workers. There continues to be reluctance on the 
part of MNCs to take responsibility for the governance of global supply chains and, 
because of a lack of union density, there is only limited potential for national and global 
unions to expand TPLR to include indirect employees.  
The motivations of MNCs to negotiate with the GUFs are diverse, but broadly TPLR 
comprises a part of their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policy. A recent TPLR 
development is the Bangladesh Accord, created after the Rana Plaza disaster in April 
2013. The Accord is a significant development in expanding TPLR to the supply chain, in a 
sector where multiple retail brands source garments from the same factories and industrial 
zones. The Accord, coordinated through Industriall and the Workers’ Rights Consortium 
(WRC), was signed in July 2013 with 35 brands. The Accord was based on a pre-existing 
Memorandum of Understanding signed by the ITGLWF (now merged into Industriall), the 
Dutch Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) and two MNCs, PVH and Cheebo, following the 
2012 Tazreen fire in Bangladesh where 112 garment workers died. The Accord is a more 
substantial framework, with a formal Steering Committee and inspection structure, with 
signatories funding the remedial work through subscriptions based on levels of production 
in Bangladesh. Inspections have all been carried out by three private contractors with 
corrective actions and plans currently being set up. 
The use of contractors to set up the Accord highlights the significant lack of national 
capacity to implement the agreement. This relates both to the State’s capacity to provide a 
regulatory framework for factory inspections as well as the 14 Bangladeshi trade unions 
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affiliated to Industriall to carry out the inspection and monitoring work. There have been 
significant delays in setting up new legislation required to establish national inspection 
systems, despite significant ILO funding. Additionally Industriall’s Bangladesh affiliates, 
who have historically been weakly organised, have not been proactive in using the Accord 
to build local bargaining capacity, particularly on the issue of minimum wages. There is a 
new large scale union building project funded by the Swedish trade unions involving 
Industriall’s 14 affiliates which funds full time organizers to go to workplaces to introduce 
the Accord and organise workers in the sector. However, the expectation is that only a 
percentage of these unions will be able to make use of these resources in the long term. 
Although there are discussions underway within Industriall about the future development of 
industrial wage bargaining in the garment sector, focusing on Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Vietnam and Ethiopia, there is a genuine question of whether international agreements 
and bargaining can be matched with the local union capacity necessary to implement and 
maintain them.  
The credibility of international agreements is periodically questioned, because of their 
minimum content and scope of application. This is particularly true in relation to the 2012 
Temporary Agency Charter signed between the Volkswagen Group and Industriall. Despite 
the Charter offering major gains for agency workers internationally, the criticism is that it 
came about because of the particular circumstances relating to the long-standing 
corruption scandals at Volkswagen in Germany. After many years of public tax avoidance 
and environmental and safety scandals the company’s use of bribes and payments to 
employee representatives on the Supervisory Board was exposed in 2005, resulting in a 
three year prison sentence for the Volkswagen Employees Representative Klaus Volkert 
for receiving an estimated $4 million from Peter Hartz, the then head of personnel and 
Klaus-Joachim Gebauer, a Volkswagen executive. This case received high attention 
because of the influence of Volkswagen in national economic policy through the Hartz 
Reforms and the overturned 2007 Volkswagen Law, which attempted to give 
unprecedented influence to employee representatives in German companies. As a result, 
the credibility of the Charter has been severely damaged and is unlikely to be replicated 
with any further MNCs.  
!
3.2 Structural Power 
!
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The structural power of the GUFs is based on the strategic position of their affiliates in 
production processes and their relative sectoral and collective bargaining power. The key 
economic and employment relations’ trends affecting the structural power of the GUFs 
include the rise of financialisation of non-financial companies, growth of precarious work, 
impact of recession and austerity and resulting decline in union power. 
Over the last 20 years the majority of large companies have made extensive use of 
outside finance - debt and equity - for funding which has led to short term investment 
strategies and management practices designed to deliver faster and higher returns on 
investment. Of increasing concern to trade unions has been the growth of Alternative 
Investment Funds (AIFs), including Private Equity (PE), particularly in health, technology 
and finance sectors. The economic crisis, which was felt acutely by AIFs leading to sharp 
losses, raised concerns about the risk of bankruptcy in a wider range of non-financial 
companies in the future and subsequent job losses (Applebaum et al., 2014). 
Since the recession there have been large scale cuts in public sector jobs, and renewed 
privatisation, particularly in Western Europe. This has contributed to a decline in public 
sector membership and a growth in ‘precarious’ work in traditionally organised sectors in 
Western Europe. This has put a downward pressure on union power in relation to wages 
and job security. An indication of this is the massive growth in youth unemployment and 
temporary contracts since 2008 (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013). This means that 
both nationally and internationally, union members traditionally from elite and core classes 
are declining with an increase in the number of non-unionised periphery and excluded 
workers. 
One of the most significant factors affecting the structural power of trade unions is the 
growth of insecure and precarious work, primarily through the use of subcontracting and 
outsourcing, and extensive subcontracting chains (Doogan, 2009). With this 
‘externalisation’ of the employment relationship (Theron, 2005) come other 
externalisations; projections of risk and duties away from the principal employer onto 
others with implications not just for trade union density but also unions’ capacity to 
represent members’ interests including collective bargaining. 
Downsizing across OECD countries is significant because it offers immediate cost 
savings to companies. During 1980-2005 10 million jobs were lost in Western European 
industrial sectors (Peters, 2011) with a rise in jobs in the finance and service sectors.  
Approaches to downsizing are diverse, with the political orientation of governments and 
the electoral system good ‘explanators’ for the models adopted (Brewster et al., 2013). 
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Although there are significant differences between Liberal Market Economies and 
Coordinated Market Economies, proportional voting systems show significantly stronger 
employee protections than majoritarian systems, indicating how important electoral reform 
could be for unions in, for example, Britain. With the increased use of new technology and 
downsizing and outsourcing a relocation of jobs to low wage and 'non-union regions’ has 
taken place (Peters, 2011: 88). This includes OECD countries such as the USA with its 
system of employment-at-will and countries with low union density in the private sector 
(Applebaum et al., 2014). 
These changes in the employment relationship have led to the introduction of 
management techniques aimed to introduce new ‘flexible’ working and lean production 
methods (Peters, 2011). Often these new working methods are linked to work 
intensification and production processes that reduce protections and increase managerial 
control. Research on the service and health care sectors reveals widespread use of 
‘command and control’ systems of management, linked to work intensification, cuts and 
targets (Carter et al., 2013).  
Hyman (1997) usefully divides classes of workers into four main groups; elite, core, 
periphery and excluded. These groups are constructed differently in different national 
contexts but GUF membership patterns can be understood using these four categories, 
where elite and core workers tend to dominate and there is still a relatively low level of 
activity relating to periphery workers. Periphery workers include relatively visible 
categories such as temporary agency workers and ‘self-employed’ workers. Excluded 
workers include the large majority of informal workers in developing countries who remain 
outside of labour and trade union protections. 
For several decades, there has been a general decline in traditionally strong trade union 
memberships across Europe, with the number of UK shop stewards falling by two thirds 
between 1984-2004 (Charlwood & Forth, 2009) and with a ‘de facto enterprise unionism’ 
prevailing in the private sector (Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman, 2013). Connected to these 
changes in the nature of work and representation, there has been a downward pressure 
on wages and collective bargaining, reflected in the decline in real wages in developed 
countries, shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Average Real Wage Growth G20, 2006-2013 
 
Source: ILO, Global Wage Report (2014/15). 
!
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Since 2008 there has been a decline in national level collective bargaining, particularly 
in Western Europe and a return to ‘concession bargaining’ and bipartite agreements as a 
way of maintaining job security. Although there continues to be high numbers of working 
people covered by collective bargaining across Europe (Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman, 
2013), during economic crisis there has been a pressure for unions to engage in 
concession bargaining trading employment guarantees against wages, with only Belgium 
and Denmark avoiding wage reductions (Peters, 2011). 
The institutional bias of the Western European affiliates of the GUFs may explain their 
relative lack of attention to precarious work until the early 2000s (Standing, 2011). The 
strategic importance of precarious work forms globally means that the GUFs have had to 
develop strategies and resources for this new area of work, often focusing on the ‘zone of 
higher unionisation’ (Hyman, 1997) where workers are between the core and the 
periphery, such as temporary agency workers. This leaves key affiliates and the GUFs with 
strategic choices about how to both protect existing memberships and dues incomes, as 
well as building their strategic capacity to organise precarious workers. 
As outlined in Section 2.4, the GUFs have, since the early 2000s, placed a growing 
strategic importance on developing ‘field-enlarging strategies’ for affiliates dealing with 
precarious work. The GUFs have capitalised on their multilateral structures to offer a place 
for international exchange and coordination of responses to precarious work. Increasingly 
GUF initiatives include attempts to organise precarious workers, often through education 
programmes looking at organising strategies and broad social justice campaigning, such 
as the Stop Precarious Work Now campaign coordinated through Industriall.  
This level of work involves an emphasis on ‘organising from below’ rather than the more 
traditional GUF work of ‘regulating from above’ (Gallin, 2014). Although building affiliates’ 
capacities to organise precarious workers is a necessary and important role for the GUFs, 
on an organisational level the increase in precarious work will inevitably mean a decline in 
national and therefore international union membership and dues incomes. 
As a result, GUF strategies for union building outside of elite and core workers, to 
include categories of periphery workers, although essential for legitimacy, raises difficult 
questions about their structural power in the future.  
!
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3.3 Associational Power 
!
The associational power of the GUFs is the willingness of members to pay dues and to 
mobilise around GUF campaigns and international solidarity actions. Associational power 
is difficult to measure at international level as affiliates’ capacity to pay membership dues 
does not necessarily relate to their willingness to pay nor ability to mobilise national 
membership around international issues. 
!
Solidarity 
At national and international levels trade unions often move between two different senses 
of solidarity: first, as a normative or moral principle which creates an obligation to support 
other workers and their unions in case of need; second, as a form of ‘enlightened self-
interest’ with only weak ethical underpinning, motivated by the belief that an injury to one 
is an injury to all (Stirling, 2007). 
The notion of solidarity appealed to by unions is influenced by their institutional setting 
and organisational cultures. There is an inherent tension between the ‘two 
faces’ (Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman, 2013) of trade unionism, the ‘sword of justice’ 
where unions defend the oppressed and underprivileged and a model of ‘vested interests’ 
where the focus is on defending particular interests of a smaller group of predominantly 
elite workers.  
This tension has become more acute as precarious work grows and the diversity of 
workforces becomes a clear social justice and trade union issue. One question that 
preoccupies unions is how to maintain a sufficiently strong level of solidaristic ties between 
increasingly diverse groups of workers and, to a lesser degree, memberships (Muller-
Jentsch, 1988). In addition to changes in employment relations, this question relates also 
to societal changes and, in Western Europe, to the decline in cohesive working class 
groups and social-democratic political support (Kjellberg, 2011). As a result, building 
sufficient levels of solidaristic ties between diverse affiliates is a major job of work for the 
GUFs.  
!
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Income 
The GUFs’ capacity to raise income from affiliates suffers from a ‘density bias’ (Sullivan, 
2010a: 146) in that only a small percentage of affiliates are paying full affiliation fees for 
their full membership numbers.  
The affiliation fees of ITUC are representative of the GUFs’ capacity to raise 
membership dues internationally, with Europe by far the largest payer, Asia-Pacific second 
and Africa, with the largest and growing membership within the internationals, providing 
the lowest level of dues income, shown in Table 4.  
!
!48
!!!
Table 4: ITUC regional affiliation fees, 2014 
!
Source: ICFTU congress documents. 
!
Region Paid 2013 Chf
Forecast 2014 
Chf
Paid 2014 Chf
Europe 8,527,724 9,026,917 7,494,450
Asia-Pacific 3,246,565 3,611,932 2,372,615
North America 2,062,314 2,064,227 1,658,347
Latin America & Caribbean 679,061 729,670 539,875
Sub-Saharan Africa 609,239 556,684 30,082
Middle East and North Africa 20,496 29,027 2,755
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Additionally each region often has one affiliate who pays a large percentage of national 
and regional dues payments. In the case of Industriall, as Table 5 shows, the largest 
payment comes from the German union IG Metall, and is closely followed by a small 
number of unions below. 
!
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Table 5: Top 10 paying Industriall affiliates, 2014 
!
Source: Industriall Executive Committee Report (2014). 
!
Industriall affiliate Country Affiliation 
Fee 2014 Chf 
IG Metall Germany 2,200,000
Japan Council of Metalworkers Unions (JCM) Japan 1,650,000
IG BCE Germany 1,100,000
United Steelworkers of America (USW) USA 771,000
Unite UK 460,560
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) South Africa 392,240
International Association of Machinists & Aerospace 
Workers
USA 369,854
United Auto Workers (UAW) USA 304,502
Unifor Canada 261,828
Unionen Sweden 249,891
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The majority of GUF affiliates pay a reduced membership rate, calculated according to 
organisational incomes which, for example in the case of unions in Eastern Europe, 
represent a small percentage of membership dues income. It leads to the anomaly that the 
largest trade unions pay only a small affiliation payment to the GUFs, shown graphically in 
the case of Industriall’s Russian affiliates in Table 6. Russian affiliates have been 
consistently reluctant to disclose full membership numbers with the exception of the 
Russian Oil and Gas Workers Union (ROGWU) with an estimated membership of over 1 
million members, the Miners’ and Metallurgical Workers Union of Russia (MMWU) with 
estimated 900,000 members and the All-Russian Electric Trade Union (ARETU) with an 
estimated membership of 500,000. What is known is that these are some of the largest 
affiliates within Industriall but paying consistently low affiliation fees.  
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Table 6: Industriall’s Russian affiliates, 2014 
!
Source: Industriall Executive Committee Report (2014). !
Russian trade union Affiliation Fee 
2014 Chf
Miners' & Metallurgical Workers' Union of Russia (MMWU) 167,800
Russian Oil, Gas and Construction Workers Union (ROGWU) 25,000
All-Russian "Electric Trade Union" (ARETU) 16,300
Automobile and Farm Machinery Workers' Union of Russia (AFW) 15,125
Engineering Workers' Union of Russia (EWU) 15,125
Russian Aircraft Industry Workers' Union (Profavia) 15,125
Russian Independent Coal Employees’ Union (ROSUGLEPROF) 15,119
Shipbuilding Workers' Union of Russia (SWU) 8,800
Russian Chemical Workers Union 8,650
Russian Trade Union of Metal Workers in the Nickel, Cobalt and 
Platinoids Industries (RTUMWNCPI)
7,500
Russian Radio-Electronic Industry Workers’ Union (REIW) 6,000
Interregional Trade Union "Workers Association" (ITUWA) 2,500
Timber & Related Industries Workers Union of Russia (TRIWU) 1,200
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The increase in non-OECD membership across all the GUFs since the 1990s is a major 
resource for GUF legitimacy and capacity to mobilise international solidarity. However, it 
also represents a major threat to the financial stability of the GUFs. This is partly because 
of the lower affiliation rates for unions from developing and transition countries, but also 
the reluctance of key affiliates in each region to take the lead in identifying and securing 
financial resources available in their regions for GUF activities. In the main, this relates to 
the unions of Brazil, South Africa, Japan and Russia where union branches may have 
financial resources for international work that has not successfully been negotiated by 
national union structures. In addition, the fundraising potential of trade unions in these 
countries has not been exploited even where established charitable and development aid 
funds exist which trade unions would be eligible to apply for, particularly in partnership with 
local NGOs and community groups.  
Attempts by the GUFs to raise affiliation fee rates over the last ten years have failed, 
with affiliates cutting membership numbers in order to maintain total dues payments. This 
is often a reflection of declining national membership but it also reflects a concern that 
national union executives will not be willing to make the political decision to increase the 
costs of international affiliations in a climate of recession and declining dues income. 
Although GUF executive members are generally highly committed to the work of the 
GUFs, they often experience difficulties in winning the necessary political support in their 
own unions to raise affiliation payments.  
Additionally the willingness to pay GUF membership dues is often not matched by the 
willingness to mobilise around international issues. For example, the North American 
unions pay substantial membership dues but are often reluctant to take a lead in GUF 
campaigns or programmes, preferring to carry out their own international work bilaterally. 
This is a characteristic of North American, Japanese and Australian unions, where despite 
relatively high GUF affiliation fees the main bulk of their international work, including 
educational programmes, are carried out bilaterally. This is not to question the quality of 
the work carried out bilaterally by affiliates, such as the important educational work of the 
USW or CAW in Canada, but rather to explain the gap between paying GUF affiliation fees 
and willingness to mobilise memberships through them although, as noted below, there 
are recent signs of a change in attitudes in the USA. 
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For all of the GUFs, the German, Dutch and Scandinavian unions continue to be the 
main sources of both financial resources and solidarity action within the GUFs. These 
unions only partly fund their solidaristic work through their own funds, with the much larger 
share (on average 80 per cent) of project funding coming from national development funds 
paid by taxpayers. This means that the unions are subject to government policy and will 
continually need to defend international expenditure. Even in Europe there is a deficit of 
resources, coordination and expertise to carry out international solidarity (Gumbrell-
McCormick and Hyman, 2013) thus, providing added value in return for the substantial 
costs of GUF membership for these unions.  
The principal response by trade unions to reduced resources is to merge. In Western 
Europe there has been a large decline in the number of trade unions over the last fifty 
years which has, particularly in Northern European countries, led to a concentration of 
trade union power nationally and internationally. This is particularly noticeable if we look at 
the cases of Germany and the Netherlands where a small number of industrial unions 
represent the largest political power within both their national centres and the GUFs.  
The experience of merger strategies is ‘mixed’ both in relation to the impact on services 
and also the financial benefits. Unsurprisingly, GUF responses to reduced resources have 
focused on streamlining activities and merger, with the most recent merger taking place in 
2012 between the ICEM, IMF and ITGLWF to form the largest industrial GUF, Industriall. 
Currently there are no further mergers being discussed within the GUFs. This is in part 
because mergers often come at a time when some unions have failed to secure sufficient 
consensus on organisational renewal. The larger these organisations get the greater the 
‘problem of large numbers’: lack of commitment, latency, reduction in paying membership, 
decline in democratic involvement leading to decline in efficiency and legitimacy.  
GUF mergers have historically been carried out in a highly secretive way excluding 
most affiliates and avoiding the difficult work of struggling for political consensus, an 
approach which is counterproductive in building affiliates’ participation and concern for 
their own internationals (Gallin, 2014). 
Often underestimated is the cost of redundancy packages for staff that have often two 
or three decades of service within their organisations. It has tended to mean that the 
younger staff have left the GUFs during mergers, something which is likely to merely 
postpone the problem of GUF capacity within the next ten years during which the majority 
of staff will be retiring. Mergers also threaten a decline in the GUFs’ specific industrial 
identities and, through the loss of experienced staff to redundancy or early retirement, a 
loss of sectoral and international expertise.  
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The only counterbalance to this trend relates to the hundreds of local project 
coordinators employed short term by the GUFs to deliver their education al programmes. 
These people tend to be younger with an orientation towards union building and activism, 
capacities that are likely to prove more important to the GUFs as these structural issues 
become even more problematic. 
GUFs have attempted to increase coordination between them as a way of pooling 
resources. Recently an attempt was made to establish an independent coordination point 
for the GUFs through the creation of the Council for Global Unions (CGU) in 2012. The 
CGU came out of the ITUC’s founding congress, which decided to end the full time 
coordination position that the ICFTU had funded and ask the GUFs to directly fund this 
coordination mechanism themselves. The coordinator, Jim Baker, carried on in this new 
organisation and an annual income of €250,000 was raised per year for his salary and the 
work of the council. Despite the CGU managing to set up a working group on Temporary 
Agency Work and to establish the GUF principles, the Council has not been able to 
develop a key role within the GUFs. In the event Baker, possibly unadvisedly, stood 
against Sharon Burroughs at the last ITUC congress for General Secretary and 
subsequently resigned from the CGU. As a result of the lack of support for the work of the 
Council, it is likely that the GUFs will take this opportunity to close the CGU in 2015. 
!
Labour Support Organisations (LSOs) 
Throughout the history of trade unions there have been related ‘labour support 
organisations’ set up to support organising. LSOs typically focus on specific technical 
interventions, such as education and organising in countries where union capacity is weak, 
and also providing specific services to the GUFs such as fundraising or new areas of 
expertise such as HIV/AIDS.  
In each of the regions where GUFs carry out educational projects the GUFs have used 
the research and pedagogical services of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) set up 
to support workers and unions. Although funding in the main is directed towards affiliates, 
in particular areas such as informal workers or HIV/AIDS, where unions are not the main 
actors, existing progressive organisations are used. Over the last two decades important 
partners providing research, education and organising resources, including Naledi and 
Ditsela in South Africa, CLIST in Thailand and Instituto Observatorio Social in Brazil. At 
international level, LSOs include LabourStart which provides the largest online trade union 
news service, the International Federation of Workers Education Associations (IFWEA), 
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the Global Labour Institute (GLI) which organises an annual activists summer school and 
critical research and Labour and Society International (LSI) which was set up in the 1990s 
in the UK to access European Union and to project manage education programmes in the 
former Soviet Union for the IUF and ICEM. With the exception of LSI which was closed in 
2004, these organisations continue to do important educational and research work for the 
GUFs. 
Additionally, Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organising (WIEGO) was 
created by Pat Horn originally from the self-employed women’s union in South Africa (now 
closed) and Dan Gallin, previously IUF General Secretary and Director of GLI. WIEGO has 
attempted to fill a major gap in international work of trade unions in organising informal 
workers. It is a broad and expert network of organisations, mainly NGOs, practitioners and 
researchers looking at organising women who work informally. Of the GUFs only the IUF, 
which sits on WIEGO’s board works with them actively, because of the high number of 
unorganised women workers in their sectors. This is an untapped resource by the GUFs, 
in part because of the reluctance of their affiliates to recognise self-employed and informal 
sector organisations as trade unions.  
LSOs have, despite their expertise and fundraising capacity, not historically been valued 
by the GUFs. This is expressed through the reality that none of these organisations have 
managed to secure sufficient levels of funding from the GUFs, either directly through their 
dues income or indirectly through project funding that they raise, to sustain themselves 
and core staff. Although the relationships between the small numbers of individuals 
involved in these initiatives are good and often highly involved, the GUFs have not 
supported them sufficiently, and as a result these initiatives are limited and vulnerable, 
resting on the commitment of a small pool of individuals. 
!
Mobilising Members 
The GUFs have had a high degree of success in building their geographical coverage by 
focusing activity since the 1990s on recruiting affiliates in developing and transition 
economies. This is reflected in the growth of developing country membership of the ITUC 
summarised in Table 7.  
!
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Table 7: ITUC declared membership and estimated paying members by region:  
1998, 2003, 2013  !
!
Source: Croucher & Cotton (2009); ITUC membership figures and authors’ calculations. !
Region 1998 2003 2014
Declared  
Membership
Declared  
Membership
Declared  
Membership
Western Europe 43,214,250 43,637,707 50,930,563
Central and Eastern 
Europe/ N.I.S.
8,235,265 37,296,378 42,298,495
Asia and Pacific 27,907,407 27,282,638 32,709,509
Latin America 19,361,761 16,467,678 21,348,304
Africa 8,941,858 10,590,676 14,261,365
North America 14,612,112 12,362,956 10,277,531
Middle East 747,800 1,273,528 3,868,052
West Indies 420,332 382,798 Included in Africa 
Region
Total  
Memberships
123,440,785 149,294,359 175,693,819
Percentage of 
membership for 
which dues paid
87 63 Estimated 40-50
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The GUFs’ capacity to mobilise members is, paradoxically, limited by their large 
memberships where the majority of memberships will be passive. In Section 2.2 this is 
described as the ‘problem of large numbers’ where the majority of the membership will be 
latent and unaware of any link between their union and a GUF.  
Despite the decline of social democracy in most of the countries of Western Europe, 
affiliates in these countries continue to have a relatively high capacity to mobilise their own 
memberships on issues of international solidarity and social justice. In order to maintain 
this important connection between domestic memberships and international solidarity 
action, they tend to be highly involved in programmes and campaigns with activists and 
branch officials often providing technical support and coordination. Western European 
trade unions’ relationships with key national employers also provide important industrial 
leverage which can be used for international solidarity although, as discussed above, this 
leverage is likely to decline.  
In the main, the GUFs are able to mobilise their affiliates around key issues if they are 
framed well. Generally, the closer the issue to the interests of local membership the more 
likely they are to carry out international solidarity action. This is particularly the experience 
of international solidarity networks within major MNCs, where workers recognise the 
concrete benefits of solidarity action, particularly around issues of contract labour and 
during periods of collective bargaining. 
One of the positive developments since 2008 indicated by a number of GUFs is a 
change in attitude of unions from North America. Historically, although paying large 
affiliation fees, these unions carried out most of their international solidarity work 
bilaterally. Despite a long history of antagonism with key North American employers and a 
culture of more aggressive corporate campaigning, the North American unions have been 
actively involved in GUF sectoral and company networks, recognising their value in 
increasing leverage with company managements. For a long time one of the items for 
negotiation around IFAs was the ‘special’ situation of North America with MNCs claiming 
that international labour standards could not be applied there, in part because of highly 
repressive labour and trade union legislation, but also because of this adversarial 
corporate culture.  
This was compounded by the political conflict within the USA trade union movement 
between AFL-CIO and Change to Win which isolated these affiliates from the GUFs even 
further. The SEIU, a key union behind the creation of Change to Win in 2005 and unions 
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affiliated to it channelled their solidarity funding through this new structure, carrying out 
politically motivated bilateral projects focusing on organising models, mainly in strategic 
countries like the UK and China. However, over the last few years this division has been 
resolved with most USA unions re-affiliating to the AFL-CIO and collaborative work on 
issues of organising and international solidarity now taking place.  
One of the positive impacts of this split was that it created a movement towards 
democratic debate within the USA unions with a demand for more direct involvement of 
union branches, including international solidarity action. Indications are that it has led to 
higher branch level engagement with the GUFs and their campaigns. An example of this is 
the Nestlé dispute in the USA in 2014 where local United Food and Commercial Workers 
(UFCW) members wore ‘I am IUF’ badges after workers were told by Nestlé management 
not to sign an IUF petition because this would signal ‘trouble’.  
For most of the GUFs there is a tension between increased demand for international 
solidarity and their capacity to supply it. There is a growing developing country 
membership and deterioration of working conditions in North America and Western 
Europe, which raises the capacity of the GUFs to mobilise around international solidarity. 
However, this increased capacity for mobilisation is not matched by the capacity of the 
GUFs to raise dues and other income from their affiliates, either in traditionally high paying 
regions of Western Europe and North America or in the power bases within their growing 
regional structures. This leaves the GUFs with a widening gap between the demands for 
international solidarity action and the resources available to them to effectively coordinate 
it.  
!
3.4 Union Building Power 
!
A key function of trade unions in most parts of the world is to support members to build 
their individual and collective capacities in the face of employers (Huzzard, 2000), 
particularly in response to sectoral, technological or political changes such as introducing 
collective bargaining into the newly independent trades unions of the Former Soviet Union 
(Khaliy, 2005; Sogge, 2004). One of the principal ways that they do this is through 
educational programmes and methodologies, well established in most parts of the world. 
Over the last three decades these methods have been adopted by unions in most parts 
of the world, principally through the work of international trade union structures such as the 
GUFs and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (Croucher & Cotton, 2012; 
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Croucher, 2004). Millions of Euro are raised and spent annually to disseminate these 
education methods to national and local trade union structures in a conscious attempt to 
build trade union capacity and international solidaristic networks. 
!
Emancipatory Methods 
The methods used in the vast majority of GUF education projects are founded on workers 
and emancipatory education traditions that emphasise dialogic methods, small group work, 
consciousness raising and collective problem solving. These methods require only limited 
resources and can have high returns for unions in capacity building of local organisations 
and strong solidaristic relationships between members. 
An emancipatory model of trade union education aims to build activism through 
consciousness raising, problem identification and collective problem solving. It is a dialogic 
model of education, emphasising small group dynamics and collective tasks 
(Klandermans, 1986). It is underpinned by a number of principles, including confidentiality 
and solidarity, and activities aim to provide a safe space for expressing and processing 
experience and a vital source of support in the workplace.  
Additionally, education programmes provide important opportunities to widen the pool of 
collective experience and to learn from diverse strategies and union responses to 
globalisation. This is a key resource for trade unions in developing strategies for renewal 
on the basis of gains made by other unions. These methods are highly effective at building 
social capital, understood as the resources built up through relationships to provide mutual 
aid and development. A detailed analysis of the strategic importance of emancipatory 
education in the work of the GUFs is explored in Section 4. 
The combination of multilateral structures, minilateral methods and principle of 
subsidiarity is a highly ‘potent’ way of union building. The GUFs offer a multilateral 
structure that provides a consistent and reliable system of norms and obligations, which 
facilitates the recognition and engagement of trade unions at international level both with 
employers and with the international human rights mechanisms. In addition, their 
minilateral work allows the GUFs to provide meaningful union building programmes which, 
although limited by resources, build social capital and with it high capacity for international 
solidarity action. This capacity to deliver international solidarity in turn gives important 
credibility to the work of the GUFs and raises their standing with affiliates as important 
international actors.  
!
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3.5 Future Regional Trends 
!
Despite the GUFs’ important membership gains, there are significant limitations to their 
development and consolidation of their regional structures. This Section examines the 
GUFs’ attempts to build union capacity in Eastern Europe, China and Middle East North 
Africa (MENA) and draws some conclusions about their strategic capacity in the future.  
!
Eastern Europe 
From the 1990s several of the GUFs took the political decision to establish programmes 
and offices in Moscow to build their relationships with unions in the former Soviet Union. 
This was a major departure for the GUFs, to court affiliation from formerly communist 
union structures, all of which were almost entirely unreformed. At that time, there were no 
procedures for affiliating former Communist unions into the GUFs, and each organisation 
developed different strategies to establish solidaristic ties during this period of transition. 
For example, the ICEM created a category of ‘transitional’ status for unions that could not 
immediately affiliate but with which the intention was to encourage sufficient democratic 
reform to allow for full affiliation. This fairly shortly led to the affiliation of unions across the 
region, but with unions that had only, at best, started the long process of organisational 
reform. 
Some GUFs made the decision to wait until further economic and industrial reform had 
taken place before investing the large resources needed to build Eastern European 
membership. Three GUFs - IUF, ICEM and UNI - quickly became the most active and 
organised in the region, establishing project offices in Russia employing activists who were 
younger than the existing union leadership and in different ways independent from them. 
Unlike other regions, the GUF structures in Russia remained outside of existing union 
structures. The GUF personnel involved were Kirill Buketov, Lika Shershukova, and Galina 
Yurova working for the IUF, Andre Mrost for the ICEM and Olga Vinogradova for UNI. The 
staff of the three GUFs adopted a collaborative approach and jointly developed an 
educational approach in the region. 
!
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Table 8: Chronology of trade union developments in Eastern Europe, 1990s to the 
present 
Dates Location Activities & events GUF  
participation
1990s-19
95
Central & Eastern  
Europe, Transcaucasus 
& Central Asia
Networking & information  
exchange, planning/ feasibility, 
seeking transitional  
status/ affiliations
IUF 
ICEM
1992-199
9
Central & Eastern  
Europe, Transcaucasus 
& Central Asia
Amendment of labour and trade 
union legislation including  
collective bargaining
1995-200
5
Caspian region Bilateral and multilateral contact 
between oil and gas unions
NOPEF 
ROGWU 
OGWU 
ICEM
1996 Russia • Russian legislation on trade 
union pluralism passed 
• Creation of independent 
confederations VKT and KTR
1995-200
0
Russia, Ukraine, 
Romania, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Moldova, 
Belarus
Trade union education projects 
(Phare/Tacis)
IUF 
ICEM
1999-200
5
Central & Eastern  
Europe, Transcaucasus 
& Central Asia
Affiliation of unions and national 
centres to the GUFs and ITUC
All GUFs and 
ICFTU/ITUC
1999-
present
Croatia, Serbia, BiH,  
Kosovo
Trade Union Education Projects IUF 
ICEM
1999 Russia Putin becomes Prime Minister of 
the Russian Federation
2000-201
0
Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan
Trade Union Education Projects 
(Tacis)
IUF 
ICEM 
UNI 
ITF
2000-200
8
Russia Putin is President of the Russian 
Federation
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2003-201
0
Russia, Belarus, 
Georgia, Moldova, 
Ukraine
Complaints submitted to ILO’s 
Committee on Freedom of 
Association: 
• Russia (1) 
• Ukraine (8) 
• Moldova (1) 
• Belarus (3) 
• Georgia (2)
ITUC 
IUF 
FNV 
ICEM 
VKT/KTR
2004 Ukraine Orange Revolution
2005 Caspian Region Creation of Caspian Energy 
Network
ICEM 
ROGWU 
NOPEF 
OGWU
2005-200
6
Azerbaijan • Creation of new private sector 
unions in contractors  
McDermott (USA) and 
Boschelf (France) 
• Protocol on organising 
contractors in oil and gas  
ROGWU & OGWU
ICEM 
OGWU 
NOPEF 
ROGWU
2006 Russia Closure of ICEM Regional Office ICEM
2009 Russia Creation of KTR: integration of 
VKT & KTR)
2010 Ukraine Yanukovych wins Presidential 
Elections
2012 Russia Putin becomes Prime Minster of 
the Russian Federation 
2013-201
4
Russia Closure of GUF and ITUC  
regional offices
UNI 
IUF 
Industriall 
ITF 
ITUC
Novembe
r 2013
Ukraine • Yanukovych suspends 
negotiations on EU 
Association Agreement 
• Maidan protests started 
• 1st December national  
protests and violence in Kiev
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January-
May 2014
Ukraine • Crimea annexed 
• Separatist groups formed in 
Donetsk and Luhansk 
• Sniper attacks on protesters in 
Kiev 
• Yanukovych replaced by 
Poroshenko in Presidential 
elections
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These developments were coordinated through the GUF head offices, principally 
through Wolfgang Weinz (IUF) and Peter Schmitt (ICEM), tasked with building contacts in 
Central and Eastern Europe and a strategy for long term engagement. Both had jointly for 
many years carried out solidaristic and information gathering visits. 
By the mid-1990s the ICEM and IUF had jointly secured European Union structural 
funding, through their involvement with an independent UK-based NGO called Labour and 
Society International (LSI). LSI was set up by David Clement, previously from the 
Commonwealth Trade Union Council (CTUC) and Professor Arthur Lipow, a labour 
academic at the Department of Politics at Birkbeck College London. The author was 
shortly after employed by LSI to raise funding through the EU and manage the subsequent 
education programmes for the IUF and ICEM. Ron Oswald (IUF General Secretary) and 
Vic Thorpe (the then ICEM General Secretary) jointly sat on LSI’s board, along with David 
Cockroft (General Secretary of the ITF) and UK trade union leaderships including Fred 
Higgs who at that time was a National Officer of the TGWU and subsequently became the 
General Secretary of the ICEM from 1999. LSI was set up to raise funding and provide 
educational expertise from the UK’s trade union education centres - principally tutors from 
South Birmingham Trade Union College and the Workers Education Association (WEA) - 
for long term educational programmes in Central and Eastern Europe. The first projects, 
funded by the Phare/Tacis Democracy Programmes were carried out in Romania, Hungry, 
Slovakia and Russia. Further project funding was secured and education programmes 
were developed in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Further funding was secured through 
Tacis as well as the Dutch trade union structure FNV Mondiaal to establish a joint ICEM/
IUF project office in Baku and an education methods programme on the same model in 
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan with the inclusion of additional GUFs, namely UNI 
and the ITF. This model of education methods programmes was also adopted in the joint 
IUF/ICEM Balkans region, run by an experienced trade unionist Mato Lalic and Teuta Krilic 
in Zagreb from 1999 to the present.  
The adoption of an educational approach enabled the establishment of relationships 
with these previously unknown unions. Importantly this model of joint union education 
programmes, carried out with unaffiliated unions, gave the GUFs the opportunity to work 
with both established and new trade union structures. In the main, this was only achieved 
in the mining sectors, with independent mining unions from Russia (Independent Coal 
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Employees Union of Russia, Rosugleprof), Ukraine (Independent Trade Union of Miners of 
Ukraine, NPGU) and Belarus (Belarussian Independent Union, BNP). Although their 
participation in the programmes was relatively small because of the fragility of the union 
structures and leadership at that time, it allowed the GUFs to open affiliation to both old 
and new structures within the region.  
Additionally, this educational work allowed unions in the same sectors to establish 
solidaristic contacts and start to develop networks, which proved to be important for unions 
working along growing supply chains and production processes. One of the key 
developments during this period was the creation of the ICEM’s Caspian Energy Network 
formally established in 2005 in Azerbaijan, with the support of the Russian Oil and Gas 
Workers Union (ROGWU) and Nopef, the ICEM’s Norwegian oil sector affiliate. (See Part 
2 for more detailed outline of this network.) Unions in this network had long standing 
exposure to international educational activities and resulting relationship building amongst 
affiliates which provided them with a basis for effective networking and cooperation. 
Additionally, the ICEM’s work on organising contract workers encouraged the Azeri Oil and 
Gas Workers Union (OGWU) to organise contract workers in American contractor 
McDermott during the launch of the network, establishing the first union for a private 
foreign contractor in Azerbaijan.  
The educational model used in the former Soviet Union was important in those 
countries where unions were motivated towards change because of the rapid decline in 
union resources and capacity to service memberships after 1989, principally outside of 
Russia. Strong relationships were formed through the educational programmes, with many 
of the participants of these programmes going on to become union leaders within their 
organisations (Croucher, 2004, Khaliy, 2005), an important indicator of the union building 
impact of education programmes.  
However, the leverage developed with the Russian unions through these education 
programmes was low, in part because of the size and resistance of these structures to 
economic and political changes taking place at that time. There were some notable 
exceptions amongst the Russian unions including ROGWU that, under the leadership of 
Lev Marino, took an active role in developing solidaristic relationships with unions in the oil 
and gas sectors across the Caspian region and an active participant in ICEM/Industriall 
executive policy making. However, for all of the Russian unions, one of the barriers to 
reform relates to their financial structures where membership dues are paid directly to 
enterprise and branch level organisations with only a small percentage passed onto the 
national structures. As a result the national offices are under-resourced and reluctant to 
!67
raise difficult organisational and political problems with key branches. This means that the 
national leadership of the Russian unions are not able to raise sufficient leverage, either 
political or financial, with key branches to undergo a process of organisational change at 
the level that they need to do to accommodate transition to a market economy.  
The alternative unions in Russia are increasingly well organised with the creation of the 
Confederation of Labour of Russia (KTR) in 1996 which has grown into a membership of 
approximately 2 million. The KTR is organised into sectoral unions and sections covering 
the seafarers, dockers, pilots, teachers, agricultural and construction workers. The 
construction union is interesting because it is the first Russian trade union to focus on 
organising migrant workers. 
KTR has created two organising schools set up to develop new cadres of organisers 
and leadership. The original strategy was to recruit organisers from workplaces but this 
failed because of the victimisation they faced. Then student groups were approached but 
this model of organising did not work, in part because of the dropout rate of the students 
when they were transitioning into work. Additionally, MNCs repressed the creation of new 
unions in their operations, a strategy that has become more aggressive since the 
introduction of sanctions against Russia in 2014, particularly affecting the food sector 
where many food companies are closing and conditions are deteriorating quickly. As a 
result the current organising strategy is to recruit organisers from new political networks 
and demonstrations that have been taking place throughout Russia over the last five 
years, taking advantage of the growing opposition to the increasingly authoritarian 
government.  
The Trade Union Rights Defence Centre was set up in 2013 offering solidaristic and 
legal support to new unions and activists in the region. The Centre was set up by Valetin 
Urasov, a Russian trade union leader who was released from prison in 2013 following his 
arrest for activities in the Russian Alrosa diamond mining company. Following a protest 
rally about working conditions and trade union rights he was arrested under charges of 
possession of narcotics and sentenced to six years in a penal colony. A human rights case 
was submitted to the ILO by the KTR, supported by the IUF, Industriall, ITUC, and the 
FNPR following which he was released and reinstated but with a 15 per cent cut in his 
salary. In 2013, he was given the Arthur Svensson award by the Norwegian trade unions 
which came with a €50,000 prize with which he set up the new Centre. 
Although the growth of independent trade unions and leadership is significant, by the 
late 1990s authoritarian politics had returned in the region with a rise in human rights 
abuses, including attacks on Freedom of Association in Belarus and the 2011 Zhanaozen 
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massacre in Kazakhstan when sixteen protesters were killed following an aggressive 
police response to a six month strike of 20,000 oil workers in the Mangistau region.  
Since 2013, political events have moved quickly in the Ukraine. The Maidan movement, 
created from the original crisis when Yanukovich refused to sign the EU Association 
Agreement, has developed into a political movement protesting against corruption, 
authoritarian rule and the violent repression of democratic protest. 
Despite organisational and political reform within the Ukrainian unions, particularly in 
the transport, metal and food sectors, unions are facing an industrial and human rights 
crisis. Crimea’s infrastructure is broken and there has been a virtual cessation of food 
production. The Independent Trade Union of Miners of Ukraine (NPGU) under the 
leadership of Mikailo Vloynets, with its stronghold in Donetsk region, is trying to coordinate 
international solidarity through its strong international links to protect its members from 
intimidation from separatist groups. At the time of writing, 12 of Ukraine’s 136 mines are in 
occupied territories with widespread abandonment of mines across Donetsk and Lugansk. 
As a result of the lack of civil and political responses in Russia to the conflict in Ukraine, 
the Russian trade unions are also facing a further crisis of legitimacy. The two ITUC 
affiliates in Russia, the FNPR and the KTR have remained limited in their capacity to 
challenge Putin’s foreign policy in the region. The FNPR officially shows loyalty to the state 
in relation to the conflict in Ukraine, ostensibly to avoid economic sanctions and job loss. 
Rank and file members across Russia are heavily divided with the Confederation of 
Labour of Russia (KTR) being the only Russian union structure that is opposed to the war 
but with relatively limited political power. 
The political developments in Russia have affected civil society organisations at large, 
with a long-standing problem for INGOs to secure legal registration. It had meant that the 
GUFs had been operating in semi-legal status since the 1990s but with the Russian 
government taking a position of non-intervention. During the ICEM’s financial restructuring 
in 2006, this was a decisive factor in the closure of its Moscow office with unforeseen legal 
and other costs involved in attempting to regularise their operations. As the political 
situation in 2013 deteriorated many non-governmental organisations were visited by the 
Federal Security Service (FSB), including the ITUC, to warn them that they and the GUFs 
would need to cease operations in Russia. As a result, all of the GUFs have closed their 
regional offices with political responsibility for the region returning to the secretariats. 
The probable future trend for the region is that further anti-democratic legislation will be 
brought into place and that the region will develop violently into two sub-regions. Russia, 
Belarus, and Kazakstan, which in 2014 signed a trade agreement with potential to extend 
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the agreement further by incorporating Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. A second sub-region 
is composed of countries looking towards the EU, including Ukraine, Georgia and 
Moldova. 
These developments leave the GUFs in a precarious position. With weak established 
and independent trade unions in the region, and the increasing isolation of Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan from Europe, opportunities for union building are limited. Therefore, the 
GUFs will continually need to review and revise their strategies across the region in 
response to these developments. They will need to take a longer-term perspective on 
working with the collective and political structures that come out of this period of unrest. 
!
China 
China continues to represent a significant political challenge to the GUFs, both in terms of 
engagement with workers in China who are increasingly involved in industrial disputes, 
and with China’s official trade union structures, the All China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU). The ACFTU is structurally under the control of the Chinese government and the 
Communist Party and a clear international position that free and independent trade unions 
do not exist in China. Although the 1995 Chinese Labour Law allows certain levels of 
collective ‘consultation’ and the 2004 Chinese Trade Union Law recognises the role of 
trade unions in collective negotiations, collective bargaining remains limited in China (ILO, 
2010). The collective agreements signed by 2008 covered over 60 per cent of working 
people but include only minimum standards and wages, which are already enshrined in 
national law (ILO, 2014).  
Although none of the GUFs or the ITUC have courted the affiliation of the Chinese 
unions - neither the ACFTU nor the ‘new’ unions which have been organised in foreign 
multinational companies - there continues to be a general policy of ‘engagement’, with only 
the IUF clearly maintaining a position of non-engagement. This compromise reflects a lack 
of debate and strategy within the GUFs about their position on the potential for union 
building in China.  
This was most recently highlighted at the ITUC congress in Berlin in 2013, which the 
Hong Kong trade union confederation, the HKCTU, and the ACFTU both attended. The 
HKCTU, recognised as the only independent trade union within Chinese territories, was 
denied the right to speak from the platform about the situation in China. This was on the 
basis that the ITUC had guaranteed there would be no criticism of the ACFTU at the event 
as a condition of their attendance. As a result the HKCTU organised a side event attracting 
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a high level of participation of unions, particularly from Eastern Europe, including an IUF 
representative who boycotted the rest of the congress.  
During this event, recent developments in Hong Kong and trade union links with the 
Occupy HK movement were discussed. Also the panel reported on the HKCTU’s general 
strike, which was led by Coca-Cola workers who had been involved in IUF union building 
projects for some time.  
Despite the lack of reform within the ACFTU, there has been a significant rise in 
spontaneous industrial action in China since market reforms. Although figures are 
unreliable, Guandong province has seen a 300 per cent increase in strikes since 1999 
(Taylor, 2000) mainly in the private sector and related to non-payment of wages, job 
insecurity and concerns over favouritism. By 1998 there were over 16.5 million workers 
claiming non-payment of wages and 8 million complaints over wage cuts (Taylor, 2000). 
This is attributed to the economic situation leading to changes in management approaches 
and a decline in working conditions. These disputes are not carried out with the support of 
the ACFTU unions, although official unions have not so far attempted to repress any 
industrial unrest.  
New unions have been created in the foreign owned private sector and these 
developments have been watched carefully by the GUFs. Although still officially part of the 
ACFTU, some of these new unions show encouraging signs of more participatory cultures 
and relationships with management. The character of these new enterprise unions is 
heavily context dependent, exemplified in Taylor’s important research on 7 recently 
privatised enterprises in Guangzhou and Shanghai which highlight the growing demand for 
collective representation in response to the increasing tensions between market reforms 
and workplace wages and conditions. 
The Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions (HKCTU) is an increasingly important 
actor in these developments. Internationally their profile has grown as a result of the 
HKCTU’s participation in the Hong Kong Occupy movement since 2013. As soon as the 
violence broke out in 2014, the HKCTU called for a general strike and has been an highly 
active partner to Occupy Central, particularly in mobilisations and maintaining order during 
the demonstrations. There has been a good transfer of skills between the two structures, 
with the HKCTU sitting on the organising committee of Occupy Central. 
The HKCTU has been active in developing an organising approach in Hong Kong. The 
organising model used by the HKCTU is a familiar one of offering legal consultation and 
‘crisis interventions’ in disputes, as well as an element of strategic planning and mapping 
of recruitment targets. Education activities are used to build cadres and new leaderships, 
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based on a participatory and study circle methods, following many years of international 
education programmes. 
The HKCTU also runs an organising project in mainland China, but because of the 
vulnerability of activists there is no official information about the work that they do. In 
informal conversations with the HKCTU activists involved in the project the strategy for the 
project is described as focusing on Hong Kong businesses operating in mainland China 
and using the same organising model as is used in Hong Kong at workplace level. An 
important aspect of this work is to secure accurate information about industrial relations 
within China, a severe problem given the scale of ‘dis-information’ that is distributed 
through the official union and party channels.  
Despite these important developments there is a debate about whether reform of the 
ACFTU is possible and what could be sustained through the industrial changes taking 
place in China. Disagreement centres on the potential for institutional reform and the 
weight given to social change and industrial struggle in shaping and reforming social 
capital in China. The HKCTU does not believe reform of the official structures is realistic 
despite a growing number of progressive trade unionists within it. Some, including the 
renowned Han Dong Fang from the China Labour Bulletin, are more optimistic about 
younger generations of workers building strong networks and alliances, as a basis for 
organisational reform. Central to this argument is the impact of legal reform allowing 
Chinese unions to bargain collectively with employers, thus developing a new generation 
of trade union officials who have the capacity to carry out basic union functions. Han Dong 
Fang currently works as an advisor on labour issues to the ACFTU and the Chinese 
Communist Party. 
The GUFs have predominantly kept their relationships with the ACFTU at a distance, 
receiving their delegations and, in the case of Industriall, securing initial agreement with 
the Chinese Government to build minimum industrial standards in the mining sector.  
In some cases, such as the German and Scandinavian unions, some bilateral projects 
are ongoing in home country company operations, such as the metals sector. These 
bilateral initiatives tend to be jointly carried out with company management, looking at 
human rights and health and safety in their operations. Because of the small scale of 
these projects in comparison to the scale of the Chinese labour market, these projects 
appear to be benign but there is no evaluation of their impact. 
Probably the most critical literature on international attempts to form relationships with 
Chinese unions is in Dan Gallin’s book Solidarity, where he offers an important critique of 
the USA union SEIU’s attempts to engage with the ACFTU, exposing the political 
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weakness of international union interventions in China. Focusing on the organising 
‘success’ in Wal-Mart operations in China he argues that there is no potential for genuine 
international union building work in China.  
The creation in 2008 of a union in Wal-Mart in China was heralded by the American 
union SEIU and its president Andy Stern during a solidarity mission as a major union 
building success. This is despite union recognition being requested by the then Chinese 
President, Hu Jintao. Stern’s understanding of the importance of union organising in China 
to protect American jobs is a sobering reminder of the dangers of bilateral work and of 
representing the interests of one group of workers rather than the fundamental principles 
that underlie international trade unionism. In the event, the Wal-Mart operation was closed 
in 2014, and with no activists or cadres within the enterprise there was no opposition from 
the trade union.  
Gallin’s book reminds us of an important aspect to change: change will take place when 
the old system breaks down. Although China has high levels of industrial struggle, the 
ACFTU has shown remarkable resilience in its refusal to reform. Although there is 
obviously potential for the Chinese labour movement to develop through these struggles 
the question is whether this will trigger sufficient crisis within the ACFTU such that it 
stimulates genuine internal reform of the official structures.  
This leaves the GUFs with the option to continue to ‘engage’ with Chinese unions but at 
a low level of sectoral or foreign company level. The resources required to engage with 
Chinese unions are not available to the GUFs, nor are they likely to result in paying 
affiliations. This means that that any interventions in China will have to be for strategic 
rather than organisational reasons.  
Furthermore, although the GUFs will be naturally inclined to encourage and support any 
new union structures, the question will be whether their intervention would increase their 
chances of long-term survival or, as has been the case in many cases of weak new union 
developments, be a hindrance given the likely reprisals from the state and ACFTU.  
Unlike the diverse union structures in the former Soviet Union, union renewal in China is 
only likely to come about if sufficient activism and demand develops at the level of the 
workplace. However, because of the severity of state repression of self-organised groups 
of activists it is optimistic to think that the current spontaneous disputes will be sustained 
over the long term and lay the foundations for an alternative union structure, as it did for 
example in Russia. These inherent problems within the Chinese union environment have 
led to an organisational inertia at the level of the GUFs, a situation that is likely to remain 
for the foreseeable future.  
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Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, as it is predominantly demarcated within 
GUF structures, is a complex and diverse region. Over a decade of civil conflict within the 
region, the impact of the political changes taking place since the Arab Spring of 2011 and 
the rising threat of jihadist groups has meant that industrial and trade union activity has 
been severely damaged. With the virtual non-existence of trade union organisations in the 
Gulf States and the development of still fragile union structures in Egypt, Tunisia and Iraq, 
unlike other regions of the world there is no obvious base or coordination point for the 
GUFs in the region. Even in Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt, where much of the work of 
international organisations including the GUFs has traditionally been originally based. 
!
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Table 9: Chronology of trade union developments in the MENA region, 1945 to the 
present !
Dates Location Activities & events GUF  
participation
1945 MENA Creation of Arab League
1989 Maghreb: Tunisia,  
Algeria, Libya, Morocco, 
Mauritania
Creation of Arab Maghreb  
Union (UMA)
ICFTU
1995-2000 Egypt, Tunisia Creation of ICEM National 
Councils
Industriall
2003 Iraq Saddam Hussein overthrown
2005 MENA Free trade zone created 
across Arab League
2007 Palestine Creation of Federation of  
Independent Democratic 
Trade unions and Workers 
Committees
2010 Tunisia Self-immolation of Mohamed 
Bonazizi
2011 Arab Spring: Tunisia, 
Egypt, Libya, Syria, 
Yemen
• Tunisian Government over- 
thrown 
• Mubarak resigns 
• Anti-government protests 
and massacres in Libya 
• Gaddafi over-thrown 
• Syria suspended from the 
Arab League 
• Yemen President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh injured in 
palace bombing
Industriall  
affiliates in 
Tunisia, Egypt 
and Yemen
2011-2013 Saudi Arabia Labour protests
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2012 Algeria, Egypt, Libya, 
Israel
• New Law on Association in 
Algeria limits international 
participation 
• Morsi government seizes 
Trade union assets and 
INGO/GUF activity 
suspended 
• Industriall’s Egyptian and 
Israeli affiliates expelled for 
non-payment of fees
Industriall 
Friedrich 
Ebert 
Foundation
2013 Iran Interim agreement on Iran’s 
nuclear programme with 
Western states
2013 Egypt Trade Union Education 
Projects reinstated 
Industriall 
Friedrich 
Ebert 
Foundation
2013 Jordan, Egypt ITF Jordan and ITUC Jordan 
and Egypt project offices 
close
ITF 
ITUC
2013 Iraq Industriall’s 6 affiliates form 
National Council in Iraq
Industriall
2013 MENA Creation of new ITUC Arab 
Structure
ITUC 
2014 Iraq, Syria, Libya Islamic State (IS) declared a 
caliphate and consolidated in 
Iraq, Syria and Eastern Libya
2014 Iraq Energy sector training held in 
Lebanon
Industriall
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Because of the strategic nature of its sectors and established relationships with unions 
in the region, the work of Industriall provides a good indicator of international trade union 
capacity in the region.  
In Egypt, the election of Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood led to the state controlled Egypt 
Trade Union Federation’s (ETUF) substantial assets being taken over and union leader-
ships being replaced by supporters. Despite a new government being in place, democratic 
elections within unions were not reinstated and new leaders of the ETUF were appointed 
by the government. For Industriall, many of their ETUF affiliates were dis-affiliated in 2012 
because of non-payment of fees. These unions were traditionally aligned with the Mubarak 
government, and opposed to the new trade unions that have been created since 2011.  
The two new national centres, the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions 
(EFITU, created in 2011) and Egyptian Democratic Labour Congress (EDLC, created in 
2013), are affiliating new trade unions but there are also a growing number of new trade 
unions not affiliated to either. The new unions are either plant or company based, often 
welcomed by the military onto sites in the oil fields because of the attempts by the Muslim 
Brotherhood to take over the existing union structures.  
As is common when there is a sudden growth of ‘alternative’ new unions, traditional 
trade union donors have been active in Egypt, predominantly the Solidarity Centre of the 
AFL-CIO. This money, used for union building projects, was relatively short lived in part 
because of the arrests and interference experienced by International Non-Governmental 
Organisations in Egypt during this period.  
Industriall’s most active affiliates are the General Trade Union of Electricity and Energy 
(GTUEE, affiliated to EFITU), a new General Trade Union of Petroleum Workers 
(GTUPW), which is a collection of new unions linked to the EFITU, and the Free Trade 
Union of Misr Mahalla Spinning and Weaving Company (FTUMMSWC) which is an indus-
trially and politically active organisation based in a textile factory which has 22,000 work-
ers. Industriall uses education programmes to increase both industrial and organisational 
capacity, although there are currently no long-term developmental programmes in place. 
Instead, as is common in unstable countries, there have been a wide range of industrial 
seminars, for the metal, energy and textile sectors and in October 2013 Industriall hosted a 
conference on Trade Union Rights and Industrial Relations in Multinational Companies, 
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with the participation of parliamentarians, academics and unions adopting recommenda-
tions on labour laws, minimum wages and fundamental rights.  
In Iraq, there exist some established unions, where leaderships worked in exile for sev-
eral decades, and new organisations in the construction, textile, engineering and electricity 
sectors. This includes a new Iraqi Federation of Oil Unions (IFOU) with Hassan Jamal as 
leader with good links with new workers’ councils set up in Basra. Industriall has six Iraqi 
affiliates who in 2013 created a National Council to coordinate international solidarity work. 
Industriall, along with the ITUC, is focusing on a campaign to reform the labour laws that 
prevent trade unions from carrying out organising, collective bargaining and strikes. Iraqi 
affiliates are well respected within the GUFs with Hashmevia Muhsin Alsaadawi, the Presi-
dent of the General Union of Electricity Workers and Technicians (GUEWT), a titular mem-
ber of Industriall’s international Executive Committee.  
Industriall’s work in Iraq focuses on campaigning for amendments to the labour code 
and to introduce trade union rights. This campaign was suspended during the change in 
government but will be re-launched in 2015 although the Government is likely to be fo-
cused on responding to the presence of IS in Iraq. Industriall also carries out educational 
seminars for the Iraqi unions but organising events within Iraq presents a major security 
problem for participation such that even in 2014 meetings are held in Lebanon. It is likely 
that in 2015 one focus for activity will be networking between unions in the region within 
MNCs, particularly Shell, Lukoil and Eni although the lack of legal status of trade unions in 
Iraq mean that direct negotiations with MNCs at national level is not possible.  
In Tunisia, Industriall's affiliates are all part of the Tunisian General Labour Union 
(UGTT), overwhelmingly the largest trade union confederation and a respected party in 
ongoing political negotiations with the newly elected governments. Tunisia represents one 
of the most stable countries in the region for trade unions, following the completion of two 
post-transition elections and the use of voting to marginalise Islamic groups. In both 
Tunisia and Morocco, Industriall National Councils were set up in 2013 with a focus on 
networking in MNCs, union building and protection of women workers. 
In Palestine, Industriall continues to work with the Palestine General Federation of 
Trade Unions (PGFTU), which is supported by Fatah. In 2007 a new national centre was 
created - the Federation of Independent Democratic Trade Unions (FIDTU), following long 
standing workers’ rights campaigns coordinated by the Democracy and Workers' Rights 
Center (DWRC), based in Israel but there is no formal contact between this group and the 
GUFs. Israeli Histradrut was disaffiliated from Industriall in 2012 due to non-payment of 
affiliation fees.  
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There are also developments in Libya with the creation of new trade unions in the pe-
troleum and petrochemical trade unions although there is no information on how these 
new structures relate, if at all, to the existing national centres and the Bengazi leadership 
of the traditional Libyan unions. The declaration of Eastern Libya as a province of IS and 
the ongoing conflict between military, militia and Islamic militants means that there is no 
current potential for union building activity in Libya.  
The difficulties in establishing GUF structures in regions of conflict are familiar. With a 
lack of political leadership from affiliates in the region, the GUFs are limited in their capaci-
ty to build national and regional structures. The GUFs, having learned from experiences in 
Eastern Europe, are cautious in adopting a strategy of working too quickly with new unions 
formed over the last few years. The political and leadership situation within the old and 
new unions is not stable which means that a more long-term perspective has been taken 
to union developments in the region.  
Although there is a tendency for solidarity funding to come on stream to work with new 
unions, typically USA development funding through the Solidarity Centres, the GUFs have 
taken a longer term perspective in observing new developments and limiting their educa-
tional work to networking and technical activities such as exchanges between unions in 
the same sector and, to a much lesser degree, MNCs. 
The ITUC is in the process of creating a new regional structure but there are inherent 
problems within the ITUC constitution that splits affiliates from MENA into two distinct re-
gions - Asia Pacific and Africa. The ITUC has continued to carry out activities with its affili-
ates and most recently has developed a strategy to set up Workers Committees in Saudi 
Arabia, following the spontaneous industrial disputes that took place between 2011 and 
2013.  
As with all international interventions in the region, it is difficult to measure the potential 
impact of the ITUC and the GUFs’ solidaristic work. Although contacts exist with old and 
new trade unions in most sectors and educational and networking activities continue to 
take place, the political and industrial instability has not allowed long term union building 
initiatives to take place. 
!
Summary 
These industrial and regional trends have a long-term impact on the structures, incomes 
and working practices of the GUFs and the need to identify strategic points where they can 
deliver international solidarity in the longer term.  
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Furthermore international solidarity will require working with an expanded range of 
social actors to include social movements which are increasingly important vehicles for 
social change, building democracy and basic standards at work. This engagement with 
social justice and civic movements is crucial to build a sufficient base for unions to 
mobilise around industrial issues. It implies that the GUFs will need to organise solidarity 
action more in response to events than in response to union affiliations, and work 
increasingly on the issues and using the same methods as broader social networks. 
In the next Section this theme of union building and education is revisited and the 
impact on social relations and union democracy explored in detail. The proposal we turn to 
in the final section is that GUFs could use their expertise in education methods to build 
dialogue and democracy and with it the strategic capacity to mobilise working people 
around democratically debated sets of priorities.  
!
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Section 4: Education Revisited !
There are two main roots to the methods used in GUF education programmes. The first is 
trade union education in Western Europe developed out of the Swedish Working Men’s 
Institutes of the 1880s and the German workers education system (Eiger, 1994). What is 
common to these traditions is that they understand education primarily as a way of 
creating social change and have therefore a broad understanding of education to include 
political, cultural and recreational activities.  
As a result of the changes in class and communities in the early twentieth century, trade 
union education adopted a more liberal and pragmatic focus, not explicitly working on 
issues of class in many parts of the world. The German system tended from the 1920s to 
be more systematised and became a system of technical training and ‘academies’; 
however the principal aim of both traditions was to build workers’ participation and build 
their confidence to deal with workplace issues. The Swedish model of study circles is less 
formalised and more grassroots focused with a limited role for tutors and a focus on small-
group work and participant selection of areas of study. Interestingly in response to the 
recession in the 1990s the Swedish LO responded by closing its residential colleges in 
order to cut costs and returning to the original model of study circles (Eiger, 1994). 
The second root of GUF education comes from the Brazilian pedagogue, Paulo Freire 
who developed his methods throughout the 1970s until his death in 1997. Emancipatory 
education (Freire, 1970), sometimes called Active Learning Methods (ALMs) or 
participatory education, is the dominant model used in GUF education projects. 
Emancipatory education builds solidaristic relationships and collectivisation by using 
dialogic methods, consciousness raising, containment and building social capital between 
individuals and unions. 
Freire’s politicised thesis is that education is a ‘practice of freedom’ which has the 
ontological aim of ‘humanisation’ (Freire 1970: 25), how to live a full and free human life. 
This process of liberation requires raising consciousness, collectivisation and praxis 
(Klandermans, 1986), defined as reflection and action upon the world in order to transform 
it. The methods aim to promote a dialogue between participants, looking at their 
experience of the real world, reflecting on it and changing it (Mayo, 1995). Dialogue here is 
understood not as a pure form of reflection, or ‘verbalism’ (Freire: 1970: 68) rather it is 
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mediated by experience of the material world, including emotions and the body. An 
important aspect of a dialogic approach is that it involves both understanding of and acting 
on the world (Vella, 2002).  
Emancipatory education is a ‘deconstructive methodology’ (Taylor, 1993) that attempts 
to de-codify our understanding of the world, a process which involves naming, reflecting 
and acting. The ‘knowledge’ and content of emancipatory education is based on the 
experience of the participants within the group and for this purpose, emancipatory 
education invariably uses small groups. For Freire it is through dialogue that humanisation 
and transformation of organisations and society takes place by creating a sense of 
connectedness and humanisation, parallel to the psychoanalytic project. 
Although an emancipatory framework is used in most GUF education programmes, its 
application depends on the specific union environment in which the methods are used as 
well as the orientations and capacities of individual tutors. For example, in established 
trade union education systems, including the UK, education methods have become 
stagnant and limited in their emancipatory potential in part because their administration of 
state funds distorts the original emancipatory objectives of trade union education. 
Additionally, because organisational decline is threatening union survival many 
organisations have developed defensive cultures, characterised by rigid thinking, 
idealisations and undemocratic practices that are diametrically opposed to emancipatory 
education methods. 
To understand the value of GUF education work, this Section will look at how an 
emancipatory model of education works and draw out the developmental 
‘parallelism’ (Armstrong, 2005) between this model of education and psychoanalytic 
processes. Although Emancipatory Education is not a therapeutic practice per se, it shares 
important developmental concepts with psychoanalysis, including its emancipatory aims 
(Britton, 2003), the emphasis on understanding internal and external realities in order to 
reduce inhibitions and build ego strength, using dynamic and dialogic processes between 
people, providing a containing and transitional framework for development and building 
solidarity between people.  
!
4.1 Emancipatory aims 
!
Freire’s teaching is based on the belief that the principal aim of learning is to establish 
ourselves as subjects with the capacity to define our own experiences, problems, and 
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desires and with it a capacity to act on the world (Brown and England, 2004). Additionally, 
emancipatory education aims to build agency by increasing decision-making capacity 
where people make use of the resources available to them (Freire, 1970). This model of 
agency can also be equated with one of the aims of psychoanalysis that is to build ego 
strength (Britton, 2003). Ego here is understood as the regulatory agency in the mind 
(Freud, 1923), where the individual is able to provide a boundary between and manage 
different internal and external realities (Rice, 1965).  
Emancipatory Education, as a result, highlights the embodied nature of learning and the 
need to incorporate practice and knowledge (Freire, 1970). This has an important parallel 
in psychoanalytic approaches that emphasise an embodied understanding of the self and 
its relationship with the material world (Miller and Rice, 1967; Menzies Lyth, 1989). We can 
think of this as a process where people can move from a paranoid schizoid position where 
difference is projected outwards, to a depressive position where there is a tolerance of 
complexity, vulnerability and difference. This movement between positions allows us to 
acknowledge our projections and increase our ‘capacity to experience our enemy as part 
of ourselves’ (Mosse and Zagier Roberts, 1994: 130). 
Building agency is, in part, a process of empowerment and rethinking our relationship to 
power, inevitably touching on our own internal relationships principally with the superego. 
Freire’s thesis is that full emancipation involves addressing both the external ‘oppressors’ 
and the internal ‘oppressor’, aspects of individual psychic experience which oppress or 
inhibit us. Freire’s understanding of the need to emancipate ourselves from internal 
oppression sits well with the work of Britton (1993) and his writing about the process of 
liberating the self from the superego by building the ego and adopting a position where the 
demands of the superego can be challenged. The process of empowerment within the 
emancipatory education tradition can be understood as precisely this movement from 
‘underdog’ to a self capable of making critical judgements about reality and of taking 
action. In psychoanalytic terms we can understand this as a process of development 
where the ego becomes the source of individual authority rather than the ‘monarchic 
autocracy’ (Britton, 2003: 104) of the superego. 
Mirroring this formulation of emancipation, Freire explicitly sees the overthrowing of 
oppression as a dual process, exposing both internal and external oppressors leading to a 
stronger sense of our own and other people’s humanity. His thesis is not that internal 
change is a substitute for attempts to change external reality, rather that removing external 
‘oppressors’ is not sufficient for full emancipation.  
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4.2 Dialogic methods 
!
Emancipatory education is fundamentally based on dialogic methods where alternative 
ideas and perspectives come about through interaction between different people and from 
which alternative politics can emerge. 
This requires setting up ‘communicative spaces’ (McKeown et al., 2014) where genuine 
dialogue is possible. Dialogue here is understood as a process where everyone presents 
their arguments but attempts to remain open to persuasion remaining respectful of 
difference (Raelin, 2008). This model, which emphasises egalitarian, transparent and 
discursive approaches to defining and solving problems, is ideally suited to stimulate 
democratic involvement in diverse settings (Croucher & Cotton, 2012). The use of small 
groups is highly effective in establishing dialogue (Feidel-Mertz, 1964; Huzzard, 2000) and 
providing important opportunities for group learning (Vella, 2002) 
Olmsted (1959) describes these primary and small groups as ‘incubators’ of human 
character based on a belief that human beings are essentially social and require 
interaction with other human beings and the material world to form a sense of self. 
Importantly for both Freire, and indeed psychoanalysis, learners and educators are both 
equally necessary to developing an awareness of reality. For Freire this dialogic model is 
emancipatory because it is based on the necessary liberation of the participant from object 
of study to subject of study. 
Union education is essentially a ‘problem posing education’ where both teachers and 
students are ‘critical co-investors in dialogue’ (Freire: 1970: 62) and therefore subjects in 
the educational process. This implies a shift in the positioning of teacher and participant, 
towards what he calls ‘co-intentional education’ (Freire, 1970: 22), moving away from a 
‘banking concept of education’ (Freire, 1970: 64), towards a dynamic dialogue between 
participants and between participants and tutors. 
!
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4.3 Consciousness Raising  
  
Freire’s writing (1998; 1994; 1974; 1970) describes two stages of learning: a growing 
awareness of reality and a commitment to transform that reality. Freire regards learning as 
consciousness raising, ‘conscientizacao’, where we learn about reality including issues of 
power and oppression. Emancipatory education takes an ontological position that our 
perceptions of reality are socially constructed, privileging some versions of reality over 
others and denying those realities that undermine established realities. As with 
psychoanalytically informed approaches, emancipatory education is premised on a 
‘recognition of reality’ (Freud, 1937) and bringing into consciousness those aspects of 
internal and external reality that have been dissociated (Freud, 1923).  
In learning theory part of this emancipatory process of seeing reality as it is, involves 
tackling core assumptions, or ‘threshold concepts’ (Meyer and Land; 2003) that provide a 
basis or a perspective to the subject area and are ‘transformative’ in that they trigger a 
change in consciousness (Meyer & Land, 2003; Mezirow, 1997) or authentic insight, 
described by the psychoanalyst Bion as a transformation into ‘being that something’ (Bion, 
1970).  
Methodologically, consciousness raising is stimulated through dialogue in small groups, 
providing an important reality-testing function, both at the level of raising consciousness of 
reality as it is but also developing ‘reality-tested relations’ (Main, 1975: 71). 
For example, the first stage of any educational activity involves participants defining the 
issues they are facing, a kind of ‘naming’ process or ‘problematising’ (Taylor, 2013) which 
then forms the focus of the following activities. This is an important orientation whereby 
engaging with people’s perceptions of their own situations, they become the subject rather 
than the object of critical investigation. The tutor has no role in establishing or naming 
problems, only to then ensure that the following activities are geared to address them. This 
framework has clear parallels to the therapeutic relationship where sessions are directed 
by the patient bringing issues, either consciously or unconsciously, that then determine the 
focus of the therapeutic work. 
Another important aspect of emancipatory education is to collectively understand the 
external environments in which we work and the dynamics that underpin them. A specific 
method used within psychoanalysis is to carry out workplace observations and analyse 
them through workplace observation groups. Although now rarely used by trade unions, 
Freire explicitly advocates this method of carrying out ‘observation visits’, which aim to 
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understand environments by observing ‘moments’ either direct or indirect at different times 
and locations. This includes taking notes and preparing a report for the learning group, 
whose aim is to decode and reconsider what was seen. For Freire there is a direct causal 
link between consciousness raising and concrete change such that by understanding 
environments we also help to build responses to the real problems that are being faced.  
!
!
4.4 Containment 
!
One of the difficulties for learners is to overcome the defences that we create to protect 
ourselves from the pain of being challenged and provoked out of an ‘everyday 
consciousness’ to allow for a realistic understanding of the world. This is a central aspect 
of psychoanalytically informed processes, dealing with ambivalence in relation to wanting 
and not wanting to know about reality, and the resistances we put in place to protect 
ourselves from the anxieties this evokes (Gosling, 1981). 
Anxieties are heightened by learning in groups, making it important to understand group 
dynamics and the use of defences that can obstruct learning (Krantz, 2006; Erlich, 2006), 
such as the inability to engage critically with the subject matter, attacking participants with 
different views or trying to find quick simple solutions in order to reduce group frustration.  
One of the most common defences in groups is denial of differences, reflected in the 
idea that we are all the same or that we can always reach consensus, common in trade 
union organisations and settings. Anxiety within groups can lead to toxicity where primitive 
defences are used involving projections of unwanted states (Main, 1975) into individuals, 
groups or people on the boundaries of organisations (Krantz, 2006). This can result in a 
focus on group survival and a dominance of basic assumption groups, rather than a focus 
on the work task itself (Bion, 1961).  
Emancipatory education focuses on often-harsh realities at work including victimisation, 
redundancies and a lack of power in relation to employers. Trade unionists themselves are 
vulnerable to anxiety and burnout in the face of the nature of their work, heightened in a 
time of recession. So it is important here not to underestimate the levels of anxiety 
experienced within these groups or the importance of the containing function of the 
educational frame and the tutor to manage them. 
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An emancipatory framework is designed to manage the likely increase in anxiety of 
participants through guided activities, setting clear timeframes and through tutors' 
modelling of behaviours. Emancipatory Education consistently follows three main stages; 
problem identification, getting information and planning. Activities are designed to be 
familiar and clear by having explicit aims, tasks and time limits, with instructions at each 
stage of the process.  
Bion describes maternal containment as a process where the mother ‘detoxifies’ the 
infant’s destructive feelings by taking them in, digesting them and then returning them in a 
digested form (Sandler, 2005). The infant’s experience is that although it has projected 
something painful into the mother, they were able to tolerate and process it and the infant 
is able to introject the idea of an object that is capable of dealing with anxiety. Parallel to 
this, an emancipatory education framework is set to provide containment of group 
anxieties to allow for learning, but one which is sufficiently porous to allow for experiential 
learning to take place at the individual and group level and to focus on securing real 
outcomes for participants.  
Much of this containment comes down to the capacity of the tutor to provide a secure 
and predictable framework for participants and to negotiate the tensions between 
individual difference and membership of a union (Gosling, 1981). Although the role of a 
tutor is not to provide interpretations specifically about group dynamics (Miller, 1989) as 
with therapists and consultants within the psychoanalytic tradition, tutors are involved in 
managing group dynamics. They will inevitably have to bear high levels of confusion and 
projections from the group (Bion, 1952; Main, 1975), and develop their awareness of 
group dynamics and how to manage them. Importantly the tutor is also responsible for 
modelling the values and principles of emancipatory education, including confidentiality, 
equal respect between students and acknowledgment of the realities in the classroom. In 
the absence of clinical or workplace supervision for most trade union tutors this capacity 
tends to be diverse and highly individualised with tutors having to find alternative support 
systems to manage these often overwhelming experiences within groups.  
!
4.5 Solidarity  
!
Solidarity is a central organising principle for trade union activity, referring both to the 
principle of common action with others and to the identification of one’s own interests with 
theirs (Hyman, 2001). This model of cooperation is linked to psychoanalytic formulations of 
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cohesion in groups established through identification (Freud, 1930) and a focus on group 
tasks (Menzies Lyth, 1989). For members of trade unions, this involves the commitment to 
support other members in response to conflicts with employers.  
Solidarity can be conceived in two senses: first, as a normative or moral principle that 
creates an obligation to support other workers and groups; second, as ‘enlightened self-
interest’ motivated by the belief that an injury to one is an injury to all representing only a 
weak moral imperative. At national and international levels trade unions often move 
between these two different modalities although there is an increased emphasis on mutual 
and concrete benefits from solidarity within this period of economic globalisation and 
political conflict (Stirling, 2007).  
The emphasis on small group problem solving is based in part on a pragmatic aim to 
pool ideas and experience, with trade unionists often having enormous experience in 
dealing with workplace problems. The final stage of any trade union education activity is to 
plan concrete steps forward. These ‘solutions’ are based entirely on the experience and 
ideas of the participants, making use only of the experience within the group. 
Working in small groups makes it possible to build strong emotional ties sufficient to 
build a sense of altruism (Freud, 1930) and reinforce an often deep understanding of the 
importance of collectivism. Small group educational activities are helpful in building ties 
where ‘solidarity is un-self-conscious’ (Olmsted, 1959). This is in part because small 
groups provide an important ‘holding environment’ (Praglin, 2006) where people can 
potentially feel secure enough to speak honestly and with authenticity allowing meaningful 
relationships to be formed. As a result, being in small groups allows a sense of 
identification and ‘belonging’ (Bion, 1961; Turquet, 1975) where people can generalise 
about their connectedness, but at the same time offer individuals a specific and unique 
role in the group. This sense of belonging could be understood as a workplace equivalent 
of secure attachment, a necessary basis for building mental health (Fonagy, 1994).  
In large group settings such as union congresses, there are risks of reinforcing basic 
assumptions, such as ‘oneness’ (Turquet, 1975) or pairing in the attempt to create 
cohesion. Although less likely, small groups can also be vulnerable to strong identification 
with the ‘union’, which can lead to ‘gang states of mind’ (Canham, 2002) where the 
diversity of memberships and individual difference are denied (Hoggett, 1992; Winnicott, 
1950). 
Trade union education’s attention to developing realistic plans in the final stage of 
activity is helpful in overcoming the common basic assumptions found in trade union 
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groups. If the real workplace problems have been identified clearly at the beginning, then 
the focus on finding realistic responses to them can minimise retreating into a basic 
assumption, particularly the idea that the ‘union’ will omnipotently provide a final solution. It 
places the responsibility and activity firmly in the hands of the participants and in so doing 
reinforces their sense of agency (Pogue White, 2006). Further, small groups focused on 
tasks reinforce the solidaristic relationships between the participants, building confidence 
in the direct benefits of collective action and encouraging cooperation between them 
(Flavin et al., 2009). 
!
!
4.6 Transitional Spaces 
!
Using Winnicott’s idea of transitional phenomena, we can understand trade union 
education as an ‘intermediate area of experience’ (Winnicott, 1971: 2) which is ‘in-
between’ (Praglin, 2006) union organisation and outside it. Winnicott saw transitional 
phenomena as a ‘third area’ of life made up of both inner and external realities with 
transitional spaces providing a ‘resting-place’ (Winnicott, 1971: 3) from our attempts to 
keep them separate. This is particularly the case with education settings that create 
spaces where dialogue and emotional experience can openly take place. As a result 
participants are likely to feel a stronger sense of freedom to talk openly about their 
experience, including their emotional experiences within a group setting. Gosling (1994) 
argues that, as a result, these transitional spaces are important locations for innovation 
and experimentation, much needed resources within often stagnating trade union 
organisations.  
One way in which these dynamics are explored is through simulation exercises, or role-
play involving negotiations or situations of conflict. Although often initially unpopular with 
participants because of the experiential nature of learning, they are highly effective 
developmentally as they encourage people to work in teams on common tasks within 
complex scenarios. The use of role-play in trade union education is a version of a 
psychoanalytic ‘event’ in that it creates a temporary ‘play space’ (Winnicott, 1971) for 
individuals to carry out activities as a form of ‘serious play’ (Evans and Palmer, 1989). The 
content of the role-play is based on people’s experiences and feelings in an attempt to 
trigger experiential learning rather than ideological or theoretical learning.  
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The use of role-plays exposes often denied and under-articulated unconscious 
dynamics within groups (Erlich, 2006). From a psychoanalytic perspective well-contained 
learning experiences have a powerful effect on the individual providing, when successful, a 
sense of satisfaction and hope that contact with other people can realistically be positive. 
For Winnicott (1971), participation allows individuals to reduce their guilt about aggression 
towards the group, and strong feelings of fear, and build non-idealistic collaborations with 
others.  
The availability of different roles within simulation exercises allows participants, often for 
the first time, to experience different perspectives and positions such as taking authority or 
arguing back. A key advantage of a role play format is that it allows argument to be 
experienced as non-personal and appropriate to the task, and can encourage participants 
to claim ‘the right to form a judgement’ (Britton, 2003: 108) and an important opportunity 
for ‘benign projective identification’ (Main, 1975). This can, if used well, contribute to 
building participants’ ‘negative capability’ (Bion, 1970) to understand individual and group 
dynamics, experience uncertainty and make realistic assessments of what can be 
changed.  
This emphasis on creating spaces in education has to be balanced with the idea that 
there is a ‘paradox in learning’ (Armstrong, 2005: 181) such that once a model or course 
becomes formulated and, as is often the case institutionalised, the spontaneity of 
experiential learning within the space decreases.  
!
4.7 Building Unions 
!
The objective of emancipatory education is not simply to build social capital but also to 
build political capital (Banks & Methgar, 2005), the resources to make political gains and 
shift the power balance at work and in society more generally. The broad political agenda 
for all trade unions is to build human welfare and social justice, which not only involves 
raising standards for workers through negotiations with employers, but also necessarily 
involves societal and political projects. 
The adoption of emancipatory education methods to build union organisation has a long 
tradition in most parts of the world. Even in regions such as Eastern Europe where the 
methods were not introduced until the 1990s, there is widespread acceptance that the 
methods can be used for organising and building solidaristic ties. For many unions their 
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organising and education work will fall under one department and organising drives will 
use emancipatory education methods to engage existing and potential memberships. 
This is particularly clear in union traditions that emphasise ‘social-capital formation and 
mutual-aid functions’ (Jarley, 2005: 1) in order to build union organisation. It means that 
resources can be mobilised within the group, even where dense working class networks 
that formed the basis for trade union movements no longer exist. This is particularly 
important to the GUFs when affiliates are asked to make difficult decisions about 
committing resources internationally where identifications are harder to make. One of the 
problems with looking just at social capital and organising is the tendency for ‘like’ to 
attract ‘like’ (Clawson, 2005: 40). As a result unions that use emancipatory education have 
to be careful that attempts to build social capital prioritise activities that are inclusive and 
therefore attractive to diverse groups. 
This is a much broader understanding of trade unions than the Webbs’ idea of unions 
improving employment conditions for wage earners (Webb & Webb, 1913). This orientation 
regards unions’ organisational legitimacy as based on their capacity to serve human 
welfare rather than narrow interests such as wage claims or collective bargaining. It is a 
political view that the interests of trade union members are not separate from the interests 
of society at large and that in order to renew and maintain their legitimacy with members 
and society at large they have to advance the interests of a broadly defined constituency.  
In order for this model to work it has to transform ‘individual dissatisfaction into 
collective grievance’ (Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman, 2013: 177), unions have to create a 
collective sense of injustice, including a sense of who is responsible for it and sufficient 
organisation to shape collective demands and action. 
The GUFs by their nature are orientated towards this bigger political project of re-
establishing social justice through international solidarity action.  
However, taking this broad political perspective presents the GUFs with the problem of 
how to reconnect members to a sense of ‘belonging’ (Gallin, 2014) to an internationalist 
perspective. Currently the GUFs represent predominantly a ‘union of strangers’ (Jarley, 
2005: 7) with information and control of political advantages maintained at leadership 
level. In the next Section it is argued that in order for this internationalist strategy to work 
and given their resource limitations, the GUFs will need to develop the scope and the 
density of their solidaristic networks so as to sustain their political objectives into the 
future.  
!
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!
Section 5: Conclusion !
5.1 The political choice 
!
This context statement started by exploring the changing political, economic and 
sociological factors affecting the future capacity of the GUFs to coordinate solidarity 
internationally. In Global Unions Global Business the dilemma faced by the GUFs is 
framed as a conflict between the Logic of Legitimacy and the Logic of Resources. The 
political choice for the GUFs and their affiliates framed in specific concrete terms, to 
secure an increased percentage of trade union resources to the GUFs as a response to 
declining national membership levels and reduced leverage with international capital. 
The decline in financial resources is a long-standing problem within the GUFs although 
there has been a marked reluctance both internally and with key affiliates to address 
financial issues head on. In 2000 the ITUC (then the ICFTU) carried out the Millennium 
Review, looking at the structural options facing them and the GUFs. Although revealing 
some important data for the first time and thus opening up a debate within the GUFs, the 
review did not provide a broader platform for debate amongst key affiliates in Germany, 
Netherlands, Scandinavian and North American countries. Instead the review was totally 
ignored by the GUFs, possibly because of the coordination role that the ITUC took during 
the process, something that would act as a disincentive for the GUFs. What was distinctly 
lacking from the process was any debate about the future political aims of the global 
unions, and with it ignoring the core justification for maintaining these international 
structures.  
This thesis has stayed with this central dilemma, but has taken a broader look at the 
basis of GUF legitimacy and resources. Firstly it is proposed that GUF legitimacy does not 
rest entirely on membership size and geographic scope or international agreements with 
MNCs; instead it argued that increasingly the GUFs’ political proposals and activities are 
necessary for their continued legitimacy. Developing political responses to the current 
economic crisis is required to act as a ‘counterpower’ to neo-liberal economic globalisation 
and the systemic problems faced by working people. Political action around social justice 
are increasingly central to this political struggle, demanding that the GUFs increase their 
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strategies and activities to engage with the organised political movements developing 
internationally, from which new generations of activists and political identities will be 
formed. 
Secondly a broader understanding of the resources available to the GUFs is proposed 
which highlights their capacities to build the social and political capital required to sustain 
international solidarity. This capacity, principally achieved through a model of emancipatory 
education, is a key resource that the GUFs need to expand and mainstream across all of 
their activities and expand to include the participation of a broader range of networks and 
associations. This educational resource is the basis of the GUFs’ capacity to bring about 
progressive change, by building a deep level of engagement, which in turn acts as a basis 
for international cooperation and strategic exchange between diverse groups and 
individuals. 
The strategic advantage of using an emancipatory education model and methodologies 
is that it allows a deeper and broader exchange between trade union organisations and 
individual activists. As has been argued, this is important not just in developing social 
capital, it also provides unions who are often working in isolation with ‘field enlarging’ 
strategies. Where unions have successfully, or unsuccessfully, developed responses to 
workplace issues these experiences when pooled and exchanged through GUF networks 
and activities create valuable collective knowledge and capacity for union building. 
However, it is argued here that through the use of emancipatory education methods 
across all of these networking activities the efficiency of those exchanges will increase.  
This links back to the issue of legitimacy, where the international regulatory and 
negotiation work of the GUFs, important in relation to key European affiliates, has to be 
met with a capacity to exploit it at local level particularly in developing countries where the 
vast majority of GUF membership works. In turn, the capacity of GUF affiliates to 
implement international regulatory mechanisms, such as IFAs, serves to raise their 
leverage with employers because of the increased credibility of those agreements.  
In most cases it could be argued that the regulatory work of the GUFs was developed 
from the top down, representing the interests of key unions in Western Europe and further 
that the methods used in negotiating and implementing agreements and organising 
networks suffer from limited dialogue and debate with affiliates in developing countries. In 
particular, there is very limited scope to debate political strategies in response to MNCs 
within the GUFs. There is a tendency to use the networks as procedural processes where 
complaints are raised by unions in developing countries to headquarter unions such that 
the power relations, both in relation to the company and between unions, remain intact. 
!93
That is not to say that unions cannot see the value of building networks in multinational 
companies but it does question the strength of this connection. What current practice does 
not seem to do is act as a sufficient basis for building dense social networks and with them 
a strong enough solidaristic relationship to mobilise internationally. This leaves the GUFs 
with a political deficit, and not just a purely financial one.  
One of the risks of this political deficit is that it limits the GUFs capacity to act in relation 
to the key human rights and social justice issues that they were set up to address. A 
comment made about the ICFTU seems an appropriate warning to the GUFs here: ‘The 
institution lives far too much in a bureaucratic and abstract world where form takes 
precedence over substance and preoccupations with turf, jurisdiction and status 
overshadow the original purpose of the exercise’ (Gallin, 2014: 82). 
Restructuring the GUFs and increasing cooperation between them, although financially 
necessary, are essentially strategies for managing decline. As a result they do not address 
the fundamental questions about how they can mobilise workers in defence of collective 
interests and values. Kelly (1998) usefully categorises the necessary elements of 
mobilisation into: a conception of common interest; some form of collective organisation; 
and a perception of opportunities for successful outcomes. The biggest challenge to the 
GUFs is to build engagement with affiliates and more broadly across social movements to 
create a sufficiently powerful conception of common interest to form the basis of collective 
organisation. 
Increasingly, labour movements are integrated into broader social movements and work 
with a wide range of civic and single-issue groups. The majority of these in developing 
countries operate informally, with trade unions considered exceptional in their levels of 
organisation and financing as well as their capacity to disrupt economic and political 
activity. For many unions, their solidaristic networks are dense and their leaderships are 
capable of adopting the role of ‘visionaries’ (Sullivan, 2010b) within often unfocused 
collective organisations that come out of specific protests and disputes. 
This model of trade unionism is sometimes described as social movement unionism, 
emphasising the capacity for mobilisation as a way of turning association (numbers of 
people forming a collectivity) into organisation (capacity for collective action in opposition 
to capital and the state) (Jarley, 2005). Social movement unionism is characterised by not 
limiting activities to traditional collective bargaining and focusing on relationships with 
employers, but rather opting to work with broader social and political opportunities and to 
carry out direct political action. It also means widening the organising model from a simple 
one of recruiting union members as the sole basis for union revitalisation (Sullivan, 2010b) 
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towards an expanded model of building relationships with existing and often spontaneous 
groups of working people. In the current political climate this is an important opportunity for 
trade unions, where the experienced activists within them offer an important resource to 
the many self-organised and spontaneous collective actions and networks that exist within 
social movements. 
!
5.2 The Proposal 
!
One of the key resources that trade unions offer civil society is their educators and 
activists experienced in running activities in a way that builds capacity within groups. 
Emancipatory education methods respond to the growing need to build social and political 
capital though understanding societal changes, building dialogue and strong solidaristic 
relationships in situations of industrial conflict and mobilising diminishing resources. This is 
not a process of building ‘organic solidarity’ (Hyman, 1997: 529), rather it is precisely this 
educational model’s capacity to contain differences and conflict that gives its relevance to 
the task of building collective organisation in the current political and social climate. 
A key reason why education has been so overlooked in the GUFs’ attempts to secure 
their position internationally is that educational work is often undervalued within the GUFs 
and by their affiliates. On a practical level one of the reasons for this is because the 
majority of their affiliates at any one time are not engaged in educational project activity. 
This means that experience of the link between education and union building is often 
restricted to new affiliates in developing and transition economies and the small number of 
German, Dutch and Scandinavian unions that provide the main bulk of funding. Even 
where donor unions are actively involved in GUF education projects, as with the Swedish 
trade unions, appreciation of the emancipatory impact of the methods will be limited to a 
few hundred trade union leaders and branch activists.  
As a result, the hundreds of experienced educators that carry out GUF projects are 
often regarded as ancillary to the organisations, a status reflected in their temporary 
contracts and lack of contribution to regional or international decision making structures. 
Although project staff tend to be highly engaged with affiliates and with each other, 
politically they are not highly valued nor, therefore, influential in decisions about 
organisational change within the GUFs. 
One of the deeper reasons why GUF education projects are undervalued relates to the 
inherent difficulties in carrying out union building work. Union building is not a straight-
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forward process because it involves managing the diversity of individual, organisational 
and political perspectives that exist within trade unions (Hoggett, 1992). The process of 
union building is a developmental one and as a result involves overcoming both the 
psychological and structural difficulties of looking realistically at problems and engaging in 
collective problem solving. In a situation of ‘organisational overwhelm’ (Perini, 2010) there 
is often a reluctance to engage realistically with the problems that unions face or to 
address the individual psychological development of members, in an attempt to avoid 
‘catastrophic change’ (Sedgwick, 1982).  
Emancipatory education requires working with groups and individuals, managing the 
politics of difference while maintaining the ‘cross-sectional demands’ (Sedgwick, 1982) of 
diverse memberships and organisations. Education by its nature can raise difficult 
emotional issues for participants including acknowledging the presence of need and 
dependency on others and being able to challenge often strongly held ideological views 
and positions about trade unionism. Using Freire’s formulation, education involves 
challenging both external and internal oppressors, representing a complex political and 
psychological view of the world and of change.  
For some trade unions the psychological aspects of education work are not believed to 
be the legitimate work of trade unions, preferring instead to focus education on industrial 
and ideological themes and on the external environment. The psychosocial basis of 
Freire’s model however regards union building as essentially a project of emancipation. 
This is understood as a dual task of addressing the external reality of oppression, as well 
as internal psychic oppression, where individual psychological empowerment or building 
ego strength is central to the political project of organising. One of the consequences of 
trade unions denying emancipatory education’s dynamic model of development, is that 
education becomes marginalised, understood as a support service rather than the 
principal tool for union building. 
For unions in hostile environments a common defensive position is to locate all 
problems in external actors, as a way of creating cohesive group identification. Although 
this is, at times, an important driver of solidarity action such cultures can have the 
consequence of arresting the development of social and political capital at membership 
level. Censorship of dialogue and denial of the diversity of opinions and conflict inherent 
within all groups, is a ‘strategy of survival rather than development” (Armstrong, 2005: 89) 
leaving members without the authentic relationships and political framework that they 
need. 
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The proposal of this thesis is to prioritise the union building work of the GUFs across all 
areas of activity as a response to the political deficit that the GUFs currently face. This 
emancipatory educational model is one that is essentially political in that it emphasises 
consciousness raising and collective action in response to the economic structures in 
place. A union building process is one that it encourages both the development of strong 
solidaristic ties between workers as well as providing a space for dialogue that allows for 
the development of common ideas and strategies. That is, emancipatory education 
methods can build both the social and political capital needed for the GUFs to bring about 
real social change.  
The proposal does not involve any further restructuring of the GUFs but rather a focus 
on work that creates spaces or ‘cognitive frames’ (Culpepper, 2002: 778) where new 
ideas, politics and action can be determined by activists and trade unionists. This 
necessarily includes international exchange and coordination but it is a model that re-
orientates work and remaining GUF funding into educational activities. The key capacity of 
unions and GUFs to create spaces where new political ideas are evolved has to take 
priority over executive, bureaucratic, and organisational processes.  
This would involve prioritising funding for educational work as well as using 
emancipatory methods across all areas of activity, in particular global meetings and 
networking activities. There is a long history of dissatisfaction with the efficiency of 
international meetings and network activities, in large part due to the lack of dialogue and 
social capital that they support. There is a tendency to use the networks as procedural 
processes through which complaints are raised by unions in developing countries to 
headquarter unions while the power relations, both in relation to the company and 
between unions remain intact. Further, in order to stimulate the degree of internal diversity 
and democracy needed within the GUFs their ‘dialogic capacity’ (Culpepper, 2002) needs 
to be built so that they can coordinate genuine exchange of ideas and experiences among 
increasingly diverse memberships. 
This leaves us with a further question about whether the use of emancipatory methods 
is sufficient to create political power within trade unions or whether unions need to 
introduce ‘political education’ (Gallin, 2014) which looks explicitly at the politics of union 
building. This thesis has argued throughout that a model of emancipatory education is 
intrinsically politicising because it provides important transitional spaces where these new 
ideas can be articulated and developed. In particular, the methods facilitate dialogue 
between diverse groups and issues, which is likely to be important as political 
developments take place and social movements emerge.  
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The GUFs have in many ways benefitted from a high degree of institutional inertia when 
it comes to addressing their financial deficit in that they have remained relatively stable 
organisations to date. However, the absence of any organisational crisis has allowed the 
GUFs to ignore their growing political deficits. It could be argued that a level of ‘creative 
destruction’ (Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman, 2013: 197) needs to take place for them to 
orientate their structures and activities to the needs of future memberships and workers.  
The radical reintroduction of democratic practices through emancipatory education 
programmes into the GUFs across such diverse memberships requires patient attention to 
union building and with it the capacity to bear disappointment and conflict. The proposal 
represents a shift in leadership power and opens unions up to the possibility of policy 
changes such as a break with social partnership models. However, the GUFs are well 
suited to this important task because they are based on ‘generalised principles’ of 
solidarity and social justice and are therefore highly durable (Ruggie, 1993) in the context 
of a proposed period of organisational crisis. 
Fimmen steadily reminds us that the work of global unions involves two objectives 
which, at times, are in tension: to operate within the existing economic system in order to 
negotiate the best conditions for working people but at the same time to develop 
alternatives to it. This is essentially the tension that the GUFs need to navigate now, and 
the proposal is to emphasise the development of the social and political capital that can 
shape this alternative rather than a continued strategy of adaptation to the current 
economic order. The proposed strategy is to use an emancipatory model of education, in 
order to create the important transitional spaces where people can develop their own 
ideas about the construction of social justice at work.  
!
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PRAISE FOR GLOBAL UNIONS, GLOBAL BUSINESS
‘This pathbreaking book provides both an invaluable resource on the history of global 
union federations, and new insights on current issues and contestations. It will be of 
great interest to all with an interest in the state of unions worldwide, commentators 
and critics of globalization, and those concerned with fairness at work in a wide range 
of contexts.’
Professor Geoffrey Wood, University of Sheffield
‘Powerfully argued and impressively documented, this stimulating book provides 
a readable, insightful introduction to the challenges facing global trade unionism. 
It will prove of tremendous value to both union activists and academics teaching 
international business, international employment relations and HRM.’
Professor John McIlroy, Keele University
‘This book is an excellent example of public social science. Focused principally on 
global union federations it is historically informed, empirically rich and argues 
that the key to international union renewal and success is education (informed by 
research). I most strongly recommend it.’ 
Professor Peter Fairbrother, RMIT University, Melbourne
‘Elizabeth Cotton and Richard Croucher have written the essential guide to 
international trade unionism: its actors, its structure, its history, its functions, its 
activities. I know of no other recent book that details as clearly what the international 
trade union movement actually does and why it is important for workers everywhere. 
Its weaknesses are not glossed over but Cotton and Croucher have proposals on how 
these can be addressed. A must read for trade unionists and for activists in the global 
justice and solidarity movement.’
Dan Gallin, Global Labour Institute
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T h i s  book is aimed at all those interested in the experience of working people in the current phase of globalisation. We have incurred debts to many such people in writing it. Experts in international business, corporate social 
responsibility, international trade unionism and others have generously shared 
information and their thoughts with us. We therefore thank Mare Anceva, Ross 
Brennan, Samar Badar Al-Husan, Alexandr Ivakhno, Aranya Pakapath, Cristhian 
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Richard Croucher
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Preface to the 
 second edition
T h i s  book’s first edition attracted considerable interest from academics, trade unionists, labour educators and experts in globalisation. The appearance of a second revised version provides us with the opportunity to respond to some 
points made by reviewers. We were fortunate to have our work reviewed by an 
impressive and cosmopolitan group of academics and practitioners. The judgements 
published by those experts were generous; they were also consistent in stressing the 
book’s value in terms of explaining how the GUFs work. 
I
Anibel Ferus-Comelo, writing in the Journal of Economic Geography (August 2009) 
felt us to be ‘well placed to analyse the position of these historic labour institutions’. 
She described Global Unions Global Business as ‘An exciting read’ that made ‘a 
valuable contribution to the vast body of literature on globalisation and labour by 
engaging insightfully with subjects rarely touched upon by proponents of labour 
internationalism, namely the financial and human resources of Global Union 
Federations, their governance structures and their role in the political education of 
union members. This is clearly an ‘insiders’ account worth taking seriously.’ Rachel 
Anand, an academic and ex-GUF official, also drew attention to the ‘excellent 
discussion of the little known structure and organization of the GUFs.’ (Historical 
Studies in Industrial Relations 25/6).
Salma Soliman, an expert on the Arab world, reporting on the work in the 
influential Africa-oriented Pambazuka News asserted the book’s wider significance, 
suggesting that it: ‘Makes important reading for all those interested in social justice 
in Africa and indeed the world. Brief, concentrated, clearly written, authoritative 
and well-documented, it is the first book for a generation to look in detail at the 
workings of a little-known and therefore widely misunderstood level of trade union 
activity, the Global Union Federations (GUFs), and their relations with activists on 
the one hand and the corporate world on the other’(Pambazuka News, Issue 451). 
The global labour authority Ronaldo Munck, writing in the first edition of Global 
Labour Journal, picked up on similar aspects. Finding it ‘a fine book’, he joined 
Ferus-Comelo, Anand and Soliman in underlining its contribution to furthering 
understanding of the Global Union Federations’ governance and activity: ‘The 
singular contribution..... is a close and detailed analysis of the governance and 
resources of the GUFs.’ Munck also stressed our educational and regional themes: 
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‘A major – and perhaps unique – emphasis is placed on the importance of education, 
too often taken for granted by labour strategists.. ...... I would mention the emphasis 
the authors place on the regional dimension which they, correctly in my view, posit 
as a neglected yet increasingly important level of activity between the national and 
the inter-national.’ Munck went further than the reviewers in drawing out the work’s 
wider significance: ‘On the face of it Global Unions, Global Business is a study of the 
role of the Global Union Federations (GUFs) in international employment relations. 
It certainly delivers a closely observed insider based account of the opportunities and 
constraints faced by the GUFs in the era of high globalization. However, given its 
scope and the experience of the authors it goes much further to provide an ambitious 
and grounded answer to the question of what is to be done by labour to answer the 
challenges posed by globalization’. 
In broad terms, these estimations were endorsed by the American labour 
educator Tracy Chang who, addressing her fellow educators through the pages of 
the US-based Labor Studies Journal, identified a specific use for our publication. 
After summarising its content and suggesting that it ‘provides a good overview of the 
GUFs and how they function’, she reached the conclusion that it is ‘A useful book for 
advanced union leaders who wish to study globalisation and international strategic 
campaigns and for labor educators… (Labor Studies Journal 35 (1 ). This was indeed 
one of the important contexts for which we originally designed the book. 
II
We feel the need to respond to some minor critical comments made by reviewers, 
since they allow us to clarify significant elements of our main arguments and also to 
update readers on the current state of writing on our subject. Ferus-Comelo points out 
for example that, despite the book’s title it is not about global business. Her remark 
is accurate in that we were not centrally concerned with corporations. We would 
nevertheless add that the book does cast a backlight on business activity by looking 
at the global labour aspects of companies’ operations. Paul Gooderham, a specialist 
in international business, writing in the Norwegian union journal LO Aktuelt (02/09), 
recognised this. He highlighted our analysis of the Global Union Federations’ relations 
with MNCs: ‘Without in any way idealizing GUFs Croucher and Cotton demonstrate 
very convincingly the ability GUFs have to  monitor the activities of multinational 
companies across continents and to negotiate binding agreements on behalf of 
employees.... ‘However, our main response to Ferus-Comelo’s comment is to invite 
readers to reflect on the deliberate ambiguity of the way that we use ‘business’ in the 
title. The book’s central argument concerns the global nature of the GUFs’ business’ 
despite the influence wielded by the unions of the developed world within them. We 
view matters from the sweatshops of the ‘developing’ world and not only through the 
GUF General Secretary’s office window. As Anand recognised, it is written ‘from a 
perspective that avoids as far as possible the ‘Eurocentric’ position’. 
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We analysed the ways that power is distributed within the Global Union 
Federations and proposed methods of alleviating the problems, in ways consistent 
with the GUFs’ traditions. Our proposed solutions are two-pronged. We call for 
unions in the developed world to increase their material contributions to the global 
level of unionism. We do not leave the matter there. At the same time, we argue that 
small groups of national unions working together can use educational activity to 
re-build the trade unions in a ‘mini-lateral’ way, simultaneously using the expertise 
and resources of the GUFs to increase local participation in their affairs. We propose 
an extension of those forms of active education which socialize and arm activists and 
which also encourage democratisation.
One reviewer, the retired British trade union official Regan Scott, criticised this 
argument. He suggested that the GUFs were not likely to abandon their classical 
tool of international collective bargaining in favour of educational activity, nor 
to establish the latter as a rival to it. We replied extensively to this criticism in 
the publication in which it originally appeared (the European construction union 
publication CLR News 1/2010). We did so in concert with four other academic 
colleagues (John McIlroy, Gary Daniels, Martin Upchurch and Graham Taylor) also 
criticised by Scott and in whose company we were pleased to find ourselves. We 
respond more briefly here. 
Scott’s criticism is helpful to the extent that it provides us with the opportunity 
to re-iterate our original argument in clear terms. First, we did not and do not 
suggest that international collective bargaining should be abandoned; rather, we 
pointed out that most of the world’s unions are little involved in it and are unaware 
of the opportunities which International Framework Agreements can provide. Union 
education can address the issue and function as a complement to international 
collective bargaining. 
To reiterate our argument in a little more detail. International Framework 
Agreements bargained by GUFs and multinationals are declarations of principle. 
They do not embody joint regulation of substantive employment issues. Nor do 
they ensure union recognition. Indeed, they may even on occasion help companies 
evade or postpone the extension of recognition to unions outside of the developed 
world. Progress requires GUFs to engage in power-building through education 
if they are to assemble the components of a challenge that can facilitate genuine 
joint regulation. In the process, participation in the GUFs’ affairs can be promoted 
through educational processes. 
Moreover, education can assist more widely in vital information exchange on 
what organising approaches work best in practice, as well as in the ideological 
and practical construction of solidarity, something that does not necessarily arise 
‘spontaneously’. This is no small matter when the vast majority of the world’s 
workers make their livings not in MNCs nor even in their supply chains but rather 
in ‘informal’ employment. Unless and until unions find effective ways of organising 
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these workers, collective agreements at the global level will have only limited impact 
on them. Moreover, the GUFs’ and ITUC’s legitimacy as the voice of world labour 
will be open to challenge as they will continue to represent only a small proportion 
of workers.
III
Geoff Wood, an academic specialist in employment relations, writing in the 
Canadian-based Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations (64 (4)) felt that he was 
reviewing ‘a fine book’ but also called for more empirical detail. 
Wood’s request has to some extent been met by other authors. A considerable 
volume of relevant material has been published since the appearance of the first 
edition of our book. Indeed, a huge volume of data is contained in an encyclopaedic 
two-volume survey comprising nearly 900 pages on the GUFs and the European 
union federations published by the German trade union foundation the Hans Bőckler 
Stiftung: Die globalen und europäischen Gewerkschaftsverbände (‘The Global and 
European Trade Union Federations’) by Hans-Wolfgang Platzer and Torsten Müller 
(Berlin:Edition Sigma, 2009). The research for this work was based on extensive 
official organisational documents deposited in the Archiv der Sozialdemokratie of 
the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Bonn. We used materials from the same source and 
added to them by our own deposit in that archive. Platzer and Müller’s documentary 
analysis was supplemented by interviews with General Secretaries and other senior 
officials. This German-language publication therefore represents a rich source of 
official information and discussion, leavened by academic comment. 
A second significant publication to have appeared since our first edition is an 
excellent historical analysis of the very uneven development of international union 
networks in Ford and General Motors between 1953 and 2001 by Thomas Fetzer, ‘The 
late birth of transnational labour cooperation: Cross-border trade union networks 
at Ford and General Motors (1953-2001)’ (Labour History Review 75(1): 76-97). It is 
impossible and unnecessary to do full justice to Fetzer’s subtle analysis here. 
The key point that we wish to make is that this detailed article complements 
and supports our analysis of the development of transnational union networks. We 
identified a number of conditions for successful network building and explained 
that network building in MNCs is a difficult and problematic process best carried 
out on a regional basis and using educational methods over a long period. Fetzer’s 
impressive study confirms the importance of a regional basis and of the long-term 
perspective required, although it makes no mention of educational activity. 
Fetzer documents just under half a century of failed co-ordination initiatives 
beginning in the early 1950s initially led by the American United Auto Workers 
through its then strong influence in the International Metalworkers’ Federation. 
He shows how increased though still modest co-operation through what he calls 
‘risk communities’ (whereby the risk of companies establishing intense competition 
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between plants may be contained) has been built. In doing so, he warns against 
teleological conceptions of a growing transnational labour identity. Greater, although 
strictly limited co-ordination has arisen from a very specific combination of political 
and economic circumstances, and could easily be reversed. Most importantly in 
relation to our arguments, he argues that to the extent that greater co-ordination 
has been achieved, it has been based on the growing threat of competition from 
plants outside of Europe and the USA. There has been, he suggests ‘A conscious 
juxtaposition of (West) European and non-European interests’ (93). The article 
therefore reminds us of an important political reality. It shows how, where the 
regional basis is Europe alone rather than a group of regional networks across the 
world, that a ‘Fortress Europe’ mentality inimical to a global approach may emerge. 
Again, this is in line with our argument that the tendency in Western European 
(and especially British) unions to conflate ‘international’ with ‘European’ may 
operate in ways contradictory to the interests of their counterparts in developing 
countries. This contention informed our critical analysis of how International 
Framework Agreements are used by the GUFs. Moreover, we strongly suggest 
that it underlines the importance of generating a shift in power within the GUFs 
themselves that allows unions from outside of the developed world greater influence 
than they currently enjoy if greater global co-ordination is to be achieved.      
IV
In this new edition, we take the opportunity to update our list of International 
Framework Agreements. This evidence, taken together with our recent conversations 
with international union activists, confirm us in the view that we expressed in the 
first edition that they make considerable demands on GUF resources. During 2009, 
relatively few new IFAs were signed; in general, these were limited in their geographic 
scope than previously since some covered regions of the world rather than the globe. 
We also note that GUFs were increasingly signing Memoranda of Understanding 
with companies, reflecting a growing realisation that specific agreements on union 
facilities are the key issue. Further, we see that significant campaigns were being 
conducted that did not (as we pointed out had been the case with the ICEM and 
Anglo-American plc) result in IFAs but nevertheless brought GUFs into significant 
dialogues with important companies. 
Besides correcting some typographical errors which occurred in the first edition, 
we have also taken the opportunity to add a brief new chapter (six) to provide 
an account of the GUFs’ campaigning activities. The case study which we pursue 
in this new chapter is of the campaign recently run by the IUF in relation to 
the global Anglo-Dutch company Unilever. It shows how the IUF initiated and 
orchestrated a campaign centring on both union rights in Pakistan and on the 
crucial ‘externalisation’ or employment issue which we stressed in the first edition. 
The campaign had the Pakistani workers at its centre, and their involvement was 
Global Unions, Global Business 2011.indd   13 31/05/2011   08:39:57
GLOBAL UNIONS, GLOBAL BUSINESSxIv
supported by educational activity. We feel that it buttresses two of our key themes: 
the importance of international union education, and the scale of the resources 
needed by the GUFs to conduct this kind of work. Given that campaigns are now 
being conceived of by the GUFs as permanent, it seems to us to underline our 
argument that they GUFs are sorely in need of greater support from their best-
resourced affiliates. 
V
 We would like to reiterate our thanks to those experts on international trade 
unionism and others to whom we have incurred debts. We are pleased to repeat and 
amplify here our heartfelt thanks to all of these people, many of whom have taken 
the time and trouble to engage with us after the appearance of the first edition.
We again conclude by thanking all those ‘ordinary’ trade unionists who have 
discussed these subjects with us over the years. Again, many of them continue to 
discuss these issues with us. They are extraordinary people. 
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•  C h a p t e r  O n e  •
Introduction 
We had been approached by phone calls from some crew members of the vessel 
Little Kid-II, a Cambodian-flagged ship, saying that they were not being paid. We 
spoke several times to the Ship Manager insisting that they pay all the money due 
to the seafarers. The company totally ignored its obligations to the crew and did 
not pay them when they were due, even though the rate they were paid was below 
the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) rate. 
On 20th of December 2006 we were informed by the seafarers that the vessel 
was calling at Rostov-on-Don (Russia). We asked for the help of the ITF Actions 
and Claims Unit in London, and following their detailed advice contacted their 
Russian colleagues. We advised the ITF affiliate, the regional organisation of the 
Seafarers’ Union of Russia (SUR) of the situation, asking for their assistance. At 
the same time we recommended that the seafarers spoke to SUR, and supplied 
them with the contact details. We and SUR recommended the crew members 
to organize protest actions. To help the seafarers in these actions two SUR 
representatives were sent on board (Mr. Zenkovskiy, head, and Mr. Petchenko). 
The port authorities, frontier guards and the company itself were alerted to the 
coming actions. The guards put obstacles in the union’s way. The vessel’s captain 
put pressure on the crew aimed at getting them to abandon their action and 
promising to pay out the balance of the wages due later, in Istanbul and trying not 
to permit the union’s representatives to come onboard. Later the frontier guards 
just took back SUR’s permissions to enter, but they went on contacting the crew 
by phone and outside of the port persuading them to go on with the actions. 
This, and the knowledge that the ITF was watching the case, inspired the seafarers 
to continue their sanctions. It took several days, but finally the company gave in 
when they received evidence that they had no choice but to pay out the wages, 
and they knew the ITF was involved. 
Extract from an interview with Alexandr Ivakhno,  
Ukrainian Seafarers’ Union, 20 January 2008 
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4This book analyses the work of the Global Union Federations, illustrated in our 
opening quotation, and makes suggestions for their re-orientation. We discuss the 
current position of the trade union movement’s international institutions, their 
internal lives and their relations with companies. The book is therefore a contribution 
to a widely overlooked aspect of globalisation.
Unions remain by far the largest membership organisations in the world and 
have extensive international coverage, dwarfing non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) also engaged with the impact of globalisation. Although NGOs are often 
regarded more positively than unions, they rarely have membership structures and 
generally rely on unelected professionals (Edwards, 2001; Batliwala, 2002). In terms of 
democratic involvement, unions provide much greater opportunities for members to 
determine policy and play a part in organisational governance. Despite some historic 
cases internationally of corruption, trade unions have long and proud traditions of 
democratic processes. They provide a substantial proportion of working people with 
opportunities for political involvement, and for shifting power relations at work. 
This aspect of unionism has taken on renewed importance with the development of 
global trade. Nevertheless, we also argue that without change in the ways that the 
international institutions of the trade union movement operate, the existing power 
dynamics will remain intact and globalisation will continue to operate in negative 
ways for many workers.
Our primary focus is on the global union organisations themselves, significant but 
little-studied actors in the construction of the beginnings of an international system 
of industrial relations. The work of these organisations is important in coordinating 
union responses to longstanding distributive and procedural justice issues that 
have been exacerbated by globalisation. Real possibilities exist for international 
trade unionism to build its position within these discussions. The distribution of 
wealth and access to resources such as health and education within countries is 
central to current debates around development, and unions are relevant because 
of their redistributive capacity. As Elliott and Freeman (2003) argue, the ‘missing 
voice’ in these debates is that of workers in developing countries. Unionisation 
has a major contribution to make in rectifying that position. Unions have many 
positive outcomes for workers, facilitating collective voice mechanisms that help to 
increase their earnings and reduce earnings differentials, including gender earnings 
differentials (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebner, 2003). 
They help to enforce the law in workplaces (Harcourt et al., 2004). The benefits 
they bring to society more generally are well established. Unions internationally 
gave birth to many other cooperative, mutual and adult educational organisations, 
building civil society and promoting ‘democratic development’ (Stiglitz, 2000). 
Stiglitz linked this to the way that unions have historically played a major role 
in providing opportunities for democratic involvement, including by addressing 
workers’ needs to improve their wider understandings through education.
CONTExTS
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5Many international companies are involved in a quest to show that they have 
‘fair’ labour practices without recognising unions. These quests involve increasingly 
elaborate and ineffective methods of monitoring themselves and their suppliers, for 
example by finding NGOs that will attest to the humanity of their practices through 
inspection processes and so on. It then appears to be a matter of surprise to them 
that there is a persistent pattern of rediscovery by investigative journalists showing 
that in fact these problems have not been resolved. The harsh reality is that for many 
of the world’s workers, talk of human rights in the workplace is just that: it is strictly 
rhetorical (Douzinas, 2000; Beirnaert, 2008). It is evident that only stable union 
organisation within workplaces can begin to deal with both rights and distributive 
issues on an ongoing basis; no monitoring or inspection system can hope to match 
such organisation.
Our subject is important precisely because of trade unionism’s widespread decline. 
The fall in union membership in most countries is caused primarily by objective 
circumstances: massive restructuring in global capitalism that has hugely disrupted 
well-unionised industries and created weak negotiating positions for workers. Both 
have of course been facilitated by the rise and dominance of neoliberal ideas.
Unions’ difficulties are inextricably linked with the problems faced by workers 
across the world. Labour’s share of total income has been falling in the developed 
countries for some years. In the UK, labour took a rising share of national income for 
the century up to 1970, but this trend has now been reversed (Glyn, 2006). This is not 
only because of the expanded world labour supply; it is also partly because of relatively 
low levels of investment. Further reasons are found in: the new international division 
of labour; the ever present threat of relocation; the development of different forms 
of human resource management; the widespread adoption of Japanese production 
models; lean production; ‘High Performance Work Systems’; and the pursuit of 
free trade policies by the international financial institutions (Upchurch, 2008). The 
pursuit of flexibility has become a catechism for employers, with a ‘normal’ model 
of full-time employed workers employed by one company probably now looking 
abnormal from a global perspective. Employees’ grip on their jobs has been loosened: 
even in Japan and South Korea, for many workers, lifetime employment has been 
eroded and replaced by precarious work forms. The widespread creation of ‘informal’ 
work has created a large pool of almost exclusively non-union workers. This in turn 
threatens unions’ legitimacy in their wider function as representatives of the wide 
interests of labour rather than of particular groups of employees.
The veteran trade unionist Hans Gottfurcht, a leader with enormous experience 
of international union affairs wrote on our subject in the mid-1960s, and his 
accounts exuded optimism (Gottfurcht, 1962; 1966). Trade unions, he proclaimed, 
‘stand in the centre of world events’ (1966: 12). There were objective grounds for his 
up-beat statement: trade unionism stood at an historically high level, and between 
the publication of his books in 1962 and 1966 an internationally coordinated strike 
INTRODUCTION
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6involving the chemical workers’ international occurred. It is hard to see similar 
grounds for optimism today. Multinational companies’ growing power and the 
reduction in labour’s share of global product both point in a more pessimistic 
direction. Despite much discussion of ‘union renewal’, the historic institutions of 
the labour market – trade unions and employers’ associations – have been in retreat 
in most countries for several decades. These developments affect unions’ capacity 
to act in workers’ interests at all levels, including the international. J.K. Galbraith 
(1983) noted that historically, great concentrations of power such as that collectively 
wielded by large corporations today tend to produce countervailing forces. Whether 
the union internationals can constitute such a force, or even be one element in a 
wider coalition, is an open question that is explored below. 
The broad family of international trade union institutions consists of the Global 
Union Federations (GUFs) and the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). 
Diagram 1: National and International Levels of Trade Unionism 
GUFs are distinguished by industrial sector, with national unions from over one 
hundred and twenty countries affiliating to them. Harold Lewis, ex-general secretary 
of the international transport workers has argued that GUFs account for 80 per cent 
of the international movement’s activity, and at least 90 per cent of its work directly 
affecting workplaces (Lewis, 2003). The sectors covered range from education where 
Education International represents teachers, to transport, where the International 
Transport Workers’ Federation is active. The GUFs are diverse organisations which 
share many characteristics. They can be grouped into three categories. The first 
is those with a private sector membership and an industrial and bargaining focus 
(BWI, ICEM, IMF, IUF and UNI). The second category (IFJ and ITGLWF) also 
have private sector members, but have less bargaining focus because they have a 
weak and unstable membership base. The third (EI and PSI) encompasses public 
CONTExTS
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7sector unions, which relate mainly to international governmental organisations and 
national governments and have solid membership bases. In this book, the focus is on 
the first two categories because they operate primarily in the private sector. 
The book also touches on the work of the ITUC, created by merger in 2006, 
Table 1: List of Global Unions, 2008
Global 
Union
Main Sectors
Covered
Estimated 
Total 
Membership 
(Millions)
Total 
Number of 
Affiliates
Number of 
Countries 
Covered
Estimated 
Number of 
Developing 
Country 
Affiliates
Estimated 
Percentage of 
Developing 
Country 
Affiliates
ITUC Umbrella body 168 311 155 190 61
EI Education 30 394 171 189 48
IMF Metalworking 25 200 100 Unknown Unknown
ICEM Chemicals, 
energy, mining, 
paper
20 379 117 182 48
PSI Public services 20 650 160 323 50
UNI Telecoms, 
graphics, media, 
retail, services
15.5 900 140 Unknown Unknown
BWI Construction 
and materials
12 318 130 Unknown Unknown
ITGLWF Textiles, 
garments, 
leather goods
9 238 122 163 68
ITF Transport 4.5 654 148 63 10
IUF Food, 
agriculture, 
catering, 
tourism
2.6 375 127 206 55
IFJ Journalism 0.6 117 100 43 37
Source: Union websites
which works with the GUFs. The ITUC affiliates national centres, is relatively 
well resourced and is the largest umbrella organisation in the world. These are 
the established global organisations representing labour’s interests, which are 
collectively referred to as ‘the internationals’. When we refer to GUFs alone, we 
mean to exclude the ITUC.
GUF functions can be split into three types. First, they defend the existing space 
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8in which unions operate, for example by defending trade unionists’ basic rights 
in extremely hostile environments. Second, they work to create further space, for 
example by collective bargaining (Wills, 2002). This set of tasks currently looms 
large in their own perceptions of their role even though GUFs have influence 
rather than power in relation to companies. Third, they help unions to exploit these 
spaces, primarily by building their capacities through educational and information 
activities. These functions are shown in Diagram 2. 
Diagram 2: GUF Functions 
CONTExTS
The internationals are coordinating bodies that link, or articulate, unions at other 
levels to each other and to international institutions and employers (Eder, 2002). 
Although the GUFs are formally described as ‘global’, this represents an aspiration 
rather than a reality since they are more accurately described as international bodies 
with wide coverage that are ‘globalising’. They have historically built outwards 
from their European bases to include unions in other regions and are still engaged 
in extending their coverage to every country where unions exist. The GUFs both 
co-exist with and transcend the bilateral links that often spring up between 
individual unions across the world. Central to our argument is the view that only 
the multilateral frameworks provided by these international union institutions can 
shift the balances of power that exist both between unions and between unions and 
employers. For some, less institutionalised international links between unions are 
often felt to be sufficient and even preferable. We argue against this view. 
Despite over a century of activity many misunderstandings of the internationals’ 
roles are evident. Most people engaged in workplace industrial relations have little 
knowledge or understanding of these organisations and many trade union members 
are not aware that their unions are affiliated to them. The internationals have partly 
themselves to blame: they are poor promoters of their own successes, operating 
quietly even when real gains are secured for affiliates. However, it is important to 
understand that, like other trade union bodies, they operate within harsh political 
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9environments, invariably experience a hostile press and are therefore reluctant to 
divulge information to the outside world. They emphasise internal democracy and 
accountability rather than external transparency. In the 2006 Global Transparency 
Initiative, the ITUC was ranked last of all the non-governmental organisations 
surveyed, with a 13 per cent transparency capacity. Data on their activities is 
therefore very difficult to come by. There is a need for greater information on these 
bodies, and this is an important aspect of what we set out to achieve in this book. 
Existing writing, with a few honourable exceptions, can be broadly divided into 
two camps: advocates/advisers and critics. Those falling into the first have a firm 
grasp of the realities of life in the internationals, often derived from experience 
of working in them (see for example White, 2006). Their strength, an in-depth 
knowledge of an organisation, can also be a weakness, however, since they are often 
concerned uncritically to defend their institutions past or present. Thus, for example, 
Chip Levinson (1972), ex-general secretary of the then International Chemical and 
General Workers’ Federation (ICEF), tended to overstate its international bargaining 
successes in the 1960s. In the second camp, some criticism is vehement, and is 
marked by questionable argumentation. For example John Logue (1980: 24) referred 
to ‘parasitic elite junketing’, which apparently involved ‘taking your pretty secretary 
[or, for that matter, your plain wife] on expenses-paid trips’. This is integral to his 
view that such junketing is a key reason for the longevity of this level of unionism. 
There is no shortage of writers with criticism and advice for trade unions but 
much of it at the international level is of little value because it is founded on weak 
empirical bases. In sharp contrast to unions at the national level, academics have 
only infrequently enjoyed long-term or close relationships with the international 
trade union movement. This is compounded by the lack of publicly available data 
about the work of the internationals due in part to the levels of secretiveness which 
they practice. In writing this book, for example, the authors often have to use ITUC 
data as comparable material is not available (or where available is too imprecise) 
for the GUFs – although we do so only when convinced that the two pictures are 
similar. 
We agree that what Lewis (2003) calls ‘the theoretical wasteland’ of international 
trade unionism should be addressed. We make some contribution in this area, 
focussing on education and its role, but the wider development of theory is not our 
main purpose here. Rather, we try to present a realistic and empirically grounded 
picture of the internationals in order to raise the quality of debate about their 
future. We present new data on several aspects of the internationals’ internal lives 
and external work in the global economy. These data come from numerous sources. 
First, they derive from over fifty formal and informal interviews with officials of 
the internationals and union activists from many countries of the world. Second, 
they have been drawn from a trawl of the internationals’ official and semi-official 
working documents. Many of the latter are not routinely available to outsiders, but 
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nor are they confidential and almost all of those referred to exist in the Library of the 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Bonn. These last data have been especially important 
to us. Third, we have used the archival resources of the Modern Records Centre 
at the University of Warwick, where the records of the International Transport 
Workers’ Federation and other relevant organisations are deposited. Finally, we draw 
on our own extensive personal records based on immersion in international union 
work over a period of fifteen years, some directly for the internationals and some less 
directly. We count many of those active in the international trade union movement 
as friends, and part of what we analyse is our own activity. 
The book is structured and argued as follows. The next two chapters constitute 
the first section and provide background to the current situation. In Chapter two, 
the context in which unions and the internationals operate is outlined, showing 
why national unions are increasingly turning to the GUFs for assistance and 
illustrating the considerable extent of the demands on them. In Chapter three, we 
explore the internationals’ history, showing the distinctive legacy they draw on to 
sustain them, and the significant new opportunities created by the end of political 
divisions symbolised by the recent creation of the ITUC. 
Our second section is concerned with the current position of the internationals 
both internally and in relation to companies. In Chapter four, we analyse the 
internationals’ resources and governance, explaining the twin problems of an 
internal balance of forces weighted towards developed country unions and major 
current financial issues. Chapter five examines their role in international collective 
bargaining. We show that the International Framework Agreements that currently 
play such a large role in their strategy are useful, but are generated by processes 
that reflect the power relationships described in the previous chapter and hamper 
their effectiveness. In Chapter six, we examine the company and regional industrial 
networks established through the GUFs and we suggest how they may best be built. 
Chapter seven is concerned with education and is central to the book’s argument. 
We propose that education is an important, polyvalent area of work that supports 
all of the other activities outlined previously. Importantly, it has a democratising 
effect by raising levels of participation in union affairs and could usefully be 
expanded. We therefore reject the common suggestion within the internationals 
that the GUFs’ main task should be international collective bargaining. Chapter 
eight is intended both to illustrate and integrate our argument. It is also a 
contribution to wider discussions of the dynamics of international business. An 
extended case study, it shows how one GUF succeeded in building dialogue with a 
major multinational company, combining GUF discussion with senior management 
with organisation from below, strongly facilitated by educational work in Africa 
and Latin America.  
Our third section consists simply of the conclusion. We accept that developments 
in the global political economy offer prospects for the internationals in building 
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more multifaceted forms of unionism (Fairbrother and Hammer, 2005). We argue 
that this is best done using the educational approach we advocate which should be 
developed, and partly funded by devolving fundraising to regions. This educational 
work can most effectively be carried out by small groups of countries operating 
together on a ‘minilateral’ basis within the internationals’ wider multilateral 
framework. 
Our conclusion is presented as a challenge to the internationals’ membership: 
to raise their material contribution to the internationals, despite the current trend 
in the opposite direction. The key players are the unions of the developed world, 
and the issue is whether they are able to make the political case to their own 
membership to intensify their commitment to internationalism.
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Globalisation and Unions 
Introduction 
T h i s  chapter highlights the difficult international environment in which unions currently operate, without attempting a comprehensive analysis of global capitalism and its effects on workers and unions such as that by Moody 
(1997). It is divided into two sections. In the first, we sketch the consequences of 
globalisation’s political dimension for workers and unions, stressing the weakening 
of national employment regulation and the lack of any adequate compensatory 
measures at global level. In the second, we examine both the problems and 
possibilities created for unions by multinational companies’ practices. We conclude 
that it is difficult for unions to solve their problems either at national level or through 
bilateral links with other individual unions, causing them to increase the demands 
they make on the internationals. 
Globalisation 
The definition and consequences of globalisation are contested (Gills, 2000). The 
processes, it has been shown, require precise specification in more than one sense. 
Rugman (2001) for example contends that the companies involved should be 
conceptualised as ‘regional’, since many operate across only a few, often adjacent, 
countries. Others suggest that the current wave of globalisation constitutes less of 
a break with the past than is often supposed, since the internationalisation of trade 
and multinational companies are long-term phenomena. The history of capitalism 
has been characterised over three centuries by constant expansion in a geographical 
sense and in terms of its extension to ever-wider areas of social relations (Sewell, 
2008). Capitalism has long sought ‘spatial fixes’ to labour problems: where workers 
become organised in one location, new locations are identified (Silver, 2003). 
Between 1850 and 1914, the movement of capital, trade, immigration and flow 
of information were all arguably more developed than today (Hirst and Thompson, 
2002), and this suggests a need to define the current wave’s specific features. One key 
difference is that developing countries’ systems of protection from competition are 
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today weaker than under colonialism. As late as the immediate post-Second World 
War years, strong American pressure to end the British system of imperial protection, 
in favour of the current General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was 
effectively resisted (Toye, 2003). The current globalisation wave is characterised by 
the international financial institutions’ discouragement of protectionist behaviours 
by developing countries. Indeed, the financial aspects of globalisation have profound 
consequences not only for national regulation, but also for companies and how 
they access and manage labour. Opening economies to international trade has had 
demonstrably negative effects on trade unions (Mosley and Uno, 2007). 
If some have played down the globalisation phenomenon and sought carefully 
to delimit its boundaries, another school of thought has emphasised the current 
political influence and pervasiveness of neoliberal ideas. Thus, it has been argued 
that the globalisation process should be understood more widely than simply the 
unimpeded flow of capital and goods between countries, since it includes a wide 
range of other phenomena and, in particular, a major political dimension (Carling, 
2006). Globalisation is seen as rooted in liberal economic theory, whereby the 
increasing liberalisation of trade is held to enhance wealth and to ‘develop’ those 
parts of the world to which it extends. The perspective is especially relevant to 
unionisation, whose fortunes have historically been strongly affected by the political 
environment (Western, 1997). 
In this accommodating climate, ‘free market’ organisations have moved on to 
moral high ground previously occupied by others. Organisations like the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation deploy considerable resources to present themselves 
as having an increasingly ‘developmental’ role in the world economy (Blowfield 
and Frynas, 2005), an agenda previously claimed by nationalism, social democracy 
and their historic allies. They propose a progressive, visionary, reforming agenda. 
‘Development’ is seen by them not as the task of a developmental state in alliance 
with unions, but of these charitable foundations, markets, multinationals and 
increased trade. 
From the late 1970s onwards, corporations sought new production locations 
where costs could be reduced and products marketed, and the international financial 
institutions created space for them by insisting on bi- and multilateral trade 
agreements. They pressured developing countries to reduce tariff barriers and 
allow unrestricted flows of capital, products and services. Structural Adjustment 
Programmes, repackaged as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, offered loan finance 
from the 1980s onwards, on condition of major reform and, in particular, a reduced 
role for the state. The ex-colonial powers are also implicated, as Stone (2004) showed, 
by pushing African states towards the IMF when they insist on enforcing harsh 
performance criteria as the condition of loans. 
Many states shifted towards ‘free market’ politics, and the effects on both 
employment and unionisation have been considerable. In Africa, for example, 
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they included the destruction of large parts of national healthcare and education 
systems, weakening workers in the employment relationship by making them more 
dependent on the health insurance and treatment that potentially came with formal 
employment. Much of manufacturing industry was destroyed, reducing the scope 
of and possibilities for unionisation. Unemployment rose dramatically in many 
countries as public sector workers were dismissed. Currency devaluations reduced 
real wages. Labour law was often revised in ways that were negative for trade unionism, 
while formal laws protecting employees were unenforceable by emasculated states 
(Wood and Brewster, 2007). Similar effects have occurred more widely. In many 
countries, minimum wages have fallen into disrepute, so weakly enforced have they 
become (Grindling and Terrell, 2005). Other pro-labour legislation has simply gone 
unobserved. The South Korean Equal Employment Act 1987, for example, obliges 
employers to provide facilities for childcare at workplaces, yet workplace childcare 
constitutes only one per cent of the total number of these facilities (Moon, 2006). 
In such cases, governments are clearly more concerned with employers’ reactions to 
legal enforcement than with the legitimacy of their own law-making. 
Symbolic of the current relationship between governments in the developing 
world and multinationals has been the development of Export Processing Zones 
(EPZs). These are areas where foreign companies are encouraged through incentives 
to operate and labour laws are either suspended or not enforced. They have grown 
considerably: by 2002 there were 3,000 EPZs employing more than 40 million workers, 
the great majority of whom were young women (Abott, 1997; ICFTU, 2003). Attempts 
to organise unions in EPZs have been met by violence from local security guards and 
police (ICFTU, 2003). Lim (2005) argues that multinationals have not been ‘innocent 
bystanders’ in determining the conditions that governments impose within EPZs. 
The freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, both Core 
Labour Standards in the International Labour Organisation’s estimation, are under 
growing threat at a global level. Many countries, including the USA, India and China 
have refused to ratify the ILO conventions (87 and 98) that specify these basic rights. 
We show the countries who have signed the conventions in Map 1. Even among the 
surprisingly small number of signatory countries, there are several in which there 
have been high levels of complaints that they have not been observed. The results for 
unions are obvious. For the GUFs, this means an increasing volume and difficulty 
of solidarity work, where companies and governments are the object of protest on 
behalf of trade unions and their members alleging breach of these rights. 
Recent legal changes in many countries have allowed employers to create fuzzy 
employment relationships and diffuse and precarious forms of work. These forms of 
employment are strongly associated with the growth of informal work that is a further 
distinctive feature of the current wave of globalisation. ‘Informality’ here means 
disguised, ambiguous or poorly defined employment relationships where employers are 
unclear or entirely absent (Chen, 2007). The phenomenon is very widespread: in Asia, 
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Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, informal workers now constitute between 60 
and 70 per cent of the total working population. Few of these workers operate in total 
isolation from companies; their conditions are generally determined by the lead firm 
in the value chain, either a large national or multinational company (Chen, 2007). A 
pool of workers has therefore been created who find contract, agency or self-employed 
terms relatively attractive. As Lourenço-Lindell (2002) graphically illustrates in her 
detailed account of informal workers’ lives in Guinea-Bissau, many of whom also work 
in the formal part of the economy when possible, they are ‘walking a tightrope’ where 
falling off means being unable to sustain their livelihoods. 
Although unions have made efforts to recruit those working informally, these 
attempts have brought only very limited success (Verma and Kochan, 2004). The 
barriers are formidable: fierce competition between individuals, the heterogeneity of 
the workers involved and hard-line patriarchal attitudes are just a few of the problems 
(Wood and Frynas, 2006). Anyemedu (2000) identified a central issue of concern to 
unions in trying to organise these workers, that of high organising costs in relation to 
any possible subscription income. The workers fear harsh retaliation from employers 
and state officials if they join unions, threatening their very existence. Even if they 
do join, they are unable to pay realistic union subscriptions. 
The current wave of globalisation is also characterised by a dramatic increase 
in the world labour supply. Vast amounts of extremely cheap labour, notably in 
the former Soviet Union, China and India, are now available to companies. There 
has been a tripling of the labour available to multinationals from around one 
billion people in 1980 to some three billion post-2000. This resulted not only 
from the collapse of Communism, but also from the opening up of economies to 
world capital and greater participation of women in waged labour (Munck, 2004). 
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Moreover, an increasing proportion of the labour has become mobile. There are 
currently an estimated 86 million migrant workers, who commonly have few legal 
employment rights (Lowell, 2007; UNDP, 2008). 
No global system of protective worker regulation has emerged to compensate 
for the weakening of national systems and shift in power towards employers. While 
a wide range of advisory documentation exists, from the long-standing OECD 
guidelines for MNCs to the International Labour Organisation’s Core Labour 
Standards, these are merely guidelines. As Hyman suggests, they are ‘weak and 
largely tokenistic’ (Hyman, 2002: 1). 
Multinational Companies 
Multinational companies loom large in global union thinking for five sets of reasons. 
First, they are engines of globalisation with high political profiles through their 
role in linking investment, trade, technology and finance. Second, they are often 
unionised in part of their operation and a foothold therefore exists that can be 
deepened. Third, there is a demand from companies for GUFs’ work. The companies 
themselves are aware of a need both to coordinate their human resource policies 
worldwide and of the risks that labour issues pose for them. Extended value chains 
with links into the informal economy increase their exposure to this ‘labour risk’. 
Fourth, as our case study in Chapter eight illustrates, senior trade unionists and 
MNC managers often have mutual long-term professional acquaintance. This may 
come from previous industrial relations dealings, or from discussion on a relatively 
equal and informal footing at the Davos World Economic Forum. These contacts have 
frequently established mutual knowledge of their organisations as well as personal 
lines of communication. In short, they are far more accessible to GUFs than the 
informal economy, helping to explain why a high proportion of GUF resources are 
spent in targeting them. Fifth, dialogue with central management in international 
companies is a significant, identifiable service that GUFs can offer affiliates. 
However, just one per cent of the world’s workforce of three billion people is 
employed by multinational companies (Köhler, 2003). At present, multinationals 
remain a strictly limited phenomenon in geographic and employment if not in 
trade terms. They largely carry out their business in the Triad of North America, 
Europe and Japan (Rugman, 2001). In 2005, all but four of the top 50 multinationals 
were headquartered in the Triad, although multinationals have begun to emerge 
from countries outside of it (UNCTAD, 2008). Many MNCs only expand to nearby 
countries; for example, one of the world’s largest multinationals, the anti-union Wal-
Mart, has most of its foreign investments in Canada. Multinational investment in 
the developing world is concentrated in Asia and Latin America (UNCTAD, 2008). 
MNC incidence is also to some extent sectoral. The Russian food sector is dominated 
by them, as are extractive industries in Africa, but their presence remains smaller 
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in developing countries’ railways. Multinationals are however growing: 73 million 
people worked for them in 2006 compared with 25 million in 1990. The World Bank 
projected that MNCs will increase considerably in extent and importance over the 
next twenty-five years (World Bank, 2007). For unions, work in them may represent 
as much an investment for the future as for the present. 
As we noted above, the internationalisation of companies and trade has 
been a long-run process spanning several centuries. The trading companies 
of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century gave way to multinationals in 
manufacturing, utilities, services and extractive industries that expanded greatly 
in the inter-war years (Wilkins, 1974). The largest and most rapidly expanding 
activity in the 1950s and 1960s was in the colonial world’s extractive industries 
(Jones, 1993). However, as Wilkins (1974) shows, these companies were rarely 
sufficiently powerful to challenge governments. In fact, governments actively 
sought on occasions to restrict strongly their operations and even expropriate 
them. In 1938, the Mexican oil industry, previously the preserve of multinationals 
was nationalised, providing a niche for Mexican unions, in a successful operation 
that provided a model for other countries. Costa Rica operated a system of state 
monopoly over the importation and marketing of petrol throughout the 1920s and 
1930s (Odell, 1968). From the mid-1950s to the early 1970s many countries such 
as Egypt, Algeria and Burma, expanded their state sectors as nationalisations were 
carried out in areas considered vital to their national economies. Current ‘resource 
nationalism’ is a real force but generally stops short of nationalisation. 
In a growth wave from the 1970s onwards, MNCs greatly increased their 
economic activity; by the early 1990s their accumulated sales were equivalent to 
one-third of the world’s gross product (Buckley, 2000). These corporations ushered 
in the current era, since they were operating in a diversified set of industries, with 
an increasingly strong emphasis on services (Rugman, 2001; UNCTAD, 2008). Their 
influence on governments now came to be seen in stronger terms than previously; 
the end of the Cold War meant that there was no alternative to attempting to 
attract their investment. Their control of advanced technology means that their 
presence is now seen as a requirement for development; as a result, multinationals 
have become ‘rule givers’ in relation to governments (Thelen, 2006). 
Multinationals, and especially US-based companies, argue publicly and privately for 
the relaxation of employment law. The changes in labour law recently enacted by the 
Chinese government, the Employment Contract Law 2007 and the Labour Disputes 
Arbitration Law 2007, which included some clauses providing the state unions with the 
opportunity to acquire some representative functions brought vigorous protest from 
the American Chamber of Commerce and threats that companies would disinvest. 
The equivalent organisation in Germany similarly presses for relaxations in labour 
law (Singe and Croucher, 2004). However, as the Chinese example shows, nation 
states continue to legislate in employment areas in ways not approved by international 
GLOBALISATION AND UNIONS
Global Unions, Global Business 2011.indd   17 31/05/2011   08:39:59
18
business. The nation state is therefore not always anxious simply to attract foreign 
investment at any price and outcomes are negotiated even if the balance in the 
negotiation has swung towards foreign companies. 
Multinationals are popular employers in host countries. The differential paid by 
MNCs over local companies, after controlling for the industry involved, is large, 
and largest where average wages in the host countries are lowest. In the lowest 
income countries, employees in US-based multinationals earn twice as much as 
those in domestic companies (Graham, 2000). Differentials are especially marked 
in relatively hi-tech or high value-added sectors (Flanagan, 2006). Shell and BP, 
widely criticised for their activities in Nigeria, are nevertheless pay leaders in 
that country (Otobo, 2007). These advantages are often multiplied by access to 
company-based or assisted education and healthcare. 
MNCs use much more labour than they employ, as capital markets impose 
performance regimes that demand cost reductions and push them towards accessing 
pools of cheap, ‘informal’ labour (Morgan and Kristensen, 2006). In addition, new 
forms of finance seek rates of return higher than those traditionally expected by 
investors (as they are often legally obliged to do), and simultaneously to escape 
even stock market regulation. An important form of such finance is ‘private equity’, 
and it has been estimated that some 20 per cent of the UK’s non-public workforce 
is employed by these vehicles (Rossman and Greenfield, 2006). Private equity’s 
influence clearly raises investors’ expectations of appropriate rates of return and 
erodes commitment to other stakeholders. It has been shown that private equity has 
raised rates of redundancy across the world (Hall, 2008). 
Theron (2005) uses the term ‘externalisation’ to encompass the different ways of 
obtaining labour from outside of the corporation’s boundaries. Its extent at global level 
has unfortunately not been the subject of any systematic investigation (Mosley and 
Uno, 2007). Labour outsourcing is increasingly being required of local management 
by multinationals’ central managements (Westney, 2008). Externalisation virtually 
removes the direct claims that workers can make of them. Externalised workers are 
rarely protected by law in the same ways as ‘standard’ workers, because in almost all 
countries the law envisages a ‘standard’ employment relationship. Externalisation 
takes many forms, many of which are in reality not discrete, and its incidence and 
damaging consequences for workers and unions alike have been widely remarked 
on by researchers examining the developing world (Wood and Brewster, 2007; von 
Holdt and Webster, 2005; Theron, 2005). The creation of ‘value chains’ from the 
MNC at the top down to tiny family concerns, sub-contractors or individual ‘own 
account’ workers inexorably drives the overall share of labour in company earnings 
downwards (Barrientos, 2002). The ends of these chains contain a good deal of 
‘labour risk’ for companies. An American researcher linked cars sold in Canada back 
through car manufacturing multinationals to the Brazilian steel industry and slavery 
in the Brazilian charcoal industry (Bales, 2004). 
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Thus, the multinationals are linked, both directly and indirectly, to the ‘informal’ 
economy. Intermediaries have oiled the wheels of this process. In many countries 
legislation was enacted in the 1980s that facilitated the activities of labour agencies 
(Glyn, 2006). Thus, even in highly regulated Germany, the number of agency workers 
has risen from just over 100,000 in 1993 to 630,000 in 2007 (Bundesinstitut fűr 
Arbeit, 1993; 2007). Seventy per cent of the workers used by Nestlé to manufacture, 
package and distribute products throughout the world are not directly employed by 
that company (Rossman and Greenfield, 2006). As we noted above, reliable global 
figures on the extent of externalised labour do not exist (ILO, 2007) but their 
growth may be simply illustrated by the extent of the multinational companies that 
supply it, shown in Table 2 below: 
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Table 2: Key Multinationals Supplying Labour
Multinational 2004 2006/7
Adecco 5,800 offices 7,000 offices 2007
Manpower 4,300 offices 4,400 offices 2007
Vedior * 2,200 offices 2,433 offices 2006
Randstad 1,827 offices 2006
2,670 offices 2007
Note: * Vedior was purchased by Randstad in December 2007
Source: ICEM (2004); company annual reports and websites
The labour-supplying multinationals whose empires are indicated in Table 2 are 
clearly only the formal, visible part of labour contracting; a wide range of labour 
suppliers in the developing world constitute the submerged part of that iceberg. 
These intermediaries form part of a nexus of corruption in obtaining contracts, 
criminality and violence in Colombia (Pearce, 2004). Lourenço-Lindell (2002) 
describes the extensive activities of agents called ‘headmen’ in Guinea-Bissau, who 
first negotiate for work from employers in competition with other headmen, and then 
select labour and supervise tasks. 
These work forms condition workers’ and managers’ expectations of acceptable 
standards of terms, conditions and treatment. In direct employment terms, MNCs 
can thus remain ‘model’ employers, and ‘employers of choice’, while distancing 
themselves from their suppliers and indeed the suppliers of suppliers where 
conditions are very different. The minority of employees in the company’s direct 
employment are well aware of their privileged status. MNCs are able to raise 
productivity partly because they tie employees into their ways of working. Thus, 
many MNCs follow a dual policy: ending or avoiding the employment relationship 
for the majority of employees, and improving pay to well above local levels for the 
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minority they choose directly to employ. This is a new aspect of the current wave 
of globalisation. 
There are however limits to the process. The extent to which it can be required 
depends on the extent to which the company’s success is perceived as reliant on 
developing the long-term commitment of its labour force. It is only minimally 
practised in some high value-added companies such as the German-owned motor 
manufacturers. These operate with a more cooperative labour paradigm which 
facilitates union involvement and employee representation at all levels. 
Multinationals’ direct policies in relation to unions reflect at least to some 
extent their countries of origin. US-based companies favour countries where wages 
are lower, where it is easiest to shed labour and the industrial relations environment 
is seen as benign (Cooke, 1997; Bognanno et al., 2005). The last characteristic is 
measured in terms of the extent of local union influence, though MNCs are more 
favourably disposed to company-based forms of representation such as works 
councils. As we show in Chapter five, European-based multinationals are relatively 
friendly towards unions. This is related to the form of human resource management 
(HRM) that they adopt and the extent to which they attempt to dictate the form 
from the company’s headquarters. There are essentially two forms of HRM. One is 
‘collaborative’. This has a developmental or humanistic focus, where employees are 
seen as partners or collaborators. On the other hand, there is ‘calculative’ HRM in 
which employees are treated as a resource. Calculative HRM centres on the accurate 
measurement of employee contributions to the firm, and the adoption of individually 
based reward systems (Gooderham et al., 1999). It sidelines unions since individual 
pay is not conducive to traditional forms of collective bargaining. 
In Europe, foreign companies (which are mostly US-based) more commonly 
follow ‘calculative’ HRM than domestic companies (Gooderham et al., 1999; 
2006). US-based companies in less-skilled sectors tend to follow centralised 
union exclusion policies. Thus, McDonald’s has successfully resisted unionisation 
in many national contexts (Royle, 2005; 2006). In the failed attempt to unionise 
the McDonald’s greenfield food processing factory in Moscow, the few activists 
involved received significant material, publicity and moral support from the global 
union, the IUF (Royle, 2005). McDonald’s may constitute an exceptional company, 
but similar policies have been applied by other US-based companies with relatively 
low-skilled workforces such as Wal-Mart, even in highly regulated Germany 
(Köhnen and Glaubitz, 2000). In Ireland, they follow similar policies largely through 
setting up on greenfield sites (Turner et al., 2002). 
Anti-union policies pushed by central managements may occasionally be resisted 
at local level. A recent work suggests that local managers can defend and advance 
subsidiaries’ influence in alliance with unions. Kristensen and Zeitlin (2005), in their 
study of APV, a manufacturing multinational based in the UK with subsidiaries 
in the USA and Denmark, argue that the Danish subsidiary achieved a strategic 
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role in the company by using their links to many different local actors. The union 
was a key ally for local management, helping improve the company’s access to 
skilled labour locally and actively helping management strategise. The prescription 
these authors offer, of a MNC involved in facilitating dialogue between itself and 
employees through representative institutions is, they admit, an unlikely prospect. 
The setting was exceptionally favourable for such an alliance. The Danish model 
provides considerable possibilities for union representatives not only through the 
1973 law providing for employee representatives’ election to company boards, and 
through European Works Councils, but also by well-established, historically deeply 
rooted norms. 
Outside such exceptional environments, and especially outside of the developed 
world, local management pursues less union-friendly models than central 
management. Even when written into collective agreements, local managers adopt 
‘flexible’ interpretations of relatively clear rights such as those to freedom of 
association and collective bargaining. The latter may be formally espoused at 
headquarters level, and then, to adopt the terms used by a team of management 
scholars, ‘ceremonially’ adopted or ‘lost in translation’ locally (Fenton O’Creevy 
et al., 2007). Thus, for example, managers in countries such as Russia and Mexico, 
where company-based unions are widespread, interpret allowing company unions 
as complying with central values favouring the freedom of association. They thereby 
marginalise or exclude forms of unionism centred on mobilising workers and 
meaningful bargaining. In Russia, this entails, at worst, union forms designed to 
discipline workers and, at best, welfare-oriented unions. In this scenario, collective 
bargaining consists of essentially administrative discussions about a ‘collective 
agreement’ that specifies little and cannot be enforced. 
Multinationals pose problems for unions at national level because of many 
of these companies’ capacity to threaten to shift location, to play one unit off 
against another and to distribute investment according to local performance. 
These possibilities are clearly more available in some sectors than others but 
many MNCs, as we saw above, are currently located in services rather than in the 
location-bound extractive sector and can therefore threaten this with credibility. 
Martinez-Lucio and Weston (2004) have argued that even in the highly regulated 
European context, the dynamics set up by this possibility are often very difficult 
for unions to overcome. 
In general however, and despite these problems, MNCs are relatively well 
unionised in the developing world when compared to domestic companies. The 
most systematic study of the subject demonstrates that they more readily recognise 
unions, and direct investment by them brings better labour relations (Mosley and 
Uno, 2007). Their importance also underlines the internationals’ significance to 
national unions; the latter draw on the GUFs’ expertise in dealing with them. 
The expansion of multinationals’ international reach serves to remind many trade 
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unionists, particularly in the developing world, of how intimately the fates of their 
national unions and the internationals are intertwined. 
Conclusion 
The consequences for unions of the current wave of globalisation have been 
severe. Many of the old certainties and structural supports for trade unionism 
have been removed. The predominance of neoliberal economic ideas has reduced 
union political influence. MNCs have become more assertive in relation to national 
governments than in previous waves of globalisation, while the growth of informal 
work has diminished union membership and economic power. 
The possibilities of unions dealing with their problems at national level have 
clearly decreased. National regulation has far less mileage than hitherto and unions 
have therefore turned to the international level for solutions (O’Brien, 2000). 
Developing country unions have also continued to develop bilateral links with 
other unions, often from the ex-colonial countries. But these links are much less 
likely to offer viable solutions since the internationals have greater capacity to 
generate comprehensive information about multinationals. Nor do they occur 
within the internationals’ democratic framework. Still less can links with a few 
developed country unions offer prospects of organising among informal workers, 
where these unions have little or no experience. These resilient problems are better 
addressed by the internationals, with their breadth of experience and expertise in 
the developing world. Whether they have the resources or governance mechanisms 
to address them in optimal ways is a question we discuss in Chapter four.
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Past and Present – the History of 
International Trade Unionism 
Introduction 
T h i s  chapter deals with the history of the international trade union movement’s institutions, to locate our contemporary analysis in that context. The history of all these bodies is part of their organisational culture, as their headquarters’ 
walls covered with posters of twentieth-century campaigns demonstrate. Despite 
some useful contributions, no adequate overall history of this level of trade unionism 
exists. With a few honourable exceptions (exemplified by the work of Tony Carew 
(1987; 2000; 2007) Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick (2000a; 2000b; 2001; 2004) 
and Marcel van der Linden (2000)), previous accounts have occurred in separate 
‘historical’ and ‘current’ silos. Yet certain enduring themes are apparent, implying 
profound structural issues. On the other hand, the current situation has novel 
characteristics, not least because of the relative political unity of the world’s unions 
after the collapse of Communism in 1989. 
Our arguments in this chapter are as follows: first, history shows a significant 
sequence in the formation of different bodies, reflecting their relative weight 
in the thinking of national unions. Second, we argue that it is not the case, as 
some have suggested, that the structures devised between the late 1890s and 
1903 ‘remained largely unchanged’ in the twentieth century (van der Linden, 
2000: 528). This refers simply to the dual structure with an international 
umbrella organisation and industry-based bodies. It ignores the existence of 
rival international structures for much of the twentieth century, which rendered 
cooperation across the political divide next to impossible. The inception of 
the division constituted a discontinuity of major importance. This political 
division in the international union movement that appeared soon after the 
Russian Revolution has now disappeared, creating new opportunities. Third, the 
internationals have long, rich histories which have stamped their individual and 
collective identities and, importantly, underpin a long-term view by unions of 
payoffs from membership. Long organisational histories encourage affiliates to 
see the benefits of affiliation in the long-term rather than to look for short-term 
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benefits. Finally, we suggest that a certain version of the history, emphasising 
the internationals’ collective role in the fights against Fascism and Apartheid 
functions as a sustaining resource. 
Origins 
The first wave of institutional international union cooperation occurred in the third 
quarter of the nineteenth century, at the beginnings of an earlier intense phase of 
globalisation. National markets had not yet been finally consolidated in Europe and 
America and major imperial projects such as the ‘scramble for Africa’ had yet to 
begin. 
Marx’s international, the International Working Men’s Association (IWMA), 
formed in 1864, therefore operated in a context in which the need for such a 
body was less self-evident than it was later to become. Marxist language and 
ideals live on as a set of shared reference points in international trade union 
discourse, including in its symbols such as the singing of the Internationale at 
some international union gatherings. The IWMA and its successors provided 
intellectually powerful alternatives to the nationalistic, racially based and 
imperialist ideas being pursued not only by employers and ruling élites, but 
then accepted in wide sections of the trade union movement. These ideas found 
expression in many damaging ways, including in racially based unions in many 
parts of the world (Kirk, 2003). 
Marx’s project attracted some affiliation and support from sections of the 
European trade union movement, faced by employers importing cheaper foreign 
labour from neighbouring countries. The IWMA also established relations (albeit 
fractious) between political internationalists and trade unions, which paved the 
way for the Second Social Democratic International. Trade union internationalism, 
although not initiated by Marxists, therefore found its first institutional form under 
Marxist leadership although, as Marx well knew, the policies of the IWMA were too 
advanced and idealistic for the pragmatic British union leaders. This highlighted 
what was to be a long-standing tension between the industrial interests and national 
orientations of most union leaders on the one hand, and those of the more political 
internationalists on the other (Collins and Abramsky, 1965). It already implied the 
enduring question of precisely how strong or autonomous an international could 
be: how much power would be ceded by national unions, fearful of having policy 
determined by those holding an alternative conception? The issue’s significance was 
underlined by the interest of rival political streams in international trade unionism 
such as the anarchists and Christians. 
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Diagram 3: Timeline – the History of the International Trade Union Movement
International union movement World events
1864: International Working Men’s Association formed
1871: Delegates of Austrian, German and Scandinavian 
shoemakers sign cooperation agreement
1876: International Working Men’s Association dissolved
1889: International Trade Secretariats of shoemakers, 
printers, hatters, tobacco workers formed
1897: International Transport Workers’ federation formed
1901: First conference of the International Secretariat of 
National Trade Union centres held
1913: International Federation of Trade Unions founded
1914: Over one hundred International Trade Secretariats 
in existence
1914: 33 ITSs in existence
1918–1920s: Many ITSs merge
1919: IFTU re-constituted
1919: International Federation of Trade Unions founded
1920: International Federation of Christian Trade Unions 
(forerunner of WCL) formed
1921: Red International of Labour Unions founded
1937: Red International of Labour Unions formally 
dissolved
1945: World Federation of Trade Unions formed
1949: International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
formed
1973: European TUC formed
2006: WCL dissolved to merge with ICFTU and form the 
International Trade Union Confederation
1871: German victory in Franco-Prussian 
War; Unification of Germany
1881: Second International founded
1914: Outbreak of First World War
1917: Russian Revolution
1918: First World War ends
1933: Nazis accede to power in Germany
1939: Outbreak of Second World War
1945: Second World War ends
1989: Soviet Union collapses
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The Emergence of International Sectoral and Umbrella Bodies 
The formation of the Second (Social Democratic) International created the political 
cohesion and contacts that precipitated the first international industrial organisations. 
In many continental European countries, trade unionism was a project launched 
by social democrats rather than, as in Britain, the reverse or, as in the USA, one 
that never generated a Labour Party (Robert, Prost and Wrigley, 2004). This is 
not to argue that the main concerns of the new international union organisations 
were political, since the contrary was the case as they were primarily interested in 
industrial matters. It is to suggest that the first viable institutions of internationalism 
were formed on a non-Marxist basis that nevertheless inherited some of Marxism’s 
internationalist rhetoric. 
As we show in the timeline, highly skilled craft trade unionists together with 
miners and textile workers were the first to initiate international organisations on 
an industrial basis from 1889 onwards. These were the GUFs’ predecessors, the 
International Trade Secretariats (ITSs). The basis of the craft unions’ organisation 
was strong occupational identities and capacity to restrict entry to their trades at 
local and national level. They felt a need for international coordination for pragmatic 
industrial as well as for political reasons. Huge vertically integrated cartels were 
emerging and expanding their international reach. Migrant labour was becoming 
increasingly important and threatened to undercut national unions’ efforts, especially 
in continental Europe. In Germany, whose expanding economy was sucking in 
migrant workers from neighbouring countries, the issue was especially pressing and 
the majority of ITSs were based in Germany from their inception up until Hitler’s 
accession to power in 1933. 
However, the basis for international union organisation was rickety. At the end 
of the nineteenth century, national systems of trade unionism were still being 
consolidated: in Britain there were still movements for local autonomy in craft 
unions at the beginning of the twentieth century. In France, social democrats 
‘implanted’ union organisation in rural areas (Robert, Prost and Wrigley, 2004). In 
short, strong elements of regionalism within nations remained in the unions seeking 
to establish international coordination (Dreyfus, 2000). The incomplete and uneven 
internal development of national systems until 1914 therefore formed a basis for ITSs 
founded on little more than information exchange and occasional mutual support 
of strike action. 
The development of ITSs within industry sectors both preceded and precipitated 
the formation of an umbrella organisation for national union centres and reflects 
their importance to pragmatic unions in dealing with emergent international 
companies. The umbrella body began and continued as an organisation for more 
directly political purposes than the ITSs. This was the case even if the German 
and French unions that played a key role in establishing all of these bodies had 
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very different conceptions of the purposes and methods of trade unionism. These 
unions built the next international umbrella venture, the International Secretariat 
of National Trade Union Centres (ISNTUC), to be renamed the International 
Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) in 1913. The British stood aloof, but by 1913 the 
IFTU had grown to include twenty affiliated national centres, mostly in Europe but 
including the USA and the Transvaal (Fimmen, 1922). 
The IFTU did not go far beyond exchanging information; the French conception 
of a more political and internationally solidaristic unionism was sidelined in favour 
of the more institutional and information-sharing form advocated by the Germans 
(Tudyka, 1983; Dreyfus, 2000). This remained influential in the IFTU even after the 
First World War, since it allowed national union centres to learn about each other 
and companies without being tied to any specific international policies. 
By 1914, the current structure’s broad outlines were visible: a set of industrial 
coordinating bodies, and an umbrella organisation bringing national centres together. 
So, too, were at least three of the significant abiding issues: unions’ concern not to 
cede power; tensions between forms of trade unionism; and real political differences. 
The latter were soon to sharpen, generating a major and long-standing split in the 
international movement. 
Division in the Movement: the RILU 
The First World War had been preceded by dramatic strike waves in Europe 
that encouraged the development of revolutionary union ideas, or syndicalism. 
This in turn encouraged many to imagine that the strike weapon could be used 
for internationalist purposes. But the outbreak of war demonstrated the strictly 
rhetorical nature of the Social Democratic Second International’s commitment to an 
international general strike in the event of war. The First World War brought massive 
political rupture. The Russian Revolution solidified the earlier breakaway of the 
Communists from the Social Democrats, a division that was to last, with only a brief 
interlude, for the next seventy years. This division was to be even more damaging 
than the one that had already emerged between the IFTU and the International 
Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU), whose relationship to the IFTU has 
been characterised as ‘at times quite competitive and combative’ (Tosstorff, 2005: 
401). Thus, sharp political and religious rivalries were both present in the world’s 
trade union movement from an early stage. 
The social democratic and business forms of trade unionism took steps to advance 
and consolidate their position in response to a huge upturn in union membership 
during the First World War. Between April 1919 and August 1921, twenty-nine ITSs 
were established (van Goethem, 2000). The umbrella body also became much closer 
to a global coordinating body than hitherto. The fourteen countries represented at 
the founding congress of the IFTU in 1919 consisted essentially of the Europeans, 
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plus the American Federation of Labour, self-appointed guardian of the Latin 
American movements that had joined the recently formed Pan American Federation 
of Labour (van Goethem, 2000; 2006). The Americans were determined to follow a 
resolutely industrial path, but the Europeans defeated them, insisting on the need for 
political action. But the IFTU, initially urged by the French CGT, was already taking 
this type of action in initiating discussions (from which they were subsequently 
excluded) that brought the establishment of the tripartite International Labour 
Organization (ILO). 
The ILO was an important institution that was to provide a major forum for 
international labour issues. The IFTU, though disappointed at the watered-down 
form that the ILO assumed, soon set to its enduring task of lobbying it to create 
international labour standards (Tosstorff, 2005). The IFTU had thus helped create 
much of the water in which it and its descendants the ICFTU and ITUC were to swim. 
In 1921, the American Federation of Labour, dismayed at the political turn of events, 
notified the IFTU that it had decided not to affiliate (Fimmen, 1922). This marked the 
beginning of over two decades of widespread indifference among American unions 
towards the international trade union movement that was only to be overcome at the 
end of the Second World War. For the Communists, the same developments were 
interpreted in quite a different sense: the formation of the ILO was a sign that the 
mainstream unions had definitively sold out to the capitalist class. 
In many countries, including Britain and the USA, the Communist parties 
absorbed many of the pre-war syndicalists, thereby acquiring some of the best 
and most active trade unionists. From the 1920s, the international Communist 
movement built its separate union institution, the Red International of Labour 
Unions (RILU). In 1921, the IFTU decided that any union affiliating to the RILU 
could not be admitted to the IFTU (Fimmen, 1922). A minority in the IFTU, led by 
its co-secretary and general secretary of the relatively well-developed International 
Transport Workers’ Federation, Edo Fimmen, favoured opening a dialogue on the 
appropriate structure for the international movement. Fimmen’s political outlook 
was on the cusp of social democracy and Communism and coloured by syndicalism 
(Buschak, 2002). To the consternation of many, he therefore advocated including the 
Soviet unions in the discussion. 
Labour’s Alternative 
The issue was among those that brought Fimmen’s resignation as IFTU co-secretary; 
it was only after resigning that he gained the freedom to write probably the 
most important document ever written on the international movement’s structure, 
Labour’s Alternative (1924). The majority of the work discusses developments in 
international capitalism, which ‘imposed’ and ‘forced’ change on unions. Earlier 
moves towards international cartels were now accelerating: ‘Huge, octopus-like 
capitalist groups are extending their tentacles to grasp all the treasures of the 
world…’ (p.10). Pre-1914, these only sought to dictate prices to consumers, but now 
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they sought to dictate the price of labour. He defined the internationals’ task as 
bargaining collectively with these groups, a prelude to collectivising the means of 
production through revolution. 
For Fimmen, the IFTU–RILU division was central because it obstructed 
coordinated bargaining; post-1950, this argument was proven highly relevant. Other 
significant issues such as increasing the minimal involvement of women and colonial 
workers in trade unionism would be assisted by overcoming that key problem. 
Removing the division between the IFTU and RILU was, moreover, a condition for 
releasing the resources required to bring a more truly international organisation into 
being by persuading unions in the rest of the world to affiliate. Fimmen’s emphasis on 
resources makes explicit an issue that remains relevant today. A new organisational 
basis was needed for this merged IFTU; the ITSs were a key ingredient because they 
mirrored capitalist organisation, but national union centres could not be ignored 
and he therefore advocated a combination of national centres and ITSs as a basis 
(pp.117–23). There is a notable and probably politic ambiguity here about the precise 
form that such an organisation would take, which allowed room for manoeuvre at 
a later stage. 
Fimmen’s ideas foundered on the very problem they addressed: the political split 
between Communists and Social Democrats. He had written the work at a time 
when it was still possible to argue as he did, because relations between the two 
sides had not degenerated too far. But from the defeat of the British General Strike 
in 1926 until the early 1930s, RILU encouraged breakaway unions and launched 
savage attacks on the ‘reformist’ and (more commonly) ‘social fascist’ or ‘Amsterdam’ 
unions. This poisoned relations and ruled RILU out of any constructive dialogue 
with either the IFTU or the majority of ITS affiliates. Fimmen, from his position in 
the transport workers, was left to continue to try to improve relations between the 
two warring sets of unions. 
Free Trade Unionism and Communist Affiliations:  
from Divorce to Global Rivalry 
From the mid-1920s, the unions throughout the international patchwork that was the 
Soviet Union were decisively stripped of their independence and subordinated to the 
Communist Parties. As Carew (1987) pointed out, Western unions were therefore 
right to regard them as not being free trade unions, even if Communist-led unions 
in the Western world could not be categorised in the same way. The Soviet unions 
became ‘a school of Communism’ and a ‘transmission belt’ of Communist policy. In 
the workplace, they became the welfare wing of management and exercised harsh 
discipline on dissidents. Internationally, these unions became instruments of Soviet 
foreign policy, as illustrated by the demise of the RILU itself. After the accession of 
Hitler to power in 1933 and the German unions’ destruction, Stalin decided that a 
more conciliatory attitude towards the Social Democrats and the mainstream trade 
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unions was required. RILU, which had started life as a genuinely independent body, 
was run down from 1934 onwards and quietly disbanded in 1937 because Stalin 
regarded it as an obstruction to his foreign policy (Tosstorff, 2004). 
The Nazi’s rapid demolition of the previously powerful German unions removed 
an important element in the international movement and sent tremors through 
the remainder. All of the ITSs, who had already been campaigning against Fascism 
since 1924, and who supported the Italian resistance, played a significant role in 
campaigning against Nazism. The ITF had demanded immediate action in defence of 
the German unions in 1933 by the IFTU but were defeated by the opposition of the 
German unions themselves (Simon, 1983; Reinalda, 1997). The ITF began publication 
of a multilingual publication, Swastika (soon to become Fascism), documenting the 
effects of Fascism on workers from 1934 to 1945. The transport workers’ extensive 
worldwide networks were later used to good effect by the Allied governments in 
espionage during the Second World War (Koch-Baumgarten, 1997). The ITF was also 
the driving force in establishing a Joint Council of Propaganda between itself and the 
metalworkers’ and miners’ internationals to propagandise for free trade unionism in 
the occupied countries, an initiative that soon went beyond its original functions: 
by 1944, the Council was sending delegates to liberated France to influence the re-
forming French unions. 
The effects of Stalinism on workers were also understood in the international trade 
union élite. Meeting in the context of widespread pro-Soviet feeling in Britain after 
the invasion of the USSR, the Annual Meeting of the International Metalworkers’ 
Federation in August 1942 attended by exiled trade unionists from numerous 
countries demonstrated their awareness. They heard and accepted without demur a 
speech by Sidney Parlett of the ILO, who argued that: 
The Russian representatives at an international gathering would only voice policy 
insofar as it found consent and endorsement from the Russian Communist Party. 
If, therefore, the workers were going to fight for a Charter of trade union rights for 
other countries, how could they rely on the unequivocal support of the Russian 
trade unions?
(IMF, 1942) 
The defeat of Nazism in 1945 brought a temporary and unstable unity in the 
international trade union movement, when for a brief period Social Democratic 
and Communist unions came together in the World Federation of Trade Unions 
(WFTU). But as the Cold War set in, the split between the Social Democratic and 
Communist streams re-established itself amid tumultuous and vituperative scenes 
(Hogan, 1989). One of the causes célèbres was the degree of independence to be given 
to ITSs; the Soviets argued for (and later adopted when they were left to themselves) 
a structure in which the ITSs would be integrated into the world body as ‘trade 
departments’. This, of course, would have meant ceding considerable industrial 
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influence to the Soviets, and was rejected; the ITSs were strongly opposed to having 
their autonomy reduced in this way (Windmuller, 1954; McShane, 1992). 
The US government strongly encouraged the American unions to step up their 
activities in the international movement, and worked influentially against WFTU 
across a broad material and ideological front (Windmuller, 1954; Carew, 1987). 
However, as Denis McShane has argued, the European unions’ own experiences had 
also been important in their rejection of Soviet influence (McShane, 1992). By 1950 
WFTU was unquestionably dominated by the Soviet unions because major Western 
unions had left (Koftas, 2002). The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU) was formed on Anglo-American initiative and it and the WFTU went their 
separate ways, beginning an increasingly bitter war for the political affiliation of 
unions in the rest of the world. Both of them together with the third, relatively small 
but aggressive, International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (later World 
Confederation of Labour, WCL) now pursued their own rival agendas, competing for 
affiliations and trying to establish their own structures throughout the world. 
WFTU was also influential in global terms. In the 1950s, it gave considerable 
material assistance to help found and maintain formally independent international 
associations, notably the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and 
the much stronger Congreso Permanente de Unidad Sindical de los Trabajadores 
de America Latina. In Africa, WFTU, after initial criticism of the Organisation 
of African Trade Union Unity, began to work closely with it (Lieβ, 1983). In India, 
the All-India Trade Union Congress was an affiliate. In Europe, the largest union 
confederations in France and Italy, the CGT and CGIL, were long-term full affiliates 
until the latter moved to associate membership. The CGIL gradually distanced 
itself from WFTU as part of a wider disillusionment on the part of Western trade 
unionists with the effects of their affiliation. The CGIL moved away because of 
declining strength and failure in its persistent efforts to secure unity in action in 
relation to employers with the other Italian union organisations who were strongly 
opposed to the CGIL’s international affiliation (Rogari, 2000). After 1968, this sort 
of distancing became common among national unions. 
The unions previously affiliated to IFTU formed a large part of the organisational 
basis for the creation of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) 
in 1949. The new title both reaffirmed unions’ historic assertion of their independence 
from employers and the state and stressed the difference between themselves and 
unions in the Communist world. The ICFTU soon gained primacy within the 
international trade union movement in its role as the ‘voice of labour’, because of its 
use by governments as such in the restructuring of the post-War years (Gumbrell-
McCormick, 2001). Other parts of the international movement now entered a period 
of steady increase in interest and affiliations. Thus, the Christian IFCTU expanded in 
the developing world, establishing a regional organisation in Latin America in the mid-
1950s (Pasture, 1999). So, too did the ITSs, as we show for the ITF in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Number of ITF-affiliated Organisations by Region, 1946 and 1964
ITF region 1946 1964
Europe/Middle East 57 117
Latin America/Caribbean 5 99
Asia-Pacific 9 42
Africa 3 36
North America 3 18
Totals 77 312
Source: Lewis (2003: 360)
Regional organisations grouping countries together developed throughout the 
world, first in the ICFTU and later in the ITSs, to reflect the interests of the 
developing country membership within the international structures. Their creation 
increased the diversity of unions involved in the international movement. There 
was a feeling among some affiliates that the ICFTU as a global organisation was 
constantly trying to widen its functions beyond the coordinating role that they 
thought it suited to, but that its basis made it difficult for it to help unions locally. In 
1966, the British TUC’s international committee minuted: 
If the question of starting afresh arose the TUC – taking experience as a 
starting point – would perhaps not be in favour of establishing an organisation 
such as the ICFTU with its present functions, nor disposed to accept that the 
somewhat heterogeneous political attitudes of major ICFTU affiliates provide 
a satisfactory basis for common and large-scale operations directed towards 
developing countries.
(quoted in Carew, 2007: 163) 
The judgement from the TUC’s international committee may have underestimated 
the international movement’s work. Through their structures in the world’s regions, 
the ICFTU and ITSs built widespread educational activity to develop the skills 
and capacities of local unions to deal with their problems. The ICFTU had a long 
tradition of such work and soon began to use its Solidarity Fund, first set up in 1957, 
for educational purposes (Gottfurcht, 1966; Carew, 2000). A strong example of its 
activity was the coordinated efforts by the ICFTU and six GUFs to develop cadres 
in Indonesia in the late 1960s (Carew, 2000). Another example from this period 
was the substantial educational work of the ICFTU in Africa. The calibre of those 
carrying out this work was considerable; it was led by the Nigerian intellectual Wogu 
Ananaba, author of an impressive history of the African trade unions (CISL, 1972; 
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Ananaba, 1979). This educational work also importantly allowed the internationals 
to acquire detailed understandings of the world’s very different unions. 
In Europe, the heartland of the international movement, the growth of structures 
designed to coordinate European unions in part reflected an increasing feeling that 
the ICFTU was providing too little for the unions of the developed world, one of the 
underlying reasons for the Americans leaving it in the late 1960s (Carew, 2007). The 
development of the European Union stimulated a proliferation of bodies both outside 
and inside the existing organisations. The international movement was faced with 
the development of essentially parallel structures in the form of European Industry 
Federations and the European TUC. Thus, for example, between the late 1950s and 
1983, nominally separate bodies for food, drink and tobacco workers existed both 
inside and outside of the IUF (Buschak, 2003). WFTU hoped that the development 
of these European-level bodies would improve relations with ICFTU affiliates, but 
these hopes proved groundless (Lieβ, 1983). 
For the ICFTU, creation of the ETUC led to the loss of its existing European body 
(Gumbrell-McCormick, 2001). This created major tensions within the ICFTU as it 
struggled to decide how to deal with the new phenomenon. Ultimately, it decided 
not to take a position, which Gumbrell-McCormick (2000a) argues was a wise act of 
diplomacy and not simply inertia, since it allowed the ICFTU to maintain the world 
organisation’s unity albeit at considerable cost. However, for some national trade 
union movements in Europe, the EU’s increasing pull ushered in a period of greater 
orientation towards Europe to the exclusion of the rest of the world. 
The international trade union movement was expanding beyond its hitherto 
narrow geographical base, as each side in the Cold War was trying to recruit 
unions. In Africa and Asia, unions often provided the mass base for nationalist 
movements to fight for independence from the European imperial powers, and the 
Americans and Soviets vied for their loyalty. The unions of Europe, the USA and the 
USSR pursued what was at least in part a Cold War political agenda in the rest of 
the world. Gary Busch (1983) argued that for the main governments involved, the 
importance of international trade unionism was second only to military intelligence. 
A consequence was that the ICFTU ruled out contact between itself and WFTU 
despite the wishes of some of its affiliates (Lieβ, 1983). 
In some parts of the ex-colonial world such as Africa, the Cold War had serious 
consequences for trade unionism, weakening it wherever the US distributed economic 
or military aid (Koftas, 2002; Thomson and Larson, 1978). Wedin (1991), in a 
sensitive study of foreign union assistance in Latin America, shows how despite good 
intentions, foreign interventions at this time had negative effects and even ‘victims’. 
Foreign subventions on occasions reduced union democracy to a farce (Croucher, 
2003). In Kenya, for example, the nationalist politician and trade union leader Tom 
Mboya rapidly marginalised his political opponents with financial backing from the 
USA, finally removing them from the Kenya Federation of Trade Unions (Hagglund, 
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2007). In Japan, the Cold War also had important negative effects and the ICFTU 
affiliates became identified with the occupier. By 1950, the Communist union 
centre Sanbeyu was in the forefront of the Japanese trade union movement, but the 
American Military Government stimulated a breakaway centre, Sohyo. In the early 
1950s, the American Military Government dismissed large numbers of public sector 
trade unionists in the name of removing Communist influence, but also included 
non-Communist unionists. This initiated a period lasting right up until the collapse 
of Communism, in which affiliation to the ICFTU or WFTU constituted a factional 
issue within Japanese unions described as ‘damaging’ (Carew, 2000: 218). Despite this 
sharp split, the ITSs were nevertheless able to provide a focus for coordinated action 
between Japanese enterprise-based unions. In 1964, the International Metalworkers’ 
Federation established a Japan Council, playing a major part in establishing the 
annual ‘spring offensive’ (Park, 1983). 
A combination of political and industrial rivalries weakened ITS attempts to 
confront the activities of multinationals. These attempts were the first signs that 
the international union movement was moving decisively towards attempting 
international collective bargaining despite the implied transfer of bargaining 
authority from national to international level. Charles ‘Chip’ Levinson, general 
secretary of the ICEF, seeking to raise the profile of his previously weak 
ITS (Gallin, 1997), confirmed this as the international movement’s main task 
(Levinson, 1972). The North American United Auto Workers and the West 
German IG Metall pushed this agenda within the International Metalworkers’ 
Federation while the ICEF and the IUF developed international campaigns 
directed at particular multinationals. World Company Councils were developed 
in some companies in the 1960s by the IMF and ICEF. Yet significant unions in 
France, Italy and India were excluded because they were affiliated to the WFTU 
(Leiβ, 1983). By 1988, a new approach emerged that allowed the preservation of 
national unions’ bargaining independence and the first International Framework 
Agreement (IFA) was concluded by the IUF with BSN Danone in 1988 (Gumbrell-
McCormick, 2000a; 2004; Wills, 2002). 
The ITF was meanwhile pursuing international collective bargaining in the 
shipping industry with rather more success. The ‘Flags of Convenience’ (FOC) 
campaign, initiated in the late 1940s gathered momentum in the 1960s and began to 
bite in the 1970s. The campaign had political and industrial thrusts, and succeeded 
in enforcing minimum standards of pay in many of the world’s ships. We expand on 
the FOC campaign in Chapter five. 
Towards a Unified International Movement 
The existence of a common enemy helped the ICFTU to mobilise affiliates, but 
simultaneously illustrated the significance of the division between itself and the other 
confederations. The increasingly anomalous existence of Apartheid in South Africa 
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brought the ICFTU to develop a widely supported campaign. The Confederation 
undoubtedly made a real contribution here, overcoming the many constraints limiting 
its capacity for independent action (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2001). The circumstances 
were quite specific, in that there was a considerable consensus among affiliates that 
the Confederation should act (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2001). Roger Southall (1995) 
has shown however that effective solidarity was still restricted because of Cold War 
tensions between the ICFTU, the ITSs and the (non-dues paying) WFTU affiliate, 
the South African Congress of Trade Unions. 
As the multinationals grew in strength, and pushed at existing trade boundaries, 
semi-official meetings were held between officials of the world’s divided trade union 
movement (Lieβ, 1983). The extension of Western corporations into the Comecon 
countries provided a motive for Western unionists to show increased interest 
in Eastern Europe, while the emergence of ‘dissident unionism’ there ironically 
provided a motive for official Soviet unions to shore up their role through contact 
with their Western counterparts (Busch, 1983). 
After 1989 and the collapse of Communism, the way was paved for a more unified 
trade union movement at international level and extension of previously limited 
attempts to develop international networks and collective bargaining. Huge areas of 
the international economy were now opened up to companies and the ICFTU tried 
to take the opportunity to expand its influence. A key conclusion of a 1990 ICFTU/
ITS Conference was that the ICFTU should strengthen their ‘coordination of the 
work of the ITSs and national centres’ and a new department for multinationals was 
established at the Confederation (ICFTU, 1990; Gumbrell-McCormick, 2000a: 514). 
As this showed, the ICFTU did not accept a role limited to lobbying but wished to 
expand its coordinating, organising and bargaining functions. 
Unions in the former Soviet Union were allowed back into the fold of ‘free’ trade 
unions, even if their qualifications for entry were highly questionable. In the words 
of one commentator, the arrival of the ex-Soviet unions ‘unleashed a tremendous 
struggle to remake the geography of workers’ representation in central and Eastern 
Europe’ (Herod, 2001: 224). In the 1990s, even before these unions were admitted 
to the ICFTU, many affiliated to GUFs. The GUFs were therefore able quickly to 
come into direct contact where the ICFTU could not, and this was used to reject the 
ICFTU’s hegemonic claims within the international movement. The irony was that 
these unions’ ultimate admission to the ICFTU entailed only limited strengthening 
of it, because the former Soviet Union affiliates of WFTU had no tradition of 
negotiating with management. The main weapon used by the internationals has been 
an expansion of the GUF’s educational activities aimed at improving unions’ capacity 
to represent members (Sogge, 2004). 
The loss of most Russian unions, and that of a significant number of others in 
the world who left the WFTU without subsequently joining the ICFTU meant that 
WFTU withered, and stopped publishing membership figures in the 1990s although 
it continues to play some role in India, Latin America and the Arab countries. This 
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left the ICFTU as by far the biggest international player, with the relatively tiny 
Christian WCL the only alternative. 
In November 2006, the ITUC was formed from the ICFTU, the WCL and a number 
of sizeable and influential left-wing unions such as the Polish OPZZ, the Argentinean 
CTA, the Colombian CUT and the French CGT. Since the WCL’s strength lay in the 
developing and transitional countries, the international trade union movement 
achieved better international coverage even though some WCL affiliates refused to 
join. At the same time, the ITUC established a Pan-European Council including non-
ETUC unions and notably the Russians, who are not represented in the EU-oriented 
ETUC (Traub-Merz and Eckl, 2007). 
Politically divisive tendencies persist in some of the world’s unions, and the 
largest issue is that of the state controlled unions in the All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions (ACFTU), not currently recognised as free unions by the ITUC. The 
ACFTU is linking up with African unions through its cooperation with and funding 
of the Organisation of African Trade Unions and their financing of the sizeable 
Nkrumah Labour College in Accra (Traub-Merz and Eckl, 2007). There are voices 
arguing for engagement with the ACFTU through the latter’s admission to the ITUC, 
an issue that threatens to re-divide the international free trade union movement. 
Conclusion 
The international movement is now closer to being worthy of the global description 
than ever before, and previous political and religious obstacles to unity in action that 
restricted attempts to deal with multinationals have been removed. 
Key structural issues have been evident throughout the movement’s history 
and continue to loom large today. Perhaps the most important is the reluctance 
of national unions to cede power to international organisations. Another is the 
respective roles of the sectoral and umbrella bodies. The importance of educational 
work as a central and in many respects unifying activity helping the internationals 
establish shared activity of value to affiliates has been evident. 
Those active in the international trade union movement continue to find positive 
resources in their organisations’ history: its sheer length demonstrates the depth of 
their experience. The internationals’ collective record of actively resisting fascism 
and opposing Apartheid represent shared touchstones. While political differences 
may have been at the centre of the international movement’s history, both sides now 
refer to a shared tradition of campaigning against both. 
The length of the organisations’ histories goes well beyond being a collective 
resource because it encourages affiliates to take a long-term view of their involvement 
and of the benefits to be gained from it, an idea we expand on in Chapter four.
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•  C h a p t e r  f O u r  • 
The Internationals –  
Governance and Resources 
All international trade union organisations face three tasks: organisation, policy, 
and democratisation. This means international trade union policy must be 
democratised, it must reach deep down among the membership, including them, 
involving them.
Dan Gallin, ex-general secretary of the IUF (quoted in Rütters, 2001: 1)  
Introduction 
T h i s  chapter examines the central political dynamics within the internationals. We begin with an analytical account of how they are governed, showing the developed country unions’ dominance of the GUFs’ structures, underpinned 
by their high financial contributions. We also explain the current resource difficulties 
and the consequent political choice that the more financially secure affiliates are now 
faced with. 
We also argue that the two most commonly discussed strategies of merger and 
de-regionalisation are unlikely to deal effectively either with the GUFs’ difficulties 
or the underlying problem of national union decline. We therefore advocate two 
measures. The first is an increased material contribution from more developed 
countries. The second, for which we draw on international relations theories, is 
to encourage regions and sub-regions to make a contribution themselves. We 
suggest that they pursue a union development agenda organised on a small group 
or ‘minilateral’ basis and seek funding to support it. We believe the latter measure 
offers real possibilities for accessing funds, for improving the real involvement 
of developing country unions in the internationals and for building the affiliated 
unions themselves. 
We begin with an overview of the internationals’ membership and explain how 
they are governed and staffed. Next, the resources problem is examined. Finally, we 
expand in detail on the two proposed measures for arresting and reversing recent 
trends. 
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Global Governance: Structures and Authority 
Shown in Map 2, the GUFs’ headquarters are all in Europe. Most executive and 
statutory (i.e. required by rule) international meetings are hosted at headquarters. 
Map 2: Locations of Internationals’ HQs 
In 2004, the regional offices were distributed as shown in Map 3. 
Map 3: Locations of Internationals’ Offices 
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In addition many internationals have established technical support offices in 
sub-regions and specific countries, mainly to manage particular programmes and 
projects, shown in Map 4. 
Map 4: Locations of Project Offices 
The internationals, in common with other union organisations, have well-
developed governance systems and all maintain strict formal decision-making 
procedures based on their rules or ‘statutes’. These formal structures and procedures 
constitute a framework providing some constraints on powerful groups. The first 
democratising structure, also standard in national unions, is congress. Congress is 
the highest decision-making body, and in most cases meets every four years. This 
contrasts with almost all national unions where congresses are held more frequently. 
Congresses host around two thousand delegates and provide opportunities for 
unions to network and lobby for their agendas. Formal congress procedures are 
also tightly administered by headquarters officials, restricting the possibility of 
unanticipated decisions. 
All internationals have dues payment categories reflecting ability to pay, with 
most affiliates clustered in the lower paying ones. In an attempt to limit the voting 
power of high-paying affiliates, voting rights are in most GUFs determined by 
paying membership levels regardless of category of payment. The only exception 
is the removal of voting rights from unions who have paid no affiliation fees. This 
is a second democratising measure, that seeks to de-couple subscription from 
participation but, significantly, voting is restricted to leadership elections and issues 
where consensus cannot be reached. Congresses, by virtue of their infrequency and 
the lack of decision-taking opportunities, therefore have very restricted possibilities 
for determining or affecting strategy. 
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The internationals’ executives meet more frequently, usually annually, but in 
some cases twice a year. Seats are allocated for regional committee members, 
regional distribution and women since the internationals have all made concerted 
efforts over at least the last decade to ensure statutory representation of women at 
all levels. This is a third democratising measure. It has helped to broaden executive 
meeting agendas and in some cases how debate is conducted. 
Table 4 shows the distribution of executive positions by region in the ICFTU 
between 1972 and 2003. 
Table 4: Regional Distribution of Executive Positions in Relation to Membership in the ICFTU, 1972–2003
Region 1972 1983 1992 2003
Seats % Mbp % Seats % Mbp % Seats % Mbp % Seats % Mbp %
Africa 3  12 868 2 4  11 546 1 5  11 1,997 2 6 13 10,590 9
Asia 5  20 4295 11   6  17 11,047  14 8  18 19,628  20 11 23 27,282 24
West Asia 1       3 1800 2 1    2 800 1
Middle East 2    8 844 2   2    6 865 1 2    4 882 1 2 4 1,273 1
Latin 
America
3 12 1552 4 4  11 12,608  16   5  11 10,812  11 6 13 16,467 15
Caribbean 1       4 122 -   1    3 311 - 1    2 149 - 1 2 382 1
Third World 14   
 
56 7,681 20 18  51 27,177  34 22  50 34,268  35 26 55 55,994 50
Europe 8  32 27,805  72 10  29 35,902  45 14  32 46,872  48 15 32 43,637 39
North 
America
2  8 1,300 3 6  17 14,902  19   6  14 14,990  15 6 13 12,362 11
      
Source: Gumbrell McCormick (2002) and ICFTU Congress Reports
The Table shows that in 2003 the developing country unions had a small majority 
of executive seats in the ICFTU. However, this tells us little about their weight in 
decision making both there and in GUFs. In reality, a consensus between the main 
unions of the developed world, and especially those that contribute high amounts 
financially (the Germans, Nordics, North Americans and Japanese) is likely to carry 
any vote. 
Formal authority runs in clear lines up to the general secretary and president. 
General secretaries and presidents are elected officials, as opposed to the vast 
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majority of those working for the internationals who are appointed functionaries. 
General secretaries are currently all European. An increasing number of 
presidents are from developing countries. The general secretary carries ultimate 
responsibility for their organisations but this is to some extent shared with 
presidents particularly at times of political conflict. The great majority of senior 
officials are men, with only one female GUF general secretary, Anita Normark 
of BWI. 
Information is controlled and distributed by the senior officers and this group 
therefore has significant power to set agendas (Lukes, 2002). Officers’ power in 
this respect probably exceeds that of union officers at national level, because 
of the linguistic barriers and wide range of difficult-to-interpret information 
involved internationally. As Kratochwil argues, there is a ‘baffling’ array of 
information requirements for players in a multilateral setting, and this is apparent 
in the case of the internationals. He argues that for international organisations 
to be able to achieve consensus and cooperation, ‘of paramount importance is 
the interpretation of the “facts” and inferences about motivations’ (Kratochwil, 
1993: 448). This complex process of interpretation is inevitably dominated by 
permanent officials. They also play a significant role in working groups. Working 
groups and non-statutory committees, formed regularly to review and develop 
policy are the general secretary’s main partners in policy making. 
Executive committees are formally responsible for running the organisation 
between congresses. However, Kahler’s (1992) problem of ‘latency’ is evident in 
these committees. ‘Latency’ describes the situation whereby members become 
passive in large diverse groups. Delegates fall into diplomatic mode and rarely raise 
contentious issues publicly, with the breaks and evenings providing important 
social and political contact. Few delegates attend executive meetings in order 
to help resolve difficult international issues. All delegates’ unions face their own 
financial and political problems and delegates are reluctant to tackle the same 
problems multiplied at international level. In addition, they are concerned to 
maintain unity and there is therefore limited real participation at this level. Thus, 
the financial difficulties that we analyse below are little discussed even within the 
internationals’ executives and are certainly not publicised. As a result, a subject of 
fundamental importance is not widely understood and is only discussed within a 
highly restricted group, often in informal situations. This group largely consists of 
officials together with the representatives of influential national unions, which is 
largely coterminous with those making large financial contributions. 
There are three types of authority that unions can draw on in their dealings with 
each other in these bodies: contribution authority, political authority and moral 
authority. The first comes from the amount that a union is seen to contribute to 
the collective both in financial and human terms and has primacy over other forms 
of authority. Germany, USA, Canada, Japan and the Nordic region collectively 
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represent on average 80 per cent of the internationals’ dues income. High levels of 
affiliation fees and external project funding coming from Western European and 
North American unions means that the focus at executive level is on their interests, 
and this is well understood by unions from elsewhere. Conversely, where a region has 
been consistently unable to deliver appropriate affiliation fee payments, for example 
Latin America in recent years, their credibility and influence is much diminished. 
Political authority comes from the perceived political importance of an affiliate’s 
country and its trade union movement. At the global policy level, this is closely 
associated with contribution authority although the political positioning of an 
affiliate at important political moments is also significant in the shorter term. 
The third, more temporary form of authority is moral. Moral authority is acquired 
when a union movement becomes prominent because of its exceptional achievements 
or particularly adverse environment; recent examples are Colombia and Iraq. When 
representatives from these countries speak they are not contradicted and in general 
they are supported. But this does not confer any wider authority on them to influence 
global strategy and therefore the authority is limited and transient. 
Staffing 
Some 700 people globally work for GUFs, 380 at headquarters and 297 in regional 
offices. This is a small number in comparison both with the ITUC and with major 
non-governmental organisations: in 2007, for example, Oxfam had 6,000 employees 
worldwide. This small staff must administer organisations which themselves 
consume large amounts of time and energy, with high levels of reporting and written 
accounting to executive bodies. The workforce’s capacity to meet these demands 
seems likely to decline in the near future, as approximately 50 per cent of the 
internationals’ existing staff will retire by 2013. Many of these staff have enormous 
understanding of particular industry sectors and unmatched in-country experience 
acquired over long periods, raising a serious question about the regeneration of 
human resources within the internationals. 
Archer (2001) suggests that the national composition of staff is an important 
dimension for judging an organisation’s degree of internationalisation. In this 
sense, different internationals represent variations on a theme. In some cases the 
general secretary strongly affects the functionaries’ national make up; in others the 
influence of powerful affiliates dominates while in a third group both influences 
are combined. There are therefore high proportions of South African, German, 
American, Australian, Japanese and British staff. 
Employment in the regions is often more precarious than at the headquarters 
secretariats, weakening the formers’ overall position in relation to headquarters. In 
some GUFs, a proportion of those working in the regions is employed on temporary 
contracts, through externally funded projects. The number of staff employed by the 
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internationals is provided in Table 5 below, with the minimum numbers employed 
on temporary contracts given in brackets. 
Table 5: Numbers of Staff Employed by the Internationals, 2004
Global 
Union
Total 
Number 
of Head 
Office 
Staff 
Regional Staff Total 
Number 
of 
Regional 
Staff
Total 
Number 
of Union 
Staff
Percent-
age of 
Head 
Office 
Staff 
Africa Americas Asia 
Pacific
Europe Middle 
East and 
North 
Africa
EI 33 12 8 9 4 33 66 50
ICFTU 84 12 (2) 17 (3) 19 8 (4) 2 58 (9) 142 (9) 59
IFBWW 14 8 (6) 5 (2) 14 (8) 1 (1) 1 (1) 29 (18) 43 (18) 33
ICEM 17 2 4 2 2 10 27 63
IFJ 12 (3) 2 (1) 3 (1) 3 (1) 3 11 (3) 23 (6) 52
IMF 22 3 5 9 (4) 2 19 (4) 41 (4) 54
ITGLWF 7 3 4 4 4 15 22 32
ITF 102 5 7 10 11 1 34 136 75
IUF 19 (2) 2 (1) 7 (2) 12 (8) 12 (2) 33 (13) 52 (15) 37
PSI 28 12 9 15 20 2 (2) 58 (2) 86 (2) 33
UNI 41 8 12 10 16 46 87 47
TUAC 9 (3) 9 (3) 50
Total 388 (8) 69 (10) 81 (8) 107 (21) 83 (7) 6 (3) 346 (49) 734 (57) Average 49
Note 1: The ‘Head Office staff’ figures include secretariat staff not located in Head Offices. The figures in 
brackets refer to the minimum numbers of staff employed on temporary contracts.
Note 2: The ICEM closed its regional offices and relocated the secretariat to Geneva during the period 2007–
2008.
Source: Schwass (2004)
Outside of the developed world, externally funded projects play a considerable 
role in providing staff. Not all of the internationals provided current information for 
this table, but it gives some indication of how many staff members are partly (more than 
50 per cent) or wholly financed by project funds: for example, 8 (6) means that out of 8 
staff, 6 are financed by project funds. The number of staff sponsored by project funds 
is in reality higher than shown here since some GUFs operate numerous project offices 
separate from the regional offices. The proportion of head office to regional staff in 
the last column is calculated without taking project staff into consideration; European 
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regional organisations independent of GUFs have also been omitted (Schwass, 2004). 
The governance of the internationals therefore places considerable power in 
their European headquarters, whilst influence within them is concentrated in 
affiliates with high contribution authority. Most affiliated unions fall outside of this 
category.  
Membership 
The key task in the 1980s and 1990s was seen to be moving away from being based 
in the developed world and towards becoming genuinely global organisations. There 
was therefore an intense drive to build affiliation levels in order to permit elections 
to regional structures, and this proved highly effective. The internationals recruited 
large numbers of unions, many of which became the recipients of resources from the 
developed world’s unions. Despite this drive, the internationals’ regions today are 
globally incomplete, since at this point few GUFs have established presences in the 
Middle East and none have offered formal recognition to the Chinese unions. 
Non-OECD unions’ motivations for affiliating have important consequences. 
According to Logue (1980), strong national unions will only affiliate to international 
bodies if they cannot solve their problems at national level; in the case of non-OECD 
unions, the converse applied since many of the unions affiliating were not and had 
never been strong. They affiliated because they were weak. Some sought to substitute 
for old alliances that had previously sustained them. African and Asian unions 
involved in national liberation movements had seen an erosion of their previously 
close relationships with the nationalists in power after independence and started to 
experience pressures to subordinate themselves to states (Wood and Brewster, 2007). 
Others saw affiliation as a step out of political and industrial isolation. For many 
unions, joining the internationals was their first opportunity to build genuinely 
global contacts on the basis of relative equality, as previously international contacts 
had been with ex-colonising countries’ unions. They were in addition often controlled 
by national political élites. For other unions, such as those from the former Soviet 
Union, affiliation was seen as a way of affirming their democratic legitimacy by 
gaining admission to the free trade union movement. It also provided them with a 
way of looking at other forms of unionism which they had not been able to access 
before the 1990s, without committing themselves to adopting any of them. 
These motivations sustained unions through affiliation processes which they 
experienced as difficult and involved them in divulging organisational information 
that they would have preferred not to submit. In the case of the ITUC, affiliation 
was also a protracted process as it maintained a now-abandoned policy of limiting 
affiliations to one per country, and in many countries competing union structures 
and political affiliations made selection processes lengthy. These processes raised 
expectations of what could be delivered after affiliation, and in many cases the 
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demands overwhelmed the internationals. The real possibilities of providing help 
were dwarfed by the expectations of unions whose only previous experiences of 
international organisations were of large bodies such as the United Nations or well-
resourced NGOs. 
Some unions, such as those based in South Africa, were relatively self-sufficient, 
but these were a small minority. Most new affiliates posed major difficulties, and 
foremost among them were those from the former Soviet Union. Since the 1990s, 
these unions have put significant pressure on the GUFs to help them become 
more effective organisations. Most of these vast unions, with formal memberships 
numbering millions, were completely unknown to the internationals, since they had 
previously been excluded from the ITUC ‘family’. They are heterogeneous and virtually 
impossible accurately to map (Garver et al., 2007). Whilst making demands on the 
internationals, they maintain their old affiliations. The VKP, the CIS regional structure 
dating from Soviet times, continues to operate and to provide an alternative locus of 
activity, and, along with WFTU, in the 1990s opposed national union affiliation to the 
Western ‘anti-communist’ internationals. In 2000 the Russian FNPR affiliated to the 
ICFTU. However, its President, Mikhail Shmakov, currently sits as the President of VKP, 
highlighting the Russian unions’ decision to live in both worlds. The GUFs were aware 
of the Russian stance and unions were usually admitted to GUFs without any serious 
pressure being put on them to reform prior to admission. These unions therefore posed 
real challenges when they came into the internationals as full members. 
The Chinese unions, whose formal membership is in excess of the rest of the 
world put together, represent a further responsibility for the internationals. Most 
GUFs conduct ‘active engagement’, which entails forming diplomatic and in some 
cases technical relations without discussing affiliation. In this case, they receive no 
income for their work. 
The recently affiliated unions are the main beneficiaries of the transfer of resources 
that occurs within the internationals, and developed country unions have to justify 
that transfer to their own members. In the next chapters we look at two of the most 
significant areas of activity for European and North American unions: collective 
bargaining and networking across multinationals. Here is an important positive 
argument for their contributions, because international bargaining and networking 
are easily identifiable products. National networking between affiliates of the same 
GUF is a further benefit. Less-apparent benefits also exist, including being able to call 
on the internationals’ experience and linking capacities. It is often assumed that it is 
only the developing country membership which either needs this level of support or 
can demand it from other affiliates. Yet many cases exist of OECD country unions 
benefiting from international support during disputes. One recent example is that of 
the powerful Finnish Paper Workers’ Union which in 2005 received extensive support 
from many unions including the Brazilian paper workers in its successful battle to 
resist employers’ attempts to increase the use of contract labour. 
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In summary, the internationals have faced increased demands from their affiliates 
outside of the developed world for which they receive little income, and although 
identifiable benefits exist for OECD-based affiliates, this has caused them to examine 
their commitment more closely. 
Headquarters–Regions Relations 
There is clearly a balance to be struck between the requirement to tailor policies and 
practices to specific conditions on the one hand and the need to ensure coherence in 
global policies and activities on the other. 
The issue is strongly affected by broader political attitudes. Sentiment in favour 
of increased regional autonomy has solid underpinnings, both in Europe and in 
the developing world, where unions have long been suspicious of the ‘imperialist’ 
foundations of the global unions. This is especially apparent in radical unions in 
Latin America who see the Western European and North American domination of 
the international structures as reflecting the policies of their national governments, 
and as part of an imperialist policy. These broad sentiments are shared by many 
other unions in the developing world. 
Gumbrell-McCormick, in her study of the ICFTU, approaches the centre–region 
balance issue through the concept of federalism, defined as ‘individuals gathering 
together through national groups to act in common with other national groups’ 
(2001: 20). Strong and weak federalism are distinguished, depending on the level of 
power delegated by national unions to the internationals. In the ICFTU, federalism 
is relatively strong because regions are virtually autonomous. Regional structures 
within GUFs have varying degrees of autonomy but federalism is weak in the 
majority because regions are essentially subordinated to the headquarters. Most 
are effectively outposts of the international and are, unlike the ITUC’s regions, not 
regarded as essentially autonomous organisations. 
Regional executive committees generally meet twice a year and regional 
conferences are held, in the main, every four years, putting considerable power in 
the hands of regional officials. Regional secretaries head regional offices, and they 
are usually appointed functionaries of the international. In these cases the GUF 
exercises control through its regional secretary. In a minority of cases (the ITUC, 
UNI and IUF) the equivalent officer is elected, with the title of regional general 
secretary. In simple terms the distinction is between a regional secretary, whose job 
is to represent the interests of the international within the region, and a regional 
general secretary or elected regional president, whose task is to represent the 
interests of the region to the international executive. 
Regional autonomy is also limited because, for the majority of GUFs, budgetary 
and financial issues are ultimately regulated exclusively at headquarters level. In 
recent years, internal and external auditors have begun to focus on the regions’ 
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financial practices, bringing criticism of the management of project funds and 
standards of accountability more widely. They also refer to the precarious position 
of regional offices and structures, and in particular the common problem of the 
non-registration and lack of legal standing of regional offices and structures with 
national authorities. 
Regions are further weakened in relation to headquarters by the distribution of 
authority within the regions themselves, since they are not homogenous blocs of 
countries with shared interests. Within each region, with the exception of Western 
Europe, clear national centres of influence exist. In Africa, South African unions 
dominate, providing up to 80 per cent of GUFs’ regional income. They are a much 
admired union movement that emerged through struggle, an evolution not replicated 
by unions in other African nations. They therefore combine a high degree of all three 
of the types of authority identified above. The South African unions are, on the other 
hand, self-conscious in their dominance of political processes, a self-consciousness 
that is not evident in the cases of Japan in Asia and the USA in the Americas. In Asia, 
Japanese unions exert strong influence on the basis of high contribution authority. 
In Latin America, despite the fragmentation of the organisations themselves, the 
Brazilian unions do likewise through political authority. Where structures cover the 
Americas, the North American unions essentially control them through a combination 
of contribution and political authority. In Eastern Europe, Russian unions are highly 
influential, also through contribution and political authority. In Western Europe, 
power relations between countries are more balanced. The Nordic unions are well 
interconnected and tend towards common positions that increase their influence 
within the European and international structures. They, along with the Germans, in 
most cases the highest dues payers to international bodies, are also the main funders 
of international projects and that contribution authority, although not always decisive, 
gives their views heavy weighting in GUFs. 
As implied above, a different centre–periphery model exists in the ITUC and 
some GUFs, closer to a strong federalist arrangement where regional structures 
enjoy high levels of autonomy. The most extreme example is the ITUC, which has 
the powerful European TUC and three autonomous regional organisations (Africa, 
Asia and Latin America). 
However, analysis using the federalist concept only takes us so far. It focuses on 
centre–affiliate relations and therefore does not help greatly in addressing the issue 
of imbalances of influence within and between regions. The imbalances issue is 
important because it limits many unions’ influence, involvement and commitment. 
The concept of multilateralism, which focuses on coordinated relations beyond 
those of the centre and affiliates, is useful here. The GUFs are multilateral bodies; 
their multilateralism contains federalism. In other words, multilateralism forms an 
outer frame for federalism. Ruggie defines multilateralism as it applies to norms, 
régimes and organisations as follows: 
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Multilateralism is an institutional form that coordinates relations among three 
or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct; that is, principles 
which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the 
particularist interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in 
any specific occurrence.
(Ruggie, 1993: 77) 
Axelrod and Keohane’s (1986) idea of ‘diffuse reciprocity’, where membership of a 
multilateral organisation is expected to yield a rough equivalence of benefits between 
members in the aggregate and over time, usefully deepens Ruggie’s multilateralism 
concept. The multilateralism and diffuse reciprocity of GUF membership contrasts 
with the bilateralism and short-lived nature of an increasing amount of international 
union work. Bilateralism is both particularist and linked to a particular situation 
such as a campaign; it is normally a short-term relationship based on specific 
reciprocity. Diffuse reciprocity on the other hand is longer term, in that affiliates do 
not expect short-term payoffs from their membership. 
Ruggie (1993) argues that multilateral structures are sustainable because the 
generalised organising principles on which they are based are more elastic than 
those of bilateral relationships. This elasticity means that multilaterals are able to 
contain internal tensions, especially when their work is in demand. The theory helps 
explain the GUFs’ immense adaptability, and even their survival in a context of 
extreme resource pressures. 
Multilateralism, as we suggested above, provides a flexible outer frame for federal 
arrangements and for groupings of different sorts. These internal small groups, with the 
right incentives, are able to work towards creating collective goods. As Olson says: 
If the central or federated organization provides some service to the small 
constituent organizations, they may be induced to use their social incentives 
to get the individuals belonging to each small group to contribute toward the 
achievement of the collective goals of the whole group.
(Olson, 1965: 62) 
In short, multilateralist bodies like the GUFs can contain smaller or ‘minilateral’ 
(Kahler, 1992) groupings that can strengthen them. This is positive both because of 
the problem of ‘latency’ and due to the power imbalances within GUFs and their 
regions. We return to this later, since it has a bearing on the resource issue which 
we now outline. 
The Resource Issue 
Developed country unions are experiencing a steady decline in the number of workers 
paying subscriptions. Table 6 shows how this is reflected in the ICFTU through the 
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declining numbers of members that national unions actually pay subscriptions for 
in relation to their declared membership. 
In 2001 the ICFTU claimed 147 million members (the WCL estimated its 
membership at 4.3 million at that time). These figures are only broadly indicative, 
since they include over 50 per cent of unions implausibly declaring exactly the 
same membership figures for each year over a five- or six-year period (ICFTU, 
2001b). 
Falling membership in the majority of unions has a direct and dramatic effect on 
the internationals’ dues income, a key source of funding. Only one per cent of union 
membership dues worldwide is dedicated to international action and affiliation. 
The most recent calculation of the funds available to the internationals, carried 
out as part of the ITUC’s Millennium Review in 2001, estimated a total income of 
US$60 million per year from membership dues, donated funds and development 
cooperation funds raised externally. Between 1999 and 2003, an additional US$70 
million of donations and project funds was channelled through ITUC regional 
structures. To put these figures in comparative perspective, Oxfam received some 
US$580 million in 2007, while the British union Unite claimed an income in the 
same year equivalent to about US$400 million. 
Table 6: ICFTU Declared and Paying Membership by Region, 1998 and 2003
Region 1998 2003
Declared 
Membership
Paying 
Membership
Declared 
Membership
Paying 
Membership
Western Europe 43,214,250 37,594,584 43,637,707 36,233,803
Asia and Pacific 27,907,407 18,112,000 27,282,638 14,708,392
Latin America 19,361,761 19,254,000 16,467,678 7,439,380
North America 14,612,112 14,612,112 12,362,956 12,362,056
Africa 8,941,858 8,454,000 10,590,676 10,254,425
Central and Eastern Europe/ 
N.I.S.
8,235,265 8,048,000 37,296,378 11,300,583
Middle East 747,800 745,000 1,273,528 1,271,000
West Indies 420,332 424,122 382,798 387,000
Totals 123,440,785 107,243,818 149,294,359 93,956,639
Percentage of membership for 
which dues paid
87 63
Source: ICFTU (2004) and authors’ calculations
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The 2001 analysis noted that real value fee receipts per member had dropped 
by 22 per cent since 1994 (ICFTU, 2001a). Table 7 shows the actual fees received 
from its affiliates in 1998 and 2003. Between 1999 and 2003 the ICFTU increased 
its membership by 28 million but saw a fall in paying membership of 12.4 per cent. 
In addition, the internationals all face a serious challenge from the late payment of 
membership fees. 
Table 7: ICFTU Actual Fees Received per Region, 1998 and 2003 
Region Actual Fees Received, 
1998 (EURO)
Actual Fees
Received, 2003 (EURO)
Percentage Change 
(+ or -)
Central and Eastern 
Europe/N.I.S.
115,884 194,870 +68.2
West Indies 3,030 4,351 +43.6
Western Europe 5,403,298 5,862,541 +8.5
North America 2,215,906 1,647,439 -25.7
Africa 131,899 67,675 -48.7
Asia and Pacific 1,467,920 490,412 -66.6
Latin America 29,744 4,259 -85.7
Middle East 37,890 5,155 -86.4
Source: ICFTU (2004)
National unions practise trade-offs between affiliation fees and the number 
of members they choose to affiliate: if the international increases fees, they 
simply reduce the number of members affiliated. The internationals’ resources 
are therefore strictly limited by the amounts that national unions are prepared to 
contribute, conceived of in essentially historic terms. In 2004–5, the ICEM tried 
to address the problem directly in an explicit but unsuccessful attempt to raise 
international affiliation fees higher on the political agenda of OECD country 
unions. Annual accounts revealed that a 2003 affiliation fee increase, designed to 
bring a 14.29 per cent increase in income brought only a 1.2 per cent increase in 
2004 (ICEM, 2004a; ICEM, 2004b). Here was explicit confirmation of the GUFs’ 
previous experience, that raising affiliation fee levels simply leads to a reduction 
in claimed membership by affiliates. The ICEM discussed two alternative 
responses. Initially, it considered presenting the case for affiliates to devote 
an increased percentage of their national income to international work. After 
enormous and at times acrimonious debate amongst affiliates at international 
and regional levels, this proposal was rejected as unrealistic. Affiliates were 
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unable to secure sufficient political support within their own organisations to 
defend an increase in affiliation fee levels. The only remaining option was to 
reduce expenditure and to close regional offices. The ICEM’s regions have from 
then on been assisted by the secretariat. 
Project funding is also essential income, used to sustain educational activities that, 
as we outline in Chapter seven, are considerable. In total, project funding represented 
just under half of the internationals’ total income in 2000 (ICFTU, 2001f). Increasingly, 
the internationals blur the line between project activity and the resource people 
employed to manage them on the one hand, and their core costs and staff on the 
other. Schwass (2004: 22) refers to this blurring in diplomatic terms: ‘the term “direct 
project costs” is somewhat difficult to define’. It is therefore impossible precisely to 
estimate the balance between membership dues and project funding, a particular 
issue in the cases of the ITGLWF, BWI and ITUC. The area is sensitive since it is clear 
that a sizeable proportion of the internationals’ funds come from outside the trade 
union movement. This fundamental reality, which has gone un-noticed or at least un-
mentioned by other authors, is a major issue. It clearly means that the internationals 
are dependent on external funders and risk becoming essentially project-driven 
organisations as happened to the IFPAAW prior to its forced merger with the IUF 
in 1994. There is a need for the international trade union movement to become less 
dependent on these sources. 
Nevertheless, the internationals’ ability to continue to raise significant project 
funds currently remains crucial. Potential exists here to develop the role of GUF 
regions, since donors have increasingly decentralised arrangements, with funding 
decisions often being made at regional and sub-regional levels. Those GUFs with 
a relatively strong federalism may therefore have a potential route out of financial 
problems, especially when combined with a minilateral approach where several 
countries’ unions collaborate. GUF regions operating within a strong federalist 
model, such as the IUF’s East European region, have already been able to use their 
independence to raise considerable project funds. 
Financial problems have intensified debate over the appropriate level of regional 
autonomy. In this debate, the case advanced by headquarters for improved regional 
accountability cannot be dismissed as simply a device for headquarters to increase 
their specific weight. In the ITUC’s 2004 Congress documents, the financial auditors 
complained of a lack of consistent financial reporting from AFRO (ITUC, 2004). 
Gottfurcht had done the same in 1966, indicating that this is a long-term issue and 
not one invented opportunistically. 
Thus, the financial problem means that the internationals rely heavily on external 
funding to support key areas of activity. An answer may lie in more rather than 
less regional autonomy, but regional accountability both upwards and downwards 
remains an issue. These, however, are not the terms in which the internationals’ 
future is normally discussed. 
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Re-structuring the Internationals 
The most recent major attempt to generate discussion around restructuring, the 
ITUC’s Millennium Review, failed seriously to involve GUF executives and brought 
only minor results disproportionate to the scale of the problems. 
Within the internationals, discussion of organisational strategy focuses 
almost entirely on a merger of the main GUFs. One GUF, the ITGLWF, clearly 
has inadequate resources to carry out the range of tasks required of any global 
union body, and merger offers a way out which it intends to take. For other 
GUFs, pushing the merger trend to its logical conclusion is not a solution that 
will be widely acceptable; some, like the IUF, have set policies firmly against 
merger. A common suggestion (see for example Traub-Merz and Eckl, 2007) 
is to establish two large GUFs, one for manufacturing and one for the public 
sector. However, the current prospects of the GUFs agreeing to merger on this 
scale are tiny. There are several understandable reasons for this. First, GUF 
merger has invariably meant that one headquarters has to be chosen, bringing 
the loss of uniquely experienced staff. Second, some international trade unionists 
refer to the national level experience of merger which has often entailed long 
periods of internal disruption. There is some support from serious research for 
that viewpoint (Dempsey, 2004), and it was long ago suggested that mergers 
fail to overcome the problems that create them (Chaison, 1996). It seems that 
although no research exists on GUF mergers, these problems are likely only 
to be magnified at international level. Third, it is pointed out that many of the 
claimed benefits of GUF merger centre on cost reductions that are not assured 
or quantified, and that could be obtained in other ways. 
In 2006, in direct response to the weakness of the solutions under discussion, the 
Council of Global Unions was formed to intensify coordination and cooperation. Yet 
this appears to have attracted little support from several GUFs, with the IUF and 
IMF deciding not to participate. The objection is that it is, in the words of one official, 
‘a complete waste of scarce resources’. Currently, neither merger nor the Council of 
Global Unions offer viable solutions to the current resource problems. 
Prior to discussing a proposed solution, we note that the internationals stand 
to benefit from a management review encompassing all of them, similar to those 
that have been carried out by some trade union movements at national level (for a 
review and comparison of these in Canada, the USA and Britain, see Clark et al., 
1998). At a minimum, this seems likely at least to make useful suggestions as to how 
efficiency could be improved both individually and collectively. Some of the issues to 
be covered, such as succession planning for the high proportion of staff due to retire 
over the next decade, are especially urgent. 
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Small Groups: Collaboration and Minilateralism 
In the current situation, a further strategic review seems unlikely to attract sufficient 
support from the GUFs to be viable; the Millennium Review may be read as 
an illustration of the intractability of the structural issues. We now outline an 
alternative approach. 
Both research and experience indicate that small groups are able to work more 
effectively together and deliver improvements to the internationals’ work even with 
reduced income. We therefore suggest a move away from a merger/restructuring 
focus and towards increased inter- and intra-GUF collaboration. 
Intra-GUF collaboration can be enhanced by small groups of unions working 
closely together on concrete issues, offering the prospect of overcoming Kahler’s 
problem of ‘latency’. Small groups create environments where individuals and 
individual organisations are more likely to form robust relationships. They find it 
easier to define their own individual and collective interests and to navigate the 
process of forming alliances and working with other organisations. When small 
groups are comprised of geographically, politically or industrially connected unions 
there is potential for them to operate effectively together in symbiotic ways. 
There are two ways in which small groups can make international groupings 
more effective, as described by Kahler (1992); in one, the group acts as a ‘broker’ 
(sometimes described in practice as ‘missionaries’) for negotiations within the wider 
grouping. In the other, the small group operates as a ‘progressive club’ in which it 
develops and promotes more progressive policies or work than the ‘lowest common 
denominator’ normally experienced in larger groups. This model offers global unions 
a way of developing meaningful and ambitious collaboration between affiliates. 
A strategic approach to inter-GUF collaboration could also be usefully developed 
by substantially expanding a number of existing collaborations. Educational 
collaboration offers good prospects here. One positive example has been the ten 
years of GUF cooperation in the former Soviet Union across various educational 
programmes. A second is the work of UNI, IUF and PSI on the shared concern of 
private equity. The joint initiative started in 2007 and includes research and online 
information, with potential for joint campaigning. A third joint initiative relates to 
contract labour, initiated by the ICEM but being extended to include all GUFs and 
the ITUC. The programme has developed research and strategic discussion about 
how unions manage the issue in different sectors. An important element has been 
to spread awareness amongst unions that the growth of the use of contract labour 
or the ‘externalisation’ of work is a major threat to labour standards at local and 
international levels. This collaboration could involve an important campaigning 
(including around multinational labour agencies) and lobbying element, to relate 
to the current wider discussion around international labour standards. Collective 
bargaining provides a fourth case. The joint signing of IFAs is important for 
strengthening IFA credibility with stakeholders. Three currently exist and it appears 
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likely that more will follow. Finally, significant collaboration exists between the 
internationals in the Middle East and North Africa, and China. The needs of both 
areas far outweigh the resources available, underlining the need to pool resources. 
These collaborations offer global unions a focused and decentralised way of 
forming stronger international structures, and could provide a more ambitious and 
realistic way out of the current impasse. 
Conclusion 
The internationals have been victims of their own success in recruiting affiliates, 
but the influence of the latter remains limited. This is important background to the 
shortcomings in using international agreements and building company networks 
that we identify in the following chapters. 
Resources have been a resilient, long-term problem. In a ‘big picture’ sense, the 
resources issue would have been recognisable to Gottfurcht in the 1960s and even to 
Fimmen in the post-First World War years. The reluctance of unions at national level 
to cede increased resources to the internationals is a long-term one that can only be 
addressed by a combination of the objective logic of globalisation and the political 
will to take the necessary steps in response. 
The immediate resource issue that the internationals face can only be dealt with 
by developed country affiliates because it is urgent. Survival rests on this small group 
of unions making the political choice to devote a higher percentage of their income 
towards international structures than they have historically done. A strategy to 
convince their own executive bodies to do this when their own membership income 
is in decline is needed and one of this book’s objectives is to provide material for such 
intelligent appeals to members. 
There is a second, longer-term prong to our proposed strategy. We propose 
a minilateral approach within the existing multilateral structures. We suggest 
pursuing the union developmental agenda through educational activity supported 
by fundraising, by building sub-regional and small group programmes both between 
unions and the internationals themselves. Funding is increasingly decentralised 
and offers real opportunities for such groups. The inter-union collaboration should 
mobilise the demonstrated democratising effects of educational activity discussed 
in Chapter seven. Participation can be raised, and this can combine with increased 
contribution authority, providing an opportunity for developing country unions to 
increase their influence in the internationals.
the wOrk Of the internatiOnals
Global Unions, Global Business 2011.indd   56 31/05/2011   08:40:02
•  C h a p t e r  f i v e  •  
International Collective  
Bargaining 
Two leaders of the union Edegel in Peru’s electricity sector, organising workers in 
the Endesa group attended the ICEM project’s education, which led to a number 
of achievements. Their improved bargaining skills directly brought better salaries 
and conditions of work. It helped establish a Contract Workers’ Union in the 
company. Membership increased, so did links with the community and a library 
was set up for members. The International Framework Agreement with Endesa 
was used to improve health and safety standards, and this also included extension 
of the same standards to contract workers.
Cristhian Rivas, ICEM Project Coordinator Peru  
Introduction 
T h i s  chapter deals with the main tools currently used by GUFs to improve unions’ ability to bargain and organise within multinationals: International Framework Agreements (IFAs). 
A good deal of attention has been focussed on these agreements both within the 
internationals and by academics interested in the development of an international 
system of industrial relations (for example, ICFTU, 2001b; Wills, 2004; Müller 
and Rüb, 2005). They have been adopted as a major part of the industrial GUFs’ 
strategies; UNI, IMF, ICEM, BWI, IUF and ITGLWF have all passed congress and 
executive resolutions to this effect. Essentially statements of fundamental rights, 
these agreements offer some possibilities for local unionists by establishing a context 
for unions to develop local bargaining with employers. 
Our argument is as follows: current ways of working do not maximise IFAs’ 
potential. Many agreements are negotiated without the involvement of unionists 
from developing country unions, who are not made fully aware of the agreements’ 
purpose, ramifications and implications. Indeed, in some cases the GUFs, as the 
representatives of these unions, are themselves only marginally and formally involved 
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in concluding them. Trade unions from outside of the developed world are often 
little involved in IFA monitoring and review processes. In these circumstances the 
agreements frequently do not enable developing country unions to conduct dialogue 
with companies. There is therefore a need to review how they are negotiated, 
promoted, monitored and reviewed. 
Negotiating International Framework Agreements 
International Framework Agreements are often concluded between unions and 
GUFs on the one hand and senior management on the other. We reproduce the 
building workers’ model framework agreement in Annex 1 and an actual agreement 
with the French company Lafarge in Annex 2. These agreements may be seen as an 
attempt to establish stable relationships with companies on an international basis 
and they are favoured by European unions over the more adversarial and episodic 
US strategic campaigning approach, which identifies and attacks companies’ key 
relationships (Russo, 1999; Greven, 2003; 2006; 2008). 
IFAs may also be viewed as alternatives or supplements to unilateral company 
codes of conduct as, unlike these codes, they are negotiated and normally 
feature key union rights (Holdcroft, 2006). In some sectors, such as clothing 
and textiles, thousands of unilateral codes remain in existence and are likely to 
remain the predominant tool available to GUFs to exert leverage on companies 
because of union weakness. Table 8 below provides those details which we have 
been able to establish of the IFAs in existence in mid 2008.
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Table 8: International Framework Agreements to February 2011
Company Headquarters 
Country
Industry GUF Year  
Concluded
Signed 
by HQ 
Country 
Union
Danone France Food Processing IUF 1988 No
Accor France Hotels IUF 1995 No
IKEA Sweden Furniture BWI 1998 No
Statoil Norway Oil ICEM 1998 Yes
Faber-Castell Germany Office Material BWI 1999 Yes
Metro Germany Commerce UNI 1999
Freudenberg Germany Chemicals ICEM 2000 Yes
Hochtief Germany Construction BWI 2000 Yes
Carrefour France Retail UNI 2001 No
Chiquita USA Agriculture IUF 2001 No
OTE Telecom Greece Telecommunications UNI 2001 Yes
Skanska Sweden Construction BWI 2001 No
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Table 8: International Framework Agreements to February 2011
Company Headquarters 
Country
Industry GUF Year  
Concluded
Signed 
by HQ 
Country 
Union
Danone France Food Processing IUF 1988 No
Accor France Hotels IUF 1995 No
IKEA Sweden Furniture BWI 1998 No
Statoil Norway Oil ICEM 1998 Yes
Faber-Castell Germany Office Material BWI 1999 Yes
Metro Germany Commerce UNI 1999
Freudenberg Germany Chemicals ICEM 2000 Yes
Hochtief Germany Construction BWI 2000 Yes
Carrefour France Retail UNI 2001 No
Chiquita USA Agriculture IUF 2001 No
OTE Telecom Greece Telecommunications UNI 2001 Yes
Skanska Sweden Construction BWI 2001 No
Company Headquarters 
Country
Industry GUF Year  
Concluded
Signed 
by HQ 
Country 
Union
Telefonica Spain Telecommunications UNI 2001 Yes
AngloGold South Africa  Mining ICEM 2002 Yes
Ballast Nedam Netherlands Construction BWI 2002 Yes
DaimlerChrysler Germany Auto Industry IMF 2002 No
Endesa Spain Power Industry ICEM 2002 Yes
ENI Italy Energy ICEM 2002 Yes
Fonterra New Zealand Dairy Industry IUF 2002 Yes
Merloni Italy Metal Industry IMF 2002 Yes
Norske Skog Norway Paper ICEM 2002 Yes
Volkswagen Germany Auto Industry IMF 2002 No
GEA Germany Engineering IMF 2003 No
ISS Denmark Building Cleaning UNI 2003 Yes
Leoni Germany Electrical/Automotive IMF 2003 No
Rheinmetall Germany Defence/Electronics IMF 2003 No
SKF Sweden Ball Bearing IMF 2003 No
Bosch Germany Automotive/Electronics IMF 2004 No
H&M Sweden Retail UNI 2004 Yes
Lukoil Russia Energy ICEM 2004 Yes
Prym Germany Metal manufacturing IMF 2004 No
Renault France Auto Industry IMF 2004 Yes
Röchling Germany Engineering IMF 2004 No
SCA Sweden Paper Industry ICEM 2004 Yes
Arcelor Luxembourg Metals IMF 2005 No
BMW Germany Auto IMF 2005 No
EADS Netherlands Defence IMF 2005 No
EDF France Energy ICEM & PSI 2005 Yes
Falck Denmark Graphical UNI 2005
Impregilo Italy Construction BWI 2005 Yes
Lafarge France Construction BWI & ICEM 2005 No
Rhodia France Chemicals ICEM 2005 Yes
Stabilo Germany Cosmetics/Instruments BWI 2005 Yes
Veidekke Norway Construction BWI 2005 Yes
Euradius Netherlands Graphical UNI 2006 Yes
Nampak South Africa Graphical UNI 2006 No
Portugal Telecom Portugal Telecoms UNI 2006 Yes
PSA Peugeot Citroen France Auto IMF 2006 Yes
Royal BAM Netherlands Construction BWI 2006 No
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Company Headquarters 
Country
Industry GUF Year  
Concluded
Signed 
by HQ 
Country 
Union
Securitas Sweden Property Services UNI 2006 Yes
Staedtler Germany Writing and Drafting BWI 2006 Yes
France Telecom France Telecoms UNI 2007 Yes
Inditex Spain Textiles ITGLWF 2007 No
NAG Australia Finance UNI 2007 Yes
Quebecor Canada Graphical UNI 2007 Yes
RAG Germany Mining ICEM 2007 Yes
VolkerWessels Netherlands Construction BWI 2007 No
Waz Group Germany Media/journalism IFJ    2007 No
Brunel Netherlands Recruitment & and Services IMF 2008 No
UMICORE Belgium Metals ICEM & IMF 2008 Yes
Vallourec France Metals IMF 2008 Yes
Aker Norway Shipbuilding IMF 2008 Yes
Ability Brazil Telecoms UNI 2008 Yes
Danske Bank Denmark Finance UNI 2008 Yes
ICOMON Brazil Telecoms UNI 2008 Yes
G4S UK Security UNI 2008 Yes
Takashimaya Japan Retail UNI 2008 Yes
Wilkhahn Germany Office furniture BWI 2009 Yes
Elanders Sweden Printing UNI 2009 Yes
Indetex Spain Retail/distribution UNI 2009 Yes
Tel 
Telecomunicacoes
Brazil Telecoms UNI 2009 Yes
Antara Indonesia Printing UNI 2010 Yes
Shoprite Checkers South Africa Retail UNI 2010 No
GDF Suez France Energy & water ICEM, BWI 
& PSI
2010 No
Pfleiderer Germany Wood BWI 2010 Yes
Italcimenti Italy Cement BWI 2010 No
Electrolux Sweden Appliances IMF 2011 Yes
Source: IFAs taken from GUF websites, employee figures taken from Hoovers.com
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IFAs originated in the late 1980s, but have developed significant momentum in 
the twenty-first century. They are arguably an historic breakthrough since earlier 
attempts at international collective bargaining in the 1960s and 1970s essentially 
failed (Bendiner, 1987; Rehfeldt, 1993). One reason for their emergence is that 
subsequent long-running attempts since the early 1970s by the ITUC and GUFs to 
win a social clause in international trade agreements had met with little success 
over the following quarter of a century. The ITUC, while claiming some success 
in dealings with the World Bank, acknowledged the difficulties and limitations of 
discussions with the international institutions (ITUC, 2006). 
GUFs therefore decided at the turn of the century to try to use the Core Labour 
Standards that had been recently agreed by the ILO. It was thought best initially 
to target ‘softer’ European companies with requests for them to publicly accept 
these standards and adopt them as their own. It was seen as important to obtain 
a sufficient number of agreements to build momentum and to encourage more 
reluctant companies to start negotiations – and this proved successful. IFAs often 
contain statements of the ILO’s Core Labour Standards, some form of review and 
complaints process, a communication/monitoring mechanism (generally an annual 
meeting between the signatories) and provision for review and re-negotiation. In 
2000 just nine signed agreements existed but by 2004 there were thirty-two, and by 
mid-2008 sixty-one, mainly in the metalworking, chemical and energy, building and 
wood, and services sectors (cf. Schömann et al., 2008). 
The current context is, however, not conducive to strong agreements at international 
level. Rehfeldt’s (1993) argument in relation to the earlier international collective 
bargaining attempts – i.e. that they were undermined because no adequate legal 
framework existed for them – remains valid. Nor are current power relations conducive 
to negotiated compromises weighted towards workers’ interests. Management are not 
responding to sustained pressure from workers throughout companies when they 
conclude IFAs (Thorpe and Mather, 2005). Company motives for reaching them are 
little studied, but IFAs’ titles reveal a CSR agenda. For those who look no further (for 
example, unions outside of those involved in negotiating them) they may appear from 
these headings as nothing more than company CSR statements. There is a clear risk for 
the GUFs of being used by companies simply as accomplices in their PR efforts. 
It has been argued that companies signing these agreements wish to influence 
stock market views of their company, develop their corporate cultures internationally, 
improve conflict resolution and to extend existing cooperative relations with 
headquarters unions (Schömann et al., 2008). The first IFA was signed by the IUF 
with Danone, a company that sees itself as a ‘social business’, a self-image it continues 
to develop. In this case, the image appears to have some substance. Bruno Vannoni 
of the IUF was quoted in 2003 as saying: ‘We have a real dialogue with the company 
and they appear to be much more interested than many other farm-produce 
multinationals in listening to the concerns of employees’ (Blyth, 2003: 2). Danone’s 
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family-friendly brand image as a food company also gives it sizeable exposure to the 
risk of costly brand damage. The majority of its workforce is employed outside of 
France and it is therefore exposed to the risk that its labour practices may contain 
pockets of poor practice. 
The process of forming a relationship with management leading to an agreement 
is not uniform. Headquarters unions and related European Works Councils generally 
play an important role, but agreements are also initiated directly by GUFs (Hammer, 
2005). GUFs are the only representatives of unions from outside Europe involved in 
negotiating IFAs and have attempted to define their role in relation to headquarters 
unions in concluding them. The International Metalworkers’ Federation report on 
IFAs summarises the principles of negotiation required by that GUF. These include: 
reference to the ILO Core Labour Standards, universal coverage across all company 
operations and the importance of home country unions’ and works councils’ 
involvement in the negotiation process. The emphasis is therefore on the role of the 
headquarters union and works councils, reflecting the especially strong influence of 
powerful national unions in the engineering industry and therefore in that GUF. 
The metalworkers are a specific case where workplace organisation is strong and 
unions are especially reluctant to delegate negotiations to the GUF. Consequently, the 
IMF has had little role in negotiating many of these agreements, but has often been used 
to sign them after they have been agreed. Thus, for example, the Röchling ‘Principles 
of social responsibility’ are signed by the company chairperson and his counterpart 
from the European Works Council (Ernst Gräber, also chair of the German Works 
Council), while two representatives of the European metalworkers and one of the IMF 
are described as ‘entering into the agreement at the time of its signing’. Similarly, the 
Rheinmetall ‘Principles of social responsibility’ are signed by the chairperson of the 
European Works Council, Erik Merks, also chair of a Rheinmetall Works Council and in 
2002 a member of the company’s supervisory board. This agreement is signed by Merks, 
and also by representatives of the European metalworkers and the IMF, both of whom 
are described as ‘joining the agreement at the time of signing’ [sic]. In terms of the right 
to freedom of association, both agreements’ texts are rather ambivalent, and refer to 
works council forms of representation as a legitimate alternative to trade unionism. In 
these cases, it appears that the chairpersons of the European Works Councils are also 
prominent in their German companies. The general impression is that the influence of 
the German headquarters union has been more significant than that of the GUF. 
Other GUFs have equivalent well-organised unions within them and also 
experience a similar if less sharply posed issue of the balance between the global 
union and powerful affiliates. There are often practical reasons making it difficult 
for unions from developing countries to be involved in negotiations. Thus, without 
real GUF involvement, there is no voice in the negotiation process for unions from 
outside Europe. This increases the need to make these unions fully aware of the 
rationale for the agreement and how they might use it. 
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What occurs in the period after an agreement has been signed has a great bearing 
on whether it is used by local unions. Agreements have to be translated into all 
the relevant languages and sent to local management and unions. However, even 
if this is carried out effectively, the local representatives’ level of understanding of 
the agreement’s purpose is unlikely to be high if they simply receive a copy of the 
IFA without further explanation or discussion regarding the thinking behind it. 
Even the full meaning and import of specific terms can be an issue. For example, 
the term ‘freedom of association’ may not be immediately clear to many workers. 
Thorough reporting back to extra-European unions on the purpose and course of 
the negotiations is clearly required. 
The evidence of these agreements being used to good effect in practice is not 
especially strong. Although the texts are often available on GUFs’ websites, examples 
of their practical use are not prominent either there or in their publications. We 
surveyed selected GUF websites and publications for a six-month period, searching 
for such references; the results are presented in Table 9. 
Table 9: References to International Framework Agreements in Selected GUF Publications
Global Union Total Number of Items Total Number of References 
to IFAs
BWI 115 1
IMF 55 10
IUF 47 0
UNI 81 3
Sources: Global Union online Newsletters & Bulletins July–December 2007
The nature and purpose of IFAs could play a significant part in union educational 
programmes. Yet, mainly concerned with their relationships with well-organised and 
large European headquarters unions, GUFs currently promote them in a way that 
contributes little to educating or building their other affiliates’ capacities. In reality, 
GUFs and headquarters unions substitute for the weakness of many affiliates in 
relation to multinationals by negotiating and signing international agreements that 
leave local power relationships and dynamics intact. 
International Collective Bargaining: Scope and Content 
Hammer (2005) distinguishes between two types of IFAs, dividing them into ‘rights’ 
and ‘bargaining’ agreements, with the first covering union rights and the second 
dealing with substantive issues. In some cases they include clauses on bargaining 
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subjects such as health and safety and HIV/AIDS. However, the second category’s 
title is potentially misleading: it should not be understood as substantive bargaining 
on central distributive issues, since this is not included in IFAs. 
The only GUF which negotiates substantively on key distributive issues is the 
International Transport Workers’ Federation. The ITF bargains for seafarers with 
groups of ship managers and employers centred on the International Maritime 
Employers’ Committee, with whom it reaches collective agreements through the 
International Bargaining Forum. These managers and employers have been forced 
to react collectively to union power in a way that other employers currently are 
not (Anner et al., 2006). The ITF’s long-term Flags of Convenience (FoC) campaign 
underpins this bargaining by establishing and enforcing conditions of employment 
through mobilising the combined industrial strength of seafarers, dockers and 
transport workers. Ships docking in well-unionised ports may be subject to industrial 
pressure from these groups of workers, and agreements are backed up by an 
international system of ITF inspectors in ports worldwide. The ITF’s agreements 
with employers are distinctive in that they reflect a serious and prolonged industrial 
campaign, but also in three further ways. First, they have required that affiliates 
at least share bargaining with the GUF. Second, these agreements cover wages. 
Third, they are policed by a co-ordinated ITF inspectors’ network, supported by 
regular educational activities allowing them to meet, develop contacts and exchange 
experience.
Koch-Baumgarten has cogently argued that there were three circumstances that 
brought this unique situation about. Firstly, the FOC nations were located in the 
developing world and were at the time of the campaign’s origins essentially union-
free, allowing the transfer of collective bargaining responsibilities from national 
level to the ITF. Secondly, the unions in labour-exporting countries were not to 
be influential in ITF decision-taking processes for some time to come, allowing 
the capital-exporting countries to enforce and consolidate the system. Finally, 
port union controls could be used to discipline potential conflict, both between 
unions and between unions and the FOC employers. The ITF was gradually able to 
build the commitment of unions from all countries to the campaign (Lillie, 2004). 
Nevertheless, the campaign arose, as Koch-Baumgarten shows, from a very specific 
set of historical circumstances unlikely to be replicated. 
It is anticipated within the internationals that IFAs can also be extended to 
sectoral employers’ associations where these exist at international level. Sectoral 
agreements are clearly easier, and cheaper, for GUFs to make than agreements with 
large numbers of individual employers. Whether employers who are tending to move 
away from national level employers’ associations will be inclined to move towards 
them at international level is, however, unclear (Croucher et al., 2006). 
As outlined above, IFAs normally include the eight ILO Core Labour 
Conventions: the freedoms of association and collective bargaining (87 and 98), 
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against discrimination (100 and 111), forced labour (29, 105) and child labour (138, 
182). An important right contained in the Danone agreement but absent from 
many others is that contained in C.135, ‘rights of workers’ representatives in the 
undertaking’. Other labour standards could in theory be included, such as those 
enshrining the right to strike, security of employment, access to decision makers and 
those regarding migrant workers. However, the conventions mentioned are generally 
restricted to the eight stated above. An ILO survey of those agreements signed before 
the end of July 2003 showed that 20 per cent did not even include Conventions 87 
and 98, while mentions of other conventions were even fewer (ILO, 2003). Some, 
such as the Volkswagen agreement, make only indirect reference to the Core Labour 
Standards. 
The IUF has developed a way of dealing with the current weak focus on union 
recognition in the agreements, designed to educate both affiliates and companies 
more fully on their purpose. It has signed a number of national and international 
Labour Recognition Agreements with multinationals, whose limited but clear aim 
is to secure union organising and bargaining rights. These agreements emphasise 
arguably the most important rights covered by an IFA and, because of their relatively 
sharp focus, may be a more effective way of helping unions build their organising and 
bargaining capacity. Increasingly, GUFs are trying at review meetings with companies 
to formulate and agree clearer and more specific language in IFAs, particularly on 
the right to organise. The IUF’s move towards highlighting the organising and 
bargaining rights issue is clearly a departure of fundamental importance for the 
whole international union movement. It brings the vital question of local union 
rights much more clearly into focus. 
Hammer (2005) suggests that one effect of IFAs is to extend company level 
agreements up supply chains to suppliers. In general, however, multinationals resist 
strong clauses mentioning suppliers. In fact, in some agreements such clauses do 
not exist (Schömann et al., 2008). With few exceptions, when these clauses appear, 
they simply specify that companies should ‘inform’ and ‘encourage’ their immediate 
suppliers, ignoring the extended supply chain, and there is no hint of sanctions if 
they do not conform (Schömann et al., 2008). The Lafarge agreement reproduced 
in Annex 2 says ‘Lafarge will seek to use the services of those trading partners, 
subcontractors and suppliers which observe the principles agreed’. The Prym–IMF–
European Works Council agreement simply ‘encourages and supports their business 
partners to consider this declaration in their own respective company policy [sic]’. 
Even the proposed clauses in the IMF model agreement are not strong: ‘X company 
supports and encourages its suppliers to take into account these principles in their 
own corporate policy.’ 
The IMF obviously regards a more stringent model clause as unrealistic. The 
Lukoil agreement arguably has a stronger but essentially similar version of this type 
of clause: 
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The Agreement covers all activities and operations where Lukoil has direct 
control. Where Lukoil does not have overall control it will exercise its best efforts 
in order to secure compliance with the standards and principles set out in the 
Agreement. Lukoil will notify its contractors, licensees and major suppliers of the 
existence of the Agreement and encourage them to comply with the standards 
and principles contained within it.
Lukoil–ICEM–ROGWU Agreement 2004 
The absence or weak wording of these clauses is significant in the context of 
widespread externalisation and the fact that the great majority of workers are not 
directly employed by multinationals. This weakness primarily reflects company 
resistance to including more substantive terms and conditions. 
Implementing and Managing Agreements 
The implementation and management of these agreements is a critical area. Local 
management, like some local unions, are often neither aware of, nor committed to, 
an agreement signed by senior management in Western Europe. Unions can remedy 
this situation by reporting problems through agreements’ review processes. Local 
company management can be surprised to learn that these processes exist. In Asia 
and Latin America, national union federations are weak and incapable of providing 
much assistance, so management in local operations generally do not anticipate that 
unions can muster any level of technical or political support. However, the actual 
incidence of this sort of reporting does not appear to be high. 
There is little evidence that local unions have exploited these agreements. The 
BWI (2004) evaluation suggested that ‘currently only a handful of unions are active 
in using the framework agreements and many are unaware of their purpose or even 
of their existence’. Vic Thorpe and Celia Mather, highly experienced international 
trade unionists reporting on the ITGLWF’s project designed to conclude IFAs, wrote 
that ‘Many affiliates interviewed had no clear idea of the nature or purpose of an 
International Framework Agreement’ (2005: 7). It is worth noting that this ignorance 
was despite the project’s specific efforts to inform them. Thorpe and Mather went on 
to recommend a more ‘up from below’ approach to generate more support (Thorpe 
and Mather, 2005: 7–8). Such an ‘up from below’ approach could include involving 
affiliates more fully in implementation and review processes than at present. 
There are currently two approaches to monitoring both IFAs and unilateral 
company codes. A model promoted by BWI and ITGLWF is of direct GUF supervision 
and systematic monitoring of suppliers. BWI argues that establishing monitoring 
groups as part of an IFA’s terms is an important tool for monitoring and building 
the agreements, particularly in companies with long sub-contracting and supply 
chains. The best-documented example comes from the favourable Scandinavian 
context. The BWI–IKEA agreement established an IKEA Monitoring Group, made 
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up of BWI, IKEA and Swedish trade union representatives aimed at developing 
good industrial relations. Joint missions were carried out by the Monitoring Group 
in response to complaints from Slovakia, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, Poland, 
Thailand, Laos and China. IKEA then set up a Compliance and Monitoring Group 
to manage IKEA’s own code for suppliers. According to the company, this structure 
carried out training for 80 IKEA auditors and it is claimed that between 2000 and 
2003 twenty thousand corrective actions were carried out as a result of audits. The 
model is essentially one of joint policing from headquarters, thereby at one level 
overcoming the issue of weak and uneven union representation in many of the 
company’s workplaces outside of Sweden. It satisfies the company’s requirement for 
reduction of labour-related CSR risk and clearly brings benefits to workers. The clear 
danger for the global union, however, is that the process plays too small a role in 
building trade unionism outside of the headquarter country. 
The second model, used by IUF, UNI, IMF and ICEM, is more collaborative 
(Fichter and Sydow, 2002) and designed to build affiliates’ capacity to monitor and 
use complaints and review mechanisms. This model is closely tied to the formation 
of company networks that potentially facilitate complaints being raised. Recently, 
a method of monitoring has been agreed at Peugeot–Citroen that envisages more 
decentralised processes. The agreement will be monitored by ‘social observatories’ to 
be established at local level involving management and unions according to terms of 
reference to be agreed by the local parties. The involvement of local unions provides 
a direct voice for them that would otherwise be absent, and they are clearly more 
involved in this case than in most. Such an arrangement promotes confidence that 
local representatives will understand the agreement’s content and how it should be 
applied. 
To offer real possibilities for unions outside of Europe to organise, IFAs need to 
clearly state practical, concrete and specific rights at the workplace. That is, they 
must be capable of being used by local unions and not simply vague statements by 
companies of general responsibilities. In this respect, the IUF approach of making 
them recognition agreements has a good deal to offer. 
Conclusion 
What impact might IFAs have on building local capacity to bargain and organise? 
It is important to answer this question within a global perspective, since only a tiny 
minority of the world’s workers are employed in these companies. This is unlikely 
to change rapidly, and if the internationals cannot organise workers well beyond 
multinationals their legitimacy as representatives of global labour is likely to be 
threatened. 
Although IFAs set frameworks, the way this is done means that their impact may 
always be minimal. Limits exist for further developing agreements through review 
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processes if the current balance of forces between local unionists and managements 
in the developing world – where the latter possess an overwhelming advantage 
– remains or, as seems more likely, worsens. The building workers’ evaluation of 
these agreements reached a similar conclusion: 
There is an urgent need for more and better involvement of affiliated trade 
unions and for them to take greater responsibilities. This will require a training 
programme to assist unions to take up the challenge of recruiting and organising 
in those companies.
(BWI, 2004) 
It seems more important to help trade unionists to operate both technically and 
politically within multinationals than to attempt to create agreements they cannot 
use. As Ingeborg Wick concludes in relation to her research on IFAs and unilateral 
codes of practice, there is a need to strengthen union capacities to take advantage of 
them, ‘particularly in the developing world’ (Wick, 2004: 127). This can be seen as 
part of the wider process of explaining and promoting international régimes that was 
identified many years ago as important to any such régime’s diffusion and survival 
(Olson, 1965). Developing networks of trade unionists at both company and regional 
levels can potentially play a part in this, and this is the subject of our next chapter.
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•  C h a p t e r  s i x  • 
Campaigning
Introduction
I n  the previous chapter, we stressed the lack of involvement by unions in the developing world in important aspects of the IFA process.  In this brief chapter, we discuss campaigning, by which we mean pressurising companies in a comprehensive 
and concerted way.  In practice, this primarily means mobilising activists to 
publicise companies’ labour practices and using formal procedures in order to win 
concessions and open a wider dialogue with it.  ‘Corporate campaigning’ is included 
in this definition, but as a sub-category. Increasingly, difficulties in conventional 
collective bargaining have generated a need for such activity and it is therefore one 
which GUFs are taking increasingly seriously.  We use a case study to highlight how 
issues raised by a developing country union were brought on to a GUF’s agenda and 
successfully pursued in this way.  
We reject any false dichotomy between the two strategies of IFAs on the one 
hand and campaigning on the other.  Both approaches have their place, according to 
circumstances.  We do nevertheless note that many campaigning opportunities, often 
originating in the developing world, present themselves to the GUFs.  They regularly 
come into contact with groups of workers experiencing major problems with multi-
national employers.  Whether they choose to adopt these issues as campaigning 
matters and if they do, how they then prosecute the subsequent campaign are the 
questions to be addressed. When vigorously taken up, campaigns can maximise 
opportunities for involving workers and unions in the developing world when 
compared with the top-down signing of agreements conducted thousands of miles 
away. 
The chapter is structured as follows. We begin by discussing some of the different 
methods open to GUFs in campaigning, explaining the issues that they raise. We 
then present our case study. 
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Campaigning: forms and issues
Campaigns may take many different forms, from on-the-ground representations to 
companies, through co-ordinated industrial action, to political action in the public 
sphere, including ‘cyber campaigning’. All today draw at least to some extent on 
the ‘Corporate Campaigning’ technique which originated in the USA in the 1960s 
and is currently exemplified in the work of Ray Rogers and Andy Stern of the 
American SEIU. The approach identifies company pressure points and attacks them 
by every means possible. Because of its emphasis on mobilising union resources 
to pressurise companies this technique exists in a sometimes uneasy relationship 
with ‘organising models’ which stress worker self-activity. Yet, as we noted above, 
corporate campaigning emerged precisely because of unions’ reduced capacity to 
mobilise members.
It has been seen as a case of “desperate measures for desperate times”, since it 
is a nothing-to-lose approach in that it adopts powerful measures in the face of 
obdurate employers (Manheim 2001:40). It can therefore heighten tensions between 
different trade union movements since it is not always viewed favourably by the more 
co-operatively-oriented Continental Europeans. The latter often point out that the 
aim is to create a dialogue with a company, and that this can be made more difficult 
if strong and damaging measures are taken against it too early in the process. 
Increasingly, therefore, GUFs adopt nuanced versions, involving programmes of 
escalating pressure in order to exert just enough to reach their aims. 
As noted above, campaigning may take many different forms, but when a 
comprehensive range of methods is used, it tends to be resource-intensive and GUFs 
therefore have to choose their issues strategically. The increasingly extended time-
frame for campaigns is a further reason for considering the matter in a strategic way. 
Given the experience that companies will make agreements to settle particular issues 
without monitoring compliance on the ground, and without generalising any local 
solution to the global level, GUFs have come to see a need for extended campaigning 
that transcends single issues and seeks permanently to embed the means for exerting 
constant pressure on companies. This approach reflects and illustrates the concept of 
“permanent campaigning” (Plasser & Plasser, 2002) where campaigns are conceived 
of as continuous in order to regulate corporations on an ongoing basis. It is in effect a 
substitute, ideally a temporary one, for collective bargaining. The GUFs are therefore 
faced with long-term commitments which have major resource implications. 
A further, related choice that offers the prospect of addressing the resource issue 
is whether and how far to act in alliance with other organisations. Campaigning 
with NGO and broader civil society organisations has historically been important 
to trade unions. The strength of these campaigns often lies in their capacity to raise 
general awareness and mobilize consumers (CIIR, 2000) although this clearly has 
little purchase in non-consumer sectors. However, at times it is difficult to resolve 
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the inherent tensions between the different organisational and political methods 
favoured by the GUFs and NGOs. The international NGOs’ constitutions, are shaped 
by their charitable status, and lack political clarity in relation to companies and their 
labour practices (Berry and Gabay, 2009). An excellent case in point is campaigns 
for company codes of conduct, often promoted by NGOs, but of very limited value 
to unions because of their vague stance on labour issues and their self-regulatory 
nature. Even where alliances are built, thereby creating the prospect of making some 
economies in the use of resources, the potential difficulties and costs of maintaining 
the alliance itself have to be taken into account. 
Some forms of campaigning entail a need for sophisticated and costly 
communications techniques, in order to reach large and diverse audiences and to 
engage with highly developed corporate systems. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
American campaigning techniques, using television and new internet technology, 
were disseminated and rapidly became mainstream both within GUFs and their key 
affiliates (Plasser & Plasser, 2002).Two of the earliest promoters of these technologies 
within the labour movement, Eric Lee and Marc Bélanger, continue to develop new 
communication and campaigning approaches, including online radio programming. 
Other cyber methods were on the other hand relatively low cost in relation to 
the benefits they brought, in part because they sought to leverage the company’s 
own information and image against them. Strong examples of the use of online 
campaigning were the ICEM’s tyre campaigns against Continental and Bridgestone/
Firestone in the mid-1990s, both carried out using what were then innovative online 
petitioning methods, where websites were set up to support direct email protests 
to management in Germany and Japan (Manheim, 2001). Bridgestone/Firestone, 
who had ‘permanently replaced’ two thousand striking members of the USWA, was 
subjected to a ‘cyber picket’, using the company’s web presence against it. In common 
with many later campaigns, it used a visual symbol. In the Firestone case, this was a 
black flag, symbolising immediate disqualification for major rule violation in motor 
racing. Several of these campaigns were seen within the GUFs as quite successful in 
bringing results with the companies concerned. 
In general, using a combination of different channels appears to work most 
effectively, and this requires more time and resources from the GUF than cyber-
campaigning deployed in isolation. The case that we now present shows precisely 
such a wide range of approaches used simultaneously. 
The IUF, Unilever and the Casual-T Campaign
Our example is the IUF’s Casual-T campaign. This had a number of distinctive 
features. It involved a GUF in using education to crystallise an issue experienced 
by a group of workers and then using a combination of methods successfully to 
pressurise a major MNC. It was a direct result of the GUFs’ wider strategic concern 
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with the evolution of precarious work, and the publicity and emphasis that they gave 
the subject. The campaign is not a sporadic action, but is regarded as a permanent 
feature of the IUF’s work in order to achieve and maintain an ongoing and structured 
dialogue with Unilever. 
It is important to note that the apparent prospects of success were far from obvious 
at the outset, not least because the very issue that gave rise to it -casualisation- also 
hampered campaign building by tending to fragment the workers at its centre. 
Moreover, the company also appeared to be in a fairly strong position for other 
reasons. Many unsuccessful attempts had been made over decades by national and 
international unions to establish dialogue and bargaining with Unilever, one of the 
world’s largest food and domestic product companies. Unilever has approximately 
140,000 employees in one hundred countries and claims that it supports between 
four and seven million jobs through its supply chain. It is a company with a positive 
CSR image and is often regarded as a ‘good employer’. It invests huge amounts in 
advertising and promoting itself and its products; in 2007, this totalled some 5.2 
billion Euros. 
The company had created endemic insecurity within the workforce. An estimated 
20,000 permanent jobs annually have been eliminated in this MNC through 
subcontracting, outsourcing and agency labour, a process described by the IUF as 
‘Hindustanisation‘because of the lead taken by Hindustan Unilever. Clearly, in a 
relatively short space of time the company would directly employ a tiny number of 
workers. In Pakistan, very few workers fulfilling tasks on the company’s behalf were 
either permanent or employed by Unilever itself. Rather, they were ‘no work, no pay’ 
employees taken on by labour contractors with none of the rights to sick pay or the 
many other enjoyed benefits by the small number of permanent workers. Many had 
been used in this way over decades. Because of this employment basis, they were 
lawfully excluded from joining an existing company union, the Union of Unilever 
Workers. 
The basis for any campaign clearly had to be laid carefully and systematically 
and, as we stress elsewhere, union educational work can play an important role here. 
The IUF’s relationship with the Pakistani union was developed over a long period of 
union educational work. This included wide-ranging discussion of union organising 
issues and in particular around the casualisation question, using the IUF manual 
Outsourcing and Casualisation in the Food and Beverage Industry developed for 
affiliates in 2006. It was this that led the workers involved to decide in October 2008 
to launch a campaign to secure permanent jobs. 
As we have already implied above, the central company policy towards unions 
since the 1970s had been rigidly to oppose any form of contact. The standard 
corporate response to national unions and GUFs alike was that industrial relations 
issues were a matter for subsidiary companies and local managers. Managers were 
instructed to avoid coordinated bargaining above all. In short, the policy remained 
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that laid down in very clear terms by the Company’s document ‘Attitude Towards 
International Trade Unionism’, dated 1 September 1973:
‘Unilever regards industrial relations as a matter for individual operating 
companies and national managements. It has no wish for wages to be compared 
between countries, or for workers in one country to support those elsewhere, or for 
unions to negotiate internationally. It is a corporate priority (emphasis original-
authors) to make sure that trade unions never feel that they could negotiate above 
the heads of national managements outside their own countries.’ 
The workers’ campaign therefore faced a determined employer which clearly 
required the international’s support if it was to succeed. Articles appeared on the 
IUF website and a letter was sent to Unilever’s CEO. Four months after this letter had 
received no reply, in early 2009, the IUF made a strategic decision to launch an IUF-
led campaign. This was centrally planned and resourced by the GUF, and focussed 
on the deteriorating employment conditions experienced by non-permanent workers. 
The framing of the issue, as one of casualization linked to worsening conditions, 
had substantial resonance with many IUF affiliates and beyond (Shawki, 2010). 
The campaign had a central team in the IUF’s Geneva headquarters, was actively 
supported by its regional co-ordinators and also by a Pakistan network set up by the 
local union. 
A strongly and valuably branded, widely recognizable product, Lipton Tea, one 
of the company’s 1600, was targetted. The Lipton tea logo was appropriated and 
modified as the campaign’s symbol. This provided a central theme which could be 
used in conjunction with add-ons such as ‘100% disposable’ and ‘the slaves built the 
pyramids, casual workers build pyramid tea’ added as appropriate. A wide range of 
mechanisms were used to pressurise the company. First and foremost, the workers 
at Khanewal themselves took action co-ordinated by the Khanewal Workers’ Action 
Committee. Second, and also importantly, the Dutch trade union FNV Bondgenoten, 
especially active on international issues, supported them, citing their own fears for 
casualisation more generally. Third, the central IUF orchestrated the campaign, 
deciding from the outset to mobilise its affiliates around the world in a co-ordinated 
way. IUF research facilities were used to investigate the company’s structure and to 
identify all of its key relationships. The company’s ethical advisors were supplied with 
information. The company’s Annual General Meeting was informed on the situation, 
attracting media attention. Social networking sites were used as part of a cyber 
campaign, to target the company and its shareholders through virtual petitions. 
Postcards and e-communications were sent to the company. 
Demonstrative protest action from a geographically-dispersed range of IUF 
affiliates and others was organised. In September and October 2009, a series 
of co-ordinated demonstrations were held internationally. Pickets were held at 
company premises in Pakistan, Russia, the Netherlands, Hungary, the Philippines, 
Australia, Uruguay, South Africa and the Dominican Republic. Lipton’s Australasian 
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headquarters in Sydney were targeted by a range of unions co-ordinated by Unions 
New South Wales. The protest demonstration featured the ‘Casual-T ’ logo and 
was covered by national radio and television. In Russia, the VKT (the All-Russian 
Confederation of Labour) and the All-Russia Agricultural Complex Union conducted 
a series of demonstrations at Unilever-sponsored events and offices. In South Africa, 
despite strong management pressure not to participate, members of ICEM affiliates 
demonstrated outside the Unilever Maydon Wharf plant in Durban. In Budapest, 
activists from the Hungarian Trade Union Confederation MSZOSZ and the Metal 
Workers’ Federation drank a symbolic toast of tea to the Pakistani worker activists at 
Lipton’s Budapest headquarters. They then threw the teabags into a rubbish bin and 
handed it, together with a written demand from the Hungarian Unilever Workers’ 
Union, to a Unilever representative. Thus, the campaign showed considerable 
creativity and involved an internationally wide range of unions with very different 
cultures and political orientations. The company was being simultaneously pressured 
at multiple geographical locations and in different ways. 
The company’s initial reaction was to continue the previous policy of trying to 
ignore what was occurring. The Pakistani labour contractors on the other hand were 
more hostile and less aware of the way that their actions were now in the public 
sphere than Unilever. Their relatives violently attacked and hospitalised Abdul Aziz, 
a member of the Khanewal Action Committee. This was in turn publicised all over 
the world by the campaigners, to Unilever’s embarrassment.
Positive results were obtained from using a formal mechanism. The IUF 
acknowledges that use of a frequently criticised and non-binding procedure played a 
role in changing the company’s long-held policy. The procedure in question was that 
linked to the OECD’s Guidelines for Multi-National Enterprises, a set of guidelines 
and principles designed to promote responsible practice in, inter alia, industrial 
relations. These have no legal force but may be adopted by national governments. 
Complaints that they have been breached may be made to National Contact Points, 
who are individuals nominated by governments. 
In March 2009, the IUF made complaints to the OECD National Contact Point 
for the UK that the rights to fair or decent pay and to freedom of association were 
being breached at the two plants. These were not the first relevant complaints to 
be made to the National Contact Point, since two others concerning the company’s 
operations in India and Pakistan had been made earlier. According to the OECD 
guidelines, the complaint must give rise to an investigation and an attempt at 
conciliation. The mere fact that the conciliation process is set in train does not imply 
that the complaint is accepted, but negotiations between the IUF and the company 
began under the auspices of the UK National Contact Point. Through that process, 
the company soon agreed to make important concessions at the Pakistani plants, 
bringing the beginning of international dialogue between the IUF and the company.
Unilever agreed to create two hundred additional direct, permanent jobs with 
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priority given to the members of the Khanewal Workers’ Action Committee, which 
led the struggle locally. Thus, even if in only a minor sense, the ‘Hindustanisation’ 
process was reversed. Further local agreements were also reached, at the Rakhim 
Yar Khan plant in Pakistan and at Sewri, India. Perhaps more significantly, union 
dialogue with the company was achieved in a number of broad areas. Mention 
of unions appeared on the company’s website for the first time. The mutuality 
principle was accepted at the level of the Pakistani company, in that the IUF 
and Unilever Pakistan agreed to form a committee to oversee appointments to 
permanent jobs. The company also agreed that the IUF itself and its affiliates were, 
in its own words ‘entitled to exercise full representational functions’ in the factory. 
Finally, in March 2010 the company hosted an international meeting of trade union 
representatives from all of its major countries of operation; this in turn led them to 
commit themselves to regular meeting with the IUF to discuss labour practices. The 
continuing campaign holds out the prospect of ensuring that the regular meetings 
envisaged between the company and the GUF both actually take place and are 
adequately and fully informed by workers’ problems. 
A broadly similar pattern of events also led to a role for the IUF and its affiliates 
in ensuring that union rights are upheld in the Coca Cola bottling plant through an 
agreement that resolved a long and bitter dispute in Multan, Pakistan in July 2010. 
Thus, the role of the international itself appears to be expanding.
In July, 2010, in a curious coda to this case, Unilever was named ‘Company of 
the Year’ by the UK-based organisation Business in the Community, for the ‘positive 
impact’ it has on communities, environments, marketplaces and workplaces around 
the world. Whilst the award is from a UK organisation, it is made for the company’s 
work at the global level. While the solutions described above may appear to legitimate 
such an award, the fact that a major campaign formed the background to them 
seems to have been ignored. As is so often the case, most of the self-congratulatory 
discourse which followed the award concerned the environment and sustainability 
rather than employees. This illustrates the extent of the gulf between so many 
business organisations on the one hand, and realities in the developing world’s 
workplaces on the other which makes the need for the GUFs’ work so apparent. 
Conclusion
Clearly, the Casual-T campaign successfully utilised a range of co-ordinated tactics 
to achieve a symbolic win on casualisation, an issue of major importance. It succeeded 
in establishing apparently permanent channels of dialogue with a company that had 
previously resisted dealing with unions on anything other than a national level and 
even then on as narrow a front as possible. Finally, while the company has not signed 
an IFA with the IUF, it has recognised the GUF’s industrial relations role at global 
level. The campaign may be regarded as a contribution towards the GUFs’ wider goal 
Global Unions, Global Business 2011.indd   75 31/05/2011   08:40:03
76 the wOrk Of the internatiOnals
of mainstreaming the labour standards issue within globalisation discussions, which 
remain centred on environmental and other questions that do not compel companies 
to confront the ways that they get work done. 
Several further conclusions may be drawn that are significant for our themes. 
First, Casual-T drew on but transcended ‘corporate campaigning’ tactics by involving 
workers and using formal procedures. Unlike the lead-up to the signature of most 
IFAs, it mobilised the whole GUF’s human resources in a centrally-co-ordinated 
way to build on sustained local activism. No IFA has been concluded with the 
company. Second, it bears repeating that it is a continuing campaign designed to 
ensure that pressure on the company is maintained. It is this, together with HQ 
involvement in campaigning and the fact that the IUF is involved in monitoring the 
implementation of local agreements that has made it resource-intensive. Since the 
campaign was on a strategic issue, this could be justified, but any proposal to take 
the approach to more than a few other companies will have to take this into account. 
As we stress throughout this book, this underlines the crisis of resources faced by 
the internationals. Third, long-term educational activity carried out by the GUF was 
important to developing the local activism that formed the foundation for the whole 
campaign, a theme that we develop in chapter eight dedicated to that subject. 
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Networks 
Introduction 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  networks of trade unionists are clearly useful for unions attempting to make IFAs into meaningful organising tools. Moreover, because they help to build unions’ engagement with other unions internationally, they are 
key to delivering international solidarity action. 
Defining ‘networks’ is problematic as the term is used by GUFs in multiple 
and often confusing ways – sometimes to describe ad hoc groupings, sometimes 
committees and even to describe a GUF (Union Network International). By ‘network’ 
here we mean stable groups of union representatives from different units of a 
multinational company or sector who are in communication with each other. A 
degree of stability and permanence is required for the description to be meaningful, 
as in many cases networks have been formally established but have no continuing 
existence (Greven, 2006). Finally, networks should be identifiable as such within the 
trade unions and membership should be possible. In practice, networks take quite 
different forms, with differing levels of involvement of works councils, headquarters 
and non-headquarters unions, management and GUFs. From a union viewpoint, 
networks’ aims vary and may develop across time, but they are generally set up 
initially to collect and exchange information with the aim of progressing towards 
organising, coordination and solidarity action. 
Company networks are of strategic significance to GUFs (Garver et al., 2007). 
The IMF World Auto Council identified both IFAs and ‘timely, accurate and 
accessible information’ through networks as central, related tasks for the IMF in 
2004 (IMF, 2004). The BWI evaluation of IFAs similarly suggested that to succeed, 
they would require ‘substantially improved communication and global networking’ 
(BWI, 2004). 
The central argument of this chapter is that the networks in existence are in these 
terms problematic. Staggeringly, given their strategic importance and the substantial 
GUF resources dedicated to them, there are no examples of truly global company 
networks. There are no networks with global scope that relate directly to existing 
International Framework Agreements. This is largely because of pockets of non-
unionism, non-affiliation by some unions and because many companies take pains 
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to keep agreements and networks apart. However, important methodological and 
procedural problems also hamper network development. 
To be described as successful, a network should deliver demonstrable benefits 
to workers. In this chapter, five key factors are identified that underlie successful 
networks: how they are formed, company attitudes and influence, resources, the 
network’s ability to facilitate participation of diverse memberships, and the spatial 
basis of that membership. Existing company networks show that self-interest and a 
potential increase in bargaining power with employers are insufficient to generate 
the high level of engagement required to achieve success. The networks that we 
examine which function at higher levels exhibit ‘significant commonality’ (Olmsted, 
1959: 21) and encourage a depth of engagement that goes beyond the instrumental. 
The network members are aware of having something significant in common; that 
is, a commitment to international trade unionism. 
The chapter concludes with the suggestion that the best way to develop sufficient 
commitment from network members is to build engagement by working in small 
groups, or ‘minilaterally’ as defined in Chapter three, using participatory educational 
tools. 
A Functioning Regional Network 
That networks have great potential for unions is exemplified by the ICEM’s Caspian 
Energy Network, formally established in 2005 in a region and sector of major 
strategic importance to the GUF. The Caspian Sea region, with the world’s third 
largest oil and gas reserves behind the Middle East and Russia is likely to become 
a major energy exporter over the next decade. Currently, these countries are 
relatively minor producers due to specific political, economic and technical factors. 
Major multinational oil and gas companies operate in Azerbaijan, the centre 
of oil production in the region, through a consortium. BP, Chevron, ENI-Agip 
and Lukoil are involved and the Norwegian oil company Statoil is a small but 
significant consortium member. The Azeri state oil company Socar is a major 
player in exploration and development, directly employing around seventy thousand 
people. Numerous new pipeline projects have been proposed. Some are under 
construction, the most significant being the Caspian Pipeline Consortium Project, 
the Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline and the South Caucasus natural gas pipeline 
Baku–Tiblisi–Ersurum. These and other projects involve countries outside the 
Caspian region, notably Turkey, Georgia, Iran and the countries of Central Asia. 
The oil unions in the former Soviet Union were until the early twenty-first 
century entirely enclosed in bureaucratic relations with their state employers, with 
no experience of or, in many cases, interest in organising workers in the growing 
number of private companies. Long-term contact between the leaderships of the 
Norwegian, Russian and Azeri unions led to discussion of forging a strategic alliance 
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and opened the Azeri union to wider perspectives. These unions represented the 
most significant groups of union membership and concentrations of available 
resources, particularly in relation to access to company management. For more 
than five years the unions, in partnership with the ICEM, engaged in educational 
work and associated relationship building, developing strong communication links 
between future network members. Thus, the group’s evolution allowed time for 
educational processes to occur. 
At the initial network meeting, union participation was as broad as possible, given 
that there were no contacts in Iran and Turkmenistan and only weak links with Kazak 
ICEM affiliates. The meeting was held on the basis that participants would be free to 
set up the kind of network they thought would be effective. Group participation was 
high, allowing unions to set group goals highly congruent with individual interests 
and to form an informed, realistic view of what could be achieved. Active learning 
methods were used, and focussed aims established through in-depth discussion about 
the network’s purpose. These aims included the identification of business and trade 
union partners willing to enter into dialogue, and the development of negotiation 
skills in union representatives. Significantly, the network also decided on immediate 
tasks, including research, negotiation and organising activities. The process allowed 
the core group of Azeri, Russian and Norwegian unions to persuade less-engaged 
members to increase their commitment. Both the strategic and immediate targets 
were concrete and achievable but group aims were set to the highest, rather than 
the lowest, common denominator. The network agreed collectively to attend an 
international oil sector conference taking place in Baku the following year in order 
to find possible company targets and present the network publicly. 
During the visit to Baku the network directly assisted the Azeri Oil and Gas 
Workers’ Union (OGWU), which until this point exclusively organised permanent 
workers in the state oil company Socar, to organise private sector employees. The 
union had only limited experience of organising and none of managing strike action. 
In November 2005 two thousand workers employed by Socar, BP and the American-
based contractor McDermott, supported by OGWU, went on strike for union 
recognition, medical care, improved pay and contracts. The Caspian Energy Network 
members, all senior leaders in their own countries, assisted OGWU’s President, 
Jahangir Aliyev, to manage the negotiations and to carry out a recruitment campaign 
to organise private sector workers. The network used the national media to pressure 
the employers’ consortium, highlighting the issues involved and announcing the 
presence of union leaderships from across the region, supported internationally by 
the ICEM. 
OGWU organised 5,000 private sector workers during this campaign. Shortly 
afterwards, 1,600 workers employed at the offshore BosShelf site, a French–Azeri 
construction project partially owned by Bouygues, joined OGWU following a strike. 
Union negotiations brought improvements for workers. Several of the companies 
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now recognise Azerbaijan’s national celebratory days and official holidays. These 
strikes proved to be historic breakthroughs in the Baku area, because a wave 
of similar actions followed. At the time of writing, workers in another fourteen 
companies have been engaged in industrial action also bringing improvements 
to contract workers’ terms and conditions. Most recently, in June 2008 OGWU 
negotiated increases of more than 100 per cent in minimum salaries and obtained 
health and safety improvements for over one thousand contract workers at Caspian 
Shipyards. 
The network was therefore able to perform a high level of ‘locomotion’ (Olmsted, 
1959: 113), or mobilisation, based on the high level of cohesiveness built within 
the primary group. This cohesiveness was, in turn, based on the high capacity of 
network members to communicate, developed through the educational approach 
to relationship building. The wave of organising and negotiating successes in Baku 
galvanised the network, providing a precedent for organising in the private sector 
that showed results which members in other countries promoted in their own 
unions. Several other unions in the network are now moving beyond their enclosed 
state oil company horizons to organise more widely. 
Company and Sectoral Networks 
The Caspian Energy Network contextualises our analysis of company and sectoral 
networks because many are less evidently successful in delivering benefits to 
workers. There is in fact little reliable information about the numbers and workings 
of the networks supported by different GUFs, reflecting the latters’ nervousness 
that a gap exists between theory and practice in this area. The number of genuine 
networks operating in each GUF is likely to be in single figures. 
In what follows, the five key factors in developing networks mentioned above are 
highlighted and illustrated from the limited evidence available. 
The first factor to consider is how networks are formed. The Caspian Energy 
Network was created after a long process of relationship building. The core unions 
at the network’s centre had brought their relations to the point at which they were 
already strongly committed to the idea of a regional network before the founding 
meeting. At the meeting, network aims were developed from the bottom up and 
attracted the broadest possible participation. This contrasts sharply with the normal 
process whereby a GUF or union raises money for a meeting, and then invites 
unions to join a ‘global network’. There are normally short preparation periods 
for these meetings and the scope of the proposed organisation is already set from 
outside. In addition, relationships are generally too weak to build commitment 
and a focus on practical issues is lacking. Expectations are raised beyond what is 
achievable, particularly in view of the actual resources available, which are seen 
as almost exclusively the GUF’s responsibility to acquire. The network is then in 
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practice frequently reduced to a small ‘global steering committee’ with little wider 
involvement. 
Although the few existing accounts pay little attention to them, company 
attitudes and influence are another key factor. Since resources are a major issue, in 
almost all cases management plays a role in providing the conditions for networks to 
exist. Frequently, network meetings divide their time between union-only pre- and 
post-meetings, as well as joint meetings with management. Management structures 
often conceptualise them as ‘employee consultative councils’, similar to national 
level or European Works Councils but without the same legal basis. Companies are 
anxious, as Schömann et al. (2008: 46) point out, to avoid trade union organisations 
‘becoming real negotiating partners on working conditions’ at international level. 
Thus, for example, Unilever expressed its preference for company-based forms of 
representation such as works councils over trade unions to Schömann and her 
colleagues. In common with many management structures, they prefer to avoid 
the ‘outside influence’ of unions, and to build close relationships with in-company 
representatives. However, these can be too close. The Volkswagen World Works 
Council (VWWC) appears to have the strongest structure and most cooperative 
relationship with management. But it has also become clear that the nature of the 
relationships between company and works council in the national level German 
codetermination bodies that form the basis for the VWWC went well beyond 
cooperation. Their corruption amounted to a major public scandal that still threatens 
to discredit the entire system of codetermination in Germany. 
As we remarked above, a disjuncture exists between IFAs and company networks. 
In the cases of the signed IFAs listed in Table 9 in Chapter five there appear to be 
only a few functioning regional and no global networks corresponding to them. The 
explanation, it has been suggested to us, is simple: managements do not wish the 
two to coexist and, given their role in allowing paid time off and funding travel and 
accommodation for those who attend, they often have the power to make sure that 
they do not. 
A common theme of the limited discussion that has taken place on this subject 
by others is that structural and process difficulties may be overcome, but only if 
more resources become available (Müller and Rüb, 2005; Miller, 2004). That is, 
the cost of running networks poses a serious challenge to already stretched union 
finances. A ‘global network’ meeting costs between thirty thousand and seventy-
five thousand Euros and approximately three quarters of the network’s potential 
membership is likely to lack the resources to pay for their participation. Since global 
networks are seen as the responsibility of the coordinating GUF, it is assumed that 
they must either raise project funding from donors or from companies themselves. 
A second possible resourcing strategy is for the headquarters union to carry the 
main burden of administration and activity costs. This inevitably tends to further 
increase the weight of that union within the network. Networking underlines 
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the resource crisis facing the internationals. Either unions at national level will 
have to commit more resources to international work, or networking will remain 
inadequate to the tasks. 
The fourth factor to consider is the network’s ability to facilitate the participation 
of diverse memberships. This is affected by the complexity of communication within 
international networks (Miller et al., 2000). Communication at international level is 
difficult, for both practical and political reasons. In many countries, and probably 
the majority, union activists have only limited English or second language capacity. 
In most developing countries activist access to computers is extremely limited and 
telecommunications are often unreliable for providing timely responses to other 
network members’ messages. Even when the practicalities of communication are 
somehow managed, most activists from the developing world are entering an entirely 
unfamiliar forum in a ‘global’ network. At network meetings members must explicitly 
state their own interests, understand those of other unions and critically assess the 
network’s potential. This all has to be done within a relatively short period of two to 
three days, often with little pre-meeting information or previous contact with other 
network members. Groups of diverse and often inexperienced participants find it 
difficult to successfully navigate such situations. 
Levels of union organisation in multinationals are uneven. This can limit the 
scope of network membership, with totally unorganised sites and others with low 
density coexisting with well organised ones. These disparities create a situation of 
unequal weight and influence between units which has to be managed to ensure that 
genuine collaboration becomes possible. The more truly international the network 
is, the greater are the socio-economic differences that must be confronted. As 
discussed in previous chapters, considerable differences exist between the politics 
and approaches of unions from different traditions, to the extent that cohesion can 
become almost impossible to achieve. 
None of this is to deny that interests can be aggregated, but the difficulties in 
developing full participation are considerable. Clearly, the internal dynamics of the 
network count, in particular whether the network helps members from developing 
regions genuinely to participate. 
The problems are graphically illustrated through the example of an international 
network within the US tyre manufacturer Goodyear. The United Steel Workers of 
America (USWA) funded the initiation of the Goodyear Global Union Network in 
March 1999, at an event attended by over one hundred trade unionists from sixteen 
countries. In 2006 the USWA started the Goodyear Newsletter, during a strike 
against Goodyear in the US and Canada, called ‘Global Solidarity’. By the account 
provided by a representative of the Thai workers involved, the network later proved 
incapable of defending a victimised activist. 
In 2005 Anan Pol-ung, President of the Thai Goodyear union PCFT was sacked 
for trying to negotiate improved benefits and permanent contracts for twenty-five 
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contract workers on annual contracts. In October 2005 all of these workers were 
sacked, and all direct employment of contract workers by Goodyear was terminated. 
Goodyear then used external labour agencies to employ workers in these functions. 
Anan was simultaneously reinstated, although at a lower grade. 
The Thai Industrial Relations Court ruled for the reinstatement of the contract 
workers in April 2006. When the remaining sixteen workers (two had died in the 
intervening period) appeared at the factory for work in May 2006, management 
refused them entry. In August 2006 Anan was sacked for a second time for failing to 
attend a meeting because he had to attend to his comatose mother in hospital. 
The ICEM was contacted by the Thai union PCFT requesting solidarity support. 
The ICEM ensured that the dispute was understood and recorded, and contacted 
the United Steelworkers of America. The GUF built a high-profile information and 
solidarity campaign, as this represented one of the first attempts by a small local 
union to organise and bargain for contract workers, a priority issue. After repeated 
requests, the United Steel Workers of America agreed to invite Anan Pol-ung to 
discuss the case during the two-day Global Goodyear Unions’ Network Meeting 
in Akron, Ohio, USA 19–20 March 2007. The meeting was attended by ICEM 
representatives and its most powerful affiliates, including the South African NUM 
and the German IG BCE. Despite this representation, when Anan’s case was raised in 
the meeting with management, the Goodyear HR representative was allowed simply 
to comment that he tried not to be involved in matters outside the US and that he 
would refer the case to the manager in charge of Thailand. The outcome is regarded 
by the Thai workers as a network failure, particularly since they had managed to 
overcome major barriers in bringing the case to international attention. Despite 
heavy backing by the GUF, the Thai activists did not obtain even moral support from 
the network, including from the developed country trade unionists present. 
International company networks are too frequently dominated by headquarters 
unions, leaving no space for weaker and smaller unions to genuinely participate in 
network development and work. Several longstanding networks have made little 
or no progress in addressing this major problem. The Daimler–Chrysler World 
Employee Committee, formed after the merger between the two companies as an 
extension of German works council arrangements, provides an example. Some 
unions outside of the key Europe–North America company axis are not involved, 
while the IMF has only an advisory role. In the view of both of these unions and 
the IMF, the network pays too little attention to the need to construct and aid 
organisation in the developing world. 
A second example is that of the Nestlé network, whose development is shown in 
Table 10. This network’s origins are tied up with significant international action, in 
which the right of a Peruvian union to operate was successfully defended, via the IUF 
and a New Zealand affiliate (Rütters, 2001). This initial impetus was important to all 
concerned, but, predictably, proved hard to maintain. 
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Table 10: The Nestlé Network
Phase Objectives Participants Activities Funding
1972–1979 Networking & 
information exchange, 
planning/feasibility
Global 2 IUF conferences,
informal contact with 
Nestlé management
IUF/Affiliates’ own 
expense
1980s Networking & 
information exchange
EU, North America 2 regional 
networking events 
Affiliates’ own 
expense, Nestlé 
European Council
1993–1999 Development of 3 
regional networks, 
global networking and 
information exchange,
establishment of 
network objectives
Africa, Latin America, 
Asia-Pacific
1 global & 3 regional 
meetings,
Manila Declaration
LO Norway
2002–2004 Coordinated 
information exchange, 
networking and 
campaigning
Africa, Latin America, 
Eastern Europe, Asia-
Pacific
4 regional & 1 global 
meeting
FES, NGG, IUF
2004–2007 Coordination of 
information and 
networking in 4 regions
Africa, Latin America, 
Eastern Europe, Asia-
Pacific
4 half-time 
coordinators
FES
Source: Levinson (1972) and Rüb (2004)
The IUF report on the Nestlé network (Rüb, 2004), as it has functioned more 
recently, raises structural and process issues about the way that internal dialogue 
is conducted. Agendas and procedural matters are used to deal formally with issues 
that are of interest mainly to headquarters unions, and there are too few possibilities 
for delegates to address problems outside of this framework. 
The key to successful aggregation of interests between representatives of 
workplaces with different interests from unions of very different types and of 
facilitating the necessary learning process is, Hoffmann (2005) suggested, a discursive 
and transparent way of operating that acknowledges differences of interests and tries 
openly to find common ground. This underlines the relevance of using educational 
methods, which assist networks in developing open and participative approaches, as 
Erne (2006; 2008) has shown. Doug Miller, an experienced worker educator with the 
ITGLWF, provides guidance on appropriate processes (Miller, 2004). His sensitive 
analysis is especially useful precisely because it derives from a sector with relatively 
weak union organisation, which tends to magnify the problems associated with 
network building. The methods Miller advocates are: a multi-level research effort 
by unions on the company, awareness raising to build networks, a flexible approach 
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by the GUF, and coordinated campaigns with other interested organisations such 
as NGOs (an approach that is especially relevant to the weakly organised ITGLWF). 
Thus part of his prescription is similar to ours since he advocates an inclusive, 
flexible approach facilitated by strong research and two-way educational processes 
broadly defined. 
The fifth and final factor that influences network functionality is the 
spatial basis for membership. The network operating in the German chemical 
multinational BASF illustrates the point, because there is no central dialogue, 
but rather a set of regional networks established over a period of around ten 
years. This is a highly devolved structure, sustained by a combination of external 
project funding from the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and company finance, and 
built on a regional basis with involvement from the ICEM. It is viewed within the 
GUF as relatively successful since regional dialogue with management has been 
secured in Latin America and Asia. Coordinated bargaining within each region 
has been achieved, albeit to different extents. The right to organise has also been 
won in practice, most notably in some Latin American workplaces. Definite gains 
have therefore been made, although how much this has been brought about by 
the network is harder to ascertain. The BASF example indicates the significance 
of the degree of devolution of the networks’ structures and power relations. It is 
an example of the benefits of working within smaller groups, in this case with a 
smaller geographic scope. The problem of language is to some degree alleviated 
by working within sub-regional or regional groups. Although this will have a 
limited effect in the Asia region, it impacts much more in Latin America and the 
former Soviet Union. 
We summarise our interpretations of the five networks discussed above in Table 
11 below. We note the limited level of solidarity action, mobilisation and bargaining 
success that the networks have managed to achieve, despite many years of activity. 
All of the networks discussed claim some success, but their achievements, although 
real, are so far limited to a few documented instances. Some limited space has been 
created for trade unionists outside of the developed world. The Daimler–Chrysler 
network succeeded in successfully raising the right of Turkish workers at the 
Ditas plant to organise, and has dealt with other complaints raised through its 
consultative structure with management. In Nestlé, the network’s origins were 
linked to successful international solidarity action. Later, it was able to provide moral 
support to an important strike at a plant in Korea, with the union consolidating its 
position and membership through public action and the network in turn gaining 
impetus through that. 
The most substantial, if uneven, bargaining successes appear to have been 
achieved by the BASF regional networks. The regional Caspian Sea network has also 
delivered considerable gains to workers. 
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Table 11: Interpretive Summary of Five Networks
Company/
Sector
Initiator Motives Achievements Disadvantages
Caspian Energy 
Project
ICEM
NOPEF
ROGWU
OGWU
Build bargaining & 
organising capacity in 
the Caspian
Organising private 
sector workers
Establishing regional 
network
Requires high level of 
GUF and union staff 
resources
No real capacity to 
include organisations 
from Turkmenistan 
and Iran
Goodyear USWA Establish global 
information and 
campaigning network 
to support national 
negotiations
Information exchange No capacity for direct 
solidarity action
Nestlé IUF Inability to secure 
dialogue with Nestlé 
management
Information exchange
Solidarity
mechanism
High-profile IUF 
activity
No dialogue at 
national, regional or 
international levels
Unsustainable 
financially
DaimlerChrysler IG Metall
German Works 
Council
Secure information 
and coordination 
between key plants
Ensure IG Metall 
control of international 
dialogue
Resolution of several 
disputes
No real IMF role 
No real developing 
country influence
Weak agreement with 
company
Unable to sustain 
commitment of unions 
globally
BASF IG BCE
ICEM
GWC
Establish regional 
social dialogue outside 
Western Europe
Regional dialogue in 
Latin America and Asia
Networking contacts in 
Eastern Europe
No IFA
No global dialogue; 
failure to engage 
North American 
management and 
unions
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Conclusion 
The conclusions here mesh with arguments made elsewhere in the book that working 
within small groups and with an educational focus offers an immediately viable way 
of networking. Five key factors have been identified as important to networking 
success: how networks are formed, company attitudes and influence, resources, the 
potential for participation and the spatial basis of membership. In terms of how 
networks are formed, time and resources are clearly needed for the educational 
processes required. Company attitudes and influence are closely linked to the 
resources issue; networks’ degree of independence needs to be as high as possible 
and therefore more independent funding is needed. At present, IFAs and networks 
are being kept apart by companies who dispose of the necessary resources. 
Maximising membership participation in the network is largely determined 
by whether the power dynamics between unions from developed (particularly the 
headquarters unions) and developing countries can be managed successfully. The 
use of an educational approach helps this to be managed effectively; what this entails 
is explored in the next chapter. How networks are run is a major issue and taking 
an educational approach to networking raises the potential for generating the other 
success factors. Education allows network members to communicate their own 
interests and relate to those of others in ways that build psychological engagement. 
Importantly, it strengthens the link between membership identification with the 
network and their behaviour. A network’s capacity to mobilise union activity and 
resources is also increased because targets are well understood and articulated. 
This level of engagement is fundamental to building a strong communication 
foundation. 
The most successful examples of high levels of engagement involve small groups 
of unions, normally brought together on a regional or sub-regional basis. These small, 
closely related groups are able to achieve higher degrees of mutual understanding, 
cohesion and coordinated action than existing networks. The point about the 
effectiveness of regional as opposed to global networking already appears well taken 
in some GUFs. Thus, the IMF’s World Auto Council has argued to the IMF that 
improved regional structures should underpin their World Auto Councils (IMF, 
2004). 
This discussion has implications for the question raised in the previous chapter 
regarding how to proceed with IFAs. Following the analysis laid out in this chapter it 
is clear networks that still need to be built effectively to use IFAs should, from their 
inception, be created on a minilateral or regional basis, with the bulk of resources 
devoted to educational activities rather than, as at present, to global steering 
committee meetings. This is an essential reorientation.
netwOrks
Global Unions, Global Business 2011.indd   87 31/05/2011   08:40:04
•  C h a p t e r  e i g h t  •  
International Union Education 
It is important to realise that this tool for the union, education, keeps on being 
improved and used to keep the movement going forward. In general, trade union 
education is an essential tool for the unions as it has the capacity to allow them to 
define where they are, where they want to be and how they will get to where they 
want to be. It is a tool for unions to deal with the challenges of today’s globalised 
workplace and the MNC.
(The African trade unionist who provided this  
quotation has asked to remain anonymous.) 
Education helps to build solidarity between workers at local, national and 
international level. Through affiliation with ITF and participation in ITF education 
courses, our airline union learned and had information exchanges with similar 
unions in other countries. In one airline company, many protest letters were sent 
to management in Thailand and they were forced to improve the work rules.
Aranya Pakapath, ICEM Project Coordinator Thailand  
Introduction 
T h i s  chapter examines trade union education in the international context. We refer here to educational work carried out primarily by the internationals, which although it is often linked to that carried out at national level, is 
distinctive because of the involvement of trade unionists from more than a single 
country. Trade union education has historically been, and remains, a central tool of 
the internationals’ work and this is unsurprising since some major national unions 
had their origins in educational activity. In most GUFs funding spent on this area is 
equivalent to income from affiliation fees and consumes more staff resources than 
any other area of work, even though its full import and significance are not always 
grasped. 
Our argument here has four related strands. First, education broadly conceived is 
indispensable for helping unions to socialise activists, arm them with arguments and 
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confidence to tackle their problems, form networks and develop their organisations. 
Second, the union educational model, which emphasises egalitarian, transparent 
and discursive approaches to defining and solving problems, is ideally suited to 
international activities. Third, the world’s unions are extremely diverse and have a 
wealth of experience in dealing with workers’ problems. This very diversity, often 
referred to as a major problem in international unionism, can be turned to advantage 
through positive use. Exchanges of experience and the results of experimentation can 
be shared constructively in educational environments. Finally, and crucially for both 
unions and the internationals themselves, education strongly stimulates democratic 
involvement. It has been shown that unions can become ‘learning democracies’ 
whereby the informal processes of collective learning coexist with, supplement and 
support more formal representative democracy (Huzzard, 2000). 
International Union Education: Definitions, Extent,  
Significance and Methods 
We adopt a broad definition of education. We include within it all forms of activity 
designed to build unions’ capacities to deal with members’ problems, from formal 
programmes of education at one end of the spectrum to secondments, informal 
consultancy and coaching at the other. Nevertheless, the primary activity we are 
referring to consists of classroom-based programmes of structured discussion and 
participant-centred activities. These approaches can also be used to good effect 
outside of classrooms, and supplemented by the other methods we refer to. 
The number of trade unionists participating in education at any one point is 
extremely difficult to estimate with any degree of accuracy because basic data are 
unavailable. Nevertheless, we attempt a very broad estimate here since it is important 
to have some idea of its global reach. 
It is likely that on average a GUF works with approximately fifty unions from 
developing countries each year and educates somewhere between five hundred 
and five thousand unionists at grassroots and leadership levels, i.e. between ten 
and one hundred per union. Therefore if the number of union participants lies 
somewhere between these poles of ten and one hundred, then the global total is in 
the region of around 25,000 a year for all GUFs. This is a relatively small proportion 
of total membership, since the membership of ITUC affiliates is around 167 million. 
Nevertheless, over the last twenty-five years of global union programmes, hundreds 
of thousands of trade unionists are likely to have received some level of education. 
A large percentage of these participants have maintained their activism and some 
have taken senior positions. A good deal of scope remains for further development, 
because some of these participants are likely only to have had brief contact with 
union education. 
Some further insight into the proportion of members involved can be gleaned 
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from rough estimates of the numbers touched by the relatively large educational 
effort made by the internationals and others in the former Soviet Union. An external 
evaluation of international union educational work there admitted that figures are 
difficult to give with confidence. This comprehensive report, produced by a team of 
researchers led by Irina Khaliy of the Russian Academy of Sciences (2005), estimated 
that the total number of people involved over the ten years between 1994 and 2004 
exceeded 300,000. The total formal membership of the Russian unions alone in 
2004 was around 34 million; therefore around one member in one thousand had 
experienced some involvement. Recognising that the aim was to train the vital 
activist layer rather than all members, the report suggested that the extent of the 
work was ‘truly significant’ but that much remained to be done to increase the 
numbers involved: ‘There are still thousands of willing activists at workplace level 
who need practical assistance to help them in the new functions they know they 
must perform’ (Khaliy, 2005: 3). Thus, even here, where major efforts have been 
made, many remain untouched. Sogge (2004) pointed out that despite the upsurge in 
international bodies’ efforts in the former Soviet Union, many requests for assistance 
could not be met. 
The internationals are responsible for coordinating the educational effort. They 
are well placed to carry out, commission, supervise and expand educational work 
since they have unique expertise in international industrial relations. They are 
living concentrations of accumulated historical knowledge, a profound asset from 
which affiliates and their activists stand to benefit. They also have many experienced 
individuals who can be described as ‘bridge builders’, people who have been 
identified as being important in helping trade unionists from different backgrounds 
to work together in effective ways (Garver et al., 2007). The internationals’ staff are 
aware of best practice in union educational methods although they are often less 
aware of the applicability of these methods outside of the classroom situation in, for 
example, network-building contexts. As we argued in the previous chapter, this is 
an issue that needs attention. 
We show the typical aims, subjects, forms and results of trade union education 
in international contexts in Table 12 below. Union education has an overarching 
aim, i.e. one that applies to all of its forms: to raise trade unionists’ and workers’ 
confidence in their capacity to tackle their own problems collectively. Underneath 
this umbrella aim, a good number of secondary aims have also existed. 
The first and perhaps most obvious is to develop unions’ capacity to carry out 
representative functions on behalf of their members, both directly by improving 
representational capacity and indirectly by addressing union structures, management 
and ways of working. Many unions worldwide do not have extensive experience of 
representation nor of organising or mobilising workers. In the case of unions from the 
ex-Communist countries for example, education has recently meant demonstrating 
the relevance of unions adopting organising, mobilising and representational 
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Table 12: Typical Target Groups, Subjects, Aims, Forms and Results of International Trade Union Education
Target Group and 
Subject
Aims Forms Results
Union officers 
and workplace 
representatives: 
representing workers
(Typical topics: 
organising and 
mobilising workers, 
health and safety, 
negotiating)
Improve worker 
representation 
Formal education 
programmes, study 
circles
Improved worker 
representation, 
democratising effects in 
unions
Union officers, 
representatives and 
workers: training for 
paralegal representatives
Provide free 
representation in legal 
contexts
Formal education 
programmes
Systems of free workers’ 
representation in 
industrial courts, legal 
arbitration systems
Trade union tutors: 
‘training trainers’
Increase available pool of 
worker educators
Formal education 
programmes, ‘micro-
teaching’, coaching and 
mentoring, information, 
materials exchange 
through newsletters etc.
Creation and 
maintenance of pool of 
worker educators
Union officers 
and workplace 
representatives: 
union management 
and organisational 
development
Improve union structures, 
ways of working; improve 
participation of women 
and ethnic minorities
Formal educational 
programmes, inter-union 
exchanges
Improvements in union 
effectiveness; increased 
participation of women 
and ethnic minorities
Workplace 
representatives and 
workers: very wide range 
of workplace-based 
subjects including HIV/
AIDS peer counselling
Very wide range
Peer counselling for HIV/
AIDS aim is to train peer 
counsellors
Formal educational 
programmes, study 
circles
Raise identification with 
union; specific outcomes 
such as creating body of 
HIV/AIDS peer counsellors
Workers Raise workers’ 
participation in unions 
and in HIV/AIDS 
programmes, skills 
training etc.
Wide range of formal and 
informal forms
Raised worker 
participation in 
unions and HIV/AIDS 
programmes, improved 
worker skills etc. 
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approaches. Issues of union structure and democracy are addressed, especially by 
encouraging the participation of women and ethnic minorities in union affairs, often 
through women-only courses (Reufter and Rutters, 2002). The second aim, from a 
more institutional perspective, has been to offer a practical and effective route out 
of the isolation and stagnation experienced by many unions in developing countries 
and to provide a much needed impetus for their organisational development. 
Programmes therefore aim to impart a sense that they are part of a wider global 
movement. More recently, a third aim has appeared: to raise levels of workers’ 
participation in activities such as HIV/AIDS or skills development programmes. This 
type of work is controversial in terms of how faithfully it reflects trade union aims 
and how far it is primarily driven by a wish to access funding. In Britain, it has been 
argued that government support for building a system of workplace union learning 
representatives has in fact brought unions little and represents little more than a 
channelling of trade unionism to state ends (McIlroy, 2008). At this point, therefore, 
it may be that the overarching aim is not present. 
At the global level, the educational emphasis has shifted in recent decades. In an 
initial phase, from the 1980s to the mid 1990s, the main thrust was towards diffusing 
union educational methods and building cadre systems. Partly because of the 
experience of the Scandinavian donors, this was based on essentially self-organised 
and directed study circles. These were experientially based, problem centred, highly 
adaptable and, not least, sustainable. From the late 1990s onwards, a second phase 
began as international trade union education directly attempted to stimulate more 
fundamental change in unions. In many cases union policies, financial structures 
and internal democracy were putting a brake on educational efforts and, more 
importantly, on broader structural changes. Education designed to make unions 
more effective, often masked in the language of ‘renewal’ or ‘modernisation’ to 
make it more acceptable to affiliates who might be offended by the idea that their 
organisations required overhaul, was launched. 
The methods of trade union education used in international work have also 
undergone a revolution in the last twenty years. For much of the twentieth century, 
the predominant method was formal lecturing by experts to relatively passive 
groups of participants. This coexisted with a minority strand, which emphasised 
the importance of an experientially based, problem-solving, highly participative 
approach whereby participants negotiated between themselves and with tutors 
the concrete problems for discussion. Union educational work has more recently 
built on this minority strand and has drawn on a set of compatible, overlapping 
philosophies eclectically fused by the tutors concerned. A more or less standard 
component has been the active learning methods first devised in German workers’ 
education in the 1920s (Feidel-Mertz, 1964). The 1920s theorists grappled with the 
problem of how to build an educational practice appropriate to the thousands of 
workplace representatives elected in German unions under the post-First World 
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War works constitution law. Their solution was essentially to begin by inducting 
accounts of problems from participants, and then to approach the issues by using 
the experience of those present, and inducting external resources such as the law, 
rather than beginning by explaining legal details. This was the origin of the current 
orthodoxy. In addition, tutors sometimes drew on the work of other theorists such 
as the Brazilian pedagogue Paulo Freire and his book The Pedagogy of the Oppressed 
(1970) to stress the emancipatory and empowering nature of education and collective 
activity. 
All of these approaches encourage participants to step aside from their personal 
educational background or position in the union to acquire the tools to address real 
issues in the workplace. Lecturing has given way to problem-solving of concrete 
issues brought to the group, defined and intensively discussed, inter alia through 
simulation exercises. In the last decade, these methods, often under titles such as 
‘the new educational methods’, or ‘the ILO approach’ after several important projects 
carried out by that organisation, have rapidly gained ground and have begun to 
displace traditional methods. 
Participative education methods have provided many unions outside of the 
developed world with the only sustainable way of conducting education. They 
require virtually no facilities, a vital consideration since funding residential training 
has been beyond most unions’ means. Dedicated buildings or large budgets are not 
necessary, and the methods provide ways of working that can be used in workplaces 
and local offices. Simultaneously, they are resource expanding since they greatly 
increase the contribution that unpaid activists can make. 
Union educational methods are frequently preferable to normal trade union 
decision-taking environments that provide far less participation opportunities and 
are governed by more formal rules. Their insistence on the equal right of all to 
participate and to share their experience is important in this connection. They 
model a highly participative mode of decision-taking that supplements and balances 
the necessary formal meetings based on organisational agendas. This is particularly 
relevant where significant cultural differences and power imbalances exist. The 
problem-solving educational focus is also usefully polyvalent in relation to the 
external world in that it is not linked to a specific subject. It therefore helps unions 
respond to collective problems in the workplace and external shocks to their 
structures whatever their nature. 
Although perceived differently by different unions internationally, union 
educational methods constitute a way of working recognised by most unions in 
the world. They therefore constitute a shared frame of reference that can be useful 
in providing a basis for constructing international networks through which the 
diversity of union functions, structures and modus operandi can be turned into a 
positive resource on which participants draw (Croucher, 2004). 
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Donors, Projects and Funding 
The great majority of international union education is carried out through projects, 
funded by a small group of donor organisations. Referred to as development 
cooperation programmes they are, in the main, funded by the Dutch/Nordic trade 
union bodies, established to administer funds from national affiliates and tax payers. 
The funds come mainly from government, and to a more limited extent in the case 
of FNV, from clauses in collectively bargained contracts negotiated with employers. 
An exception is the ITF’s FOC Campaign, funded through the Seafarers’ Fund, i.e. 
largely by employers. Another is the prominent example of employer funding for 
development work through the IUF’s joint programmes in the tobacco and chocolate 
sectors, but these do not provide funds directly for union education. In the cases 
of Sweden and Finland, national unions are expected to contribute co-funding 
for projects funded through the donor organisations. The ITUC estimated that in 
2000, US$10,380,522 was raised for the internationals’ development cooperation 
programmes. Given the large scale funding not included in the secretariat accounts 
used to compile these figures, this estimate is conservative. 
The key donors for large projects have long been the Dutch FNV Mondiaal, LO-
TCO Sweden, LO-FTF Denmark, LO Norway and SASK Finland. LO-TCO has the 
largest annual budget, at an estimated 13 million Euro for 2006, closely followed 
by FNV with 11.9 million Euro, and SASK with an unconfirmed annual budget of 
approximately 3 million Euro. In addition, the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation 
(FES), a social democratic foundation using predominantly governmental funds, 
provides extensive funding for more localised projects. Active in just under one 
hundred countries worldwide, it makes a significant contribution in a decentralised 
way. FES has a dedicated programme for the GUFs with an annual budget of 10–15 
million Euro per year. 
These organisations award and administer funding in two ways. The first is 
multilateral, i.e. by channelling money to the internationals and international 
NGOs. The second is bilateral, where money is provided direct to local unions 
and NGOs. The pattern of funding is shifting, with donors increasingly opting to 
make funds available for bilateral projects, mainly in partnership with civil society 
organisations other than unions. For example, the Danish LO-FTF over the last five 
years has moved away from working with GUFs, and their current contribution to 
the internationals’ work is tiny. Given the significance of project funding for covering 
the internationals’ core costs which we noted in Chapter four, any reduction in the 
extent to which their risk is spread across donors must be a matter for concern. 
Table 13 below provides estimates of the balance of donors’ funds allocated to 
bilateral and multilateral development projects in 2004. The table shows high levels 
of bilateral funding when measured against the funders’ rhetorical commitment to 
the internationals. 
the wOrk Of the internatiOnals
Global Unions, Global Business 2011.indd   94 31/05/2011   08:40:04
95INTERNATIONAL UNION EDUCATION
Table 13: Estimated Bilateral/Multilateral Allocation of Trade Union Development Funds 2004
Solidarity Support Organisation (donor) Bilateral Multilateral
LO-TCO (Sweden) 25% 75%
FNV (Netherlands) 70% 30%
SASK (Finland) 25% 75%
LO-FTF (Denmark) 75% 25%
LO (Norway) 80% 20%
Source: Minutes of the Nordic-Dutch & GUF Meeting, Tuesday 5 April 2005
(Document in authors’ possession)
It is increasingly difficult for GUFs to raise educational funding, for three reasons. 
The first is the election of more right wing governments in the Netherlands and 
Nordic countries, entailing increasingly stringent administrative requirements on 
the funding organisations which we detail below. The second is donors’ anxiety that 
funding will be used to compensate for the internationals’ declining income from 
affiliates. The third is that the majority of donor officials are increasingly drawn from 
outside the trade union movement and simply do not understand union objectives or 
their ways of operating. Their instinctive inclination is to work with NGOs. 
Significant attempts to find new sources of funding to sustain project work are 
therefore being made. The reduced global amounts available from some funders 
(notably the FNV), and the political sensitivities of company funding have led the 
internationals to look towards other national aid structures, such as the British 
government’s Department for International Development, and foundations. There 
has been a great expansion in the GUFs’ large-scale funding in certain areas such as 
HIV/AIDS, and GUFs with affiliates in industries such as mining and transport (for 
example the ICEM and ITF) have taken some of this up. This work is clearly relevant 
to members’ interests, but the wider risk is that the search for project funds makes 
the internationals increasingly subject to funders’ different, sometimes problematic 
and constantly shifting, priorities. 
Results 
There have been few systematic studies of the results of international trade union 
education. One of the most extensive and detailed is the Khaliy report on work 
in the former Soviet Union, based on in-depth research throughout most of the 
country’s regions. This suggested that the results of international educational work 
in the FSU had been highly significant, and that this had been underestimated 
both by the projects themselves and by the few Western researchers who took any 
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interest. Unlike Khaliy’s research team, Western researchers did not venture into the 
regions, while project coordinators often moved on to the next project rather than 
research the results of the previous one. The Khaliy report argued that the ‘results 
were precisely those that could have been expected: unions became more radical and 
democratic’ (Khaliy, 2005: 37). Similar results were found by David Sogge (2004), 
investigating the work that FNV Mondiaal supported in Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union: the union problem was ‘being turned around’ as the title of 
his report put it. Perhaps the most eloquent testimony is that of the Federation of 
European Employers, whose website says that the Soviet-style FNPR unions in the 
former Soviet Union are ‘much reformed’. 
The results are closely linked to the processes set in train by the methods. The 
overarching result of union education is normally improved confidence to deal with 
problems collectively (Charoenloet et al., 2004). Several authors have also pointed 
out that education raises social capital between participants, thereby strengthening 
the links between them, and may also effect shifts in identity that bring about 
stronger union identification (Feidel-Mertz, 1964; Huzzard, 2000; Kirton and Healy, 
2004). In our case, the identifications are international and can help to facilitate 
network building and the internationals’ solidarity work in supporting activists in 
difficulty. 
Participative methods have had a considerable and visible democratising effect 
on both the internationals themselves and their affiliates, with course participants 
going on to play a wide range of roles in representative bodies. Gumbrell-McCormick 
(2001) has shown how the ITUC’s drive to improve women’s participation at the 
international level in the late twentieth century was effective, when combined with 
other political measures in changing both the ITUC and its national affiliates. 
Studies at national level have shown how women’s perceptions of their identities 
and their identification with unions can be raised by women-only courses (Kirton 
and Healy, 2004). Broadly similar results have been reported for educational work 
in the USA directed at increasing ethnic minority activism (Margolies, 2008). The 
democratising effect referred to by these researchers has been shown to occur even 
as a result of courses with other aims (Croucher and Halstead, 1990; Caldwell, 1998; 
Croucher, 2004). 
As we show in many of the cases elsewhere in this book, activism in many national 
contexts carries considerable dangers to those involved, sometimes including risking 
their lives. In Latin American countries, trade unionism is ‘high risk’ activism since 
the murder of activists is common (Loveman, 1998). Educational activity can play a 
major part in establishing the dense and diverse national and international networks 
of support that can help to sustain activists. Relationships established through 
education have operated to support trade unionists working in the increasingly 
repressive states of Belarus and Moldova, facilitated exchanges of organising and 
bargaining information between them and helped the internationals to deepen their 
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understanding of the situations in these countries (Croucher, 2004). In the next 
chapter we document further examples drawn from Colombia. 
Results are also evident in terms of union organisational development. Significant 
improvements in this direction were reported by the five GUFs project that focused 
on the modernisation of unions in Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan. Started in 2004 and completed in 2008, this involved education on 
facilitating organisational change, together with close consultancy support to union 
leadership. In many of the unions, the project achieved a combination of ‘hard’ 
(structural and financial) and ‘soft’ (ways of working and cultural) change, albeit 
in differential ways depending on the pre-project readiness of unions to benefit. 
In Central Asia, the results have been relatively modest, involving mainly the 
establishment of educational schemes in the GUFs’ affiliates. In Ukraine and to a 
lesser extent Russia, unions have been stimulated to go a good deal further. While 
they too have increased their educational effort, several have also shifted the balance 
in the distribution of subscription income more towards their national structures, 
thereby allowing meaningful coordinated organising and mobilising strategies to 
begin to be developed. For the first time, unions in the Ukraine outside the mining 
sector (where the independent miners’ union must constantly organise in the face of 
determined opposition from managements and the official union) have undertaken 
organising drives (Guliy, 2008). 
The effects of participating in GUF-led education are summarised succinctly by 
Mare Anceva of the Union of Industry, Energy and Mining of Macedonia: 
The Trade Union of Industry, Energy and Mining of Macedonia – SIER – is a 
member of two GUFs: IMF (since 1995) and ICEM (since 1996). SIER is a small 
union in a small country. When considering all the benefits that come with 
membership, it becomes very valuable, particularly for small unions and marginal 
economies. 
We in SIER appreciated very much the education projects, which resulted in 
building up union capacities, awareness of current global trends and broadening 
views regarding the organization itself, methods of work, etc. Of course, we 
had to find our own ways in all that (no copy and paste is ever possible in this 
work), but the influence and the welfare that came out of being a member of 
the GUFs are indisputable. GUFs are, first of all, very good and reliable sources 
of information. That is of greatest importance in dealing with privatization 
and FDI. Just meeting other colleagues, both from transition and developed 
countries and having the chance to exchange opinions and experiences is of 
special value. 
To explain what I mean, the Train-the-trainer project with ICEM/IUF resulted in 
having the first trainers within the union (which further resulted in a substantial 
increase in the educational activities carried on). The Modernization project 
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resulted in speeding up changes within the organization, the development of 
regional networks and improvements in workplace representation. Now the 
Health and Safety project with IMF is expected to result in having three union 
experts in SIER who will be able to act as union inspectors and to help health 
and safety representatives in the companies in their work. 
Finally, the results of union education are not simply ‘downwards’, i.e. transferring 
ideas and information to affiliates, but are also ‘upwards’, making significant transfers 
in the opposite direction, to the internationals. Union education cannot be seen as 
uni-directional learning whereby trade unionists at ‘lower’ levels learn from those at 
national and international levels. Labour educators themselves have unfortunately 
done little to dispel this misconception. Thus, otherwise excellent works produced 
by experienced practitioners simply deal with what union activists learn (see for 
example Spencer, 2002). Internationals can access both industrial relations and 
organisational information in this way, use it to relate closely to the unions’ specific 
concerns and objective situations, and convey it to other unions. As we explained in 
Chapter three, education historically was the way that the internationals acquired 
vital information that allowed them to affiliate, assimilate and develop unions as 
they expanded outside of their strongholds in the developed world. Without such 
long-term, patient development of relationships this knowledge could not have 
been established and needs could not have been addressed in effective and efficient 
ways. 
International union education has probably been most successful where unions 
from small groups of countries have been brought together with some external input. 
The model has shown itself to be more successful than simply bringing in external 
tutors or facilitators from developed countries to conduct courses. Strong examples 
of such groupings have existed in both francophone and anglophone West Africa, 
Ukraine and Moldova, the Scandinavian countries and the countries of central 
Asia. An obvious advantage has been to reduce the linguistic and other practical 
difficulties referred to in the previous chapter. In addition, the format allowed a focus 
on exchanging experience within a set of cognate problematics since institutional and 
cultural environments show a combination of commonality and readily recognised 
differences. A limited amount of external input by GUF representatives and foreign 
tutors has in these cases allowed a wider perspective when necessary. 
An example is a small union in Tanzania, TAMICO, with members in the 
mining sector. As a result of the local system of ‘African socialism’ or ‘Ujamaa’ 
entailing state–union cooperation, the union had no history of organising workers. 
In 2001 a team of four organisers was established from the National Union 
of Mineworkers of South Africa. This exchange was facilitated by the ICEM 
through a regional shop stewards programme funded by Nordic donors and 
coordinated by Zimbabweans. The NUM organisers focussed on the Geita Mine, 
with approximately 3,000 workers, none of whom were unionised. Within two 
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weeks, using South African experience and assistance, TAMICO had recruited 400 
members. The ICEM helped the newly established branch and shop stewards to 
register the union and train its leaders. The union was able to make this dramatic 
shift in orientation through targeted contact with another mining union in the 
region and coordination with its international. 
Education’s Political Marginalisation 
Educational activity is important to the internationals, yet as we have shown above, 
its funding is problematic because it comes from a small group of European countries 
with an increasing predilection for bilateral projects that bypass the internationals. 
At the same time, there has been a long-term shift away from discussing trade 
union education within the GUFs. The subject is dealt with in a cursory way within 
executive bodies. Since these problems exist in a major area of work, why are they 
not discussed more extensively? More broadly, why is education marginalised both 
in intra-GUF and academic discussion? 
Education was regarded by a previous generation of experienced international trade 
unionists as a tool of self-evident use in their work. Omer Bécu, general secretary of 
the ICFTU, underlined its significance in his preface to Hans Gottfurcht’s mid-1960s 
book on the history and current position of the international movement, a work 
whose main text also takes the importance of education as obvious (Bécu, 1966). 
Bécu describes it as ‘indispensable for the firm anchoring of the trade unions in the 
developing world’ (Bécu, 1966: 5). This recognition appears to have diminished since 
that time, and the assumption is that education is now conducted simply because it 
is requested and/or because it provides funds. 
We suggest that there are two core reasons for this neglect. The first is that for 
many trade unions the activity is invisible, because it only applies to those most in 
need of it and therefore does not touch the relatively powerful and much-researched 
unions of the USA and Western Europe. Many large OECD-based trade unions 
affiliated to GUFs simply have no contact with the GUFs’ education programmes. At 
any one time, at least 60 per cent of affiliates will not have international trade union 
education in their consciousness. Only the donor and recipient country affiliates will 
have any real understanding of what work is being conducted and its results. 
The second reason is the more profound problem of demonstrating palpable 
outcomes from educational work. Often, very little baseline information is available 
about the unions involved prior to projects starting. For projects begun in the 1980s 
and 1990s, it was impossible to secure this information and there was therefore 
an almost complete absence of data about what these unions could already do. 
Moreover, although in many cases projects build organisational capacity and lead 
directly to recruiting new members, many of the results are vital intangibles such as 
building confidence in key activists. Impacts are also often indicated in only indirect 
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ways – for example the successful completion of a negotiation process, which will 
always have other factors determining the outcomes. 
Attempts to use indicators that take full account of intangibles can also bring 
problems with donors because they are in stark contrast to those that governments 
find acceptable. Increasingly, governments have sought to impose ‘Logical Framework 
Analysis’, a highly formulaic approach to planning and project management, on local 
unions. Global unions are consequently often caught between donors and unions as 
‘interpreters’, trying to bring these two different languages and orientations into a 
meaningful dialogue. They have not always succeeded, and these approaches have 
alienated many unions in the developing world in addition to the GUFs. 
Marginalisation of debate around education heightens the risk that it will fall by 
the wayside, and be displaced by bilateral activity. Schwass evokes a very real and 
sobering prospect: 
the future of trade union development cooperation looks bleak. If donors chose 
the easy way out by going bilateral, i.e. disregard GUFs as partners and work 
directly with national centres and unions in developing countries, then a lot of 
added value is lost. It would be the end of meaningful international trade union 
development cooperation. 
(Schwass, 2004: 23–4) 
This is a crucial and timely point made when donors under pressure to report results 
to their governments on an annual basis may find it easier to carry out bilateral 
programmes with national unions or NGOs. Development funds set up to build 
unions would then have no genuine link to the collective experience of decades of 
trade union education carried out through the internationals, a bleak prospect for 
donors and recipient organisations alike. 
Herein may lie the final reason for the marginalisation of education within the 
internationals: the very difficulty of the issue and lack of any obvious or immediate 
solutions leads to denial because they do not feel that they can address such a large-
scale problem. 
The Education–Research Symbiosis 
Research is a function that also suffers from restricted discussion within the 
internationals. It is a function with a number of different uses and has considerable 
symbiotic potential with the educational approach. Yet the current research deficit 
means that the GUFs are under-equipped with the results of dedicated research that 
can provide them with the tools they need to make well-supported arguments and 
buttress their positions as sectoral experts. 
Research on companies can obviously yield significant results for unions, revealing 
how corporations interlink, their ownership, supply chains, stakeholder structures 
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and so on. Greven (2008: 2) argues that ‘solidly based sophisticated’ research on 
industrial sectors is essential to US-style strategic campaigning against corporations 
that identifies all the pressure points that may be accessed to pressurise them, and 
his argument holds equally for organising or collective bargaining. In addition, 
detailed and properly contextualised accounts of how unions have developed their 
own organisation to approach key problems have great potential. These can be fed 
into courses, but can also be developed from them. Much rich discussion held inside 
classrooms draws on unique experience that cannot be accessed by other means and 
this needs to be captured for the use of other trade unionists. 
Many small or workplace-based unions have little or no research capacity, yet 
most of the GUFs themselves carry out little more than the simplest forms of 
investigation, providing too little detail and analysis for them to be of great use 
to affiliates. Research for the European Industry Federations, on the other hand, 
is relatively well developed, partly because researchers in Europe themselves have 
the capacity to work without a great deal of funding from the Federations. A good 
example is that of the European Institute for Construction Labour Research, which 
has existed for over fifteen years and publishes the widely distributed and well-
regarded CLR News. Similarly, the great majority of OECD unions have both their 
own research departments and good links to academic networks. 
The few examples of effective use of research demonstrate its potential. The 
ITF carries out research on key logistics companies, circulating it widely; similarly, 
its case studies on organising in the informal economy show the possibilities of 
transferring significant experience in this way (Bonner, 2006). High-quality research 
is also produced for one relatively well-resourced GUF, the PSI, to underpin its 
anti-privatisation campaigning. The PSI Research Unit based at the University of 
Greenwich in London produces a steady stream of reports and publications that help 
provide solid data to support the PSI’s campaigning. 
The ITGLWF developed multilevel research on companies it targeted in the 
early 2000s. ‘Multilevel’ because it involved trade unionists at different levels in 
companies investigating both their operations and the company’s suppliers fully. 
Miller (2004) provides a striking example of the combination of education, research 
and determined local organising activity that brought positive results in the Southern 
African clothing industry. Activists were trained, and research conducted in Southern 
Africa was used to identify the primary contractors of Asian MNCs exploiting the 
US Africa Growth and Opportunity Act in the Maseru Export Processing Zone. This 
was in turn used to exert pressure on the US companies ordering the goods, with 
the result that one-third of the 26 companies in membership of the Lesotho Textile 
Exporters’ Association conceded union recognition to some degree. 
It might be suggested that research capacity of the required type does in fact exist, 
in the form of the Global Union Research Network (GURN). This was established 
to try and bridge the gap between unions and academics, notably by coordinating 
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the ILO and academics to generate dedicated research. It brought together a group 
of supportive academics and research institutions worldwide but the results have 
been small in relation to GUFs’ needs. In addition, donors are increasingly funding 
research, such as that carried out by the Observatório Social in Brazil, but without 
union involvement or developing union capacity to carry out their own research. 
The need is for dedicated researchers to work on a GUF by GUF basis, with 
increased resources. GUFs require databases of supply chains and collective 
agreements, but unions will not provide these for public display on the web. 
In educational contexts, high-trust relations can be built, allowing exchange of 
relatively sensitive documents of this type. As Miller shows, educational approaches 
can make a further contribution by developing research capacity in local activists 
through a mix of classroom-based and coaching activities. 
Conclusion 
Vitally, education has a democratising effect within unions, from which the 
internationals have already benefited, raising the participants’ levels of commitment 
to operating within existing structures. Much academic discussion of union renewal 
all too often misses the essential processes of human interaction and development 
that necessarily underpin any such renewal. These are enhanced by education. But 
slow, patient work developing activists through long-term education programmes 
and informal dialogue does not hit any headlines and is currently under-discussed 
both in the internationals and more widely. It is nevertheless a significant aspect of 
efforts to raise the level of contact between the world’s unions and to improve their 
effectiveness.
We advocate further expanding this type of work. Yet the intermittent and 
precarious resources available to the GUFs for education are under threat and 
constitute a problem requiring full discussion. The internationals’ reliance on 
donors’ funds for developmental work masks the reluctance of national unions 
in developed countries to pay anything more than relatively small amounts to 
international bodies, as discussed in Chapter four. This is an immediate problem and 
the signs of change are currently running in the wrong direction. Swedish unions, 
previously highly reliable contributors to educational projects are now seeking to 
minimise their overall financial contribution. The problem is as serious as the dues 
income problem outlined earlier and similarly requires an open political discussion 
between unions about whether they are prepared to make the necessary investment 
in international work.
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•  C h a p t e r  n i n e  • 
Case Study – a GUF’s Relationship 
with a Multinational Company 
Introduction
T h i s  chapter illustrates many of the themes developed and discussed earlier. It is a case study of the ICEM’s relationship with Anglo American plc (AA), analysing how the GUF, national unions in South Africa, Ghana and Colombia 
and the company interacted with positive results for workers. The main institutional 
players are represented in Diagram 4.
Diagram 4: Anglo American and its Relationships to other Main Players
The case was selected for two reasons. First, it was chosen because prima facie 
it allowed detailed examination of how a GUF acted as a major player in advancing 
workers’ interests. Second, unusually high-quality longitudinal information was 
obtained through the long-term involvement of one of the authors, supplemented by 
extensive project reports, company and union documentation. 
We show how the GUF developed a positive relationship with a multinational by 
integrative bargaining on an issue of great significance both to it and to workers; this 
built company consent for distributive bargaining by affiliates in a different part of 
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its operation on another continent. The narrative demonstrates the significance of 
strong articulation developed over many years between the national and international 
union levels, in part created and supported by a strong educational input. The GUF’s 
role was crucial: none of the national unions in the case had previously related 
effectively to multinationals. The GUF learned from the process and transferred the 
approach elsewhere in the world. The case confirms that, contrary to Neuhaus’ (1981) 
suggestion, GUFs can initiate significant developments and need not simply react to 
other actors’ agendas.
The case is presented in three sections. The first introduces the company and 
its relationship with the ICEM. The second analyses work developed in Ghana 
around HIV/AIDS in the mining sector. The third section examines the dynamics 
of rebuilding union dialogue with mining companies in Colombia. Finally, we draw 
broad conclusions and examine the case’s wider relevance.
The Company, the ICEM, National Trade Unions and Their 
Relationships
Anglo American is one of the world’s largest corporations, ranked 88 in the Financial 
Times Stock Exchange index of the world’s largest 500 companies and employing 
162,000 people worldwide in 2006. Its operations are focussed on mining. The 
company, like other natural resources companies, has enjoyed rising prices for 
its products since 2000, and its increasing profits in that period are significant 
background to the case.
The company, although owned mainly by British financial institutions, operates 
in many countries but its main mining operations are in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Latin America. It was for some time South Africa’s largest conglomerate and a key 
corporate player in negotiating the post-apartheid employment settlement (von 
Holdt, 2004). It has a complex and highly devolved structure, claiming in response 
to criticisms of the activities of companies in which it has a sizeable interest (War on 
Want, 2007) that it does not have ‘management control’ of them (Anglo American, 
2007). Following the practice of many such corporations, the associated companies 
have high levels of managerial autonomy and seek to establish internal leadership 
in both efficiency and CSR matters. In this sense it is typical of the modern 
multinational, and can be conceived of as a ‘federation’ (Andersson et al., 2007) 
or a grouping of companies linked by a range of methods including overlapping 
directorships and shareholdings. The overall company composition in 2004 is 
portrayed in Table 14.
It is clear from Table 14 that in 2004 it had a controlling financial interest in both 
Anglo Coal and Anglo Gold Ashanti (AGA). This interest was reduced to 41.8 per 
cent in April 2006; but until spring 2007, AA retained two directors on the AGA 
board. In 2000, AA bought a 33 per cent share in the Cerrejón mine in Colombia; by 
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2006 three companies, AA, BHP Billiton and Xstrata, were equal shareholders. AA 
works closely with Cerrejón management.
CASE STUDy
Table 14: Anglo American plc – Business Overview, 2004
Business Area Main Countries of 
Operation
Key Subsidiaries Percentage Ownership 
of Subsidiaries
Platinum South Africa Anglo Platinum 74.1% 
Gold South Africa Anglo Gold Ashanti 54.5% (17% in 2008)
Diamonds South Africa De Beers 45%
Coal South Africa, Colombia Anglo Coal 100%
Base Metals Chile Anglo Base Metals 100%
Industrial Minerals UK, France, Belgium Anglo Industrial Minerals 100%
Paper and Packaging South Africa, Russia Anglo Paper and 
Packaging
100%
Ferrous Metals and 
Industries
South Africa, Australia Anglo Ferrous Metals and 
Industries
100%
Source: Anglo American plc, The Business: An Overview, 14 February 2004
Company relations with stakeholders have to be built on a long-term basis, Sir 
Mark Moody-Stuart, chairman, argued to shareholders at the April 2008 AGM. Fixed 
sites and high front-end expenditure mean ‘that we have to live with the judgements we 
make about our ability to operate ethically in particular locations’ (Anglo American, 
2008). ‘Resource nationalism’ increasingly means the company has to attend to its 
wider political profile throughout its operations. AA and AGA are highly engaged with 
international development and since 2000 AA has made a considerable contribution 
to the UK government’s Africa strategy. The company’s CSR efforts are also reflected 
in its role in establishing and building the Global Business Coalition (GBC), set up 
to promote business responses to HIV/AIDS, which Sir Mark Moody-Stuart chairs. 
The GBC claims that it has supported millions of people through implementing local 
workplace programmes with its 220 member companies.
AA has taken a ‘business case’ approach to HIV/AIDS provision, although there 
is considerable congruence between business and CSR rationales. AA’s subsidiary 
Anglo Coal was one of the first companies in the world to calculate the precise 
economic benefits of providing antiretrovirals (ARVs), but this ‘making disease 
management pay’ (the phrase is that of Dr Richard Gaunt (2007) of AA’s major 
competitor Rio Tinto) approach is becoming well established in mining companies. 
Research carried out in Anglo Coal showed in 2006 that it was economic to provide 
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private medical insurance, including possible VCT and ARVs, for all employees 
and their dependents rather than to provide nothing. The company’s preliminary 
cost-benefit analysis is shown in Table 15 below. After the first year, the costs of 
providing drugs were estimated to decline relative to savings from absenteeism and 
healthcare. This calculation accompanied a move beyond the classic position taken 
by companies, whereby they deny any legal responsibility for workers’ sexual health. 
The latter position clearly rejects any real responsibility for reducing risk, in order to 
limit potential liabilities (Weait, 2007).
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Table 15: Anglo Coal – Preliminary Cost Benefit Analysis of Providing ART
Duration ART Cost per 
Month  
(Rands)
Absenteeism 
Savings per 
Month
Health Care 
Cost Saving
Per month saved vs no ART – 12 months R2223 R1052 R755
Per month saved vs no ART – 18 months R1652 R1093 R804
Per month saved vs no ART – 24 months R1304 R1126 R837
Additional saved CD4 100–250 vs less than 100 –  
Two years pre-positive
R458 R396
Source: Ms D. Muirhead, Aurum Institute for Health Research, presentation
(Document in authors’ possession)
The company has scope and reasons for improving both its health and safety 
record and its public image: in 2007 it reported that forty-four people were killed 
in its mining operations, and its practices in relation to indigenous communities 
have been sharply criticised (War on Want, 2007). Part of its reply to War on 
Want’s criticisms was to point to its record in publicly insisting that the Colombian 
government attend to the physical defence of trade unionists. Like many mining 
employers, AA is reconciled to trade unionism and almost all of its mining sites 
have a major union presence. The company has sought to construct positive relations 
with unions, including them in efforts to improve efficiency by cost reduction; union 
cooperation in health and safety has brought major benefits to the rate of return 
on capital employed. Their experience at the New Denmark mine in South Africa 
demonstrated this dramatically, when union partnership helped raise the return 
on capital employed from 24.7 per cent in 2001 to 43.2 per cent in 2003. Moody-
Stuart used this experience as a model for others in the company to follow (Anglo 
American, 2003). Hence, the links between trade unionism, health and safety and 
profitability are well recognised at the top of the company.
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Anglo Gold has robust long-term relations with the South African National Union 
of Mineworkers (NUM), based on AA’s ‘progressive positions’ on recognising black 
unions in South Africa, and its part in the transition to democracy (Anglo American, 
2003; 2008). The NUM itself had a central role in ending apartheid and enjoys great 
prestige within the trade union movement both in Africa and internationally, with 
strong bilateral links with other mining unions, and high-profile participation in 
the ICEM and the IMF. The NUM has long emphasised HIV/AIDS as an issue, 
having concluded an agreement with the South African Chamber of Mines on 
the subject in 1993 (N’Deba and Hodges-Aeberhard, 1998). The union has a broad 
political conception of its representative functions and has successfully negotiated 
protection for contract workers (von Holdt and Webster, 2005). The NUM has 
conducted personnel exchanges with many African mining unions and has had a 
long-term relationship with the Ghana Mineworkers’ Union (GMWU) based on 
personal contacts developed through the ICEM Regional Committee. The GMWU 
is itself a strong union within the well-developed Ghanaian trade union movement 
(Frazer, 2008), and is therefore a relatively equal partner for the NUM. It is a highly 
politicised organisation, focussed on dialogue with the state which until recently ran 
the mines. It was only therefore relatively recently that the GMWU had to negotiate 
with private management and the union stood to learn from a relationship with the 
NUM.
Exchanges between the ICEM and AA were partly based on the long-standing 
relationship between Fred Higgs (then ICEM general secretary, retired 2006) and Sir 
Mark Moody-Stuart. The two were in contact when Moody-Stuart held management 
positions at Royal Dutch Shell and Higgs was National Oil Industry Officer at the 
UK’s Transport and General Workers’ Union. This contact continued through 
difficult years for Shell and for oil workers, including the 1995 Brent Spar incident. 
The relationship was renewed through their joint participation in the United Nations 
Global Compact’s Advisory Committee from that body’s foundation in 2002. The 
committee was established to help the Global Compact develop speedily into a 
credible CSR mechanism, working directly under Kofi Annan’s office at the United 
Nations. Its membership included representatives of civil society, labour (GUFs 
and the ITUC) and business. Shortly after its creation, Moody-Stuart became 
AA chairman but retained his Advisory Committee position. The foundations of 
trust between Higgs and Moody-Stuart were built on the fact that, unlike other 
participants, both came from an industrial relations background. They held similar 
views on the minimum ‘integrity measures’ that would be credible for the Global 
Compact to be an effective body, based on their experience of industrial monitoring 
and complaints procedures. Their capacity for joint action was higher than either had 
with the non-governmental organisations involved.
There was also a long term and complex web of relationships between the ICEM 
and its key affiliate the NUM, and of both with the CEO of Anglo Gold Ashanti, 
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Bobby Godsell. Godsell is an exceptional business person. On his retirement from 
the company in 2008, he was credited by Moody-Stuart with a significant role in 
South Africa’s transition to democracy (Anglo American, 2008). An industrial 
relations expert, he was hailed as an ‘organic intellectual’ of South African business 
(Handley, 2005) for his part in South Africa’s transition. The editor of works on 
South Africa’s future (Berger and Godsell, 1988), he persuaded a sceptical business 
community of the merits of the Labour Relations Act in its amended 2002 version, 
which improved legal cover for contract workers (Bidoli, 2004). In 2002, he surprised 
a business meeting in New York by wearing an NUM strike T-shirt (ibid.). Godsell 
had a close relationship with Cyril Ramaphosa, the first NUM president and 
subsequent secretary general of the ANC who became chairman of the Mondi paper 
and packaging group after its de-merger from AA (Bidoli, 2004; Mondi, 2007).
In West Africa, long-term relationships also existed between AGA management 
and medical staff, the ICEM and the Ghana Mineworkers’ Union (GMWU). The 
GMWU president, John Brimpong, was the Ghana TUC’s HIV/AIDS representative, 
and a member of the ICEM regional and international executives who was well 
known both within Ghanaian mining communities and to local mine management. 
Brimpong was at the centre of a constellation of industry and community contacts 
built up over forty years of union activity. An already close relationship between 
GMWU leadership, the ICEM and senior AGA medical staff was cemented through 
the latter’s HIV/AIDS project.
The ICEM’s HIV/AIDS Pilot Projects: Background and 
Significance
The ICEM was one of the first GUFs, with ITF and EI, to take a lead on promoting 
HIV/AIDS action by unions since workers in these sectors are disproportionately 
affected. From 2002 the ICEM worked with affiliates to develop a strategy and initial 
activity. The union problems identified when dealing with HIV/AIDS were defined 
as lack of leadership, the stigma around testing and a lack of sustainable funding 
for treatment. An additional barrier in Africa was the reluctance of workplace 
representatives, often from Christian backgrounds, to confront the issue. At that 
point virtually no ICEM affiliate, except those in South Africa, Ghana and Botswana, 
recognised HIV/AIDS as a union issue. In countries outside Africa, ICEM affiliates, 
notably in Eastern Europe, strongly resisted the argument. The African affiliates 
could therefore potentially become international leaders to persuade others of the 
case for taking up the area of work.
Following six months of consultation with affiliates already active around the 
issue and experienced HIV/AIDS activists, the ICEM and these affiliates decided 
to promote medical provision and prevention programmes, and to negotiate anti-
discrimination policies through pilot schemes that could later be adopted elsewhere 
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in the world. The agenda was therefore more ambitious than the earlier common 
union practice of simply carrying out awareness campaigns. It entailed developing 
core expertise, raising funds from new sources and dialogue with both employers 
and government.
HIV/AIDS is a central labour management concern for multinationals invested in 
Africa and Eastern Europe. In Sub-Saharan mining, infection rates are approximately 
double national averages and frequently higher. In Zambia the BBC reports a national 
infection rate of 14 per cent, and an estimated 50 per cent in mining communities 
(BBC News Online, published 22/06/2006). These high rates are explained by four 
factors. The first is the remoteness of mining operations and the communities 
surrounding them. Second, single sex workers’ hostels, although reducing in number, 
are widespread. Third, many male migrant and contract workers are away from 
their partners, further stimulating high levels of prostitution and ‘second families’. 
Fourth, stigma and denial around sexual practice and prevention of infection is 
widespread.
The private sector plays a significant role in general healthcare in these 
communities, making miners dependent on companies for health, and in some 
cases life, as well as work. The majority of clinics and hospitals in mining regions 
are to some extent privately supported or funded. Most miners working directly for 
multinationals at present are members of private medical insurance schemes which 
provide antiretroviral drugs, although this is a recent development and rarely applies 
to indirect or contract workers. Thus, companies play a considerable role in the 
diagnosis of HIV/AIDS and in providing access to treatment as well as in healthcare 
more broadly.
The diagnosis of HIV/AIDS raises significant dilemmas for management and 
workplace representatives alike and is therefore extremely demanding for individuals 
on both personal and professional levels. If a worker with HIV/AIDS is threatened 
with dismissal, this raises fundamental issues about that worker’s future. Workers’ 
fear of losing their jobs demands strong workplace representation by the union, 
since local management may take action against them despite statements by senior 
company staff thousands of miles away. The issue giving rise to the dismissal threat 
may not be the simple fact of the worker having HIV/AIDS. For example, a worker 
receiving antiretrovirals through a company medical scheme may face dismissal for 
a gross misconduct matter. The local manager and workplace representative will 
both have to take personal responsibility for evaluating the cost to the worker, his 
family and the community of him losing his job and, simultaneously, his access to 
treatment.
Workers must be convinced that testing will not lead to dismissal and, to 
a lesser degree, they also must be confident that it will lead to treatment. This 
should be seen in the context that until legislation changed in 2003, mining 
companies in South Africa practised compulsory testing for workers at the point 
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of recruitment, refusing those who tested positive (Kenny, 2004). The role of trade 
unions is important in negotiating, verifying and rigorously policing any assurances 
by securing anti-discrimination and anti-victimisation protections in collective 
agreements, promoting and monitoring VCT provision and by convincing workers 
that they will not suffer if tested.
Most workers, even in highly infected areas do not present themselves for testing. 
Only tiny percentages of workers normally volunteer, particularly if testing is offered 
by company doctors in company facilities. Companies draw a distinction between 
confidential and anonymous testing, arguing that they practise the latter, but this 
fails to reassure workers. Most employees in African mining companies have limited 
confidence in management’s concern for their interests (von Holdt, 2004) and they 
require credible guarantees of protection from company action against them that 
only union involvement can offer.
Preparing for and Implementing the Projects
In September 2002, on the ICEM’s initiative, an International Framework Agreement 
was signed between Anglo Gold, ICEM and the NUM, the first such agreement 
signed with a company operating in Africa. The accord was signed in public after 
the UN’s World Summit in South Africa, and promoted as part of the company’s 
sustainable development work. It had essentially symbolic rather than substantive 
significance in tackling HIV/AIDS, because it contains no clause on the subject. It 
nevertheless symbolically cemented the relations between the three signatories and 
was relevant background to their cooperation in the HIV/AIDS field.
By 2004 the ICEM had launched an international HIV/AIDS initiative, designed 
to identify pilot workplaces where the GUF and its affiliates could develop workplace 
provision, with the support of employers, local hospitals and international funding. 
The project aimed to mainstream the issue in affiliates’ policies and practice. It was 
decided to work in two Ghanaian mining regions, Obuasi and Tarkwa, with Anglo 
Gold Ashanti and its partner company with which it was merged in April 2004, 
Ashanti Goldfields, because of the working relationship with the companies and 
the GMWU’s clear commitment to conduct the demanding programme. Overall, 
the project worked within the comprehensive guidance offered by the ILO Code of 
Practice on HIV/AIDS in the Workplace; the immediate objective was to implement 
a strategy based on the Code. The pilot project aimed to secure, through negotiations 
with these key employers, the establishment or development of dedicated medical 
facilities for VCT and treatment, and adequate anti-discrimination and non-
victimisation clauses in agreements. The pilots would in due course identify other 
important needs, including a need for trained peer counsellors from union cadres 
to support miners diagnosed positive. These counsel people before and after testing, 
helping them to make lifestyle changes and to manage their treatment. 
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These companies, unlike many others, have professional staff to manage HIV/
AIDS to high technical standards. By 2004 the ICEM also had acquired dedicated 
HIV/AIDS coordinators. The experts responsible for CSR and HIV/AIDS in both 
the company and the GUF facilitated technical discussion between the partners. 
Technical staff involvement also helped build consensus within the companies since 
there was marked management resistance within them, as in other companies, 
to acquiring inherently difficult and open-ended responsibilities which generate 
considerable uncertainty about future costs and requirements. For all parties 
involved, there is no margin for error. Even small technical mistakes in HIV/AIDS 
testing and treatment programmes are likely to reduce uptake and to make restoring 
miners’ confidence very difficult.
It has been suggested that the most effective company strategy is to carry out 
in-house programmes, without involving partners (Husted, 2003). Yet the AA 
companies rejected this option. Company engagement with the GUF and local 
unions occurred against the background of strong relationships outlined above, but 
its immediate cause was the practical issue of testing and the positive effect that the 
company felt the union could have. The huge scope for charismatic union leaders to 
influence workers’ perceptions is difficult to envisage outside of the African mining 
context. Their role is highly significant well beyond the workplace, since they are seen 
as community, and not simply as workplace, leaders. This influence has frequently 
been referred to by AA managers. Thus, Brian Brink, AA’s senior vice-president for 
health, highlighted the partnership with other organisations including unions as 
‘crucial to success’ in tackling HIV/AIDS (Business Action in Africa, 2007: 20).
Senzeni Zokwana, the president of the NUM (elected president of the ICEM at 
its Bangkok Congress in 2007) personally took the issue of HIV/AIDS to mines. 
He carried out awareness raising activities and encouraged testing. He publicly 
submitted himself for personal testing at each mine, paving the way for successful 
testing drives. The union also undertook a wider educational effort to train peer 
educators and negotiators to bargain for protections for people living with HIV/
AIDS.
HIV/AIDS programmes are often reported in vague ways, but in the cases of AGA 
and AA more widely, tangible results could be reported. In AGA in 2004, 10 per cent 
of employees were being tested; in the company’s 2006 annual report, 75 per cent 
were reported as having been tested. By June 2006 34 per cent of AA’s workers had 
been tested: 9,758 of an estimated positive work force of 28,294 were enrolled in 
the company’s HIV/AIDS programme, 3,772 of whom were taking up antiretroviral 
treatment. In comparative terms, these are high take-up rates and a significant 
improvement on previous levels.
A further concrete result is identifiable, since the Ghana pilots triggered 
agreements with the employer and government. AGA signed a public–private 
partnership agreement with the Ghanaian Ministry of Health in 2005 to provide 
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HIV/AIDS testing and treatment and malaria control in the Obuasi mining area, 
an initiative supported by the ICEM. In this ‘co-investment’ project (Vuckvic et al., 
2005), the company donates the infrastructure of the hospital and available medical 
staff. It provides VCT and ART to its employees and their dependents at these 
facilities through an agreement with the Ghanaian government and with insurance 
company funding.
The project provided an essential first step in establishing the possibility of 
moving beyond an awareness-raising model by making material progress and showing 
concretely how that could be done. It also made the case to companies outside those 
directly involved that union cooperation is a positive factor. The pilot initiative has 
been exported, at the time of writing, to other companies in Ghana and also to 
Botswana, Nigeria, Namibia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali. 
We now turn to the second element of the case study: ICEM–union–company 
relationships at the Cerrejón mine in Colombia.
Colombia
This part of the study focuses on relations between the Sintracarbón union and 
Carbones del Cerrejón, part owned by AA. As indicated above, AA is closely involved 
in Cerrejón with regular visits to the mine by senior AA staff including Edward 
Bickham, executive vice president, external affairs. The African initiatives described 
above were essential background to developments in Colombia since they created 
awareness within the GUF and the company that positive relations on that continent 
were yielding benefits for both sides. It also shows how education played a significant 
role in building relationships between Colombian unions and generating union 
capacity to act locally in relation to AA and other companies.
For trade unionists, Colombia has long represented the most dangerous country 
in the world. The civil war has placed unions in a highly vulnerable position since 
they have to operate with and in the interstices between government, guerrillas, 
paramilitary forces, multinationals and criminals (Pearce, 2004). Hundreds of union 
leaders have been assassinated during the last decade, causing activists to reduce or 
abandon their union work, leaving small, isolated unions. At the time of writing, 
many trade unionists have again been forced into hiding by a wave of violence.
Overcoming Problems of Inter-union Dialogue
Colombian unions have varied and powerful political orientations that tend to 
fragment them. Unions in the ICEM sectors are affiliated to the main centre-left 
Colombian union federation, Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT). They have 
a strong orientation towards political action, and the state has the legal right 
to intervene in their affairs. Up until 2000, none of the unions discussed below 
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provided representative services to members and had only minimal experience of 
collective bargaining, while some resisted dialogue with employers on political 
grounds. Certain unions actively supported oppositional movements while others 
retained their historical basis in left-wing groups although there is no organisational 
or political link between the unions and the left-wing guerrilla organisations ELN 
or FARC. One union was built from the radical M19 grouping, although M19 
was disbanded and no longer directs union strategy. Unions have strong factional 
dynamics and most unions experience mistrust between executive members that 
becomes acute at high points in the societal conflict.
Unions in the ICEM’s industries also have significant industrial differences. For 
example the Sintraelecol union is a large public sector union, with the highest level 
of security threat for union leadership. Miners, among the first Colombian workers 
to organise in the early twentieth century, have a respected position, but are also 
exposed in relation to threats of violence against them. Sintraquim, by contrast, is 
a small, relatively moderate union representing a majority of women working in the 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals sectors, mainly concerned with the lack of secure 
jobs and factory closures. These differences make it difficult for unions to cooperate, 
both between themselves but also within the CUT and the ICEM. This reinforces 
their sense of isolation and weakness in relation to employers. It should be noted 
however that the ICEM affiliates have attempted to work in a coordinated way for ten 
years as the ICEM Colombia Committee, which reflects their increasingly important 
positioning within CUT and, more recently, with employers. 
The ICEM’s Interventions
The foundations of the ICEM’s work were educational, and projects moved through 
three overlapping stages: building the GUF–union relationship, reviewing the unions’ 
own structures and ways of working and finally bargaining with companies. 
The ICEM’s work with Colombian unions began in the 1980s through the 
Education Department of the Miners’ International Federation (MIF), which merged 
with ICEF in 1995 to form the ICEM. Ann Browne, then MIF education officer, 
established contacts with the mining unions, initially informally, focussing on 
mining communities and child labour, which were priority issues for the MIF at 
that point. These contacts led to a relationship with the current leadership of the 
Sintracarbón (at that time Sintraintercor) union.
Sintracarbón and the Carbones del Cerrejón management were central to wider 
developments in Colombia. The Cerrejón mine is one of the largest open caste coal 
mines in the world and Sintracarbón is also an important ICEM affiliate. Its president, 
Jaime Deluquez, is a member of both the ICEM Latin American regional committee 
and its international executive committee. He is a well respected and highly effective 
member of the international with a deep awareness of the possibilities and limits 
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of international trade unionism, formulating clear requests to the ICEM and its 
affiliates in ways that could be readily understood and responded to. He is therefore 
in a strong position to represent the interests of his own union and the other ICEM 
Colombian affiliates at international level. His reputation with management was 
that of a capable and focussed leader. He played a key role in helping build the 
relationships between Sintracarbón, Carbones del Cerrejón and the ICEM.
In 1975 the state-owned company Carbones de Colombia (Carbocol) sold 50 per 
cent of the Cerrejón mine to Intercor, an ExxonMobil subsidiary. In the late 1990s the 
mine and the surrounding region suffered from poor health and safety conditions and 
in response to Colombian requests were included in the MIF’s international Health 
and Safety Project for mining unions. Interestingly, the GMWU also participated in 
this successful global health and safety project. The project, in addition to campaigning 
for ratification of the ILO’s mining safety convention, C.176, provided education and 
consultancies for unions to develop their own health and safety capacity and to 
work with managements to build medical services. Significant gains were made by 
the union, including introducing the first occupational health testing system in the 
mine and creating a good working relationship with company medical staff. The 
doctor currently in charge of the Cerrejón medical facilities, Dr Salvador Uricoechea, 
first met the union through this programme. Uricoechea and the union established 
comprehensive systems for data collection and testing for occupational diseases. 
This programme ended in 1998 and simultaneously a dedicated educational 
methods programme began, for ICEM affiliates in Colombia and those interested 
in affiliating. The consistent funding and support it received for fifteen years from 
the Swedish metal and mining union Metall (now IFMetall) and LO-TCO was 
essential. From 1998 until 2004 the programme was coordinated from Bogotá by 
the experienced trade unionist Carlos Bustos. The high-quality work focussed on 
educational methods for Colombian regional and national leaders, with particular 
emphasis on providing a safe and inclusive educational environment for national and 
local leaders. The project funded them to travel by air rather than by the inherently 
dangerous road routes and provided an important way for national leaders to meet 
their own regional and local activists. 
Union educational methods provided democratic and safe contexts for trade 
unionists to debate and find solutions to highly threatening problems. The educational 
setting provides clear rules and participation, and emphasises equality between 
participants – exceptional emphases in the national context. For those that came 
from a highly politicised background, the experience of participatory education was 
initially very difficult to come to terms with, as they were accustomed to lecture-
based, and position-taking modes of exchange. At first, classroom discussions were 
highly combative, leading to absenteeism. Less senior, female and younger trade 
unionists were initially unwilling to participate in joint activities, but this changed as 
the focus gradually shifted from aggressive political debate towards finding practical 
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and practicable joint solutions to industrial relations problems.
Over time, participants grew to appreciate the educational environment, and the 
removal of restrictions and stress when they attended project activities. Attendance 
gradually improved. For many involved, the risks of congregating in one location 
meant that for attendance at project activities to be so consistent over the long term 
the benefits must have been significant. Education provided an opportunity to build 
social capital: friendships and good working relationships were formed between 
activists from the same and different unions. This had a long term effect on their 
behaviour at ICEM and other union events and also provided them with a firm social 
base from which to venture into trying to address their individual unions’ ways of 
working. By 2004 the ICEM’s six affiliates were all prepared to start reviewing their 
organisations.
A new phase of education was therefore directed at examining these issues. The 
unions perceived their problems to be recruiting new members, weak finances, 
corruption, and lack of education at any level, all contributing to organisational 
stagnation. Both joint and single union seminars were carried out using ICEM staff 
to initiate thinking around organisational change, focussing in particular on the 
difficult recruitment issue. Although this phase was relatively short, the discussions 
stimulated union executives to think beyond the immediate crisis that they faced, to 
consider longer-term objectives and to regard the possibilities of recruitment more 
positively. In brief, they began to take a more strategic approach, including in terms 
of their relations with employers.
Dialogue with Employers
A final phase of the ICEM’s educational work in Colombia turned to the core issue 
of dialogue with employers. By 2003 collective bargaining had effectively atrophied. 
Colombian law allows management and unions to extend collective bargaining 
agreements without revision at six monthly intervals, and the practice had become 
common. The level of danger for union leaderships is raised during negotiations with 
management, discouraging negotiators from resuming discussions. The education 
programme was redirected towards a process of formally denominated social 
dialogue, directly mediated by the ICEM, involving the six ICEM affiliates and eight 
nominated MNCs.
The original MNCs identified were:
•	 Anglo American (UK)
•	 BHP Billiton (Australia)
•	 Xstrata (Switzerland)
•	 Linde (Germany)
•	 Codensa/Endesa (Spain)
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•	 Owens Illinois (USA)
•	 Smurfitt (Ireland)
•	 Union FENOSA (Spain).
The related ICEM affiliates were:
•	 Sintraelecol (Elecric Power)
•	 Sintravidricol (Glass)
•	 Sintracarcol (Paper & Cardboard)
•	 Sintracarbón (Coal)
•	 Sintraquim (Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals)
•	 Fenaltec (Electrical Engineers).
One-day meetings occurred every quarter, preceded by ICEM affiliate meetings 
and facilitated by the ICEM leadership to agree areas for negotiation. Complementary 
research was commissioned by the ICEM on specific areas such as contract labour, 
and union-only and joint training activities were organised on new issues such as 
HIV/AIDS. The areas identified by the group for negotiation included security for 
trade unionists, health and safety, HIV/AIDS and contract labour. 
A process of ICEM-mediated negotiations with employers was initiated around 
this agenda and carried on for several years with an increasing emphasis, encouraged 
by the ICEM, on bilateral negotiations between employers and unions. International 
mediation provided both sides with an externally created platform to restart direct 
collective bargaining. AA and the Spanish-owned utilities multinational Endesa 
(with whom the ICEM has an International Framework Agreement) were pivotal 
to company participants responding to central company prompting to become 
involved. The security and health and safety agendas were especially attractive to 
these companies.
A framework for dialogue was agreed in the early stages, designed to provide 
clear mechanisms for unions and employers. The central commitment of both 
the companies and union partners was to seek common ground and agreement. 
Importantly, the partners committed to participation in the process regardless of 
any local disputes or ongoing collective bargaining. Partners were asked to nominate 
formally a small team of representatives responsible for maintaining dialogue within 
their organisation. These were responsible for ensuring their consistent participation, 
for securing bilateral meetings at workplace level to debate areas of common interest, 
for maintaining regular communication with partners and the ICEM and finally 
for contacting the ICEM general secretary if difficulties arose. The importance of 
continuity of personnel from both unions and companies was emphasised, to ensure 
that momentum was maintained.
In 2004, the process, still at an early stage, was buttressed by state involvement. 
The government appears to have been interested in closer relations with companies, 
and in discussing human rights issues both with them and with the ICEM. Employer 
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and union partners attended regular meetings with the Ministry for Social Protection, 
to present the issues under negotiation and seek support from the ministry for the 
principles of their work. The meetings were headed by Jorge León Sánchez, vice-
minister for social protection, and his staff, joined initially by government human 
rights specialists. Areas for future work were identified including promoting HIV/
AIDS initiatives and developing tripartite dialogue on setting limits and standards 
on contract and agency labour. Importantly, the vice-minister committed himself to 
prioritise action when unions approached the ministry about union representatives’ 
security.
The most significant outcome of the ICEM programme was improved dialogue 
between Sintracarbón and Carbones del Cerrejón. On 1 December 2004 negotiations 
between Carbones del Cerrejón and Sintracarbón re-opened. The negotiations were 
closely watched by other companies and unions to see what could be achieved at 
a time when the level of violence against, and murder of, unionists was especially 
high. During the negotiation period the union negotiators and their families were 
threatened with extortion and assassination and the entire negotiating team was 
forced into hiding. Sintracarbón contacted the ICEM to inform them of the threats. 
The ICEM immediately contacted Sir Mark Moody-Stuart, and requested that they 
contact Cerrejón management to establish whether the company was in a position 
to minimise the risk. AA management and the union immediately issued a joint 
statement affirming their belief in fundamental labour rights and condemning 
intimidation. The company drew the threats to the attention of the vice president 
of Colombia, asking that the personal security of those involved be ensured. The 
negotiation process was able to continue; and although the threats did not entirely 
stop, they diminished and the negotiators and their families were unharmed 
throughout. Developing an HIV/AIDS pilot in the Cerrejón mine was discussed in 
2006 with senior AA management as the final stage in this relationship. Although 
it is currently unclear whether this will succeed, it is testimony to the strength of 
relationships that such a complex issue could be broached in the context.
These negotiations brought some benefits for workers, and established a 
momentum that built on these. As a result of a subsequent wave of negotiations, an 
improved agreement was signed on 28 January 2007. The agreement brought salary 
increases for all workers including those in ancillary jobs and holding fixed-term 
contracts. The company pension scheme was opened for the first time to workers on 
fixed-term contracts of longer than six months. Also for the first time the company 
agreed to follow Colombian legislation by monitoring contract workers’ conditions, 
and by jointly carrying out health and safety inspections within the mine with 
Sintracarbón representatives. In addition, the agreement covered social issues such 
as education and family benefits. 
Sintracarbón’s achievements provided motivation for other unions to embark 
on renewed collective bargaining. Thus, for example, coordinated bargaining was 
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subsequently secured in the glass sector after many years of stalling by key employer 
Owens Illinois. The results of these negotiations were uneven, but overall workers’ 
conditions were improved in both salary and health and safety terms. In companies 
where senior management had a strong relationship with the ICEM, local bargaining 
was more successful than elsewhere. Ensuring the participation of local management 
in most cases required direct communication between the ICEM Secretariat and 
the multinational’s senior management. In these cases, they received unequivocal 
instruction from international and in some cases regional management to participate 
in good faith. Without this, it is unlikely that local managers would have participated 
as fully as they did. 
The Colombian union movement itself remains both divided and fragile although 
currently the ICEM unions and their national centre, CUT, enjoy the highest level 
of internal cohesion in their history. Alliances between the ICEM unions involved 
have proved to be extremely strong, and they represent the most cohesive bloc within 
CUT. The unions are in regular contact with each other in relation to security for 
union leaders, contacts which were totally absent in the past. The CUT itself has 
improved its standing nationally and internationally and is recognised as a serious 
partner at both levels. All of this has provided a solid base for individual unions and 
raised their confidence in their capacity to deal with multinationals. 
Without the many years of educational programmes, it is unlikely that the 
relationship between the ICEM and its affiliates would have developed sufficiently 
strongly to sustain a difficult, complex and prolonged process of internationally 
mediated negotiations. The ICEM’s direct role in preparing unions and creating 
new spaces for dialogue created the only opportunity the unions had to step outside 
a previously intractable dynamic of threats and local disputes. The Colombian 
experience of social dialogue was consciously adopted and systematically transferred 
by the ICEM to other situations such as Thailand and Peru where dialogue between 
unions and employers had broken down.
We have to record here the torture and murder of Adolfo González Montes, a 
Sintracarbón leader at his home on 22 March 2008. Adolfo’s murder reminds us of 
the continued risks faced by trade unionists in that country. 
Conclusion
The GUF leveraged a ‘partnership’ approach in one part of the company’s operation 
to enable a revival of distributive bargaining in another. The company was prepared 
to offset the clear efficiency advantages which it won from raising workers’ 
participation in HIV/AIDS programmes in Africa against the costs of revived 
distributive bargaining in Latin America.
The Ghana collaboration deepened relations between the international and the 
company. The efficiency of company investments was raised by union involvement 
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under the general education umbrella: awareness raising, peer counselling and 
workplace representative education. The results for workers were also considerable, 
raising participation rates in the company’s HIV/AIDS programmes while minimising 
risks to individuals. In Colombia, serious political factionalism within unions in an 
endemically violent situation was overcome and the GUF rebuilt dialogue with AA 
and other companies. Education was used in different ways in Africa and Latin 
America. In Africa, it was a mix of peer counsellor and workplace representative 
education while in Latin America it took more ‘classical’ forms beginning with 
representative education, and subsequently shifting to discussion of union structures 
and ways of working. In both contexts education was a major factor in building 
relationships, local capacity and creating the possibility of dialogue with AA. The 
case shows the significance of educational work and, in its African dimension, of the 
usefulness of a minilateral approach to it.
The ICEM was a major actor in its own right in the two continents that are central 
to AA’s mining operations, taking initiative and mediating between the company 
and national unions. The formal collective bargaining that resulted in an IFA with 
Anglo Gold played a relatively minor role here. The GUF’s input was important in 
taking the initiative with the AA companies and in negotiating significant safeguards 
for workers, in educating them and their representatives and in generalising and 
publicising the initiative beyond the company. A model was developed that the GUF 
transferred elsewhere in the world. 
The case illustrates the large-scale resources required to form and maintain a 
relationship between a GUF and a multinational, as well as the potential rewards 
for doing so. The resources issue is one factor prompting us to ask how far lessons 
from the case can have wider significance, since GUFs have limited capacities to 
conduct such intensive long-term work. We can only broadly estimate the case’s 
wider significance here and a need exists for more case studies. In this instance, a 
partnership approach was possible because of the HIV/AIDS issue, which generated 
an exceptionally powerful business case for working with the GUF. Nevertheless, 
broadly similar health conditions exist and concern both mining and other companies 
(Gaunt, 2007). Moreover, the multinational was predisposed to regard engagement 
with the GUF positively since it was reconciled to trade unionism, was operating 
profitably, was accustomed to initiating collaboration with unions to reduce costs, 
and senior management shared industrial relations experience with the ICEM 
leadership. These may be unusual features, but they are clearly not unique since the 
company’s federal structure, concern with CSR and raising efficiency through cost 
reduction are shared by many others.
As we remarked above, the study illustrates the scale of the resources required 
to achieve success in constructing relationships of this type, a subject central to the 
next, concluding chapter.
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•  C h a p t e r  t e n  •
The Political Decision  
T h e  internationals currently face a remarkable situation. On the one hand they are politically unified, have high membership, and good levels of engagement with unions. For the first time in history, they can realistically claim to 
approximate to being genuinely global bodies. On the other hand, they are victims of 
their own success in bringing in more affiliates since demands increase as resources 
diminish, and completion of the globalisation process will intensify the problem. 
There are two competing logics at work: those of legitimacy and resources. The 
logic of legitimacy demands that new, unaffiliated unions and groups of currently 
unorganised workers are recruited. The logic of resources is that integrating these 
into the internationals will simply deepen the financial crisis.  
Without functioning internationals, supported intelligently by their affiliates, 
the majority of the world’s trade unions have weak relationships and leverage with 
employers. The extremely high level of international connectedness needed to develop 
this leverage cannot be established through bilateral contacts. Some have been 
tempted opportunistically to adopt the single-track ‘rank and file internationalism is 
what counts’ line to justify the development of bilateral links rather than to sustain 
and develop the internationals. But bilateralism fails to address the underlying 
power dynamics both between unions, and between unions and employers. Bilateral 
contacts are established, managed and funded only by a select group of unions 
in rich, developed countries, and as a result are likely to reinforce existing power 
imbalances. For successful internationalism to be built, these power disparities have 
to be overcome.  
Power disparities are lived out through the issue of resources. There is no 
alternative to increasing the resources flowing from national to international level 
if the internationals are to survive, and more will be required to develop in the 
directions we suggest. If unions do not make the necessary financial commitment, 
the only alternative for the internationals and their affiliates is to become even more 
dependent on a small group of donors for projects that they may well be unable or 
unwilling to fund, or to become more reliant on employers who will exact a toll. 
This dependency on external funds is already, as we showed earlier, at a dangerously 
high level. Yet in a few cases unions have reduced or even ended their international 
subscriptions; many others simply affiliate small numbers of members or delay 
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paying their dues. It is understandable that unions who are hard pressed and having 
difficulties in assisting their members should look to economise by restricting their 
payments to the internationals, but it is also a real issue in the era of globalisation.  
The resources debate is becoming more public and is surfacing in conferences 
rather than behind closed doors. This leaves us with, at best, opportunities to make 
the political argument to union membership and executives to reinforce their 
international commitments. The transfer of resources from relatively prosperous 
nations’ unions to others needs to be argued for at the political level not solely as 
an act of solidarity, nor as a form of protection against ‘social dumping’, but as an 
investment in their futures. A unionism is assumed here that sees all unions as 
interconnected workers’ organisations, the demise of which in any country weakens 
the position of unions everywhere.  
Which area of work should the internationals prioritise? They have three 
overlapping but distinct functions. First, they defend the existing space in which 
unions operate. Second, they work to create further space. Third, they help unions 
build the capacities to exploit that space, by helping unions to carry out core 
and new tasks more effectively. This last function is mainly carried out through 
the internationals’ educational work. We stress that we do not argue here for the 
abandonment of any specific area of activity, all of which are relevant. Rather, a shift 
in the balance between these areas of activity is recommended, with an even greater 
emphasis being placed on education.  
The first function, defending space, would be difficult to abandon or devolve, and 
not simply because of the importance to trade unionists of the duty of solidarity. 
The increasing worldwide tendency for the freedom of association to be attacked is 
a serious issue. The internationals have a unique status as institutions that unions 
can draw on when defending victimised activists at national level, which no national 
union can replicate. For the ITUC, with a formal status within the ILO governing 
body, this is especially relevant and the ITUC should continue to be concerned 
with human rights complaints mechanisms and continue to act as the political 
voice of international labour. Despite small results to date, political lobbying is an 
important area, one in which the ITUC should come into its own. The real prize is 
the creation of a social clause in World Trade Organisation proceedings, by linking 
trade with labour standards (Ewing and Sibley, 2000). As these authors point out, 
there are ‘serious political and practical problems to be overcome’ (ibid.: 39–40), but 
such a clause would open many possibilities for unions at national level, improving 
the possibilities for applying basic trade union rights and core labour standards 
throughout corporate structures and supply chains. The ITUC has the relevant 
expertise, tradition and track record in such lobbying work. The GUFs would 
obviously retain some of their role in complaints by virtue of their role in monitoring 
IFAs and specific rights abuses with employers, but our suggestion is for as much of 
this work as possible to be devolved to the umbrella body.  
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The second function, creating space, mainly but not exclusively through 
negotiating International Framework Agreements, should remain a significant area 
of GUF activity since it clearly provides opportunities for unions at local level. The 
way that these agreements should be conceptualised and presented to companies 
should perhaps be that adopted by the IUF, i.e. as recognition agreements rather than 
the more abstract framework agreements. Furthermore, they require support by 
improved company networking that, as we have argued, requires a more long-term 
educational approach. However, these agreements’ limitations are thrown into sharp 
relief by the externalisation of much multinational employment and the explosion of 
‘informal’ work, realities that appear unlikely to change greatly in the near future.  
This area of work could also to some extent be devolved to different actors. 
Negotiation is not currently a core competence of the internationals, since many 
of their employees have relatively little in-depth experience of it. National unions, 
especially those in Europe, have more expertise, but devolution to them carries a 
significant risk. This has already been underlined, i.e. that some affiliates in the 
developed world may use it as an opportunity to further reinforce their prominent 
position in companies. Companies might try to create more space for themselves 
by exploiting the increased role it gives headquarters unions. This shift, therefore, 
would have to be carefully structured, policed and managed by GUFs. It might 
also be possible in some circumstances to devolve the monitoring of IFAs to a new 
institution that brought together the ILO, consultants and national unions, including 
those outside the OECD countries.  
The third function, helping unions to exploit space, is a major candidate for 
expansion. Education is important to all levels of union activity, from organising 
informal workers to international networking. Moreover, imbalances in democratic 
participation may be addressed by the same means. Both unions and the internationals 
themselves stand to benefit greatly from such an increase in participation in their 
representative structures. As others have suggested (see, for example, Hannigan, 
1998), the trade union movement would find labour educators only too willing to act 
with them to create an effective alliance. 
There is an evident need for unions to rethink and reposition themselves, 
both in relation to their national contexts and employers – that is, to carry out 
transformational change. This has been particularly evident in the case of unions 
from the former Soviet Union and will be similarly significant in the Middle East 
and China. By ‘transformational change’ we mean involving members, aligning 
unions’ structures with their missions and reallocating resources (Behrens et al., 
2004). Education is of major importance in this profound type of change. In this 
context, it has two main aims. The first is to help unions to build their capacities to 
organise and mobilise workers. The second aim is to aid the union’s organisational 
development. Organisational development supports organising in that it encourages 
unions to provide the necessary human resources, information and institutional 
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support to carry it out. Such a perspective is at least a medium-term one and, for 
some unions, it will take a sustained and determined effort to achieve tangible 
results. If experience of organising approaches in the developed world teaches us 
anything, it is that there are no quick fixes.  
Education should clearly be adapted to the needs in particular regions. More 
importantly, it should be linked directly to specific forms of experimentation 
considered particularly relevant by the unions concerned. Thus, it might focus 
on organising approaches, on the recruitment of particular types of worker or on 
mobilising and working with those already recruited. This type of approach is likely 
to appeal to the many unions in the world faced by large numbers of informal workers. 
As argued in Chapter seven from experience of precisely these kinds of programmes, 
efforts should be directed towards local, inter- and intra-regional groups of national 
unions exchanging experience, allowing unions to pool experience about what works 
best and under what circumstances. This would also allow unions to tap into those 
creative possibilities offered by local successes in organising in certain parts of the 
world.  
A precondition for this approach is that unions are selected for their commitment 
and capacity to carry out and sustain a programme of development. These unions 
could then act as national models for others to evaluate. There are two further 
conditions for success: first, that it is carried out by people with the requisite 
expertise in international union development, and second that it is fully integrated 
both into the work of the unions involved and that of the GUF itself.  
A shift of responsibilities within the internationals as outlined above could 
provide resources for the educational bias that is required. This could be further 
assisted both by regions and groupings of countries within them, especially since 
regions play a key role in securing dues payments from affiliates. Although increased 
contributions from national unions are urgently needed, this will require time to 
deliver and, in the interim, it will be necessary to raise funds. Regions should help 
in terms of fundraising from union-sympathetic governments such as those of Brazil 
and South Africa, both of which have extensive funds that unions could bid for. It 
may be that in the future local and regional organisations are more able to access 
funding than their international secretariats. HIV/AIDS funding, for example, 
operates on a completely decentralised basis. Raising the level of active fund raising 
in the regions would help to address the balance of power within the internationals 
by providing the sub-regions and regions with more independent resources (Wedin, 
1991). The democratising effects of education should help to ensure that these funds 
are used in accountable ways.  
In short, we find the emphasis developed by Levinson and adopted by many in 
the international union movement today on collective bargaining as a key task for 
GUFs to be misplaced. Instead, particularly given the profound informalisation of 
work that is taking place, unions need to focus their resources on using education 
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and exchange of experience between trade unionists to maintain their relevance and 
legitimacy as the voice of labour. 
The key remaining question is how to develop structures that take serious account 
of the importance of unions being able to articulate their experience and political 
work to their counterparts in other countries. The ‘problem of large numbers’ (see 
Chapter four) is a significant block to the level of cooperation and solidarity both 
within and between unions. As Olson argued: ‘The larger the group, the less it will 
further its common interest’ (Olson, 1965: 36). 
Small groups operating within a multilateral structure provide the best method 
of articulation between trade union memberships, GUF affiliates and global unions. 
Our proposed way of working stimulates a closeness that the majority of the 
internationals’ passive membership rarely experiences. Working in small groups 
provides a way of making multilateralism function because these groups can build 
on affiliates’ proximity and serve to facilitate exchanges and transfers of capacity 
between them. The shared principles of the multilateral structures provide the 
necessary sense of inclusion and common purpose in a wider enterprise to the 
small groups. Cooperation within and between small groups is also relevant to the 
relationships between the GUFs themselves. It is an approach that the GUFs have 
recently adopted in a piecemeal fashion, but collaboration on issues of strategic 
importance should become a major focus in the future. 
We have tried here to bring the current state of international trade unionism, a 
largely neglected dimension of globalisation, to the attention of a wider audience. The 
internationals’ fragility and dependence on external resources is a problem that can 
only be overcome by a range of measures, including a higher level of commitment by 
unions in the developed world, particularly those from Europe, North America and 
Japan. The challenge to national unions is to contribute more to the internationals in 
order to secure their survival, an issue that has to be addressed with some urgency. 
Simply put, the internationals’ affiliates need to make the difficult but crucial 
political decision to support them with the resources they need. The global unions 
are the only institutions that can develop the collective experience, articulation and 
collaboration between unions in the ways demanded by globalisation.
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annex 1: Bwi Model ifa  
BWI Model International Framework Agreement 
Approved by BWI World Council on 16 November 2007 
Building and Wood Workers’ International
To be signed between (company name) and the Building and Wood Workers’ 
International (BWI) to promote and protect worker’s rights. 
A paragraph(s) should be inserted at the beginning of the agreement giving a 
short description of the company and its operations. (“The company recognises 
that corruption, bribery and unfair anti-competitive actions distort markets and 
hamper economic, social and democratic development.” Should be part of the policy 
statement.)  
The BWI is the Global Union Federation grouping free and democratic unions 
with members in the Building, Building Materials, Wood, Forestry and Allied 
sectors. The BWI groups together around 350 trade unions representing around 12 
million members in 135 countries. The BWI’s mission is to promote the development 
of trade unions in the building and wood industries throughout the world and to 
promote and enforce workers’ rights. 
The agreement is based on the signatories’ joint commitment to respect basic 
human and trade union rights, acknowledging the fundamental principals of human 
rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work as well as relevant ILO Conventions 
and jurisprudence and the OECD guidelines on Multinational Companies. The 
parties also commit themselves to achieving continuous improvements within 
the areas of working conditions, health and safety standards at the workplace and 
positive democratic industrial relations and fair collective bargaining procedures 
with representative trade unions. 
This agreement relates to all (company name) operations. The (company name) 
will secure compliance with the principles set out in this agreement also with 
its subsidiaries, contractors, subcontractors, suppliers and joint ventures. This 
agreement shall not in any way reduce or undermine existing labour relations 
practices or agreements relating to union rights or facilities already established by 
any BWI affiliate or group of affiliates or any other union within (company name). 
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In this spirit the (company name) and the BWI shall work together to verify 
the effective application by all (company name) activities and undertakings of the 
following requirements. 
1. Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining are respected
All workers shall have the right to form and join trade unions of their own 
choice. These unions shall have the right to be recognised for the purpose of 
collective bargaining in conformance with ILO Conventions 87 and 98. Workers’ 
representatives shall not be subjected to any discrimination and shall have access 
to all necessary workplaces in order to carry out their duties as representatives 
(ILO Convention 135 and Recommendation 143). The company shall take a positive 
attitude to trade union activities, including union access to workers in the organising 
process. The company will follow the most efficient process in the event that BWI 
affiliate requests union recognition. 
2. Employment is freely chosen
There shall be no use of forced or compulsory labour, including bonded labour. 
Workers shall not be asked to surrender passports, identity papers or valuables (ILO 
Conventions 29 and 105). 
3. No discrimination in employment
All workers shall have equality of opportunity and treatment regardless of their 
ethnic origin, gender, religion, political opinion, nationality, social origin or other 
distinguishing characteristics. Workers shall receive equal pay for work of equal 
value (ILO Conventions 100 and 111). Migrating and posted employees must enjoy 
at least the same conditions as the national work force. 
4. Child labour is not used
Child labour shall not be used. Only workers above the age of 15 years, or over the 
compulsory school-leaving age if higher, shall be employed (ILO Convention 138). 
Children under the age of 18 shall not perform work which, by its nature or the 
circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals 
of children (ILO Convention 182). 
5. Living wages are paid
Workers shall be paid wages and benefits for a standard working week that will 
enable them and their families to enjoy a reasonable standard of living, and which are 
more favourable than the minimum conditions established by national legislation or 
agreements. All workers must be provided with clear verbal and written information 
about wage conditions, as well as specific information regarding every payment 
period (ILO Conventions 131 Minimum Wage Fixing, 1970, C.95 Protection of 
wages, 1949, C.94 Labour Clauses (Public Contracts), 1949). Deductions shall not be 
made from wages unless otherwise stated in national law or collective agreements. 
Information regarding pay and deductions should be provided to workers each time 
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wages are paid, and these should not be changed other than by written consent of 
the individual worker or by collective agreement. 
6. Hours of work are not excessive
Hours of work shall comply with appropriate national legislation, national agreements 
and industry standards but in no circumstances should be unreasonable. Overtime 
shall not be excessive, shall not be demanded on a regular basis and shall always be 
remunerated at a premium rate. All workers shall be given a minimum of a one day 
weekly rest period. 
7. Health and Safety of Workers
A safe and healthy working environment shall be provided. Best occupational health 
and safety practice to prevent injuries and ill health shall be promoted and shall be in 
compliance with ILO Convention 155 Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 
1981 and ILO Convention 167 on Safety and Health in Construction, 1988 and the 
ILO Guidelines for Occupational Health Management Systems. 
All workers shall also be given Personal Protective Equipment, at no cost to 
themselves, and training on occupational hazards and their prevention. Workplace 
Health and Safety Committees shall be established and workers shall have the right 
to elect Health and Safety Representatives. Trade Unions shall be encouraged to 
appoint and train Health and Safety Representatives. 
Suppliers, contractors and sub-contractors shall be required to provide a site-
specific health and safety plan and to appoint a competent person to manage health 
and safety and to take part in safety meetings. 
8. Welfare of workers
At every work site the company shall provide an adequate supply of wholesome 
drinking water; sanitary and washing facilities; facilities for changing and for storage 
and drying of clothing; accommodation for taking meals and for shelter. 
When workers are offered living accommodation, this shall be planned, built and 
maintained to provide reasonable housing conditions. The company shall provide 
health education and an HIV/AIDS awareness raising and prevention programme in 
accordance with the ILO Code of Practice on HIV/AIDS and the World of Work. 
9. Skills training
All workers shall have the opportunity to participate in education and training 
programmes including training to improve workers skills to use new technology 
and equipment. 
10. The employment relationship is established
The company shall respect obligations to all workers under labour and social security 
laws and regulations arising from the regular employment relationship (Social 
Security Minimum Standards Convention C.102). In locations where conditions 
permit, efforts shall be made to offer fixed employment opportunities. All workers 
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shall receive a written contract of employment. The company and all sub-contractors 
shall, wherever practicable, directly employ all labour, and shall pay social security 
and pension contributions for their workers. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The (company name) will ensure that appropriate translations of the agreement are 
available at all workplaces and should include suppliers and subcontractors. The 
agreement will also be made public on the Company’s website and Intranet. 
a) Both parties recognize that effective local monitoring of this agreement must 
involve the local management, the workers and their representatives, health 
and safety representatives and local trade unions. 
b) To enable local and national union representatives of BWI affiliated unions 
to play a role in the monitoring process, they will be given adequate time for 
training and involvement in the monitoring process. The company will ensure 
that they are provided with information, access to workers, and rights of 
inspection necessary to effectively monitor compliance with this agreement. 
c) A reference group shall be set up, composed of representatives of (Company 
name), and of the concerned BWI affiliated union(s) in the home country of 
the company and a BWI coordinator. It will meet at least once a year, or when 
necessary, to evaluate reports on compliance and to review the implementation 
of the agreement. 
(company name) shall make the necessary resources available for the 
implementation of the agreement. 
Trade union representation should be secured in internal or external monitoring. 
Monitoring or audit reports should be made available to the signing organisations. 
The annual review of the present agreement shall be incorporated into (company 
name) annual reporting with the consent of the signatories. 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
In the event of a complaint or an infraction of the agreement the following procedure 
will normally apply: 
a) Firstly, the complaint should be raised with the local site management. 
b) If the complaint is not resolved with local management, it should be referred 
to the appropriate national union who will raise the issue with the company. 
c) Any infractions which could not be resolved through discussion at the 
workplace or national level will be addressed by the BWI coordinator in close 
cooperation with the BWI affiliates in the home country and will be reported 
to the responsible manager, who will ensure that corrective measures are 
implemented in a timely manner. 
d) If the issue is not resolved, the reference group will deal with the matter and 
propose appropriate action. 
e) If corrective measures are not taken in a way that is satisfactory to the BWI 
affiliate raising the complaint, and the BWI-affiliate and the BWI coordinator 
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participating in the reference group, the dispute shall be resolved through 
binding arbitration. The arbitrator will be jointly selected by all of the members 
of the reference group. All expenses for the arbitration will be the responsibility 
of the Company. 
f) If a dispute is not resolved and breaches continue, withdrawal from the IFA 
should be a final resort. 
Signatories agree that any difference arising from the interpretation or implementation 
of this agreement will be examined jointly, for the purpose of clarification. 
DURATION 
This agreement is effective from today’s date, with a mutual three month notice of 
termination. 
Date and venue  
(Signature Building and Wood Workers’ International, BWI)  
& 
(Signature company name)
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Annex 2: Lafarge IFA
Agreement on corporate social responsibility and international industrial 
relations signed between the Lafarge Group and the International trade union 
federations IFBWW, ICEM and WFBW to promote and protect workers’ rights 
The IFBWW, International Federation of Building and Wood Workers, is a Global 
Union Federation organising more than 10.5 million members in 281 trade unions 
in 125 countries around the world in the building, building materials, wood, forestry 
and allied industries. 
The ICEM, International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General 
Workers’ Unions, is a Global Union Federation organising workers in the Chemical, 
Energy, Mine and related Process Industries including Cement, Glass and Ceramics. 
ICEM unites 425 member trade unions from 121 countries representing in total 
around 20 million workers in these industries. 
The WFBW, World Federation of Building and Woodworkers’ Unions, represents 
1.5 million workers in the building and wood industry and who are organised in 55 
unions in 41 countries all over the world. 
Lafarge is the world leader in building materials, holds top-ranking positions 
in all four of its Divisions: Cement, Aggregates & Concrete, Roofing and Gypsum. 
Lafarge employs 77,000 people in 75 countries.  
PREAMBLE 
Lafarge believes that there’s a link between social and economic progress. The 
interests and success of Lafarge and its employees are interdependent. Lafarge 
commits itself to involve its employees directly in the Group future through an open 
dialog; Lafarge recognizes that employees may choose to be represented by elected 
employees and/or trade union organizations. 
The Lafarge philosophy is to develop and maintain positive relationships with 
its employees in accordance with the ‘Lafarge Principles of Action’: “Lafarge 
responsibility is as much about complying with local and international laws and 
standards as it is about aligning our actions with our values. Respect for the common 
interest, openness and dialog, integrity and commitment are the main ethical 
principles of the Group and of the employees”. 
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Trade unions believe that decent wages and working conditions, a meaningful job 
with prospects, a safe and healthy working environment, the right to join free trade 
unions and the right to collective bargaining are preconditions for good industrial 
relations.  
The signatories consider that this agreement is based on the joint commitment to 
respect human and social rights and to achieve continuous improvement within the 
areas of working conditions, industrial relations, health and safety standards in the 
workplace and environmental performance.  
The signatories recognize that the subsidiarity principle is a key performance 
management process within the Group; therefore the signatories respect the 
principle that industrial relations issues are best resolved as close as possible to the 
workplaces. 
Lafarge considers respect for workers’ rights to be a crucial element in sustainable 
development. Lafarge will seek to use the services of those trading partners, 
subcontractors and suppliers, which recognise and implement the principles listed 
below.  
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES  
Lafarge commits itself to comply with the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 
the United Nations Global Compact and also the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 
No forced labour 
It is prohibited to make direct or indirect use of forced labour, including bonded 
labour and involuntary prison labour (ILO Conventions 29 and 105). 
No discrimination in employment 
All workers, whatever their workplace, shall have equality of opportunity and 
treatment regardless of their ethnic origin, colour, gender, religion, political opinion, 
nationality, social origin or other distinguishing characteristics. Workers shall 
receive equal pay for work of equal value (ILO Conventions 100 and 111). Migrant 
and posted employees must be ensured at least the same rights and conditions as the 
national workforce working in the company.  
No use of child labour 
It is prohibited to use child labour in any form whatsoever: only workers above the 
age of 15 years, or over the compulsory school-leaving age if higher, shall be employed 
(ILO Convention 138). In view of their age, children under the age of 18 shall not 
perform work, which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is 
likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children (ILO Convention 182).  
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Freedom of association and right to collective bargaining 
Lafarge should uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the 
right to collective bargaining (ILO conventions 87 and 98). 
The Lafarge Group guarantees that workers’ representatives shall not be 
discriminated against (ILO Convention 135).  
Living wages 
Workers shall be paid wages and benefits for a standard working week that should be 
at least at the level of current national legislation or collective agreements, as applied 
in the industry/sector concerned. All workers must be provided with clear verbal and 
written information about wage conditions in their native language.  
Deductions from wages, unless permitted under national law, shall not be made 
under any circumstances without the express permission of the worker concerned.  
Working hours 
Working hours shall comply with appropriate national legislation, national agreements 
and industry/sector standards. Overtime shall not be excessive and shall always be 
remunerated at a premium rate. All workers shall be given a minimum of a one day 
weekly rest period.  
Health, safety and working conditions
A safe and healthy working environment shall be provided (ILO Convention 155). 
Best occupational health and safety practices shall be followed and shall be in 
compliance with the ILO Guidelines for Occupational Health Management Systems. 
All workers shall be given training on occupational hazards and shall have the means 
of preventing them.  
The signatories undertake to raise awareness of the HIV/AIDS problem and of the 
prevention programme in compliance with the ILO HIV/AIDS code of practice.  
Skills training 
All workers shall have the opportunity to participate in education and training 
programmes including training to improve workers’ level of skills so that they 
can use new technology and equipment. Whenever possible, the Lafarge Group 
in cooperation with trade unions shall develop workers’ training with a view to 
improving their level of skills and ensuring that they participate in their career 
development and increase their employability.  
IMPLEMENTATION AND FOLLOW UP 
The Lafarge Group will provide information concerning this agreement in written or 
verbal form in all countries where this agreement is applicable. 
All signatories are strongly committed to the most widespread dissemination 
possible of the content of this agreement throughout the Lafarge operations.  
A reference group consisting of representatives of the Lafarge management and 
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the signatory international federations shall meet at least once a year, or whenever 
necessary, to follow up and review the implementation of this agreement.  
The Lafarge Group shall make available to the reference group the resources 
needed for its mission.  
The annual review of the present agreement should be incorporated into the 
Lafarge Group’s reporting with the consent of all signatories.  
All signatories agree that any difference arising from the interpretation or 
implementation of this agreement will be examined jointly, for the purpose of 
making recommendations to the signatories concerned.  
DURATION 
This agreement shall remain in force unless otherwise agreed by any party giving 
three calendar month’s notice, in writing, to the other.  
The present agreement may be revised at the request of one of the signatories no 
later than four years after it has been signed.  
Paris, 12 September 2005 
The Lafarge Group, Christian Herrault 
The IFBWW, Anita Normark
The ICEM, Fred Higgs
The WFBW, Stefaan Vantourenhout
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Abstract 
We apply an international relations framework and the notion of multilateral organizations as 
a means of understanding the nature of trade union internationalism, the conditions under 
which it operates. We argue that international trade unionism involves an imperfect 
multilateralism which requires close working relationships between small groups of unions in 
order to function, that is, a ‘minilateral’ method of working. By using this framework we 
attempt to highlight the intrinsic durability and adaptability of the Global Unions and also 
identify areas of activity that serve to strengthen them as organisations, primarily by building 
affiliates’ engagement and investment in them. 
 
 
Keywords: Global Unions, multilateralism, minilateralism, international organisation, 
international trade union movement 
 
 
Introduction 
Much of the literature on the international trade union movement is under-theorized. 
International trade union organizations comprise numerous affiliates with marked 
differences in membership strength and material resources, and conflicting 
ideologies and identities. How in practice are policies shaped and decisions taken? 
Formal constitutional provisions tell us little. As an approach to an answer, we apply 
an international relations framework, and in particular the notion of multilateral 
organizations, as a means of understanding the nature of trade union 
internationalism, the conditions under which it operates and the problems which it 
currently faces..  
 The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) is an international 
organization of national trade union confederations. It has 305 affiliated member 
organizations from 151 countries and territories, with a total membership of 176 
million workers. It is closely linked to the international organizations of occupational 
or industrial trade unions, the ten Global Union Federations (GUFs) (previously 
known as International Trade Secretariats), which date back in some cases to the 
late nineteenth century. Together the ITUC and GUFs have adopted the collective 
label ‘Global Unions’. The relative lack of attention among academics and the 
general public to international trade unionism is curious when one bears in mind that 
they are, along with faith groups, the world’s largest membership organizations. They 
have great though often hidden influence on other international bodies, national 
governments, trade union movements and civil society. Yet their very size is 
indicative of the problem we address here: the difficulty for very large democratic 
organizations to operate effectively.  
 Archer (2001: 33) defines international organizations as ‘formal, continuous 
structure[s] established by agreement between members... with the aim of pursuing 
 2 
 
the common interest of the membership’ and with core functions which include norm 
and rule setting and providing information, socialization and articulation between 
members. This definition clearly applies to the Global Unions, which even more than 
most other international organizations are founded on the principle of internal 
democracy (Webb and Webb 1920). In order to operate successfully, they must not 
only act efficiently on behalf of their membership but be able to engage their 
membership in order to achieve their objectives. (Offe and Wiesenthal 1985). We 
argue that the existence of multilateral structures is necessary for genuinely global 
trade union activity to take place, but that what exists is an imperfect multilateralism 
which requires close working relationships between small groups of unions in order 
to function effectively. We further argue that union capacity to carry out international 
solidarity action requires a robust relationship between members which can only be 
developed by working in a ‘minilateral’ way with small groups of affiliates.  
 For most of its history, international trade unionism has been beset by 
ideological, regional and organizational cleavages. Most of the literature has focused 
on ideological cleavages, with the primary dividing lines being between social-
democratic, christian and communist organizations (Carew 1987, MacShane 1992). 
At its creation in 2006, the ITUC united for the first time affiliates of the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the inheritor of the social-democratic 
tradition, and most of the affiliates of the much smaller World Confederation of 
Labour (WCL), derived from the christian tradition, along with a number of important 
ex-communist unions (previously affiliated to the World Federation of Trade Unions, 
WFTU) and other independent unions. What were once inter-organizational 
ideological divisions now had to be managed within the new unified organization. The 
second major basis for division, geographical differences, is more significant today 
than ever. There have long been significant differences between the ideas, practices 
and priorities of the unions of the industrialised countries and those of the 
industrialising countries. All the Global Unions have their headquarters in Europe, 
mainly in Brussels and Geneva, where the weight of membership and financial 
resources has always been concentrated, although most of them also possess 
regional structures including committees, offices and staff. The regional structures do 
not necessarily resolve the differences of interests, resources and perspective 
between these two groups. A third basis for division is the more practical one 
between organisations like the ITUC and its predecessors (ICFTU etc.), which are 
based on national centres, and the GUFs, based on industrial unions. While the 
GUFs retain a formal autonomy in the new structures, they are now more closely 
linked to the new global body, the ITUC, but it remains to be seen how effectively this 
closer link will operate in practice. 
 
What do Global Unions do, and why do they do it 
 
Scholars and practitioners of international trade unionism give different answers to 
the questions of why unions act internationally, and what they do. Many view trade 
union internationalism as a response to the internationalization of both product and 
labour markets, which entails that wages and working conditions can no longer be 
defended by action purely at the national level. This was the position of Charles 
Levinson, general secretary of the International Chemical and Energy Workers’ 
Federation, who led the drive for World Company Councils in the 1960s-70s 
(Levinson 1972). In recent years this challenge has been conceptualized in terms of 
globalization, with the growing power of multinational companies (MNCs), the 
unequal relationship between rich and poor nations and the threat of a ‘race to the 
bottom’ in terms of labour costs and employer practices (Logue 1980, Ramsay 1997, 
1999). Similar arguments, however, were made by early advocates of international 
trade union organization, such as Edo Fimmen, general secretary of the International 
Transportworkers Federation (1924). Other authors present the case for a 
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transnational trade union response in terms of solidarity, a concept which refers both 
to the principle of common action with others and to the identification of one’s own 
interests with theirs (Hyman 1999, Lorwin 1953, Zoll 1996). For members of the 
Global Unions, this involves the commitment to support other members in response 
to conflicts with employers, both locally and internationally, in order to protect 
standards for working people everywhere. Solidarity can however be conceived in 
two contrasting senses: first, as a normative or moral principle which creates an 
obligation to support other workers and their unions in case of need; second, as a 
form of ‘enlightened self-interest’ (Collier, 2008: 247, Logue 1980, Ramsay 1997) 
with only weakly ethical underpinning, motivated by the belief that an injury to one is 
(sooner or later) an injury to all. The tension between these two conceptions of 
solidarity has generated dilemmas for international trade union organization, in part 
because the practical benefits of solidarity actions are often difficult to identify and 
take many years to bear fruit. 
 A second dilemma concerns the orientation of action. This may be internal, 
focused around the sector or industry the organisation represents, particularly in the 
case of the GUFs and their predecessors: Global Unions seek to align the policies 
and activities of affiliates in order to pool resources and prevent damaging 
downwards pressure on standards. The rationale is that effective collective action will 
enable unions through their own efforts to counteract the challenges of globalization. 
 The other orientation is external, focused on action at a more general and 
political level. The ITUC in particular has conceived much of its role in terms of 
engaging with other actors at international level, especially the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and other UN institutions. The International Federation of Trade 
Unions (IFTU), a predecessor of today’s ITUC, was deeply involved in the creation of 
the ILO in 1919 (Van Goethem 2000: 80-2) and was a ready-made interlocutor for 
the new organization. Within the ILO’s tripartite structure – its Governing Body draws 
half its members from national governments and a quarter each from workers’ and 
employers’ organizations – the ITUC and its predecessors the ICFTU and IFTU have 
always effectively controlled the workers’ side. To an important extent, the ITUC (like 
its forerunners) and the ILO confer legitimacy and recognition on each other. This 
relationship has become increasingly important in recent years, as globalisation has 
brought international labour relations affairs into greater prominence, and as a result 
of institutional change within the UN system, in particular within the ILO (Fröhlich 
2007). These changes were stimulated by a number of international developments 
(Haworth and Hughes 2003) including the end of the Cold War, increased concern 
about social protection and the linking of world trade and labour standards. The ITUC 
has strongly supported the ‘decent work’ agenda launched in 1999 by the newly 
appointed ILO director-general, Juan Samovía. Closely linked to this agenda was the 
priority given – from among the multiplicity of ILO conventions – to a set of core 
labour standards relating to freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
prevention of forced labour, elimination of the worst forms of child labour and 
prevention of discrimination in employment. 
 Similarly, while the GUFs have long focused on MNCs, work on this issue has 
become even more important following the recent process of company mergers and 
acquisitions (Schmidt, 2002). This process has stimulated a new area of work for the 
GUFs in their efforts to resist the competitive downwards pressure by MNCs on 
national standards. National unions lack the capacity to influence corporate policy 
without concerted international cooperation, and the response has therefore been the 
attempt to negotiate transnational agreements, usually in the form of International 
Framework Agreements (IFAs).  
 These global developments have increased the incentives for national unions 
to cooperate globally, providing both concrete benefits but also broader advantages, 
such as providing thinking, coordination and opportunities for joint action. But Global 
Unions are faced with an internal conflict between two competing realities of supply 
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and demand. The first reality stems from their success in affiliating trade unions from 
outside the OECD countries which provided their traditional core, and the fact that 
their legitimacy demands that this process of recruitment continue, perhaps even to 
include China. Yet in most non-OECD countries, unions have few fee-paying 
members (even though they may attract wide-scale support), whereas membership 
numbers (and hence financial resources) have been declining throughout the 
traditional industrialized world. The second is that, as indicated above, the need for 
effective international trade unionism becomes ever greater with the acceleration of 
economic internationalization, itself driven by the priorities of the international 
financial institutions (IFIs) and key national governments (notably the USA), which 
the Global Unions strive to little effect to counteract. 
 There are enormous cultural, organizational and political differences between 
unions that make cooperation particularly difficult at the international level. It is hard 
for new and even sometimes established member unions fully to understand the 
position of other members or to appreciate how to navigate an international setting, 
even with today’s greater possibilities for transport and communication. The 
language barrier remains significant at the world level, especially for less educated 
trade unionists, and it remains one of the key capacities of the Global Unions to 
integrate information and experience from a diverse membership and use it not only 
to facilitate communication between them but also to forge common values and 
priorities for action. This is essential for all international organisations: As Kratochwil 
argues (1993: 448), a central function of international organizations ‘is the 
interpretation of the “facts” and inferences about motivations’, and Windmuller (1967, 
1987 ) and others agree that this is equally true of the day-to-day work of the Global 
Unions. 
 
Global Unions: The regional dimension and the issue of resources 
The work of the global unions can be divided into three main areas (Croucher and 
Cotton, 2009). The first is the defence of affiliated unions, usually through direct 
solidarity action in support of a particular dispute or problem. The second is to further 
the interests of trade unions within international and inter-governmental 
organisations, in recent years mainly through pursuing international negotiations with 
employers, using company networks and International Framework Agreements 
(IFAs). The third is capacity-building for unions in less developed parts of the world, 
carried out primarily through long-term development work, in particular education 
programmes.  
 The ICFTU was the first peak-level international trade union organisation to 
establish regional organizations for the Americas (including both North and South 
America), Asia and Africa shortly after its foundation in 1949; its rivals the largely 
communist WFTU and the christian CISC, predecessor of the WCL, soon followed 
suit. In the new climate of the cold war trade union organization was seen as an 
essential part of a greater ideological battle. De-colonisation offered many 
opportunities for trade union growth in newly independent states, where trade unions 
had often played a key role in the independence struggle. All three internationals 
found themselves competing for affiliates, a competition that created opportunities for 
corruption and opportunism on all sides. Many of the organizational problems evident 
today originated in the 1960s, particularly the struggle of the regional structures to 
achieve a sustainable basis of paying affiliates and to reduce the reliance on 
externally funded projects. By the early 1990s the GUFs were establishing regional 
structures and offices, directing the bulk of their dues income towards building a 
genuinely global membership. This included integrating unions from the former 
Soviet Union and attempting to incorporate unions from the Middle East. .At the 
European level, the ICFTU also set up a European regional organization, which 
became moribund and then gave way in 1973 to the independent European Trade 
Union Confederation (ETUC), which soon admitted affiliates of the WCL and former 
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affiliates of WFTU. The rise of an autonomous European regional body thus paved 
the way for the foundation of the ITUC, but also encouraged a greater focus on 
European affairs among European trade unions, sometimes to the detriment of 
international trade union solidarity (Windmuller 1976, Gumbrell-McCormick 2000). As 
Traub-Merz and Eckl have noted (2007: 4), ‘organisational autonomy necessitated a 
division of labour which repeatedly called for difficult compromises – especially on 
issues affecting European foreign-trade interests – between an ETUC with a more 
protectionist profile and an ICFTU bound to solidarity with trade unions from 
developing countries.’ 
 There have been marked variations both within and between the regions in 
terms of economic and social development, levels of trade union membership and 
financial and organizational resources. At the beginning of the 1970s, union 
organization was relatively strong in Asia, while in Africa it was clearly weakest, 
meaning that effective regional organization was possible only with substantial 
external support (Croucher and Cotton 2009). The majority of the Global Unions 
brought together two completely distinct regions, North and South America, with the 
USA and Canada largely subsidising this work. In the case of the ICFTU, the regional 
body ORIT (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores) was widely 
criticised as a channel for US foreign policy, supporting corrupt and unrepresentative 
but anti-communist Latin American unions in the 1960s and 70s, before a ‘clean up’ 
in the 1980s (Gumbrell-McCormick 2000). In contrast, the WCL had a separate 
regional organization for South America, CLASC (later renamed CLAT) (Central 
Latinoamericana de Trabajadores) that prided itself on its autonomy from North 
America and gained considerable influence among all those opposed to the US 
domination of ORIT. How to deal with the Americas was to be one of the most 
contentious issues in the creation of the ITUC and has been resolved only by the 
creation of regional sub-structures which allow North and South America to operate 
largely independently. A different issue arose in the case of Europe, where – as 
noted above – the ETUC was autonomous from the Global Unions. The solution was 
to create a Pan-European Regional Council (PERC) within the ITUC; the ETUC 
general secretary holds the same office within PERC. In practice, the latter focuses 
on trade union issues in Eastern Europe, beyond the boundaries of the European 
Union (EU). 
 The ETUC and ITUC share a headquarters building, the International Trade 
Union House in Brussels. But the European organization is significantly better 
resourced. Though the ITUC charges its wealthiest affiliates higher affiliation fees 
than the ETUC – in 2010, €197 per thousand members as against €161 – the 
majority of ETUC membership belongs to the higher-fee affiliates, whereas the 
opposite is the case with the ITUC. In addition, the ETUC benefits from substantial 
resources from the EU, in particular for its research, education and health and safety 
agency, the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI). The differences are reflected in 
staffing. The ITUC, with its global remit, lists 74 headquarters staff in 2011. The 
ETUC lists 52, with an additional 64 in the ETUI. The latter has 20 research staff with 
a direct input into the ETUC policy process; the three ITUC policy departments 
(Human and Trade Union Rights, Economic and Social Policy and Equality) together 
have 17. 
 For many unions in developing and transition countries, contact with a Global 
Union was their first possibility to establish relationships with trade unions outside 
their own country, and sometimes inside, on a basis of relative equality. In most parts 
of the world, in particular in countries under military dictatorships and in the former 
Communist bloc, trade unions, and in particular any international contacts, were 
heavily controlled by governments. Subsequently, democratization often went hand 
in hand with economic liberalism, and unions faced dramatic changes in the structure 
of their industries and the employment relationship, and often faced foreign 
employers for the first time. Affiliation to a Global Union was thus a highly attractive 
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option and provided both contact with the outside world and internal prestige as well 
as educational and financial resources for union work. This was particularly 
pronounced in the case of the former Soviet Union. Unions in these countries 
typically cost more for the Global Unions in development aid than they bring in  
affiliation fees. 
 As noted above, unions in most developed countries have experienced a 
steady decline in the number of workers paying subscriptions (Visser 2011). This is 
in part due to increased unemployment but also the shift from manufacturing to 
private services, and more recently the squeeze on public sector employment, which 
almost universally is a trade union stronghold. Also of great importance is the growth 
of insecure working arrangements such as short term contracts, temporary agency 
work, homeworking, subcontracting and ‘dependent self-employment’. While the 
extent of the ‘informal economy’ has long presented a serious obstacle to 
unionization in developing countries, the growth of precarious work forms in OECD 
countries has similar effects (Heery and Salmon 2000; Gumbrell-McCormick 2011; 
Standing, 2011).  
 These developments are to an important extent associated with the rise of 
neoliberalism, which has driven the promotion of employment flexibility and 
encouraged deregulation of markets more generally, and has greatly empowered the 
global corporations (Crouch 2011). The latter have put pressure on traditionally well 
organized industrial sectors (Hayter, 2009; Holdcroft, 2009) and regions through the 
exploitation of global production chains. Such trends have been a major focus of 
analysis and pressure by the Global Unions, though with limited success in stemming 
the neoliberal tide. 
 Precarious workers are difficult to organise for a broad range of reasons. 
Precarious work is dominated by women and ethnic minorities who have traditionally 
been weakly organized by unions in most parts of the world outside Scandinavia 
(Wrench and Virdee, 1996; Young, 2009). Perceived vulnerability to job loss and 
victimization also make unionization difficult. In some countries, moreover, there are 
specific legal constraints on the right of workers on ‘atypical’ contracts to organize 
and to bargain collectively (ILO 2009). 
 These changes in the employment relationship have provoked a profound 
questioning and repositioning of trade union activity and structures, not least in how 
unions organise (Frege and Kelly 2004; Phelan 2007; Webster et al. 2008). Unions 
have in most parts of the world attempted to find new organising techniques to reach 
new industries and work arrangements, such as the use of online campaigning and 
recruiting (Lee, 1996; Hayter, 2009). However there is little evidence that a ‘new’ 
organizing model has enabled unions to replace previously permanent memberships 
with precarious ones.  
 Membership decline has been reflected in a reduction of payments to the 
Global Unions, and often an increased incidence of late payment of affiliation fees, a 
significant problem for the international organizations which possess few if any 
financial reserves. Financial information is not readily available for all the Global 
Unions, but reports from the ICFTU and ITUC give a broad indication of trends. 
According to the ICFTU Millennium Review in 2000-01, total income was US$60 
million per year from membership dues, additional donations and development 
cooperation funds raised externally. Between 1999 and 2003, an additional US$70 
million of donations and project funds was channelled through its regional structures. 
During the period 1994-2001 real value fee receipts per member dropped by 22 
percent. Despite an increase in declared membership of 28 million during 1999-2003, 
there was a drop of 12.4 percent in paying membership. The ITUC reported a rise in 
declared membership of more than 10 million between 2007 and 2009, but paying 
membership barely increased. Table 1 presents fees received by region for the 
ICFTU in 1998 and 2003, and for the ITUC in 2009. It is important to note that 
affiliation fees are weighted by the level of national income in each country; in 2009 
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the fee was €191.45 per thousand members for unions from the richest countries, 
only €3.1 for those from the poorest; the GUFs have similar arrangements, as has 
the ETUC. This weighting means that any fall in paying membership in the wealthiest 
countries has a disproportionate impact on the resources of the Global Unions. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
In addition to financial resources, intangible resources such as technical expertise 
and political influence are also unevenly distributed across the Global Unions. 
Historically, the staff of Global Unions have tended to come from the most developed 
countries, in particular from the Low Countries, the Nordic countries, and more 
recently the English-speaking countries. The leading role of certain nationalities is 
even apparent at the regional level: English speakers from the Indian sub-continent 
long dominated Asian regional affairs, although their place has now largely been 
taken by the Japanese. The higher level of education and greater language 
knowledge of citizens of these countries is the probably the main reason for this 
phenomenon, but these are also the richest and most influential affiliates, and their 
over-representation within the staff only adds to the imbalance within the global trade 
union structures. 
 As a result of the imbalance of funds and concentration of expertise among 
staff at the secretariat level, regional organizations have tended to act as recipients 
of policies or resources, rather than initiators. Although the Global Unions vary 
constitutionally in the status and structure of regions, all are to some degree 
centralized decision-making bodies. Their formal decision-making structures have 
evolved over time to reflect their changing membership composition, and in particular 
to improve the representation of women and of affiliates from the developing and 
transition countries. Most base formal voting power on the number of dues-paying 
members, and suspend the voting rights of affiliates who fail to pay their fees. 
However, formal voting generally occurs only at the end of the decision-making 
process, leaving the core policy and strategy decisions to regional and international 
committee meetings and informal negotiations between the leaders of key affiliates 
who play a leading role on these committees and contribute the bulk of resources 
(usually the Germans, Nordics, North Americans and Japanese).  
 This is not to say that a union’s international influence depends only on 
membership numbers and financial contributions. Authority, understood as the ability 
to act upon others or upon organizational structures, also derives from internal 
qualities (knowledge, experience, strength of personality or resilience). There are a 
number of different types of authority held by unions beyond contribution authority, 
based on political and moral weight (Croucher and Cotton, 2009). Political authority 
changes over time, with the South African unions having come to represent one of 
the most admired political movements. Moral authority comes through a union’s 
ability to withstand extreme pressure: currently unions from Colombia and Iraq are 
seen as having an exceptional position in international activities because of the 
climate in which they operate. Over the history of the international trade union 
movement, there have been a number of influential leaders from the developing 
countries, but this does not change the general imbalance of resources and 
influence. 
 In addition to affiliation fees, the ITUC receives roughly €1 million a year in 
voluntary contributions to its Solidarity Fund, just over half coming from its German 
and Japanese affiliates. Far more substantial – about €7 million a year – are the 
project-oriented Development Aid Funds. Almost half this funding is provided by the 
Dutch government and trade unions, with other substantial contributions from the 
Swedish unions and the ILO. These are advanced and well organized funding 
sources but largely depend on the political support of national governments. Given 
the political shifts in Western Europe, the funds are increasingly dependent on the 
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ability to show concrete outputs and benefits for the donor countries. In many cases, 
these funds are earmarked for specific projects, often entailing a bilateral relationship 
between donor and recipient countries and unions.This bilateralism can be seen as 
subversive of the broader collective solidarity which the Global Unions aim to 
represent (Gumbrell-McCormick 2000b, 2001). 
 Another observable trend has been for unions to turn their focus inward 
toward their own regions. This is especially true in Europe, where unions have 
increasingly focused on intra-regional relationships and on the EU structures at the 
expense of wider international work (Gumbrell-McCormick 2000a, 2002). On some 
analyses, the unions of Western Europe – the Global Unions’ main paymasters – 
have come to regard European economic integration as a more immediate concern 
than globalization, privileging their relationship with the ETUC. The latter, in its most 
recent Activity Report (ETUC 2011), a hundred-page document, devoted just three 
pages to global issues. This can be understood as another threat to the Global 
Unions, which require the substantial contributions of their wealthier affiliates to 
achieve collective goals. A similar phenomenon has arisen in the Asian-Pacific 
region, where the numerical and financial weight of the Japanese confederation 
RENGO allows it to dominate trade union developments in Asia (as the unions of the 
Indian sub-continent did before it). 
 Politically, both the imbalance of power and resources between regions and 
the increasing internal focus within regions are problematic for the Global Unions. 
Bilateral and regional organization leaves the power dynamics between trade unions 
from the global North and South intact, subordinating international priorities to the 
interests of the key players. When their interests change, the arrangement itself may 
prove precarious. A key advantage of multilateralism is that it is an attempt to govern 
globally, and as a result the participation of all affiliates is sought, which in turn 
implies a high degree of democratization affecting levels of communication between 
the governed and the governing¸ rules and accountability of global union officials.  
 Despite the generally accepted need for trade unions to have international 
multilateral structures, the affiliates of the Global Unions have proved remarkably 
reluctant to address an evident resource crisis. Unions facing declining membership 
at home naturally find it difficult to commit to paying higher amounts to their 
international organizations. Yet what is striking is the lack of argument and energy 
devoted to the problem by national affiliates within their own structures and decision-
making bodies, perhaps reflecting an ambivalence towards membership of the 
Global Unions. There is, we argue, a tension between the broad principles of 
multilateralism and the specific and complex actions required to carry them out. This 
is clear in the case of solidarity: the policy itself is virtually unchallengeable among 
trade unions, but there is far less consensus on the specific and demanding actions 
needed in order for these principles to be pursued at global level. 
 We attempt below to use international relations theories to understand this 
tension. After introducing the concepts of multilateralism and multi-level governance, 
we discuss Olson’s ‘problem of large numbers’, which suggests that organizations 
with large membership will always struggle to develop the motivation to participate 
actively in multilateral structures, threatening their organizational coherence. We 
refer briefly to the literature on institutional entrepreneurs, advocacy coalitions and 
policy communities, then turn to Kahler’s notion of ‘minilateralism’ – the practice of 
working in smaller groups with a resulting higher degree of consensus, clarity and 
closeness – in order to conceptualize the development of more robust international 
relationships between unions. This entails a ‘disguised’ multilateralism where 
minilateral relations are framed within a multilateral structure. Using the idea 
developed by Ruggie of the ‘elasticity’ of multilateral structures, we conclude that 
multilateralism as a concept has ‘heuristic fruitfulness’ (Kratochwil, 1993: 443) in 
relation to the durability of the global unions. 
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Placing Global Unions within an international relations theoretical frame 
Multilateralism and multi-level governance 
Though multilateralism is a dominant characteristic of international institutions, it is 
still a relatively weakly defined concept. A definition widely used in international 
relations literature is by Ruggie: 
 
“an institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more states on 
the basis of generalized principles of conduct; that is, principles which specify 
appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularist 
interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any 
specific occurrence.” (Ruggie, 1993:77)  
 
Caporaso (1993: 54) adds that multilateralism is also a ‘conception of how the world 
might be organized’. Multilateralism can apply broadly to international regimes, rules 
and decision-making procedures, such as the international labour standards regime 
(Haworth and Hughes, 2003) and more formalized organizations such as the ILO. 
Multilateral regimes, in essence, involve working relationships between states on the 
basis of agreed rules and principles, and offer a structure where states can 
potentially develop an agenda for global governance.  
 Two important characteristics of multilateralism that Ruggie emphasises are 
that it is both durable and adaptive. These characteristics are in part a consequence 
of the kinds of principles on which multilateral organizations are based: they apply to 
all members and across all particular moments in time or interests. This gives 
multilateral arrangements their adaptive and ‘reproductive’ capacity. In addition, most 
multilateral regimes or organizations rely on the intense cooperation and investment 
of sub-sets of members, who are willing to sustain organization despite the higher 
costs they incur, as we discuss below through the concept of ‘k-groups’.  
 The principles and activities of a multilateral form need to resonate with 
domestic environments, or to reflect the values and cultures of key members. Ruggie 
(1993:10) points to the cohesive effect of collective defence against an external 
force: multilateral organization constitutes a ‘collective-security system’. Elsewhere 
(Ruggie1982), in his discussion of ‘embedded liberalism’, he notes that the post-1945 
global governance regime was shaped by US dominance and development of free 
trade agenda. It can be argued that the supposed benefits of entering into a system 
of embedded liberalism have never been realised in developing countries (Bull and 
McNeill, 2007), because it has not provided sufficient benefits to compensate for the 
negative effects of involvement in international markets and free trade regimes.  
 The interaction between actors at national and supranational levels is a key 
theme of the literature on multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks 2003). This 
concept, developed primarily in analysis of the EU, points to the process of 
negotiation and accommodation between national and supranational (and sometimes 
also sub-national) actors as an essential ingredient in successful policy formation. 
The multi-level character of multilaterism and supranationalism is an essential insight 
for the study of trade union internationalism. 
 
Generalized principles 
As suggested earlier, the key ‘generalized principle’ underlying trade union 
multilateralism is the idea of solidarity. In abstract terms this has resonance with 
trade union members, but educational and campaigning activities by national unions 
are often necessary to reinforce and make real this sense of solidarity among the 
membership, particularly younger members who do not automatically identify with 
solidarity as an ideologically based ideal. However, within trade union membership 
there is often a deep understanding of the importance of collectivism, a key motivator 
for joining a union and a real and evident benefit to members. Such understanding 
profoundly shifts the perception of the importance of alliances with workers in other 
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locations, including other countries (Zoll 1996). 
 This idea of solidarity as ‘enlightened self-interest’ (Logue 1980) is a long way 
from the internationalism which underlies early international socialist trade unionism, 
although Fimmen (1924) managed to combine the two approaches. Early Christian 
trade unionism was also based on solidarity, although it was closer to the christian 
conception of charity. The contemporary concept of solidarity is not explicitly anti-
capitalist and steers away from political ideology, particularly since the integration of 
the socialist and christian traditions. Rather it focuses on a more pragmatic 
conception, that there are common interests among workers internationally, however 
weakly defined. It does, however, link to the objectives of the ‘post-cold war 
internationalists’ (Goldmann 1994: 2-3) who have driven the development of global 
economic and political institutions in order to promote a world ‘order’ and find 
common ground or ‘co-existence’.  
 Another key organizational principle of the Global Unions is subsidiarity, 
where the main power resides in local or regional structures with the central body 
carrying a framework-setting, coordinating and monitoring function. Marleau (2006) 
describes subsidiarity as also providing an ‘articulating device’, a way for different 
levels from local to central to find a way of linking within one structure. In the case of 
trade unions we can see that this idea of subsidiarity matches closely the doctrine of 
solidarism, a principle of social organization where individual and collective interests 
are interdependent and form a dialectical relationship. Marleau argues that this 
principle forms the basis for EU regulation and the ILO’s international standards, and 
the same is clearly true of the Global Unions, although they tend to place more 
emphasis on the coordinating function of the top level. 
 This generalized nature of the principles and the obligation between members 
helps explain the adaptability and subsequent durability of multilateral organizations. 
The principles are ‘principles of indivisibility’, that is they are not based on any 
particular set of interests and therefore exist and survive beyond particular 
circumstances.  
 
Self-Interest, diffuse reciprocity and the problem of large numbers 
The concept of collective or public goods is undeveloped in international relations, 
but has received growing attention since the 1990s, with the discussion of global 
public goods (Stiglitz 1999), revived interest in social justice (Long and Woolley 
2009) and failure of the WTO Doha round negotiations (Gallagher and Stoler 2009). 
Organizations generally provide collective goods which benefit both members and 
non-members (Olson 1965: 15), although most will also provide selective or private 
goods as an incentive to membership. One of the collective benefits of affiliation to a 
Global Union is increased power in relation to employers; a private good could be, for 
example, the increased leverage with employers of those unions participating in the 
negotiation of an IFA. 
 The net benefit of any collective good, as understood in traditional 
international relations theory, declines as total membership increases: a larger group 
is less efficient in providing a large amount of a collective good because of the 
reduction in identification between members, increased costs of organizing diverse 
memberships and reduced incentive for individual members to contribute. Large 
groups may lack the level of connection between members to generate sufficient 
levels of solidarity or persuasion for each member to believe that the benefits of 
cooperation justify the costs (Hardin 1982).  
 We would argue, however, that the size of membership for trade unions is a 
benefit in and of itself and as a result the collective good increases significantly with 
increased membership. Being a member of what are perhaps the largest 
membership organizations in the world is itself a collective good, and is perceived as 
such by trade unionists. This perception in turn defines the interests of members and 
therefore what self-interest comes to mean. For example, the function of interlocution 
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with international organizations, where the size of membership necessarily increases 
legitimacy and power, is something which national trade unions would be unable to 
replicate through a ‘myopic’ pursuit of self-interest (Oye 1986: 229-31). 
 Self-interest is also significant here, for example economic self-interest as a 
motivation for international organization by industrial sector or occupation. The 
classic explanation for international solidarity action relates to the elimination of 
competition over labour costs within a given company or industry. It closely fits the 
reasons behind the ITF’s successful international campaign to organise sea-farers, 
which remains the most successful of all Global Union actions to this day (Northrup 
and Rowan 1979), as well as the international coordination and action by trade union 
leaders in the engineering, chemical and food production industries from the 1950s 
to the 1980s (Bendiner 1987)., A closely related explanation is the presence of 
MNCs in such sectors, and the need for workers to organize a counter-power 
(Levinson 1972). This type of self interest can be said to apply most directly to 
industries that are well organised and in the exposed sector of national economies, 
that is, those most open to foreign competition (Crouch 1993). For many other 
industries, however, such as textiles or agriculture, either the absence of MNCs or 
the lack of union influence in the producing countries makes this form of international 
solidarity action too difficult and moves international solidarity actions closer to the 
‘charity’ concept of solidarity. 
 There are of course other forms of self-interest, most notably political self-
interest, which was a significant motivation for international trade union affiliation 
during the cold war (Carew 2000), when many national unions sought to further the 
foreign policy objectives of their own governments.  A related form of self-interest 
could be described as the self-interest of organisations in their own self-preservation, 
for example through the prestige and the resources made available to trade unions 
through international affiliation (Gumbrell-McCormick 2000). 
 The benefits of affiliation are often not the same for all members, for example 
IFAs offer different advantages for unions ranging from expanded influence of 
headquarter unions and basic organizing rights for unions operating in highly 
restrictive environments (ITUC, 2010). In many cases, particularly in relation to 
specific campaigns and solidarity action that support one or more national affiliates, 
the benefits and costs are diverse. This raises an important question about how self-
interest and advantage are conceptualized and measured by affiliates. Keohane’s 
idea (1986) of ‘diffuse reciprocity’ is extremely helpful for explaining how these 
complex calculations are made by affiliates of the global unions. Diffuse reciprocity 
exists when membership of a multilateral organization is expected to yield a rough 
equivalence of benefits between members in the aggregate and over the long term, 
rather than short-term pay-offs. This diffuse reciprocity is essential to the principle of 
solidarity and the daily work of the global unions.  
 The Global Unions provide a unique arena ‘where actions take place’ (Archer 
2001: 73) through articulating and aggregating interests. This arena provides an 
opportunity for socialization, particularly important for developing country unions 
which are often isolated and lack experience of operating at international and often 
diplomatic levels. Their motivation to join a Global Union is, in part, a ‘social-
communicative approach’ (Caporaso 1993: 66): affiliation provides an important 
sense of group identity and an opportunity for dialogue. 
 However, the size of the Global Unions and the resultant distance from 
individual members has been an important issue for internal debate. The sectoral 
GUFs might be considered closer to the base than the confederal ITUC, because the 
connection from the leadership to the individual member goes through fewer levels. 
Instead of dealing with national centres which must form common policies out of the 
disparate elements of their own affiliates, the GUFs only have to deal with individual 
unions with less diversity of interests. But this advantage may disappear entirely in 
the case of large multi-sectoral unions, increasingly common with the process of 
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union mergers at national level, and in the recent mergers among the GUFs (for 
example, the 2000 merger of FIET, PTTI, IGF and MEI to form UNI). In practice, 
therefore, for the GUFs as for the ITUC, the distance from the international to the 
individual worker is very great indeed. 
 This distance may have an important impact on perceived authority and 
legitimacy of the Global Unions. Authority and legitimacy are the foundation of trade 
union power: only if the members are convinced that the union is acting on their 
behalf, and are willing to apply collective pressure to support its goals can these be 
achieved. Effective trade unionism requires not just a ‘willingness to pay’ but also a 
‘willingness to act’ (Offe and Wiesenthal 1985). At national level, the authority of 
trade unions depends on their democratic accountability to their members. Martin 
(1989) has referred to this as internal authority, and Schmitter and Streeck (1999) as 
the logic of membership. At the same time, to be effective unions must be regarded 
as representative by outside bodies, such as employers, parties and governments – 
the logic of influence. External authority can be closely linked to internal authority – if 
members support the union, employers and governments will also take the union 
seriously – but their can also be tensions between the two logics, and this is reflected 
within the Global Unions in conflicts between the priorities of ‘agitation’ and 
‘diplomacy’ (Hyman 2005). 
 At international level the relationship between authority and legitimacy and 
the willingness of membership to act is complex and, at times, counterintuitive. There 
is, at times, an evident tension between the broad principles of the international trade 
union movement and the specific and complex actions required to carry them out. 
This is clear in the case of solidarity, where the policy itself is embraced but not the 
specific and demanding actions that need to take place in order for these principles 
to be upheld. This tension can be understood as an instance of Olson’s problem of 
large numbers: ‘the larger the group, the farther it will fall short of providing an 
optimal amount of a collective good’ (1965: 35). Whatever the limitations of Olson’s 
analysis, it correctly identifies the problem that group identity is not sufficient for the 
majority of Global Union members to carry out the level of solidarity action that is 
necessary.  
 This is in part a reflection of what Kahler (1992) calls the problem of latency: 
members tend to become passive in large diverse groups, particularly within weak 
federal structures. Latency occurs when an individual member not contributing to the 
collective good does not significantly affect any other member, and does not 
therefore provoke a response or action. Latency can be anticipated within Global 
Unions, given their complex and often opaque methods of operation and the inability 
of all but the largest affiliates to exert significant weight: most members may be 
inclined to withdraw and become passive. This is observable at international 
meetings, where discussion falls mainly into a diplomatic mode, rarely addressing 
difficult issues and respecting the relative weight of speakers. The verbatim 
proceedings of ICFTU congresses indicate that speakers from the largest, most 
influential western unions tend to speak more, and to speak on more general issues, 
while those from the developing countries speak mainly on matters directly affecting 
their country or region (Gumbrell-McCormick 2004). 
 
Institutional entrepreneurs, advocacy coalitions and policy communities 
Given the obstacles which typically confront collective action, policy initiatives require 
effective forms of pressure if they are to succeed. Here, the literature on institutional 
evolution and change (Thelen 2004) is of obvious relevance. As a number of writers 
have argued, new policies and organizational structures – even when necessitated 
by changed objective circumstances – are typically driven by ‘institutional 
entrepreneurs’ (Crouch 2005) or ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Mintrom and Norman 2009; 
Moravcsik 1999). In some readings – particularly influenced by analyses of the 
formal capacity of the European Commission to initiate new regulatory practices – 
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the key entrepreneur is the supranational executive apparatus; and clearly the 
elected leaderships of the Global Unions are crucial actors in stimulating (or at times 
obstructing) radical change. But within any international organization, specific 
affiliates or members may act in combination as drivers of change, and indeed any 
effective central leadership needs to build alliances between key members and 
construct bridges between their priorities and its own. In other words, multilateralism 
is often centrally constructed. 
 Initiating radical policy change typically requires a mobilizing discourse which 
identifies a fundamental challenge and persuasively depicts a solution (Schmidt 
2002). This in turn normally depends on the existence of a ‘policy community’ 
(Falkner 1998; Wright 1988) and the creation of an ‘advocacy coalition’ (Sabatier 
1988) which can press for the required policy shift. Such communities and coalitions 
may vary in composition according to the policy domain involved. Again, these 
analytical themes have obvious relevance for our understanding of how policies are 
created and recreated within Global Unions. We develop these perspectives below 
with our discussion of minilateralism and k-groups. 
 
Regionalism, minilateralism and k-groups  
Within large membership organizations there is an evident problem of cooperation 
across diverse interests and cultures. The smaller the group, the more likely it is that 
members will reach agreement and be able to coordinate action. In reality, most 
multilateral organizations are established and governed by a smaller subset of 
countries, and a common way to do this is through establishing regional cooperation 
(Oye 1986: 21).  
 Regions are not clearly defined or delineated by international organizations 
and may not share any linguistic or cultural commonalities. As we saw previously, 
there are differences in the degree of formal autonomy of trade union regional 
structures, particularly in Europe, but they all essentially follow the principle of 
subsidiarity. The developing regions are limited in their capacity for independent 
action because of their financial reliance on wealthier, mainly European and North 
American, affiliates. The relationship between regions and the global trade union 
bodies can be understood in terms of federalism, which may assume either strong or 
weak forms. Federalism (Fleiner et al. 2002) is understood here as a limitation on 
governmental power, dividing it both horizontally but also vertically between, in this 
case, regional structures with a clear functional division between national or regional 
levels and ‘supranational’ ones (Gumbrell-McCormick 2008: 326). In the main the 
affiliates of the Global Unions do not tend to confer more than an absolute minimum 
of power to the centre, preferring – like most states affiliated to multilateral structures 
– to maintain a ’weak confederalism’ (Stein 2008) in which core aspects of national 
sovereignty remain intact. Certainly they agree to pay dues to the international and 
accept the collective choice of leadership, although not always with good grace. But 
in practice they have rarely if ever agreed to delegate any substantial national 
powers of policy-making or negotiation to their global bodies. 
 It is important to note that the power structures of the Global Unions are far 
from unipolar (Jervis 2009): the US unions, with their low membership density, do not 
hold a disproportionate share of the ‘politically relevant resources of the system’ 
(Walt 2009: 91), while the European unions do not form a cohesive bloc. Authority, if 
measured through financial contributions, is widely dispersed across Europe and 
North America, with important contributions also from Japan and Australia.  
 If the Western European affiliates that established the Global Unions remain 
particularly influential, this is not simply a question of economic resources but also of 
political culture, and the socialist and democratic norms that European trade unions 
have often embraced. The multilateralism of the Global Unions can be seen as linked 
to the embeddedness of a unificatory and rule-based approach of Western European 
nations (Saxer 2009).  
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 These constellations of influence within the Global Unions are complex and 
typically involve smaller groupings than the regional, and tend to divide into two main 
types. The first we can describe as minilateral and the second we describe as k-
group cooperation. Multilateral organizations in international relations are ‘typically 
supported by a minilateral cooperation amongst the Atlantic powers’ (Kahler 1993: 
300); such small-group collaboration increases the effectiveness and intensity of 
common action within larger membership groups. K-groups (Snidal 1985) are 
subgroups which are small enough for the benefits of cooperation among their 
members to outweigh the costs, and whose collective action enables agreement on 
policy and practice.  
 
 
It is worth noting here that all too easily, this can involve an ‘in-group’ from unions 
with more resources, more developed transnational networks and typically English 
language skills exercising hegemony over affiliates lacking these advantages. Even 
though the objectives of such groups may be benevolent, it is at best a paternalistic 
form of solidarity. Wagner (2005:93) has noted a similar tendency within the ETUC: 
from the perspective of those outside the informal leadership ‘currently solidarities 
are more like alliances of interest between the rich countries’. Within the ITUC, there 
are indications that many unions from poorer countries feel similarly excluded from 
effective policy-making. This evidently corrodes the basis for solidaristic action: 
hence a major challenge is to develop a democratic, negotiated basis for 
minilateralism. 
 
The workings of multilateral organizations tend to reflect the politics and political 
cultures of such groups, as can be observed in many multilateral organizations which 
rely on working groups, committees and sometimes less formal groups of decision 
makers (Olson 1971). Kahler (1993: 300) calls this ‘disguised multilateralism’, and 
identifies two additional and non-hierarchical forms of minilateralism, the ‘broker’ and 
the ‘progressive club’. Both offer insights into minilateral cooperation within the 
Global Unions. In the former, a small group creates a focal point for carrying out 
activity. Often this role will be taken up by a union that, although not in the k-group, 
has significant political or moral authority. Such a ‘broker’ may be a ’missionary’ 
(Croucher and Cotton 2009: 55) or a ‘policy entrepreneur’, promoting particular 
issues and actions within the multilateral structure and vying for support.  
 A progressive club is a group of members with an agenda transcending the 
lowest common denominator. It could be understood using Olmsted’s sociological 
concept (1959) of a primary group: members have close personal ties and associate 
face-to-face. Their relationship is based on a profound sense of solidarity, which is 
both political and emotional. Their shared perception of reality is reinforced through 
continuous contact and joint creation of norms, roles and cultures. This is captured 
by Bales (1950: 79-80): ‘the heart of solidarity in the institutionalized sense is the 
stabilized mutual responsibility of each toward the other... as the sharer of a common 
fate, and as a person who is under obligation to cooperate with the other in the 
satisfaction of the other’s individual needs as if they were one’s own’.  
 Significant small groups within the Global Unions are those unions active in 
education work, both those that fund and support educational projects (particularly 
from the Netherlands and the Nordic countries), and those in the developing world 
that work in partnership with them. This is a distinct and important group within the 
Global Unions, not just because of their intense and involved work together but also 
because of the political impact of carrying out workers’ education and the 
relationships it engenders. We would argue that the level of small group cooperation 
based on progressive and politically important educational principles is a major 
progressive force within the global unions. Educational settings provide strong social 
incentives and crucial socialization between unions, often from different regions, 
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sufficient to shift the perception of self-interest and increase willingness to contribute 
to the collective good. An example of a ‘missionary’ group would be the individuals 
and unions that pushed the Global Unions and their affiliates to become more active 
around the issue of gender equality from the 1970s onwards. Again, the Nordic 
unions as well as the TUC and the German DGB played a leading role, as did 
particular individuals within the ICFTU secretariat. The development of international 
trade union action around the MNCs followed a similar process, mainly on the basis 
of the joint ICFTU-ITS Working Party on Multinational Enterprises with membership 
largely drawn from the same countries plus the United States and Canada 
(Gumbrell-McCormick 2000).  
 Most unions in developing regions are isolated from their counterparts 
elsewhere. It is an important benefit to join a Global Union, because of the exposure 
it brings to trade unionism more broadly and the pool of collective experience on 
which it is possible to draw. One of the key functions of the Global Unions, 
particularly in trade union education settings, is to gather and distribute experiences 
both of failure and, less often, success – providing crucial strategic and technical 
knowledge that can be used internationally.  
 
Conclusion 
 We have attempted to deepen understanding of the international trade union 
movement by applying an international relations framework, using the concepts of 
multilateralism and minilateralism. This helps us understand not only the difficulties 
that Global Unions face in engaging with and mobilizing their large memberships, but 
also the relative durability of these structures in the face of declining financial 
resources. We have used the multilateralism concept to explain their adaptability, 
deepened it by introducing the concept of minilateralism to characterize the small-
group cooperation that they exhibit. It is through such minilateral cooperation that 
sufficiently robust and involved relationships are formed to carry out demanding 
international work.  
  
 The perspective we have proposed should be at the heart of any diagnosis of 
the profound organizational problems that the Global Unions now face. By such 
understanding we hope to stimulate additional impetus for affiliates to make the 
ultimately political decision to strengthen and democratize their international 
structures. 
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Table 1: Declared and paying membership and fees received per region, ICFTU 1998 and 2003, ITUC 2009 
 
Region Declared membership (000) Paying membership (000) Fees (€ 000) 
 1998 2003 2009 1998 2003 2009 1998 2003 2009 
Central/East Europe 8,235 37,296 47,956 8,048 11,3016 25,761 116 195 282 
West Indies 420 383 220 424 387 182 3 4 5 
Western Europe 43,214 43,638 46,204 37,595 36,234 36,127 5,403 5,863 6,671 
North America 14,612 12,362 10,389 14,612 12,362 10,354 2,216 1,647 1,982 
Africa 8,942 10,591 13,880 8,454 10,254 12,171 132 68 97 
Asia and Pacific 27,907 27,283 32,248 18,112 14,708 18,082 1,468 1,490 1,652 
Latin America 19,362 16,468 24,510 19,254 7,439 16,001 30 4 103 
Middle East 748 1,274 1,282 745 1,271 1,284 38 5 57 
Total 123,441 149,294 176,689 107,244 93,957 119,963 9,406 9,277 10,848 
 
Source: ICFTU Financial Reports 2004, ITUC Financial Report 2010 
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Abstract
This article critically assesses the potential for the international regulation of temporary agency 
work (TAW) through building partnership between the Global Union Federations (GUFs) and 
major Private Employment Agencies (PrEAs). Given the limits of existing national and international 
regulation of TAW, particularly in developing countries, and the current deadlock in dialogue 
through the International Labour Organization, the argument of this article is that Transnational 
Private Labour Regulation (TPLR) offers a unique opportunity to establish a basis for minimum 
standards for temporary agency workers. This article goes on to propose three potential 
TPLR frameworks that, although compromised, are transparent, fair and sufficiently elastic to 
accommodate the distributive and political risks associated with partnership. They also offer 
important gains, namely increasing the competitive advantage of the PrEAs involved, minimum 
standards for agency workers and ‘field enlarging’ strategies for the GUFs and their affiliates.
Keywords
Global Union Federations, private employment agencies, temporary agency work, transnational 
regulation
Introduction
Temporary agency work (TAW) is a large and relatively distinct category of externalized 
labour (Theron, 2005) signifying a triangulation of the employment relationship with the 
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introduction of a third party (ILO, 2009b). There are an estimated 46 million temporary 
agency workers working for over 176,000 Private Employment Agencies (PrEAs), with 
30 per cent of the €259 billion global annual sales revenue concentrated in 10 multina-
tional companies (MNCs) (CIETT, 2013).
A central strategic objective of PrEAs is to build TAW as a sector, and secure competi-
tive advantage with user enterprises, predominantly MNCs (Mitlacher and Burgess, 
2007), and in new markets in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America, by estab-
lishing a minimum set of industry standards. PrEAs are therefore highly active, princi-
pally through their professional associations – the International Confederation of Private 
Employment Agencies (CIETT) and EuroCIETT – in attempting to establish minimum 
industry standards for TAW.
In the main, trade unions regard the growth of externalized labour as directly respon-
sible for the erosion of permanent jobs and decent work (Fashoyin, 2010; Forde and 
Slater, 2005; ILO, 2009a). However, the use of contract and agency labour is widespread 
across sectors and many unions prioritize organizing temporary agency workers as a 
matter of organizational survival (Cotton, 2013; ICEM, 2004). Trade unions, principally 
through the coordination of their international bodies, the Global Union Federations 
(GUFs), have since the late 1990s been active on the issue of ‘precarious work’ which is 
considered an important ‘field-enlarging’ strategy (Wever, 1998: 392) for building and 
reviving trade union organization. The work of the GUFs utilizes a broad range of strate-
gies, including the use of Transnational Private Labour Regulation (TPLR) mechanisms 
to secure international agreement with MNCs including International Framework 
Agreements (IFAs) and industry standards (Croucher and Cotton, 2008; Müller and Rüb, 
2005). TPLR takes advantage of the GUFs’ ‘institutional foundation’ (Anner et al., 2006) 
located within their powerful affiliates from Western Europe with leverage with key 
MNCs (Cotton and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2012).
Despite mutual interest in building international partnerships, dialogue between the 
major PrEAs and the GUFs has resulted in a regulatory deadlock arising from their fail-
ure to manage the inevitable political and distributive risks involved (ACTRAV, 2011) 
and subsequent failure to establish a model of partnership that provides sufficient elastic-
ity to tolerate their diverse attitudes towards TAW.
One of the key obstacles to partnership relates to the mutuality of business interests 
where trade unions often have a clear preference for permanent and direct employment 
and do not support the growth of PrEAs. Given this fundamental difference of position, 
this article argues that only limited partnership between the PrEAs and GUFs can realis-
tically be established. This article proposes two potential models for limited partnership 
between the GUFs and PrEAs using Martinez Lucio and Stuart’s (2005) ‘transitional’ 
and ‘coerced’ models of partnership which focus on specific risks and challenges rather 
than the broader management or employment relations systems in place. In the case of 
coerced partnership, collaboration comes about at a critical point when a strategic alli-
ance is required by both parties. Both models, although compromised, offer a highly 
elastic model of partnership that does not require any substantial political agreement.
Further, this article argues that existing TPLR mechanisms provide an efficient basis 
for partnership because they are established, transparent and regarded as credible (Cooke, 
1990). The article proposes three potential frameworks for partnership: International 
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Framework Agreements (IFAs); an ‘industry’ standard; and international dialogue 
through the Council of Global Unions. These three approaches are not mutually exclu-
sive or alternatives to stronger labour protections (Trubek and Trubek, 2007). Rather, 
they offer viable entry points for building partnership between key international employ-
ers and trade unions and unique opportunities to break the current regulatory deadlock.
The next section introduces the debates and literature relating to the regulation of 
TAW. The following section briefly describes the research methods and is followed by a 
case study about trade union responses to TAW. The article concludes with a discussion 
about the potential for building partnership between PrEAs and the GUFs using TPLR 
frameworks.
International regulation of temporary agency work (TAW)
Externalization (Theron, 2005) is the trend of obtaining labour from outside of a corpora-
tion’s boundaries, linked to the strategies of outsourcing and contracting out, signalling 
a change in the employment relationship with the introduction of a third party (ILO, 
2009b). Although data continue to be imprecise about the scale and nature of changes in 
the employment relationship (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions (Eurofound), 2008), over the last 30 years externalized labour has 
expanded dramatically in regions such as Asia, Latin America and Central Europe 
(ICEM, 2004; IMF, 2007; Woolfson, 2007). This development is, in part, driven by the 
demand for flexible labour (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013) and the ‘stagger-
ingly uniform’ (Rubiano, 2013) ways in which MNCs have organized international busi-
ness operations leading to indirect and precarious employment relations systems (De 
Vos, 2009; Evans and Gibb, 2009; ILO, 2009a, 2009b).
The growth of externalized labour is associated with a ‘decoupling’ (Hayter and 
Ebisui, 2013) of work from employment, leading to an absence of labour protections 
(Aviles, 2009; Bentein and Guerrero, 2008; Bercusson and Estlund, 2008; Bronstein, 
2009; Gallagher and Sverke, 2005) such as unfair dismissal, Freedom of Association and 
the right to bargain collectively (ILO, 2009a; Rubiano, 2013) and by precarity and inse-
curity (Doogan, 2009).
Transnational Private Labour Regulation (TPLR) has grown in response to three regu-
latory deficits that underpin externalized employment in developing countries. First, 
there is a lack of enforced employment legislation in these countries (Kolben, 2011; 
Trubek and Trubek, 2007); second, MNCs have found it difficult to manage their global 
supply chains in developing and transition economies (Fichter and Sydow, 2002); third, 
multilateral organizations such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) do not 
have the capacity to implement and monitor international standards in developing and 
transition economies (Blanpain and Colucci, 2004). These deficits have triggered a 
growth of global governance mechanisms and regulatory initiatives from international 
non-state and private sectors (Bercusson and Estlund, 2008; Ruggie, 2008) including 
trade unions and their international organizations, the GUFs.
TPLR is regulation that is supplementary to existing national legislation (Lobel, 2004; 
Trubek et al., 2000), ‘governance without government’ (Stoker, 1998: 19) involving pri-
vate companies, employers associations, unions and non-governmental organizations 
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(NGOs). Its growth has closely tracked the increase in the global activities of MNCs and 
the broad failure of domestic labour legislation, particularly in developing countries, in 
adapting to them (Kolben, 2011).
A regulatory approach to externalized labour has inherent weaknesses (Aviles, 2009; 
Gallagher and Sverke, 2005) because much existing national labour legislation is ‘left 
without an object’ (Tsogas, 2009: 87). In many national contexts, externalized labour is 
set up precisely to avoid labour protections (McCann, 2008) by placing the employment 
relationship outside the scope of existing labour law, leaving temporary agency workers 
vulnerable to exploitation (ILO, 2009a). Regulations affecting TAW can be usefully 
divided into three main groups (Demaret, 2013): restriction of short-term contracts; 
restriction of the reasons for employing people on temporary contracts; and minimizing 
the economic savings for employers. This third category includes legislation that pro-
motes equal pay for temporary workers as well as increasing the operational costs for 
PrEAs (Keune, 2013).
There exists an understandable preference among trade unions for national legislative 
responses to TAW. However, the weakness of national institutions, particularly in devel-
oping countries, has led to an emphasis on international regulation at the level of the 
European Union (EU) and the ILO. This preoccupation with precarious work is reflected 
in the United Nation’s recent prioritization of enforcing the Ruggie Principles (Ruggie, 
2008) and ‘due diligence’ in global supply chains. One of the most important regulations 
to date is the European Temporary and Agency Workers Directive (2008), which broadly 
introduces the principle of equal treatment for temporary agency workers into European 
and national legislation (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013; Mitlacher and 
Burgess, 2007). Different institutional contexts have led to diverse impact, with the key 
criticism of the Directive concerning the exploitation of permitted derogations from the 
principle of equality of treatment (Keune, 2013) leading to a rapid increase in new unions 
and collective agreements and large-scale negotiations of permanent contracts for tem-
porary workers on lower rates of pay in companies such as Tesco, DHL, Carlsberg and 
Morrisons (Rossman, 2013).
There are a number of international recommendations and conventions established 
through the ILO that have been used to support labour rights of temporary agency work-
ers. These include the ILO’s Recommendation 198 on the employment relationship, an 
important articulation of the changes taking place in employment relations and the duties 
of states to establish the legal responsibilities of employers. The ILO’s Private 
Employment Agencies Convention 181 and Recommendation 188 require governments 
to create legal and other protections for agency workers, establish mechanisms for agen-
cies to be officially registered and protect freedom of association and collective bargain-
ing. Additionally the GUFs have made use of the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of 
Association to secure rulings on behalf of contract and agency workers, most recently in 
Colombia and South Korea (Cotton and Royle, 2014; Holdcroft, 2013).
In addition to international regulation through intergovernmental organizations, 
TPLR mechanisms are increasingly used by the social partners, stimulated by the increase 
in the global activities of MNCs and the broad failure of domestic labour legislation in 
adapting to them (Kolben, 2011). TPLR operates through MNCs and other transnational 
non-state actors, including the GUFs, using their different motivations (Hassel, 2008). 
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The ‘institutional foundation’ (Anner et al., 2006) of these agreements, and much of the 
GUFs’ work, is located within their powerful affiliates from Western Europe. It is on the 
basis of this institutional framing that leverage with MNCs exists and it is how interna-
tional agreements can be negotiated and secured (Cotton and Gumbrell-McCormick, 
2012). International partnership through the GUFs offers the potential for establishing 
stable dialogue with employers on both fundamental principles, namely the ILO’s Core 
Labour Conventions, and more substantive issues (Hammer, 2005) such as the treatment 
of contract and agency staff.
TPLR mechanisms include International Framework Agreements (IFAs); signed 
agreements between GUFs and multinational employers that have been adopted as a 
major part of the industrial GUFs’ strategies (Croucher and Cotton, 2008; Müller and 
Rüb, 2005). Importantly for TAW, contained within some IFAs there is express agree-
ment that the use of permanent direct employment is preferred, including Norske Skog, 
Aker, Vallourec, GDF Suez and GEA AG. For some of the GUFs, principally Industriall, 
there is a strategic intention to strengthen this language for suppliers and subcontractors 
within the IFAs.
A new TPLR agreement is the Temporary Work Charter signed between the Volkswagen 
Group and Industriall in December 2012, which establishes principles for the use of tem-
porary work. The agreement commits Volkswagen to limit the use of temporary work to a 
maximum of 5 per cent of the workforce, along with the principle of equal pay and access 
to training, representing a significant development for trade unions and their capacity to 
act on the issue of TAW. It remains to be seen if the Charter can be negotiated with other 
MNCs, particularly those headquartered outside of Germany, but because of the impor-
tance of contract and agency labour to the GUFs’ key affiliates these kinds of initiatives 
are likely to be a priority for the foreseeable future (Hayter and Ebisui, 2013).
TPLR has well-understood limitations both in terms of legitimacy and enforcement 
(Braithwaite, 2006; Stoker, 1998), particularly where local trade unions lack sufficient lev-
erage with employers to influence their implementation (Hale, 2008). The implementation 
of these agreements varies greatly and the evidence in developing countries is not strong 
(Thorpe and Mather, 2005). However, where the GUFs invest in solidarity and education 
activities to build the capacity of affiliates in developing countries we see higher levels of 
implementation (Croucher and Cotton, 2008). For example, some IFAs involve systems 
of joint monitoring such as the IKEA agreement signed with the International Federation 
of Building and Wood Workers (IFBWW) that has led to a notably high level of corrective 
actions in developing countries (Eurofound, 2008; IFBWW, 2004). A further generic criti-
cism of TPLR mechanisms is that they are inherently weak in terms of content, establishing 
only minimum standards and excluding probably the most important protections needed by 
temporary agency workers such as protection from unfair dismissal. Although these criti-
cisms are valid, the argument of this article is that TPLR, when used by unions that are 
involved in capacity building activities, offers a unique opportunity to establish a basis for 
dialogue between trade unions and major PrEAs.
Despite the interests of both GUFs and PrEAs to secure minimum standards, the prob-
lem remains for the PrEAs of how to secure dialogue with the GUFs in such as way as to 
‘eventually reform relations into a more open system of negotiations’ (Martinez Lucio 
and Stuart, 2005: 809). One of the key obstacles to partnership relates to the mutuality of 
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business interests where trade unions often have a clear preference for permanent and 
direct employment and do not support the growth of PrEAs. Given this fundamental dif-
ference of position, the argument of this article is that only limited partnership between 
the PrEAs and GUFs can realistically be established. Two models for limited partnership 
are Martinez Lucio and Stuart’s (2005) ‘transitional’ and ‘coerced’ partnerships, what 
they call ‘marriages of convenience’ and ‘shotgun weddings’. Transitional partnerships 
focus on specific risks and challenges, are reciprocal but temporary, and do not attempt 
to change the management or employment relations systems in place. Coerced partner-
ships are collaborations that happen at a critical point when a strategic alliance is required 
by both parties. These partnerships are characterized as being leadership driven and 
‘elite-based’ and clearly compromised, but are partnerships that can be adopted where 
there are no alternative ways of establishing specific outcomes.
TPLR offers a similarly limited ‘dialogic’ framework (Braithwaite, 2006), allowing 
MNCs to engage with trade unions on the basis of a shared acceptance of minimum 
standards. This makes TPLR frameworks both limited in depth but also highly elastic in 
relation to the different attitudes and motivations of potential ‘accountability actors’ 
(Lansbury, 2009). It means that TPLR frameworks have therefore potential for both tran-
sitional and coerced partnerships between PrEAs and GUFs. Additionally TPLR 
addresses the ‘temporal asymmetry’ (Benner et al., 2004) that exists between the rate of 
growth of TAW and the length of time needed to secure new international regulation and 
an ‘opportunity to overcome regulatory deadlocks’ (Hassel, 2008: 232).
The mutual interest of PrEAs and GUFs to establish minimum standards for TAW 
represents a critical point such that TPLR frameworks offer ways to establish partner-
ships on a transitional and coercive basis. Based on the experience of the GUFs, TPLR 
offers a way of opening up negotiations with employers, both user enterprises and PrEAs, 
in countries and workplaces where local trade union capacity and leverage is weak. 
Furthermore these TPLR mechanisms provide a realistic basis for partnership because 
they offer gains for both sides and processes that are regarded as fair and efficient (Cooke, 
1990). TPLR is however a ‘compromised outcome’ (Bartley, 2007: 297) for trade unions 
because it does not address the basis of the employment relationship directly and there-
fore leaves the political disagreements about TAW between trade unions and PrEAs 
unresolved.
Research methods
The prevailing data collection technique used in this article is participant observation by 
the author (Myers, 1999). This provides an insider’s viewpoint of the work of the GUFs 
as well as an insight into contemporary events and the attitudes of the actors and organi-
zations involved (Iacono et al., 2009).
The research is based on the author’s experience as Head of Education for the 
International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions 
(ICEM) during the period 1999–2007. The author was directly responsible for develop-
ing and commissioning the first global union project on contract and agency labour in 
2003, funded by the Swedish LO TCO and Dutch FNV Mondiaal, which continues to the 
present involving unions in Africa, Latin America, Western Europe, North America, 
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Eastern and Central Europe, Transcaucasia and Central Asia and Asia. Part of this project 
was to set up the first database of union responses to contract and agency labour and the 
commissioning of the first GUF research on the situation of contract and agency workers 
in the energy, chemical and extractive industries (ICEM, 2004). Additionally the author 
was responsible for creating the first multi-GUF coordinating group on the issue of pre-
carious work in 2005 and commissioning research to assess the potential for developing 
a multi-GUF platform for action and negotiations with key multinational companies, 
both user enterprises and PrEAs (Martin, 2006).
The participant observations (Darke et al., 1998) are supplemented by public and 
official documents and archival records, GUF project and activity reports, online publi-
cations, presentations at seminars and conferences and ILO conference reports. Particular 
use has been made of the Bureau for Workers’ Activities (ACTRAV) reports and their 
analysis of the regulatory deadlock.
The ideas contained in this article have their genesis in an iterative process with prac-
titioners at two seminars that were held at Middlesex University in January 2010 and 
September 2012 that focused on precarious work and regulation. Representatives from 
the International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and 
Allied Workers’ Associations (IUF), ICEM and the International Metal Workers’ 
Federation (IMF) (now Industriall), Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) to the 
OECD and CIETT actively participated in these seminars. The author was also invited to 
present the emerging ideas contained in this article to Randstad’s Public Relations board, 
Euro-CIETT and CIETT leadership in Nice in July 2011. Each of these three events were 
followed up with e-mail correspondence and telephone conversations with CIETT’s gen-
eral secretary, representatives of the IUF, ICEM and IMF and trade unions in South 
Korea, Thailand and Colombia.
This position of ‘industry practitioner’ (Iacono et al., 2009) provides unique access to 
data and insight into the current regulatory deadlock that is not currently available 
through academic research, and therefore offers a small contribution for both practition-
ers and academics involved in this important area of work.
Temporary agency work (TAW) case study
Trade unions do not regard the growth of TAW as a positive development. Rather, they 
see it as increasing the trend towards the ‘Hindustanization’ of employment relations 
(Greenfield, 2009) and directly responsible for the erosion of permanent jobs and decent 
work (Fashoyin, 2010; Forde and Slater, 2005; ILO, 2009a). Trade unions, therefore, 
face a dilemma about whether to focus strategies on protecting agency workers and pre-
carious workers more broadly, or to adopt strategies that protect workers from precarious 
work forms (Demaret, 2013). This dilemma is felt acutely by unions attempting to organ-
ize young workers, migrant workers and women, who represent the majority of those 
working in precarious conditions (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013).
Trade unions face difficult choices about how to respond to the increase in TAW 
between protecting temporary agency workers or protecting workers from precarious 
work forms (Demaret, 2013). Across different institutional contexts there has been a 
growing acceptance that unions have to adapt to changes in the employment relationship 
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in order to sustain memberships and structures, often involving shifts in union constitu-
tions and ideologies. As a result protective strategies towards traditional union member-
ship as historically seen in the industrial unions of Continental Europe and the public 
sectors are often combined with unions protecting temporary agency workers through 
inclusion in collective bargaining and creating separate union structures (Heery, 2004). 
Union adaptation to the reality of TAW has involved major campaigns and educational 
activities to encourage traditional memberships to support these changes, often appeal-
ing to principles of solidarity and protection of vulnerable workers (Cotton and Royle, 
2014; Hayter and Ebisui, 2013; ICEM, 2004; IMF, 2007).
Due to the importance of multinational companies in driving the growth of TAW and 
the relative lack of union capacity to address it, much of the work of trade unions, par-
ticularly those in developing and transition economies, has been driven by their interna-
tional organizations, the GUFs. The political orientations of the GUFs towards MNCs 
vary, from ‘cooperative engagement’ exhibited by UNI, to ‘militant opposition’ (Bacon 
and Blyton, 2004) often exhibited by the IUF. There continues to be clear political and 
organizational differences between GUF affiliates about how to position themselves in 
relation to TAW such that there is no unified international trade union strategy on TAW. 
However, although their attitudes towards PrEAs vary, their commitment to securing 
minimum standards for workers does not and all of the GUFs pursue engagement with 
MNCs in order to fulfil their basic functions.
For example, good use of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) guidelines has been made in the case of contract and agency work-
ers by the IUF, with the GUF representing workers in the food, agriculture and tourism 
sectors. In 2009, the IUF made a complaint against Unilever to the OECD UK National 
Contact Point on behalf of contract and agency workers in two Pakistani plants: Khanewal 
and RakhimYar Khan. The IUF, since 2008, had run an international ‘Casual Tea’ cam-
paign and coordinated solidarity action with affiliates in Pakistan, Australia, Russia, the 
Netherlands, Hungary, the Philippines, Australia, Uruguay, South Africa and the 
Dominican Republic (Rossman, 2013). The OECD set up negotiations between the IUF 
and Unilever over claims that they had breached worker rights on pay and freedom of 
association, settling the disputes by creating over 200 permanent positions for the contract 
and agency workers and establishing for the first time international dialogue between 
Unilever and trade unions. The IUF had carried out many years of capacity building pro-
jects for affiliates in Pakistan, which allowed for a close working relationship between 
them as well as a capacity for dialogue with Unilever management. This case also high-
lights the important role of the solidaristic and educational work of the GUFs in building 
union capacity in developing countries to make use of international regulation.
As well as the GUFs’ TPLR activities, an important part of their TAW work involves 
research, campaigning and educational projects aimed at exchanging experience between 
unions often funded by Dutch, Nordic and German trade unions (Croucher and Cotton, 
2008). Examples include Industriall’s Stop Precarious Work Now campaign and the 
research work of UNI’s TAW Unit. Most of the GUFs coordinate large-scale capacity 
building programmes focused on transferring knowledge and experience between unions 
about how to respond to TAW as well as international solidarity action including long-
term campaigns in Thailand and South Korea (Holdcroft, 2013).
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The importance of the GUFs’ capacity building activities for implementing interna-
tional regulation is worth exploring here. One example is the work of Industriall (for-
merly the ICEM, IMF and the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers’ 
Federation (ITGLWF)), the GUF representing workers in the mining, energy, metals and 
chemicals sectors. The initial aim of Industriall’s Contract and Agency Labour (CAL) 
project, started in 2003, was to build union capacity to respond to the growth of contract 
and agency labour at a time where there was a widespread belief among affiliates that 
atypical workers could not be organized. Over time, the project attempted to secure dia-
logue with multinational employers on their use of contract and agency labour and facili-
tate exchange between affiliates organizing in the same MNCs. The project involved 
research (ICEM, 2004) on the use of contract and agency labour in Industriall sectors, in 
response to the information deficit that existed at that time.
The CAL project allowed Industriall to carry out important union building activities 
in developing and transition economies, including Colombia (Cotton and Royle, 2014), 
a country with high political significance for the GUFs. Industriall has strong solidaristic 
links with its affiliates in Colombia built since the mid-1990s through trade union educa-
tion programmes funded by the Swedish trade unions. These educational projects had 
allowed ICEM affiliates in Colombia to create awareness within their memberships 
about the moral and strategic importance of taking a ‘field enlarging’ (Wever, 1998) 
attitude towards organizing contract and agency workers. Led by the mining union 
Sintracarbon, despite operating in a hostile union environment affiliates adopted a policy 
of organizing contract and agency workers and establishing dialogue with key multina-
tional user enterprises.
The exchange of experience and strategies between Industriall affiliates was signifi-
cant in providing viable strategies to do this, in particular the successful organizing expe-
rience of the Peruvian mining union, the Federation of Mining, Metal, Iron and Steel 
Workers of Peru (FNTMMSP). As a result, Sintracarbon has been able to organize con-
tract and agency workers in six companies operating in the Cerrejón mine, something 
that would not have been possible without this articulation between international and 
national unions. This example highlights the important capacity building work that is 
needed to make use of international regulation by unions in developing countries and the 
unique role of the GUFs in facilitating this.
Turning to the PrEAs, the drive for international regulation is primarily market-led 
(Bartley, 2007). PrEAs have, understandably, been active in building a corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) agenda to promote a distinction between their operations and the 
worst forms of exploitation of agency workers (ILO, 2009c). The major user enterprises 
of agency labour are also MNCs, themselves keen to raise their capacities to manage 
often complex global supply chains involving large-scale use of TAW (Mitlacher and 
Burgess, 2007). Although the social impact of the growth in TAW is contested (Doogan, 
2001; Standing, 2011) social attitudes towards PrEAs are a growing area of concern for 
user enterprises. As the major PrEAs look to expand their markets into Eastern Europe, 
Latin America and Asia, they are keen to establish friendly relations with national and 
international trade unions that are well represented in these countries in a way that they 
currently are not (Randstad, 2010a, 2010b). A big part of the PrEAs’ CSR agenda has 
been the relaunch and development of the international and European employers’ 
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associations, CIETT and EuroCIETT, and their own codes of conduct over the last eight 
years. The PrEAs have also actively participated in dialogue within the ILO, attending 
events and campaigning for the ratification of C181 as well as securing a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) with Union Network International (UNI), the GUF represent-
ing unions in the service sectors (ILO, 2009c).
It is important to note here that Randstad, the Dutch MNC and the second largest 
PrEA in the world, is a major driving force in the development of both EuroCIETT and 
CIETT, particularly the work of Annemarie Muntz, Director of Group Public Affairs of 
Randstad and President of EuroCIETT and Fred Van Haasteren, CIETT President and 
Executive Vice President of Social and General Affairs of Randstad. This may in part 
reflect the Dutch employment relations culture (De Jong et al., 2007) facilitating a rela-
tive openness to international standards and dialogue with the GUFs.
Despite their CSR activities, the problem remains for the PrEAs of how to secure 
dialogue with the GUFs. This problem relates to two critical events, the first involving 
the signing of an MoU between CIETT and UNI in 2008. Despite inclusion of the core 
labour standards and a commitment to promote international negotiations, quite unex-
pectedly for an agreement signed by a GUF it commits the signatories to remove legal 
and administrative barriers to TAW. Additionally the MoU represents a strategic error 
because temporary agency workers operate across all sectors such that the exclusion of 
all the other GUFs radically undermines both the regulatory scope and implementation 
of the agreement (Hale, 2008; Stoker, 1998). In addition, the MoU has created a degree 
of embarrassment and bad feeling within the GUFs, working both as a block to securing 
broader international agreement, and raising doubts as to the real commitment of CIETT 
corporate members to engage with the GUFs (Rossman, 2013).
There also exists a regulatory deadlock at the level of the ILO due to the breakdown 
of dialogue between the GUFs and the PrEAs through the Tripartite Global Dialogue 
Forum on the Role of Private Employment Agencies in Promoting Decent Work and 
Improving the Functioning of Labour Markets in Private Services. Despite initial partici-
pation in the forum, set up by the ILO in 2009 to promote international dialogue and 
regulation of TAW, the most recent forum held in October 2011 did not reach any points 
of consensus or future action. This is in part explained by the forum’s attempts to secure 
political agreement about the role of TAW in economic development and create a secto-
ral approach to TAW, thus creating a ‘sectoral straitjacket’ for dialogue. Adopting a sec-
toral approach to TAW is one that CIETT is keen to maintain as it provides members with 
a sectoral identity that, they believe, offers some degree of competitive advantage with 
user enterprises and the ILO. However, this sectoral approach has, like the CIETT/UNI 
MoU, effectively restricted partnership to a small number of organizations resulting in 
limited regulatory scope.
This has left the PrEAs and the GUFs with both political and strategic problems of 
how to get out of this deadlock and initiate meaningful international partnership.
Discussion
Partnership between the GUFs and PrEAs threatens significant distributive and political 
risks to both sides (Martinez Lucio and Stuart, 2005). Distributive risks include material 
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and environmental costs such as the impact of increased flexibility on work intensifica-
tion and conditions. Political risks include organizational practices and legitimacy, par-
ticularly heightened in the case of the GUFs with diverse memberships. However, 
increased occupational and societal precarity has become a factor in shaping our atti-
tudes and expectations of work security (Doogan, 2009) such that the risks for trade 
unions not addressing the working conditions of temporary agency workers potentially 
become greater than the risks of adaptation including partnership with PrEAs.
One of the key obstacles to partnership relates to the mutuality of business interests 
where trade unions often have a clear preference for permanent and direct employment 
and do not support the growth of PrEAs. Given this fundamental difference of position, 
only limited partnership between the PrEAs and GUFs can realistically be established. 
Two proposed models for partnership are ‘transitional’ and ‘coerced’ partnerships 
(Martinez Lucio and Stuart, 2005) which focus on specific risks and challenges rather 
than address underlying or political differences. These models offer pragmatic and 
important mutual gains but leave the political conflict between GUFs and PrEAs intact. 
These partnerships are characterized as being leadership driven in that they may attempt 
to control dissent rather than offer a fully dialogic model and therefore a compromised 
model of partnership.
The argument of this article is that TPLR mechanisms offer a way for GUFs to estab-
lish such partnerships with PrEAs on either a transitional or coercive basis. TPLR offers 
a way of opening up negotiations with multinational employers in developing countries 
where local trade union capacity and leverage does not exist. Furthermore these mecha-
nisms provide a realistic basis for partnership because they offer gains for both sides and 
processes that are regarded as fair and pragmatic (Cooke, 1990).
The first model of TPLR that we can draw on is International Framework Agreements 
(IFAs). With over 80 signed IFAs to date they offer an established and therefore transpar-
ent way for PrEAs and GUFs to structure their partnerships. Their content can be consid-
ered ‘fair’ by both sides as it is based on accepted minimum standards that the PrEAs and 
the GUFs have individually signed up to through their existing activities. This means that 
the principles included in IFAs do not pose any political risk to the PrEAs or the GUFs.
A key advantage of an IFA is that it offers an efficient way for PrEAs to reach agree-
ment with a number of GUFs. Co-signed IFAs exist – GDF Suez, UMICORE, Lafarge 
and EDF – which raises the possibility of securing an IFA across a wider group of GUFs, 
something required to overcome the current ‘sectoral straitjacket’. This again increases 
the benefits of using an IFA because it allows individual PrEAs to secure partnership 
with a wider number of GUFs than has so far been possible thus increasing legitimacy. 
The mutual gains of an IFA are that PrEAs can boast an inclusive model of partnership 
with their international counterparts and for GUFs the first signed agreement on mini-
mum standards and trade union rights for TAW.
A second, more involved model of TPLR is an industry-level agreement, certifica-
tion and inspection system administered by the International Transport Workers’ 
Federation (ITF) in the shipping sector. This system, in partnership with the interna-
tional sectoral employers’ organizations, the International Maritime Employers’ 
Committee (IMEC) and the International Shipping Federation (ISF), sets both wages 
and conditions for seafarers making it the only genuinely international collective 
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bargaining agreement in existence (Koch-Baumgarten, 1998). The system is well 
funded by ship owners who join the scheme, providing one of the few examples of 
adequately resourced monitoring of an international agreement. This agreement came 
about because ITF affiliates delegated responsibility for negotiating with employers to 
the ITF, because of low density in labour providing countries (Anner et al., 2006). The 
shipping sector has specific characteristics, but ones that it shares with TAW in that 
both have workers that are largely unorganized and work in locations not managed by 
their employers. This means that there is a similar regulatory deficit at the level of the 
workplace that could, potentially, be addressed through a derogation of organizing and 
bargaining power to the international level.
As with IFAs, because of the credibility of this partnership model it scores highly 
on transparency and efficiency. The gains for PrEAs relate to an industry standard’s 
ability to secure clear market differentiation between those companies with a commit-
ment to minimum standards, something that poses a distributive risk to PrEAs in the 
current economic climate. For GUFs the gains could be the establishment of a 
resourced system of inspection and monitoring of working conditions of temporary 
agency workers, something that has never been achieved outside of Western Europe. 
One question about this model of partnership is whether a sufficient number of PrEAs, 
CIETT and the GUFs would agree to participate. Some of the other GUFs have expe-
rience of industry initiatives and agreements, including mining, chemicals, tobacco 
and cocoa, however these have previously been single GUF initiatives. Additionally, 
the buy-in of the PrEAs would be influenced by the willingness of CIETT and its 
corporate members to engage in an initiative that was not restricted to partnership 
with service sector unions, something which they have to date been reluctant to do 
(ACTRAV, 2011).
A third and final entry point into partnership could be to establish dialogue 
between PrEAs, CIETT and the global unions through the Council of Global Unions. 
The GUFs have a long history of cooperation and relationships are generally solidar-
istic but with institutional coordination through the International Trade Union 
Confederation (ITUC) being difficult (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2000). In response to 
this problem of coordination, in 2006 the Council of Global Unions was formed, 
with an experienced international trade unionist, Jim Baker, as Coordinator. This 
represented an attempt to find a practical way for the GUFs to coordinate their work 
without having continually to address the thorny question of the ITUC’s role vis-a-
vis the GUFs. The Council is not a structure as such and is not heavily resourced, but 
it has coordinated an agreement on the Global Union Principles on Temporary Work 
Agencies (2010), the first joint GUF position on TAW. In the first section there is a 
political statement that the primary form of employment should be permanent, open-
ended and direct, and more substantive principles including the right to have a writ-
ten contract of employment, state regulation of PrEAs and protections for migrant 
workers. The principles include an important articulation of the ILO’s core conven-
tions of freedom of association and right to collective bargaining that require agency 
workers should have the right both to join a union and also be part of the same bar-
gaining unit as the direct employees of the user enterprise where they are working. 
This is an insistence on the right to collective bargaining with the user enterprise, 
 by guest on January 10, 2015wes.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Cotton 13
rather than just the agency that employs them. This is the key issue of tension con-
cerning the principles between CIETT and the GUFs. However, there remains sig-
nificant consensus on the main body of the principles and therefore some potential 
for common ground (Demaret, 2013).
The advantage of PrEAs entering into dialogue with the GUFs through their own 
principles and the Council of Global Unions is that it is a pragmatic response to a highly 
complex institutional context. The GUFs have struggled to reach consensus on the issue 
of TAW and the principles are the most advanced formulation of common ground so far. 
Much of the difficult work of establishing a basis for dialogue between the GUFs has 
now been done through the Council, offering PrEAs a potentially efficient way to initiate 
partnership with all of the GUFs.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to address the regulatory deficit of TAW and the current dead-
lock in international negotiations between the PrEAs and the GUFs. Using Martinez 
Lucio and Stuart’s ‘transitional’ and ‘coerced’ partnerships it has been argued that a 
limited model of partnership could offer important gains to both sides while at the same 
time managing the political and distributive risks involved. Furthermore, partnership 
could be structured using established TPLR mechanisms already used by the GUFs. This 
article has presented three possible entry points for partnership between PrEAs and the 
GUFs. These are to secure a multi-GUF IFA, establishing an industry standard co- 
administered with the GUFs and a less structured option of entering into dialogue with 
the GUFs through the Council of Global Unions and the Global Union Principles on 
Temporary Work Agencies.
Owing to the minimum human rights basis of these mechanisms, they also pro-
vide a TPLR framework for partnership with sufficient elasticity to allow for global 
unions and employers to enter into partnership without having to secure political 
agreement. As a result, the political risks to partnership are reduced, offering a 
pragmatic although compromised model of partnership. Additionally it has been 
argued that partnership offers concrete gains to both parties; namely the potential 
for PrEAs to secure competitive advantage through minimum standards for tempo-
rary agency workers, principally in developing countries where their markets are 
growing. For the GUFs and their affiliates partnership could secure minimum stand-
ards for temporary agency workers as well as ‘field enlarging’ strategies for trade 
union organizations.
The proposals are made in part because they are mechanisms that already exist, pro-
viding some established TPLR frameworks within which international dialogue between 
unions and employers could take place. This could not only break the current regulatory 
deadlock but potentially secure minimum standards within a relatively short time frame, 
thus addressing the ‘temporal asymmetry’ of the slow process of international regulation 
of a fast developing form of externalized labour. These three approaches are not mutually 
exclusive, nor do they offer a comprehensive solution to the political and operational 
problems of international regulation. Rather, the aim has been to offer entry points for 
partnership between PrEAs and the GUFs.
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Transnational Organizing: A Case Study
of ContractWorkers in the Colombian
Mining Industry
Elizabeth Cotton and Tony Royle
Abstract
This article examines recent organizing successes in the Carbones del Cerrejón
coal mine, reversing the organizational crisis of the Colombian mining union,
Sintracarbon. Using Wever’s concept of ‘field-enlarging strategies’, we argue
that these events were facilitated by the dissemination of organizing experiences
between affiliates of a Global Union Federation, International Federation of
Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions (ICEM), which
recently merged to form IndustriALL. Additionally, we argue that this articu-
lation between international and national unions, based on the principle of
subsidiarity, was facilitated through sustained ICEM educational project activ-
ity, providing multiple entry points for Sintracarbon to operationalize its strat-
egy and re-establish bargaining with multinational employers.
1. Introduction
The Carbones del Cerrejón mine is the largest opencast coal mine in the
world, situated in the northern state of La Guajira, Colombia. It is jointly
owned by AngloAmerican, BHP Billiton and Xstrata (previously Glencore),
operating under local Cerrejón management. The mine has its own transpor-
tation links to Puerto Bolivar from which coal is exported to Europe and the
USA. The mine is profitable, representing 50 per cent of Colombia’s coal
sector, with a national plan for increasing extraction of this valuable low-
carbon coal.
Sintracarbon is the largest coal mining union in Colombia, representing
over four thousand workers in the Cerrejón mine. The relationship between
Sintracarbon, previously Sintraintercor, and Cerrejón management has a
long history, from the initial establishment of the mine under state ownership
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(Intercor) to its current ownership structure. Despite these changes, there
has been a consistency of personnel, and many of the relationships between
Sintracarbon and Cerrejón management have been in existence for over 15
years. The make-up of the management and senior personnel of the company
has remained relatively consistent throughout the privatization process
including human resources, medical staff and technical heads of department.
Until 2007, as in most sectors in Colombia, collective bargaining had essen-
tially atrophied at the mine, and there was an increasing pressure on Sintra-
carbon to find ways to re-open negotiations with management in order to
deliver concrete benefits to members and consequently to maintain existing
membership levels.
Sintracarbon was one of the first Colombian unions to affiliate to a Global
Union Federation (GUF), affiliating to the International Federation of
Miners and then, following merger, the International Federation of Chemi-
cal, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions (ICEM) in the late 1990s.
More recently in June 2012, ICEM merged with the International Metal-
workers’ Federation, and the International Textile, Garment and Leather
Worker’s Federation to form IndustriALL, with a membership of over 50
million workers.
The foundations of ICEM’s work with Sintracarbon were educational and
institutional, with Sintracarbon leadership holding an important and active
role on ICEM’s regional and international executives from the time of their
affiliation in 1997. In 2005, as part of a global campaign on contract and
agency labour, ICEM commissioned a research report into the situation of
contract workers in Colombia. At that time, there was no data available from
the unions or government sources nor any evidence of existing union strate-
gies around organizing contract workers. Within two months, ICEM’s
research revealed that contractors employed 56 per cent of workers in the
electric power sector, 45 per cent in the glass sector, 47 per cent in the paper
sector and 27 per cent in the oil sector. Contrary to previous estimates, it
became clear that of the 8,400 workers in the Cerrejón mine, approximately
3,900 were contract workers, with an estimated 343 small contractors as well
as 18 large contractors providing the main bulk of labour and services. It was
also revealed that contract miners for these companies were paid on average
US$250 per month, compared with the average US$600–800 paid to directly
employed miners at the Cerrejón mine.
This was also reflected in the initial difficulties associated with defining
contract workers, at that time contract workers were commonly referred to as
‘contratistas’, denoting anyone working indirectly in the mine. The difficulty
of using this term was that it is the same word that is used for the contractor
companies providing services to principal companies. The term ‘contratista’
in Latin America includes labour agencies and service providers such as
cooperatives. In order to distinguish the companies from the people that
work for them, during the research process, alternative terms were developed
to describe the different actors and processes involved. This led to the
adoption by ICEM affiliates of the term ‘trabajadores tercerizados’ for the
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contract workers and ‘tercerizacion’, or ‘third-party contracting’ for the
process of contracting out, terms which are now more broadly used in
Colombia and internationally.
Given the scale and complexity of the contracting system in the Cerrejón
mine, concerns were raised by union leadership about the viability of orga-
nizing these contract workers. Although rarely documented, the reality is that
the extractive industries in Colombia are often associated with criminal and
paramilitary activity; with the political and social insecurity in La Guajira
allowing such groups to undertake economic activity unchallenged. One of
the key ways for criminal groups to extract income from the community is
to target the unions, despite their having only modest incomes due to low
subscription rates, Columbian trade union leaders are often subject to the
additional threat of extortion or ‘taxes’ (sometimes referred to as vacuna or
vaccinations by paramilitary groups). Nevertheless, although all unions in
the mining sector are subject to periodic attempts by both paramilitaries and
guerrillas to influence union organization and activity, during the period of
this case study, Sintracarbon maintained its organizational integrity and was
not infiltrated by any group. This may explain the consistent re-emergence of
threats made to Sintracarbon leadership from both paramilitary and guerrilla
groups during collective bargaining and organizing drives.
Despite these legitimate concerns about entering into a complex and new
area of organizing, what followed was a sustained campaign by Sintracarbon
from 2006 to organize contract workers. Although the situation remains
fragile, Sintracarbon has, up to 2011, successfully organized contract workers
in six companies, through direct membership and through the creation of
new enterprise level trade unions as illustrated in Table 1.
In addition to recruitment, Sintracarbon has engaged with management
in negotiations on behalf of contract workers. Following sustained union
organizing activity carried out during the period of this study, collective
TABLE 1
Organized Contract Workers in Cerrejón
Company Number of
employees
Union created Number of
union members
CBA
achieved
Masa 750 Separate union Sintramasa 365 Yes
Sotrans 500 Separate union Sintrans supported
by Sintracarbon to secure CBA
Unconfirmed No
Aseocolba 422 Direct membership to
Sintracarbon
100 No
Chaneme 261 Separate union Sintrachaneme
currently in arbitration
60 No
Aramark 207 Separate union Sinatrainal with
signed CBA
200 Yes
Eproqmecanica 60 Direct membership to
Sintracarbon
Unconfirmed No
Source: ICEM Colombia Seminar report 2011.
CBA, collective bargaining agreement.
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bargaining was re-established in 2007. In 2008, Sintracarbon began to include
specific demands on wages and working conditions on behalf of contract
workers. In 2009, Sintracarbon was able to secure the first mining sector
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which included promotions for 180
contract workers to permanent contracts as well as an agreement on the right
for contract workers to affiliate directly to Sintracarbon. Specific provisions
for contract workers have been secured in the subsequent CBA signed in
2011, negotiated with the mediation of the Colombian Vice President and
Vice Minister of Labour Relations.
This campaign raised national awareness and a commitment to tackling
contract work on the part of the Colombian Unions. In July 2011, 60 Colom-
bian trade unions, spearheaded by the ICEM’s affiliates, made a national
declaration against contract labour demanding that multinational enterprises
and the Colombian government ensure all contractors respect national law
and basic human rights. The Colombian trade unions demanded that the
Government establish a signed agreement with all companies operating in
Colombia to secure Freedom of Association. This included a specific refer-
ence to contractors, the creation of a tripartite committee including the
GUFs and the International Trade Union Confederation, and the establish-
ment of a national programme to eliminate contract work.
The purpose of this article is to analyse these developments, in particular
how Sintracarbon was able to make these profound political and organiza-
tional changes, given the lack of indigenous experience and evidence for
union instrumentality in the case of contract workers. First, we argue
that Sintracarbon was able to adopt a ‘field-enlarging strategy’ (Wever 1998)
based on the injustices experienced by both contract workers and the mining
community. This was achieved by promoting the social value of organizing
among contract workers and more broadly within the Colombian trade
union movement. Second, we argue that this strategy to organize contract
workers emerged largely due to Sintracarbon’s position within the interna-
tional trade union movement and its affiliation to ICEM. ICEM facilitated
the diffusion of organizing strategies while building Sintracarbon’s confi-
dence that this strategy could provide significant leverage with both employ-
ees and employers. That is, this international exchange increased both the
supply and demand for strategies to organize contract workers and in so
doing allowed for a shift in Sintracarbon’s political focus, away from the risk
involved in union organizing activity towards successfully managing signifi-
cant organizational change.
Additionally, we argue that ICEM’s sustained and multi-stage project
activity allowed for effective articulation between local and international
trade union structures, based on the principle of subsidiarity, allowing for
exchange of ideas and experience between affiliates (Cotton and Gumbrell-
McCormick 2012; Croucher and Cotton 2008).
The next section introduces our theoretical framework followed by a
section which contextualizes the employment relations situation in Colom-
bia. Section 4 outlines the central case study of Sintracarbon’s activities
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coordinated through ICEM. The final section provides an analysis of the case
study in which we suggest that the organizing successes of Sintracarbon were
stimulated by the international exchange of ideas facilitated through their
membership of ICEM.
2. Framework for institutional change
National and global trade unions are founded on the idea of solidarity, the
principle of common action with others and the identification of one’s own
interests with theirs (Hyman 1999; Zoll 1996). For the affiliates of the GUFs, this
translates into a commitment to support other members in response to conflicts
with employers, motivated by both a sense of solidarity and also ‘enlightened
self-interest’ (Collier 2008: 247; Logue 1980; Ramsay 1997) such that an injury
to one is understood as an injury to all. For unions in hostile organizing
environments, an appeal to international solidarity via the GUFs can be an
effective way to increase leverage with employers, by mobilizing international
solidarity action and intervention at the multilateral level. This can be particu-
larly effective with multinational corporations (MNCs) headquartered in
OECD countries where stronger unions are often located, the majority of whom
are affiliated to the GUFs, thus providing a potentially important entry point
into dialogue with international employers for the many unions that do not have
this capacity at local level (Croucher and Cotton 2008).
The organizing principle of the GUFs is that of subsidiarity (Cotton and
Gumbrell-McCormick 2012; Marleau 2006), such that the main institutional
power of these international bodies resides in local affiliates or regional
structures with the central body providing a framework setting, coordinating
and monitoring function. The principle of subsidiarity is also an ‘articulating
device’ (Marleau 2006) between local and international levels providing a
unique networking opportunity for trade unions and facilitating interna-
tional exchange across geographical regions, union traditions and sectors.
Within the GUFs, this idea of subsidiarity matches closely the doctrine of
solidarism, a principle of social organization where individual and collective
interests are interdependent and form a dialectical relationship. Marleau
(2006) argues that this principle forms the basis for international regulation,
standards and the work of international labour organizations. Further, that
the generalized nature of the principles forms the basis of the obligation
between GUF affiliates, one which is both durable and elastic (Cotton and
Gumbrell-McCormick 2012). The principles of subsidiarity provide an ‘indi-
visibility’, in that they are not based on any particular set of interests and
therefore exist and survive beyond particular circumstances.
This is a unique and valuable resource for trade unions, the majority of
which are confronted with membership and financial decline and the urgent
need to adopt new strategies and activities (Aviles 2009; Bendiner 1987;
Theron 2005), often framed as union renewal (Brehens et al. 2004; Heery
et al. 2004; Kelly and Badigannavar 2004; Kelly and Willman 2004).
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Much of the contact with affiliates of the GUFs is carried out through a
framework of educational projects. The education methods used in trade
union projects are based on participatory education principles and structured
in self-organized and directed study circles, influenced by German and Scan-
dinavian workers’ education and the work of Paulo Freire (1970) in Latin
America. These education methods emphasize equality, participation and
problem solving (Croucher and Cotton 2008; Khaliy 2005) and promote both
activism and organizing (Carter and Cooper 2002). GUF projects involve
those affiliates that fund and support educational projects (particularly from
the Netherlands and the Nordic countries), and those in the developing world
that work in partnership with them. This is a distinct and important group
within the GUFs, not just because of their intense and involved work together,
but also because of the political impact of carrying out workers’ education and
the relationships it engenders. This ‘small group’ cooperation (Olmsted 1959)
is based on progressive and politically important educational principles pro-
viding crucial socialization between unions on an international basis. It can be
argued therefore that membership of a GUF can bring important benefits to
affiliates as this allows for affiliated trade unions to be exposed to a broader
range of experience and strategies, particularly for isolated unions in hostile
environments, such as Colombia (Croucher and Cotton 2008).
Wever’s work on organizational strategy is relevant here in that it tries to
understand how trade unions come to adopt ‘field-enlarging’ strategies (Wever
1998: 392) by exploiting the social value of taking on new areas of work or
memberships outside of traditional employment relations systems. Looking
specifically at organizing in the USA, Wever (1998) examines union responses
to profound changes in employment relations, specifically the externalization
of the employment relationship and identifies three main strategies. The first
two are more traditional clusters of responses focused around adding value to
the production process and facilitating workplace flexibility, both strategies
are characteristic of Western European trade unions. The third strategy she
identifies, more typical in the US context, is to address market failures and
subsequent social problems, such as housing, health and education. She argues
that this latter strategy involves organizing around broad social issues, in
order to attract and recruit new and typically vulnerable groups of workers,
such as recent campaigns by the service workers union SEIU and the state,
county and municipal workers union AFSCME. Despite the evident difficul-
ties of taking on new areas of work, Wever (1998) argues that where social
value can be identified and used to mobilize support, it can lead to membership
gains and increased leverage with employers.
Additionally, Wever (1998) draws our attention to the instability of
organizing strategies, which focus on the ‘micro-level’, on the relationship
between management and workers in a specific workplace. Such strategies
are unstable because of the reliance on local management attitudes towards
organizing, which is commonly one of ‘sufferance’ rather than one which is
based on a more solid commonality of interests. She argues that successful
organizing campaigns are community-based, focusing on broader social
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issues that the campaign attempts to address, and also taking a long-term
approach, necessary to build up relationships of trust with those communi-
ties. This organizing approach has resonance with the experience of Sintra-
carbon where the situation of contract workers in a mining community was
already understood as a community issue and one which touched on impor-
tant social issues such as fairness and ‘public goods’ (Wever 1998: 399) such
as health and safety within the mine.
Additionally, the significance of Sintracarbon’s affiliation to ICEM in
developing ideas about how to enter into this new area of organizing should
not be underestimated. Wever (1998) raises an important inhibitor for devel-
oping an organizing strategy, namely how to carry out collective action (Olson
1965) among a wider group of social actors and in new organizing terrain
(Gallagher and McLean Parks 2001). In this article, we argue that the
exchange of successful strategies among trade unions through ICEM’s
network was a crucial factor in Sintracarbon’s subsequent successes following
a long period of decline. Weyland’s (2008) argument about organizational
change is also useful here in understanding the impact of Sintracarbon’s
international exposure as it provides the concept of a ‘viable solution’.
Weyland argues that the existence of a ‘viable solution’ is required to overcome
the organizational resistance to change, principally on the part of existing
leadership, allowing a shift in political attention from organizational decline to
future growth. It is here that external linkages are key as both the supply and
demand of institutional change are increased by the ‘diffusion’ of ideas that
takes place within international networks, and we would argue that this
includes the global networks that comes through affiliation to the GUFs
(Herod 2001).
In section 4, we look in detail at what alternative strategies were supplied
to Sintracarbon, through long-term engagement in ICEM education projects
and networking with other affiliated unions.
3. Research methods
The data for this article is based on the research and project documents
prepared by one of the authors in her capacity as ICEM Head of Education
during the period 1999–2007. The documents include project applications
and annual plans, internal seminar reports, quarterly project reports, which
provided baseline data such as union membership figures, organizational
changes and results of education methods training for all of the educational
projects referred to in the article. Other documentation includes external
impact evaluations carried out by funding and partner bodies (LO-TCO
Biståndsnämnd, Metall and IF Metall), dedicated research carried out in
2005 relating to the situation of contract workers in ICEM sectors, ICEM
Colombia electronic bulletins, and ICEM Contract and Agency Labour
(CAL) Project seminar reports and online updates. Supplementary interviews
were carried out by email with Sintracarbon General Secretary and executive
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members and the ICEM Colombia project coordinator during 2008–2012 to
update information about the organizing of contract workers.
4. Employment relations context
Despite a large body of solidaristic and human rights work in Colombia, the
human rights situation remains extremely difficult (Frühling 2003; UN Com-
mission on Human Rights 2005; United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights 2004, 2005). Recent positive developments include Ley 1309
(2007), which extends the prosecution period to 30 years for trade union
victimization and specifies prison sentences for murder, disappearances, kid-
nappings and for threats against trade union members and representatives. A
dedicated prosecution unit has been established for trade union victimiza-
tion, with some indications of an increase in prosecutions. In 2008, the
International Labour Organization (ILO) established an official representa-
tion in Colombia, unusually late given the level of complaints submitted
against Colombia over the last 15 years for abuse of core labour standards
and human rights. These changes indicate an increased recognition of the
distinct human rights situation facing trade union activists in Colombia. It is
still routine for union negotiators to live in hiding during the negotiation
process as are threats, kidnappings and extortion of trade union leaders
operating outside of Bogota and in key sectors of oil, electricity and mining.
Labour flexibilization in Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s
(Pochmann 2009) involved decentralization of collective bargaining, pension
privatization and shrinking social protection. In response to the relatively
strong labour legislation in place, a key part of this strategy was to increase
the use of atypical or temporary contracts. Latin America saw an increase in
informality and an average 1 per cent growth between 1990 and 2003. The
Latin American poverty rate was 45 per cent in 1980 (ECLAC 2009) and
44 per cent in 2002 (Fraile 2009). According to the ILO, Colombia’s trans-
formation in terms of the decentralization of bargaining and the increase in
functional and wage flexibility is rated as substantial (ILO 2009). Colombia
has an estimated 5 per cent trade union density with only 1 per cent of the
workforce covered by a collective agreement, down from an estimated
15 per cent in the 1980s.
Colombia is a ‘truncated’ welfare state where the state is involved in
poverty relief and some measure of social insurance and redistribution and
with high levels of informality of work arrangements (Arango and Pachon
2004). A key factor in this informality, as with other Latin American coun-
tries, is the failure of governments to carry out redistribution and provide
public services (Saavedra and Tommasi 2007). This failure can be regarded as
systemic, linking low quality and uneven public services with low participa-
tion in social security systems and low enforcement of fiscal policies. This
failure of the social contract is indicated by Latin America‘s long history
of being the most unequal region in the world as measured by income
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distribution (ECLAC 2009). This can be formulated as ‘low tax morale’
(Saavedra and Tommasi 2007: 292), where there is no societal pressure to
participate in tax regimes and a strong incentive to work informally (ECLAC
2009). An estimated 22 per cent of economically active people in Colombia
are currently covered by social security.
The right to collective bargaining exists for private sector workers (Código
Sustantivo del Trabajo, Article 467 and Constitución Política de República de
Colombia, Article 55); a tripartite committee was established in 2007 to draft
legislation to allow public sector collective bargaining. Importantly, if the
length of a CBA is not stated then it is presumed to continue indefinitely for
successive six-month periods (Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, Article 477).
In order to initiate a new collective bargaining process, one or both of the
signatories have to submit a written request to renegotiate the agreement
within 60 days to the labour inspector. A core issue that Columbian unions
have faced for some time is the atrophy of collective bargaining. Each time
(normally every two years) that CBAs are due for renewal unions have to
make difficult decisions about their leverage with employers and their resil-
ience in the face of potential threats to the negotiating team. This is a painful
dilemma for all unions who on the one hand have to bargain for membership
in order to function and retain members, but on the other hand are faced with
often overwhelming difficulties in doing this without threat to life and work.
There are two further complicating factors that impact contract workers in
Colombia. The first relates to the rise of cooperatives in Colombia, and Latin
America more broadly (Pochmann 2009). In Colombia, small groups of 5–20
workers can set up associated organizations (Cooperativas de Trabajo Aso-
ciados) to carry out specific functions for companies. There were an estimated
3,000 cooperatives in place in 2007, covering an estimated 400,000 working
people. Because the members are self-managed, their terms and conditions
are not covered by the Labour Code (Ley 78 de 1988 and Código Sustantivo
del Trabajo, Articles 5 and 22). These cooperatives operate as contractors and
are often themselves involved in subcontracting. This form of employment
was introduced to encourage greater flexibility in employment contracts, but
has led to a further decline in union membership as the majority of coopera-
tives formed are as a result of restructuring and privatization in the public
sector. Importantly, the ILO’s committee on Freedom of Association in 2009
stated that creating such cooperatives led to the violation of the core con-
ventions on freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining
(ILO 2009).
The second important development in the Colombian context has been the
creation of a new form of organization called the union contract or Contrato
Sindical. This facility was set up in the early 2000s to allow unions to set up
labour agencies for their own members. The model created enormous dis-
agreement within the union movement, with most unions speaking openly
against it. However, this facility coincided with a profound process of priva-
tization, principally in the energy sectors (Sintraelecol 2001). Sintraelecol, the
key union in the electric power sector, did eventually, after much internal
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debate, establish a number of union contracts in an attempt to retain some of
its then 13,000 membership. Already by 2005, when the union contracts were
established, 7,000 members had been lost during the acquisition by Endessa
and Union Fenosa. On reflection, the union decided not to expand this
function, partly because of the internal conflict that it still generated, but also
because it did not, as had previously been hoped, allow the union to maintain
its membership levels.
Given the evident limitations of Colombian legislation in securing basic
rights, there is renewed interest in national certification and governmental
inspection systems as a way of regulating contract labour. In Latin America,
resources are being put into the enforcement of labour and employment laws,
with a doubling of inspectors in a wide range of Latin American countries
(Piore and Schrank 2008). These have included systems for monitoring the
practices of contractors such as in Peru and the creation of legislation relating
to contractors and service providers (Ley 27626 and Decreto Supremo No:
003–2002-TR). One argument in favour of this model is that it allows for
flexibility in compliance and the promotion of best practice.
5. International dissemination of union strategies
The relationship between Sintracarbon and ICEM has been consistently
mediated through educational projects, coordinated centrally through
ICEM’s Education and Programmes Officer working closely with ICEM’s
Colombia Project Coordinator and the ICEM Colombia Committee made
up of its affiliates. ICEM’s project work in Colombia has been funded and
actively supported primarily by the Swedish IFMetall (previously the metal
and mining union Metall) and LO TCO Biståndsnämnd, the international
development wing of the LO TCO national trade union centre and one of the
largest funders of GUF education activity.
Projects have moved through four overlapping stages, initially focusing on
health and safety in the mining sector, following the creation of the ILO’s
Convention 176 on mining safety (1995). From 1993, ICEM had been coor-
dinating a major Global Health and Safety Project, in Asia, Africa and Latin
America to establish occupational health structures in addition to campaign-
ing for ratification of the ILO’s 1995 mining safety convention 176. Because
of relatively low affiliation at that time, there were only two Latin American
affiliates involved in the project, Sintracarbon and the Peruvian mining
federation, Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Mineros, Metalúrigos y
Siderúrgicos del Perú (FNTMMSP), who quickly formed a close solidaristic
relationship. Through this programme, the Cerrejón mine introduced the
first occupational testing system at the Cerrejón mine and established the
union as a credible partner in health and safety. The project also helped to
create a good working relationship with company management and medical
staff. The doctor currently in charge of the Cerrejón medical facilities first
met the union through this programme and the relationships that were
formed have been maintained.
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By 2000, ICEM had six affiliates in Colombia, forming the ICEM Colom-
bia Committee with a full-time coordinator providing an important coordi-
nation point for unions in ICEM sectors and representing a consolidated and
active part of the national trade union centre, Central Unitaria de Trabaja-
dores de Colombia (CUT).
Project activity then moved into a prolonged period of trade union edu-
cation methods for its growing number of affiliates. A regular series of local
seminars, Semilleros de Lideres, were carried out linking new and experi-
enced trade unionists in local areas. These seminars are regarded by CUT
affiliates as instrumental in building a new generation of union leaders within
ICEM affiliates, with clear progression recorded through project evaluations
and participants now holding elected positions in their unions. Trade union
education methods were important because these helped to create a safe and
inclusive environment for trade unionists, a space which had previously not
existed. However, it is easy to romanticize the relationships between trade
unionists in such a hostile environment. In reality, most of the union leader-
ships experienced difficult internal relationships and lack of trust, particu-
larly during periods of crisis or industrial conflict, raising the importance of
the educational principles, which allowed open discussion without attack or
reprisals.
The ICEM project activity then moved on to a new phase of organizational
development and strategic management. This involved training and seminars
for union leaders specifically targeting issues such as recruitment, finances
and corruption. This was facilitated by the ICEM’s Head of Education
and Programmes using materials and activities designed specifically for the
context, but based on international trade union research. Although this
phase of the project was of relatively short duration, only 12 months, it gave
unions the opportunity to look beyond their profound organizational crises
and focus on the strategic options available to them based on experience
in other countries. What was particularly stark during this process was the
almost complete lack of motivation of union leadership to recruit new
members with the majority accepting their own decline. Tackling the issue of
contract workers was regarded as impossible, with some unions stating that
it was ‘illegal’ to organize them, in part because of the fear of reprisals
for attempting it, but also because of the lack of any previous successful
organizing experiences. This third phase of project activity provided a clear
assessment of the future organizational needs of affiliates, which acted as the
basis for the next stage of education.
In response to the atrophy of collective bargaining, the fourth phase of
ICEM’s educational work focused on establishing a formal process of dia-
logue with employers. This phase was initiated after a series of discussions
between ICEM and the Colombian affiliates at its 2003 Congress in Norway,
in an attempt to find a strategic programme that could capitalize on ICEM’s
leverage with multinational employers. The strategy was formulated to invite
those MNCs where the ICEM and its affiliates had some leverage at
headquarter level to enter into a process of social dialogue with ICEM’s
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Colombian affiliates, facilitated directly by ICEM. After a period of six
months of sustained contact with the senior central management of a number
of MNCs, the following social partners were identified (see Table 2).
The process involved quarterly meetings with employers and unions to
try to secure agreement and joint activities on core issues. Throughout the
process, each organization was asked to nominate a team of people to par-
ticipate and to continue participation regardless of any local disputes or
collective bargaining taking place. This was important to secure the process
of dialogue from the potential withdrawal of company management or
unions.
In the first phase of the process, it was agreed to focus on health and safety,
trade union security, and contract and agency labour. During 2004, meetings
were secured with the Ministry for Social Protection (MSP), with the then
minister and the human rights department working under him. It was the first
time that tripartite discussions had taken place on this level in Colombia, and
by 2005, discussions had been held to develop joint programmes on issues
such as HIV/AIDS and occupational health. Most importantly, the issue of
contract and agency labour was a consistent and core theme for dialogue
throughout this process. Although all six ICEM affiliates were active in social
dialogue process, Sintracarbon and Sintraelecol were the main drivers of
dialogue with employers because of their relative size and leverage with
employers.
Running parallel to these national activities, in 2003, ICEM started the
Global CAL Project, offering important opportunities for international
exchange between affiliates. The initial phase of the project aimed to address
TABLE 2
ICEM Social Dialogue Project Participants, 2004–2011
Companies Trade unions
Anglo American (UK) Sintracarbon (Coal)
BHP Billiton (Australia) Sintracarbon (Coal)
Xstrata (Switzerland) Sintracarbon (Coal)
Linde (Germany) Sintraquim (Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals)
Kapp (Germany) Sintraquim (Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals)
Codensa/Endesa (Spain) Sintraelecol (Electric Power)
Fenaltec (Electrical Engineers)
Union FENOSA (Spain) Sintraelecol (Electric Power)
Fenaltec (Electrical Engineers)
Owens Illinois (USA) Sintravidricol (Glass)
Smurfitt (Ireland) Sintracarcol (Paper and Cardboard)
SCA (Sweden) Sintracarcol (Paper and Cardboard)
Ross International Sintracarcol (Paper and Cardboard)
Votorantim (Brazil) Sintracarcol (Paper and Cardboard)
Drummond (USA) USO and Sintracarbon (Mining)
Repsol (Spain USO (Oil)
Petrobras (Brazil) USO (Oil)
Source: ICEM Social Dialogue Project reports 2004–2011.
ICEM, International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions.
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the lack of information about successful union strategies around contract
and agency labour by carrying out research. Through questionnaires, events
and interviews, evidence was gradually gathered showing that unions
were often engaged with organizing contract and agency labour workers,
with some significant successes (ICEM 2005). The project funded national,
regional and international networking events allowing diffusion of experi-
ence, particularly between unions from different regions that were at different
stages in casualization and privatization. The project involved awareness
raising and campaigning activities to address a widespread belief by ICEM
affiliates that contract and agency workers could not be organized.
The CAL project also allowed ICEM to coordinate solidarity action in
support of organizing drives and disputes, requiring a high degree of infor-
mation and coordination between ICEM and its affiliates (ICEM 2008).
Dedicated project staff were employed in each region, and a team of experi-
enced trade unionists from the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, the UK and
Norway was established to offer technical support to affiliates, including
advice on organizing campaigns and negotiations with employers.
As part of this project, specific research was carried out on the situation of
contract workers in Colombia, revealing poor health and safety conditions,
due to lack of health and safety information, training or equipment. The link
between the use of contractors and impacts on occupational health and safety
is relatively well researched (Barrett and Sargeant 2008; Quinlan and Bohle
2009; Quinlan et al. 2001), but this was the first time that data had been
collected at the Cerrejón mine which could then be used in discussions with
management. Legally, Cerrejón is responsible for the health and safety of any
workers contracted in their operations, and Cerrejón’s three investors
are well known for their commitment to mining health and safety, and the
findings of the research about the situation of contract workers appeared to
be a genuine concern for them.
The experience of the Peruvian mining union FNTMMSP was crucially
important to Sintracarbon’s subsequent strategy. As early as 2003,
FNTMMSP, with the support of ICEM’s full-time project coordinator,
started organizing contract workers which led to the establishment of the first
contract workers’ union in the mining sector for employees of the Shougang
company, and is called Sindicato de Obreros Mineros de Shougang Hierro
Perú y Anexos. As part of this organizing campaign, FNTMMSP carried out
joint inspection visits with governmental ministries, exploiting legislation
in Peru limiting the percentage of contract workers in any workplace. This
legislation placed some responsibilities on the Peruvian state to promote
implementation through which the union was able to establish joint inspec-
tions in the mines where they had membership. Through ICEM’s CAL
project, FNTMMSP disseminated its organizing successes, and the network-
ing events of the project allowed Sintracarbon to explore this experience
directly with them. On this basis, and using the existing MSP contacts made
through the social dialogue process, in 2007, Sintracarbon approached the
MSP with a proposal to carry out joint inspections of the contractors in the
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Cerrejón mine. Subsequently, joint visits were carried out to 18 of the largest
contractors, checking contracts of employment, payment of wages, and
health and safety provision. Following these visits, the MSP then wrote to
regional authorities and the directors of the contracting companies to for-
mally request remedial action. The MSP then committed to carry out formal
audits of all 18 contractors to monitor progress.
Importantly, the Carbones del Cerrejón team responsible for managing
contractors within the mine were involved in each of these audits, which
clearly established the company’s responsibilities to monitor the conditions
of contract workers. These audits resulted in a number of investigations into
working conditions instigated by the MSP, involving both contractors and
the local authority in La Guajira that holds responsibilities to monitor the
practices of local businesses. Following these audits, a series of meetings were
set up with Sintracarbon, MSP and Cerrejón management to look for solu-
tions to the management of contractors. During these discussions, the union
made explicit use of Article 122 of the Labour Code, which states that
employers have a legal responsibility to ensure the agreements with subcon-
tractors comply with national labour law. Cerrejón management responded
by committing to intervene in the case of any written notification of viola-
tions by contractors and establishing monthly meetings between contract
managers and contractors, as well as committing to ensure that the MSP’s
labour inspections would be a permanent feature in the mine.
Following this series of successful joint activities with the MSP and Cer-
rejón management, Sintracarbon made the decision to start a sustained cam-
paign to organize contract workers in the mine. This required an internal
campaign to persuade Sintracarbon leadership and members of the signifi-
cance of the recent joint activities and to build their confidence that gains
could be made by adopting this new strategy. It was important to have this
debate given the need to secure statutory and budgetary changes to enable
the direct affiliation of contractor workers to Sintracarbon, and the necessary
resources to carry out the organizing campaign. In the event, Sintracarbon
established a team of organizers made up of dedicated and experienced union
leaders including the union’s President, and a strategy to approach contract
workers where contact had been made through the research and inspection
activities in previous years. This allowed the team to build on many years of
formal and informal contact with the contract workers and helped to secure
relatively quick successes in the campaign, boosting the support for this new
strategy among Sintracarbon membership.
In 2009, Sintracarbon established the first contract workers union in the
mine, Sintrans, representing 150 contract workers employed by a transport
company Sotrans. By November of that year, Sintracheneme, a union rep-
resenting 300 mechanical maintenance workers for the company Chaneme,
was recognized and started to negotiate a CBA with the assistance of
Sintracarbon and CUT. On 21 February 2011, Sinailtrainal was formed
with 90 members from the food company Aramak, so that by the end of the
year, Sintracarbon had successfully organized over 800 workers within six
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contractors. Importantly, some of these workers decided to directly affiliate
to Sintracarbon while others established their own unions. Workers
who joined Sintracarbon directly were usually from smaller contractors
where they tended to have a weaker bargaining position with regard to their
employers. It was an explicit part of the organizing strategy that direct
membership to Sintracarbon offered contract workers increased leverage
with their employers because of the relative size of union membership.
Despite these rapid and important organizing successes, the subsequent
negotiations with the contracting companies’ management have been diffi-
cult. Sintrans made immediate demands for full-time permanent contracts
and wages and benefits in line with national minimal standards, but Sotrans
management refused to recognize the union or any of their demands. Fol-
lowing a petition, 33 workers, including the two union leaders, lost their jobs
when their fixed term contracts were not renewed. Despite the direct inter-
vention of ICEM and the President of the Alternative Democratic Pole (a
political alliance between two Colombian democratic parties), with Cerrejón
management, the union has been unable to secure either union recognition or
a CBA with Sotrans. Both Sintracheneme and Sinailtrainal have also failed
to secure collective bargaining with Chaneme and Aramak management,
despite following the legal petitioning process and having the full support of
Sintracarbon leadership. Throughout this period, Sintrachaneme’s members
and leadership came under considerable pressure from management to
leave the union, being subjected to ‘carrot and stick’ style intimidation, which
included managers visiting the homes of union leaders and making both
dismissal threats for those who would not comply and offers of perks to those
who would.
Despite the ongoing difficulties in securing protections for contract
workers, this organizing strategy has become integrated within Sintracar-
bon’s mainstream activities and the union continues to organize workers in
other contractors operating in the mine. In our final section, we draw out the
reasons for these developments, arguing that despite the mixed achievements,
the international dissemination of union experiences have been an important
driver and motivator for change.
6. Discussion and conclusion
Given the barriers to organizing in the Colombian context, the recruitment of
membership in six contracting companies and the establishment of CBAs in
some of these companies at the Cerrejón mine is significant, representing the
first sustained campaign to organize contract workers in Colombia. We have
argued, using Wever’s work on ‘field enlarging’ union strategies, that this
development came about because of the responding strategically to impor-
tant social problems, principally the health and safety within the mine, as well
issues of pay and conditions for contractors, establishing an organizing
strategy that appeals to broader social justice issues of health, security and
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fairness. Additionally, the campaign was relatively stable in that it did not
rely on ‘micro-level’ relationships with individual contractors, rather it made
use of long-term relationships within the mining community and within
ICEM. Furthermore, we suggest that the diffusion of strategies and actions
between ICEM’s affiliates, through campaigns and project activity, has been
an essential factor in establishing ‘viable solutions’ that were used in Sintra-
carbon’s organizing strategy.
An important aspect of this process was the establishment of a clear sense
of injustice about the treatment of contract workers, both within Sintracar-
bon’s membership and more broadly within the Colombian trade union
movement. Despite the complexity of the employment relations system in the
mine, by using the entry point of health and safety, the campaign was able to
establish that there was a serious and genuine problem, but also that it was
the responsibility of Cerrejón management to resolve it. This created both a
sense of injustice, a clear line of responsibility and attribution (Kelly 1997;
Kelly and Badigannavar 2004) establishing an acceptance within the union of
the moral importance of adopting a ‘field-enlarging’ strategy (Wever 1998)
which would include contract workers. Addressing the issues of contract
workers then became seen as an important social value within the union,
raising internal and external political support for the campaign.
The initial focus on health and safety also addressed a genuine problem
that contract workers faced, facilitating easier engagement with them as
well as potential membership benefits. Because of Sintracarbon’s health and
safety expertise developed through the ICEM’s Global Health and Safety
Project, they were regarded by the contract workers as instrumental in
improving working conditions, something that Sintracarbon had not been
able to show since collective bargaining had effectively broken down. The
health and safety focus was also strategically important in engaging Sintra-
carbon and Cerrejón management to take seriously the threat to safety in the
mine from unprotected contract workers. The process of carrying out health
and safety inspections involved in interviewing contract workers was highly
effective in encouraging them to talk to the union establishing a relatively
neutral basis for contact as well as changing the perception of Sintracarbon
as an exclusively permanent workers’ organization.
The strategy made use of existing health and safety legislation which places
a level of employer’s responsibility for the conditions of contract workers
onto Cerrejón management, facilitating an initial and legitimate engagement
with Cerrejón management. As with the contract workers, Sintracarbon’s
expertise gave it credibility with management, building on existing relation-
ships with medical and technical staff within the mine, formed during the
initial Global Health and Safety Project. These long-term relationships pro-
vided a level of stability to this new organizing campaign, and formed the
basis for re-establishing dialogue and, eventually, some collective bargaining
within the mine.
The re-establishment of dialogue with Carbones del Cerrejón manage-
ment, facilitated through ICEM’s Social Dialogue Project, allowed informal
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contact and exchange of ideas with Cerrejón management and an opportu-
nity to start discussions outside of the formal and routinely difficult negotia-
tion processes. Commissioning research on contract workers established
accurate data and a level of credibility in discussions with Cerrejón manage-
ment and the MSP, establishing important leverage by identifying the
potential risks from using contractors in the mine. This social dialogue was
established through ICEM and the leverage of its affiliates in the headquarter
countries of the MNCs involved and provided an important stability to
Sintracarbon’s work in that it focused on building robust relationships with
Cerrejón management rather than fragile ‘micro-level’ (Wever 1998) relation-
ships with the contractors operating within the mine. We have argued that
without this level of international coordination, a formalized dialogue at
senior level could not have been established in Colombia. In the case of
Sintracarbon, it led to the eventual re-establishment of collective bargaining
in 2007 enabling Sintracarbon to successfully negotiate terms and conditions
on behalf of contract workers, including their promotion to permanent
status. This confirmed its function as a trade union providing concrete ben-
efits to contract workers, which was an important step in building a belief in
the instrumentality of unionization.
The educational approach and methods used during the campaign were
also important, promoting self-confidence and providing a focus on concrete
problem-solving in the workplace. For Sintracarbon leadership, the methods
were important in the process of organizational change, facilitating a confi-
dent dialogue between Sintracarbon activists and leadership sufficient to
secure political and financial support to start organizing. Union leadership
and activists are highly aware of the personal risk they take in organizing
contract workers, and a difficult and long internal debate had to take place
before recruitment could start. A problem-solving orientation allowed union-
ists to step outside of existing ideological or organizational narratives and
focus on the practical steps of union organizing. This approach is particularly
powerful in an inward-looking and fragmented union context such as Colom-
bia, where the dominant narrative at the time was that the recruitment of
contract workers was impossible and that the primary function of a union
was to manage their own decline.
By 2009, Sintracarbon had been involved in over a decade of education
programmes and participation in ICEM’s international and regional struc-
tures, creating the basis for deep solidaristic relationships between Sintrac-
arbon leadership, ICEM and many of its affiliates. The high level of social
capital that had been developed was important in allowing for an articulation
and diffusion of ideas and experiences of organizing contract workers. The
exchange of experience and strategies between ICEM affiliates, through
the regional and international network events of the Global CAL Project,
encouraged Sintracarbon to look for possible strategies that they could
adopt in their own context. The experience of the Peruvian mining union
FNTMMSP in organizing contract workers and exploiting national inspec-
tion legislation was also vitally important in giving Sintracarbon a viable
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entry point into building links with the contract workers in a way that could
be seen to add real social value, and also establish a working relationship
based on partnership with the state and the company management. ICEM’s
articulation and leadership on the issue of contract work generated confi-
dence among affiliates and their membership that effective union organiza-
tion and interventions did exist (Cotton and Gumbrell-McCormick 2012;
Frege and Kelly 2004; Lillie and Martinez Lucio 2004). Furthermore, engag-
ing in ICEM’s campaigns and educational activities provided a concrete way
to operationalize them (Brehens et al. 2004; Heery and Adler 2004; Kelly
1997).
Our argument has been that these ‘field enlarging’ strategies (Wever 1998)
emerged from the linkages facilitated by the international affiliation of Sin-
tracarbon to ICEM. This model of articulation between international and
national trade structures is based on the principle of subsidiarity and repre-
sents an essential element of Sintracarbon’s capacity to organize contract
workers. In turn, Sintracarbon’s vital experience of organizing has been
successfully diffused within the Colombian trade union movement and
throughout ICEM’s membership, allowing for an ‘upwards’ transfer of this
significant experience of organizing contract workers in the Carbones del
Cerrejón mine.
Final version accepted on 12 March 2013.
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